NEW TRANSLATION

Schelling’s Late Political Philosophy: Lectures 22-24 of the
Presentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy

Translated by KYLA BRUFF

Translator’s Introduction

From approximately 1847 until the end of his life in 1854, Schelling wrote on a range of philosophical topics with the ultimate goal of explicating a purely rational philosophy, particularly as it relates to mythology, religion and revelation. The notes and fragments from this period were assembled by Schelling’s son, K.F.A. Schelling, in a collection of 24 lectures known as the Presentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy. While the importance of this work for the development of Schelling’s negative and positive philosophy is well-known, the significance of the political content which appears near the end of the lecture series has been largely ignored. This could be in part attributable to the heavy hand that K.F.A had in composing the final lecture of the series. Specifically, Lecture 24, in which Schelling gives his final word on the state and the monarchy, was written based on fragments but also on conversations that K.F.A. and his brother Hermann had had with their father.

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1 I would like to thank first and foremost Joseph Lawrence for his extensive editing and proofing of the final version of this translation. Christian Stadler, Benedikt Rottenecker, Petr Kocourek and Sean J. McGrath also kindly provided their assistance at various points in the translation process. I would additionally like to thank Claire Garland for typing out the ancient Greek, and last but not least, Iain Grant for allowing me to consult his translations of these lectures. I have extensively borrowed from the latter’s notes, and relied on his translations from and references to ancient Greek, to complete the translation of this text. A section of this translation (part of Lecture 22 and all of Lecture 23) was published previously in a reduced form in Daniel Whistler and Benjamin Berger (eds.), The Schelling Reader (London: Bloomsbury, 2020). All in-text pagination refers to SW XI.
Schelling’s late political program includes a minimal concept of a rationally structured state, characterized by the constitution and the legal system, that ought to serve the freedom of individuals. The state should foster—but not determine—individuals’ capacity to freely decide for themselves and to cultivate relationships. The state, Schelling is clear, is not the goal of history and cannot be perfected. Accordingly, the institutions and laws of any imperfect state, which ought to constantly be reformed, should not directly mediate our moral decisions and mutual relations. According to Schelling, the state, perhaps somewhat ironically, offers the individual the freedom to rise above it in the development of her personality, virtues and relationships.

Schelling’s concept of social responsibility is grounded in his concept of the person, which, Schelling notes in these lectures, should serve the whole. In a word, Schelling values relations between persons higher than relations between citizens, implying a qualitative distinction between the two. Schelling’s esteem for the notion of personality is furthermore integral to his defense of the existence of the monarchy in these lectures. While citizens have the freedom to develop their own laws and to self-govern (to an extent), the monarch, Schelling claims, is the person responsible to the people of the state and before whom all citizens are equal. As a person, he is also individually answerable to the divine. Despite this appraisal, Schelling is not advocating for an absolute monarchy. He rather supports a constitutional monarch, such as was already achieved in England and was developing at the time in Germany.

Ultimately, as persons, Schelling maintains that we do not find satisfaction, reconciliation, or love within the state’s borders. Social virtues, according to Schelling, are personal virtues through which we enter the “voluntary and therefore higher community” (SW XI: 541). This higher community is, for Schelling, a unified religious community to come. In this structure, the state can be seen as the ground of society, but it should not become synonymous with the free, voluntary, community, as the latter is not bound by the limitations of state borders or national identities and into which all human beings will eventually enter on their own free will. The “voluntary” should therefore be distinguished from the “involuntary” community, which, for Schelling, is the state. In espousing such a view of the state, Schelling accordingly critiques the idea that human beings could consent to an original social contract.

Our faith in the possibility of the existence of this type of free community in the future is embedded in the progressive, historical self-revelation of a personal God, i.e., a person who exists above the state who can recognize us in our personhood. Schelling’s late political philosophy thus explores the desire of human beings to move beyond the state politically and morally in her longing for justice in the form of the reconciliation of all of humanity (which, for Schelling, is linked to her longing for the recognition of a personal God). While the human condition prohibits us from achieving a perfectly just community without God, it does not prevent us from working towards it. Indeed, for Schelling, we are called by God to do so. In
his last work, Schelling thus presents an eschatological political philosophy, which demands a critique of the structural injustices of the present and an existential revitalizing of personal responsibility in the context of the fight for social justice.

Lecture 22

[516] We now return to the general context and ask: what does spirit do in the world? The first thing, as we said in reference to Prometheus, is that, pervading the world, it is knowing spirit. As such, spirit is not free and does not have its own will until what has intruded upon it [das ’Dazwischengetretene’] no longer stands opposed to it as something foreign. That to which our considerations are thus directed is the knowledge that refers to the world.

Already many, and particularly those who trace their roots back to Leibniz, have advanced the proposition that the sole immediate object of the soul (the one that mediates all others for it) is God. For the soul that is still thought of in its originary relation and as supramondane, we have affirmed the same thing, though in other terms. But we cannot say the same thing for the soul insofar as it is posited outside of this relation and drawn into the realm of the physical-material. To do so does nothing more than to prove how commonly, in our times, “God” and “that which is” [das Seyende] are taken to be fully identical. For, relating to the side of the soul that is turned to the world, we would rather say: the sole immediate object of the soul is what is [das Seyende], which is taken in the sense that has been sufficiently explained and established throughout these lectures. For the entire concept of the soul is: not to be what is, but to be that which is what is [nicht das Seyende, aber das es seyende zu seyn] (recall Aristotle’s considerations of [517] τί ᾖν εἶναι); the soul is nothing other than this; thus to wrest being from it is to wrest it from itself. Therefore we say that it cannot let go of what is, that is, as long as it itself is. Thus in whatever being that the soul is, each soul has its unmediated object, i.e., the object which mediates all others for it. The exterior object, with which the soul is in contact by means of the senses, changes the being to which the soul belongs. But insofar as the soul retains and reconstitutes the being that it is, even in change, the changed being corresponding to the object becomes objective [gegenständlich] to the soul. It awakens within the soul the representation of that which is foreign and external to it. Without such a reconstitution [Wiederherstellung], through which that which is foreign and posited in the soul is excluded, what Aristotle says cannot be explained: that in sensory perception there are pure images of things without their matter, images that

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2 See SW XI: 451, “For if the soul is not to be thought as independent of that to which it is related as soul, as what it is, but this is reduced to physical matter, then the soul, without thereby renouncing this relation to what it is, or towards immaterials, it cannot but follow it into the (contingently) material,” citation referenced and trans. Iain Grant, henceforth IG.
remain fixed in the sense organs even after the removal of their objects.5 Without this reconstitution, what Aristotle goes on to say would be even less comprehensible: that, in sensible things, we actually see the intelligible within them.4 To be sure, sensation [Empfindung] (perception) is sensation (perception) of the particular [des Einzelnen] as such, for example, this human (Callias). The representation, however, is not itself this particular, but its universal, its universal image or Phantasma [Phantasma].5 After that, Aristotle firstly concludes that: perception for itself corresponds to mere saying and thinking—and the meaning of these expressions for him was shown above.6 The accompanying feeling of the pleasant [518] and unpleasant, however, has assertion or negation” as a consequence, in which sense even the animal soul judges.8

3 Aristotle, De Anima, II.12, 432a5 (precise section numbers provided by IG): ἡ μὲν αἰσθήσις ἔστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐιδῶν ἄνευ τῆς διής (ἐκεῖνον ἀειδῆς ἐνεύος θαν ἄδεξις) (that which is receptive of the form of sensible objects without matter [trans. IG]). Also Aristotle, De Anima, III.2, 425b24-5, with the supplement: “διὸ καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν αἱ φαστασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητήριοις” (This is why even when the objects of perception are gone, sensations and mental images are still present in the sense organ, [trans. IG]). Compare with that which is said of the physical in the process of thought in SW XI, 450 [note IG].

4 Aristotle, De Anima, III.8: Ἐν τοῖς ἔδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητὰ ἐστὶ (En tois eidesi tois aisthetois ta noeita estin) (the objects of thought reside in the sensible forms [trans. IG]). Aristotle, De Anima, III.7, 431b2-3: τὰ μὲν ἡδὴ τὸ νοητικὸν (τῆς ψυχῆς, not ὁ νοῦς) ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ (τα μὲν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, not ὁ νοῦς en tois phantasmasi noel) (the intellectual faculty (of the soul, not the mind) conceives of the forms in images [trans. KB]).

5 Ἀναστάτευε μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἰσθήσις τῶν καθόλου, ὁμοίως τοῦ ζῴου, ὁ οὖν ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὖν Καλλίου (Aristinestat mn to kath' ekaston, he d' aisthesei ton katholou, hoion anthropou, all' ou Kalliou) (Although it is the particular that we perceive, the act of perception involves the universal, e.g., “man,” not “a man, Callas” [trans. IG]). Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II.19, 110a16-b1.

6 In Lecture 15 [XI 358-9].

7 Aristotle, De Anima, III.7 [431a8-10]: Ἐν τοῖς ἔδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητὰ ἐστί (En tois eidesi tois aisthetois ta noeita estin) (the objects of thought reside in the sensible forms [trans. IG]). Aristotle, De Anima, III.2, 426b8-11: ἐκάστη αἰσθήσις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστῖν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητὴριῳ ἡ ἀισθήτηριον, καὶ κρίνει τάς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ τάς διαφοράς, ὁμοίως ἔν τοίς αἰσθητήριοις ἐστὶν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστιν τῶν φαντάσματα τὰν καταφέρει. ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἰσθήσεως τῶν καθόλου, ὁμοίως τοῦ ζῴου, ὁ οὖν ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὖν Καλλίου (Aristinestat mn to kath' ekaston, he d' aisthesei ton katholou, hoion anthropou, all' ou Kalliou) (Although it is the particular that we perceive, the act of perception involves the universal, e.g., “man,” not “a man, Callas” [trans. IG]).

8 Aristotle, De Anima, III.2 [426b8-11]: ἐκάστη αἰσθήσις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστῖν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητήριῳ ἡ αἰσθήτηριον, καὶ κρίνει τάς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ τάς διαφοράς, ὁμοίως ἔν τοίς αἰσθητήριοις ἐστὶν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητήριῳ ἡ αἰσθήτηριον, καὶ κρίνει τάς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ τάς διαφοράς, ὁμοίως καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστιν τῶν φαντάσματα τὰν καταφέρει. ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἰσθήσεως τῶν καθόλου, ὁμοίως τοῦ ζῴου, ὁ οὖν ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὖν Καλλίου (Aristinestat mn to kath' ekaston, he d' aisthesei ton katholou, hoion anthropou, all' ou Kalliou) (Although it is the particular that we perceive, the act of perception involves the universal, e.g., “man,” not “a man, Callas” [trans. IG]).
After this, there can be nothing surprising, if, in going further, we say that the soul of the animal also concludes, for this is what comes third, after judgment. The three mental [geistigen] functions were once so differentiated: simplex apprehensio, judicium, discursus. One would nowadays say: concept, judgment, conclusion [Schluß]. Now it can be easily and immediately seen that the three classes of categories that Kant issues under the headings of quantity, quality, and relation behave like each of these three functions. The soul of the animal also distinguishes the many and the few in simple perception; mathematics moves in the mere concept. That quality falls to judgment, we need not even say. But furthermore, it can be shown that the actions of the animal correspond entirely to the concepts that mediate conclusions to the understanding [die dem Verstand den Schluß vermitteln]. The animal sees only, for example, the green color of the fodder, but does not doubt that this accident has a substance underlying it. Equally, before all experience, the animal seeks the cause [Ursache] of the effect. The idle, standing horse turns towards the cause of a sound which was unexpected to him; the timid bird, the shy game animal [das scheue Wild] flees in the opposite direction from each unusual stirring of leaves close to him; it is not the understanding that says this to him, but the soul, under whose control he is alone, and which therefore rules over him even more than over the human.

[519] If the famous David Hume had just once observed the child in his cradle, who, as yet having no experience, incapable of moving his head, at least turns his eyes to the side from which a sound unknown to him comes, e.g., that of a musical instrument, then he would have indisputably spared himself of his explanation of the origin [Entstehung] of the concept of causation in us. “We are finally accustomed, when we see two phenomena follow one another over a long period of time, to thinking of these two phenomena as in a necessary connection, and namely the prior as cause, and the following as effect.” The child mentioned above had no time to become accustomed in such a way, or even to have observed two phenomena [Erscheinungen] repeatedly following each other. Kant was completely right when in claiming that the human (and with the required distinctions, he could just as well have said this of the animal) only attains experience because it is natural for him to seek the cause when he is aware of the effect.

Here, explained and shown in its particularity, is that which we earlier claimed in general about the noetic, intellective soul. The soul is unformulated knowledge, which

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10 In the Nineteenth Lecture, especially SW XI: 446-8, 452-3 [page specification IG].
11 Schelling, Über das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zu Natur, SW VII: 312. The following note has been provided by IG: In the phrase, “die Seele weib nicht, sondern sie ist die Wissenschaft,” Schelling makes science [Wissenschaft] into the “making [schaffen] of knowing [Wissen]” that the soul is, in roughly the same sense in which the physicist Johann Wilhelm Ritter did in his (28 March) 1806 paper to the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, entitled “Die Physik als Kunst,” where he writes: “die Wissenschaft,
exists as mere material, and is not elevated to actuality. If, in the well-known formula that is also valid for Aristotle, one sets the word ‘soul’ in place of the undetermined term sensus, then it is the most certain truth that there is nothing in the understanding [im Verstande] that was not first in the soul. The famous Leibnizian restriction: excepto ipso intellectu (with the exception of the intellect) is inapt, for the idea is much more that the understanding, taken completely materially, is already completely in the soul. This purely essential reservoir of knowledge that is non-acquired and prior-existing (a priori) must precede each acquired, that is, actual [520] science.12 What is at issue in actual science is what spirit has to acquire, if spirit is to become powerful enough to take on the world [soll er der Welt mächtig werden]. For spirit by itself is without science. As Aristotle says, it is similar to a tablet on which nothing is actually yet written. Certainly, one can, so to say, casually read or hear that Aristotle called the soul a blank tablet, whereas he explicitly said this of the understanding [vom Verstande].13 In relation to the soul, active knowledge [das Wissen] is something accidental [Zufälliges], something merely added on, just as spirit itself is, according to Aristotle, something added on. In spirit there is nothing that is merely material or in potency; Spirit is thus not science, but is only knowing: knowing, however, only through its relation to the soul.

This relationship to the soul rests on this: firstly, that in the soul there are already concepts, free of all matter, thus the simple forms which maintain the representations of singular, sensible things. This does not mean, however, that these concepts are objective for the soul. They are in the soul materially, as a third, we might say, unformulated and merely potential. As Aristotle also says: the soul is certainly the seat of concepts, but this is not the whole of the soul, but only the intellecive part. The concepts in it are not actual but merely potential.14 The concepts are raised to actuality first only by spirit, in which, for this very reason, they are no longer simple concepts

12 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.1, 71a1-2: τάσα διδασκαλία καὶ τάσα μάθησις διανοητική ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως (pása didaskalia kai pása máthēsis dianoētikē ek proûparchoûs ginetai gnṓseos) (All teaching and learning that involves the use of reason proceeds from pre-existient knowledge [trans. IG]).
13 Aristotle, De Anima III.4, 430a1-2: “What the mind [nous] thinks must be in it in the same sense as letters are on a tablet which bears no actual writing” (note provided and trans. IG). Further applications of this formula will come in what follows.
14 Aristotle, De Anima III.4, 429a27-29: καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες, τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι τόπον εἴδων, πλὴν ὅτι οὐτά ἐλη, ἀλλ’ ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχεία, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη (kai eû dê oi lêgontes, tēn psuchēn einai topon eidōn, plēn oti ou'ta elē, all' he noetike, ou'te entelecheia, all' à dynamei ta eide) (It has been well said that the soul is the place of forms, except that this does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its thinking capacity, and the forms occupy it not actually but only potentially [trans. IG]).
of individual, sensibly-experienced things, but rather concepts of these concepts,\textsuperscript{15} i.e., the universal concepts through which spirit has the power and knowledge to take on things \textit{[der Geist der Dinge mächtig und wissend wird]}. For to be powerful enough to take on a thing can only mean to go beyond it and not to convalesce with it, but rather to remain free from it. The name by which spirit denotes an individual thing, e.g., as a tree \textit{[521]}, does not simply contain the concept of this tree, nor even the concept of all actual trees, but of all possible trees. This universal \textit{[Allgemeine]} is the pure product of the spirit itself, because, as Anaxagoras had already said, in order to grasp \textit{all}, this universal must be unmixed and should have nothing in common with anything else.\textsuperscript{16} So, in relation to each thing, it must behave as the universal, as the equally powerful over all. But what befalls concepts also befalls judgments and conclusions \textit{[Schlüssen]}. For, we have seen that the soul does not only grasp \textit{[begreift]}, but also judges and concludes. So also the judgments and conclusions, which remain unexpressed in the soul and always refer only to the individual, are elevated to the level of actual universals. It is, for example, not \textit{this A} but rather \textit{A} in general that has \textit{B} as a consequence.

But secondly, it is to be noted that spirit does not exercise its effects \textit{[Wirkungen]} first of all through a particular act, but through its presence, through its simple existence. This is not a contingent and passing effect, it is rather a lasting effect, independent of spirit’s own will, which spirit does not exercise by virtue of a disposition \textit{(διάθεσις [diáthesis])}, but by virtue of its nature—just as it is the nature \textit{(ξεις [béxis])} of light to make actual the colors of a body that really are only \textit{potentia}. I am referring here to what Aristotle says of the active understanding, admittedly only in general.\textsuperscript{17} For if there is nothing new on the issue which we can use to distinguish ourselves from Aristotle, we must hold all the more tightly to the method which, for us, turns our consideration of transitions and the more formal differentiation of moments into law. The last step brought us thus no further than to the \textit{natural}

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\item\textsuperscript{15} Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, III.8 [432a2-3], \textit{η ἀισθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν, ὁ νοῦς δὲ εἶδος εἴδων (hē aísthēsis eîdos aisthētōn, ho noûs dè eîdos eidōn)} \textit{["...the mind is a form that employs forms, and sense is a form which employs the forms of sensible objects," trans. IG].}
\item\textsuperscript{16} Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, III.4, 429a18-19: \textit{Ἀνάγκη ἀρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὡςπερ φησὶν Ἀνάξαγόρας. καὶ μηδὲν μηθὲν ἔχειν κοινόν (Anánkē ára, epeì pánta noeî, amigē eînai, hṓsper phēsìn Anaxagóras kai médeni mēthèn échein koinón)} \textit{(It is necessary that mind, since it thinks all things, should be uncontaminated, as Anaxagoras says ... and have nothing in common with anything else [trans. IG]).}
\item\textsuperscript{17} Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, III.5, 430a14-17: \textit{καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος (ὁ ποιητικὸς) νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίγνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἥξεις τις, ὡς τὸ φῶς τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεία χρώματα (kai éstin ho mèn toioûtos [ho poiētikòs] noûs tōi pánta gígnesthai, ho dè tōi pánta poieîn, hoî héxis tis, hoîon tò phōs trópon gár tina kai poieî tā dynámei ónta chrómata energēia chrómata)} \textit{(Mind in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things, but mind has another aspect in that it makes all things; This is a kind of positive state like light; For in a sense light makes potential into actual colors [trans. IG]).}
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understanding and to [522] common, i.e., generally understood knowledge of things. It has brought us to understanding which is merely natural, because spirit here only acts according to its nature, and to knowledge common to all humans and presupposed in each one, because here the individual spirit does not yet act as itself, and individuality thus cannot yet make any difference. In contrast with the potential knowing that lies in the soul, what emerges here must already be valid for actual science. But it relates itself to freely generated science as a pre-existing (προϋπάρχουσα [proüpárchousa]) body of knowledge that only has the potential for science.

After this science and above it, we thus posit acquired science, in which the will has a part. This should already be evident from the fact that such science has always expanded, increased and grown only in relation to human purposes, i.e., to the objects of the human will. And even this acquired science, which has natural cognition [Erkenntnis] as its presupposition, relates exclusively to the sensible world. For this science wants to gain power over what Aristotle says has intruded upon us [des ‘Dazwischengetretenen’]. In it spirit would be only a dianoetic, thinking spirit, but not thinking itself [das Denken selbst], which it becomes only when it attain the purely and plainly intelligible. However, since there is nothing absolute in nature and everything is only relative, the Aristotelian distinction between the passive and the active understanding cannot be a simple, separative opposition, rather there are stages and mediations. If we begin from the understanding that is, in the deepest sense, passive in the intellective soul, so then the active understanding, by its nature, will be actus in its relation with the former. But to the extent that the active understanding is neither free nor voluntary nor conscious of any activity, but acts only according to its nature, it also is only passive understanding, however at a higher a level or potency. In relation to it, the freely generating understanding that awakens science behaves as actus. But to the extent that it is bound to the natural and has this as its presupposition, we will not be able to fully absolve it of passivity. Only the pure and simply active understanding, the creating understanding, [523] can be actually separated (χωρισθείς [choristheís]) from all presuppositions, thus from all matter. As Aristotle says, this understanding is purely itself. But we are not yet at this place; for the concern here is initially only with the understanding that subordinates itself to the foreign, to what has intruded upon us [des ‘Dazwischengetretenen’]. Insofar as this is the case, it remains connected to matter (is τῶν συνθέτων [tōn synthétōn], as this is expressed elsewhere). Nevertheless, even if it is not actually separated, this understanding is at least free in relation to everything material and also separate from it in accord to its nature (χωριστός [choristos], an Aristotelian term). It is therefore capable of understanding [auffassen] material stripped of all sensible properties down to sheer quantity so

18 See the passage in the Twentieth Lecture (SW XI: 457-460).
19 Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII.9, 1075a6-9: “There remains the question of whether the object of thought is composite [...]. The answer is that everything which contains no matter is indivisible.” The human mind, meanwhile, is a “mind of composite beings,” trans. IG.
that it can be grasped mathematically. In the same way, it is capable of raising itself from the mere phenomenon to the thing itself (to the essence). But its capacity goes beyond even this. As freely acting, it is here in its essence (pure actus). For this reason, it can also grasp itself with thinking.

The goal was to show, for all Aristotle’s separate expressions, their interrelation in which their truth is manifest. One thing, however, still seems to demand explanation. There is one time that Aristotle says: it remains only to determine the understanding as powerful nature, in reference to that which is foreign and intrudes upon us. All the same, he also says that the understanding is in accord to its capacity the intelligible, but actually or in fact, it is nothing before it has grasped the intelligible. But, regarding the first point, as long as the foreign element has not been penetrated by it, the understanding relates to that element as the mere power of comprehending [Macht des Begriﬀens], just as the light, when it is impeded by the moon which comes in between it and the earth, is also merely the power of illuminating the earth. This does not stop it, however, from being actus purus in itself. And concerning the second point, under capacity [Vermögen] here we do not understand a possibility that ceases to be a possibility once it is activated, but rather a power, which even when activated, continues to be a power. Aristotle says the same thing of the understanding. When it acts freely and once it has actually become knowing, the understanding is still in a certain respect a power, especially insofar

20 Aristotle, De Anima III.4, 429b18: τὰ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει ὄντα (tà én aphairései ónta) (something quite separate [trans. IG]), a common Aristotelian expression for the mathematical.

21 Aristotle, De Anima III.4, 429b13-14: τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα (tò sarkì einai kai sárka) (an equally common expression for the distinction indicated above). Ibid: ἄλλω (.GetService.allot.Δ) ἢ τοι χωριστῷ κρίνει (fällò (.GetService.allot.Δ) ē toī aisthētikōō) ē toī chōristō kriñe (We judge flesh and the essence of flesh either by separate faculties or the same faculties in distinct relations [trans. IG]).

22 Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429b9-10: καὶ αὐτὸς ἄν αὐτὸν τότε (kai autòs ã autòn tóte) δύναται νοεῖν (kai autòs dè autòn tòte [dan dynêtai energèin di' hautoû] dynatai noein) (the mind is then capable of thinking itself [of exercising its function by itself] [trans. IG]).


24 Aristotle, De Anima, III.4, 429b31-2: ὧτι δύναμει πως ἢ ἄλλη ἐνελευθερεύει ὅδε, πρὶν δὲ μὴ νοῆ (bòti dynámei póso esti tà noèta bo nois: all’entelechelai ouden, prin ãn mē noe) (mind is potentially identical with the objects of thought but is actually nothing until it thinks [trans. IG]).

25 Aristotle, De Anima III.4 [429b6-9]: ὧτι δὲ οὕτως ἔκαστα γίνεται, ὡς ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ἢ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν (tòto ã sympábainai, ὧτι δύναται ἐνεργεῖν δι’ αὐτοῦ) ἂτι μὲν ὁμοίως καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως ὧτι μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εἶπον (bòtai dì houtoi hêkaste génetai, hos epistêmêon légetai bo kat’ energeiain [tòto ã symbainai, bòtai dynêtai energèin di’ hautoû] esti mén homoióis kai tòte dynámei póso ou mén homoióis kai prin matheîn ê heuepeîn) (But when intellect has become the several groups of its objects, as the learned man when active is said to do [and this happens when he can exercise his functions by himself], even then the intellect is in a sense potency, though not quite in the same way as before it
as it affirms its superiority over the purely contingent actuality. In its contact with the object, it does not itself descend to the level of the object; in contact with that which is material, it remains free of the material as χωριστὸν (choristōn) and remains above it as subject (in the sense explained above). We are not speaking here of the kind of possibility that a seed has to develop into a plant, if certain conditions are met. Instead, it is the kind of possibility that someone has who has the power to produce something. Aristotle explained elsewhere in abundance the sense in which he uses the term powerful. Whoever has the power to sit down will not always sit; he has also the power to stand. The power for one includes the other. One can have the power to talk, and not talk, just as one can have the power not to talk, but nevertheless talk. When one of these options achieves actuality [ἐὰν ὑπάρξῃ ἡ ἐνέργεια], it does not make the other impossible. Thus the power to do one thing remains the power to do the other. I, at least, do not know how else to understand Aristotle, to whom it is impossible to ascribe a tautology such as results from the other explanation.

That’s enough for our explanation of an Aristotelian expression. But that which we just presented in general contains, in short, the complete theory of natural cognition [des natürlichen Erkennens]. For the acquired science must also be accounted for as one of natural cognition’s parts, for it derives entirely from it. The man in whom spirit is not free from the feeling, naturally judging, deciding learned and discovered [trans. IG]). (Here, namely, it is the power before everything actual, there the power that outlives the actus). Concerning the “becoming all” at the beginning of the passage, it is the Aristotle’s way of expressing what does the knowing in knowing is the known (note IG). Hence Aristotle, De Anima III.8, 431b23-4: ἕστι δ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστήμη τὰς, ἡ δ’ ἀισθήσεις τὰ ἀισθήτα (ἔστι δ’ ἐπιστήμης μὲν τὰ ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ’ ἀισθήσεις τὰς ἀισθήτα) (“knowledge is in a way what is knowable and sensation in a way what is sensible,” trans. IG), and Aristotle teaches generally: Τὸ αὐτὸ δ’ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι (Τὸ αὐτὸ δ’ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι) (Knowledge when actively operative is identical with its object, trans. IG). Aristotle, De Anima, III.7, 431a1.

26 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX.3, 1046b34-5: Τὸ οἰκοδόμον εἶναι τὸ δυνατὸ εἶναι ἐστὶν οἰκοδομεῖν (Τὸ οἰκοδόμοι εἶναὶ τὸ δυνατὸ εἶναι ἐστὶν οἰκοδομεῖν) [‘to be a builder’ is ‘to have the power of building,’ trans. IG].

27 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX.3, 1047a24-6: Ἐστὶ δὲ δυνατὸν τὸῦτο ὅ, τι ὑπάρξῃ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐ λέγεται ἐξείν τὴν δύναμιν οὖθεν ἐσται ἐδύναμον· λέγω δ’ ὅ, τι, εἰ δυνατὸν καθῆσαι καὶ ἐνδέχεται καθῆσαι, τοῦτο, ἐκ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τὸ καθήσασθαι, οὖθεν ἐσται ἐδύναμον (ἐστὶ δ’ ἐνεργεία τὸ δύναμιν τὸῦτο ὅ, τι, εἰ ἐνεργείᾳ δύναται ἐνδέχεται καθῆσησθαι, τοῦτο, ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ δύναμιν τὸῦτο ὅ, τι, καθῆσησθαι). A thing is capable of doing something if there is nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the potentiality. I mean, e.g., that if a thing is capable of sitting and is not prevented from sitting, there is nothing impossible in its actually sitting [trans. IG]. The οὐθὲν (outhèn) in the first sentence posited as it is so generally, when we do not restrict it by the οὐ λέγεται k. t. l (οὐ λέγεται k.t.l), thus thought as referring to this, would be meaningless. The second sentence is added here because in it the ἐνδεχόμενοι (endechomenoi) and the δυνατὸν καθῆσαι (dynamion kathēthai) are distinguished. To the first, the mere possibility of sitting, a sitting belongs as much as does an upright figure, since the animal either only lies, or can only lie and stand (trans. IG).
soul, and thus is not in his own esse— is the natural man, as rightly translates the New Testament expression ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός [anthrōpos psychikós]. As such, he knows nothing of God. But suppose he somehow acquires a knowledge of God from the outside, he might well, through an analogous application of the means of knowledge for the naturally given— those which are valid for the sensible world— also seek to reach the supersensible. Such was in fact the way of proceeding of the former metaphysics, or of the part of it that was called natural theology, as was rightly if somewhat naïvely expressed by the honourable Garve [526] when he said:

In a general manner, for this metaphysics, the supersensible world is, if further separated, not otherwise separated from the sensible world than the part of this world that we cannot see is separate from the part that is visible to us. The path through which I pass from the knowledge of our earthly globe to knowledge of Saturn is not essentially different from the path that leads me from all that I have learned, experienced, and seen in the world to that which existed before it, to that which will be after it, and to that which towers sublimely above it.30

But it is here that Kant traced the great line of demarcation by revealing the artifice by which natural knowledge deceived itself in wanting to prolong itself into the supernatural. As Kant says, this is where reason “over-soars,” becoming transcendent. What J. G. Hamann says in relation to Socrates, but evidently already guided by Kantian declarations, expresses the true result of Kant’s critique of natural knowledge in a way that this critique itself was unable to do: “The grain of our natural knowledge must rot, decay in ignorance, so that from this death and from this nothingness life and the essence of a higher knowledge can germinate and be created anew.”31

We took, at the beginning of the present lectures, this metaphysics as our starting point,32 but declared it immediately to be a spurious and factitious science (disciplina spuria et factitia). This might seem to entail a contradiction. But with this judgment metaphysics was not declared to be a merely contingent product. For, from the point of view of natural knowledge, metaphysics is also itself a natural product. Its attempt to rise to the supersensible by means of the purely natural faculties of sensibility, understanding, and reason (as the capacity to infer) was and still is inevitably its first impulse. No teacher of philosophy can take or presuppose anything other [527] than the standpoint of natural reason of the person he wants to instruct in the science of reason. And beyond this any preparation for true science

29 οὔκ ἐστιν ὅπερ ἐστίν (oúk estin hôper estín) (see Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII.4, 1030a: a man “is not precisely a certain type of thing,” [note KB]).


32 In the Eleventh Lecture.
can only exist in the elimination and abolition of false knowledge. For this reason, the
natural introduction to philosophy, over which many people rack their brains, does
not consist in setting forth some true theory, for example, as some seem to imagine,
a theory of knowledge (as if such a theory would be possible before and outside of
philosophy). Instead, it can only take the form of a critique of the sole science possible
to the natural man. In this respect, Kant’s work has lasting significance also from a
didactic perspective.

For our further development the theory of knowledge that was here presented
has achieved the following: The I, in which we now entirely include ourselves (it is the
only principle of our further development), the I that is in each person, and in which
place everyone may think of their own unique self, has now been revealed as free in
reference to the alien reality that has intruded upon us. Through knowledge the I has
power over what is alien. The will that possesses itself finds itself also limited by nature
in consideration of means (for all cannot serve all). But on the other hand it is free in
consideration of ends, or, given that many things are themselves sought as means, free
in reference to the ultimate and proper end, which, once one has come into possession
of him or herself, can be nothing other than to maintain oneself in one’s being [Seyn].
Or, better, given that a being that consists only in suffering and privations would have
no advantage over non-being [Nichtsseyn], to maintain oneself in well-being, i.e., in
the full enjoyment of one’s being [seines Seyns]. That well-being is the ultimate end
of willing, is a point not worth belaboring. At the same time, however, we now know
man is sufficiently equipped with natural understanding to recognize and distinguish
as such all that has a closer or more distant relation with the final end, to use it in
accordance with this insight and to make it serve his will, i.e., to treat it as its material
condition.

Here, however, the I immediately encounters certain limits, of which we
cannot even say where they come from. The only thing immediately clear [528] is that
they can neither come from the sensible world nor from God; for the I is free from the
latter, according to the presupposition. Nor can these limits come from men, insofar
as they are sensible beings. It thus remains only that they come from men, insofar
as they have an intelligible side and are intelligible beings. The human, with whom
we have been concerned up to now, is the individual. As an individual, man has his
place in the sensible world. But we have no choice but to assume that each person,
outside of the place that he or she takes up in the sensible world, also has a place in
the intelligible world. In the soul, of which we say, that it is equal to the totality of
being [dem ganzen Seyenden], the human exists as a possibility, i.e., as an Idea. But this
entire possibility is not fulfilled by the individual. He leaves thus innumerably many
possibilities outside of himself as unfulfilled through himself. These possibilities,
since in all of them there is only the one idea, have such a relation among themselves
that each serves as a complement to the other, and so the one could not be without the
other, and if this one could not access being, then also no other (that is, no individual
by which it is fulfilled) could be entitled to it. This is an intelligible order that is thus older than actual men, and which therefore does not first come from actuality, but persists in the latter and imposes itself on the will that has become autonomous and self-acting as a law. It does not allow anyone to override the measure of his due right. Only in this way does it become possible for each and every one to exert their will. To this extent, there is a completely equal claim to both Being [Seyn] and to well-being. But where would there be any order and how should the possibilities mutually complement each other without differences, that is, without inequality? The question thus arises—from which concern does this inequality come and on what does it rest?

Here we must once again remember, that that out of which man is taken and created (a⁰) is not a single type of thing, but is equal to all being [Seyenden] and contains thus also in itself all the possible degrees and differences of which being is capable. It does so, however, only in eminent potentiality, so that, when it comes to the actualization of these [529] possibilities, here, as in a second and indeed superior world, all the degrees of being [Seyn], from the lowest to the highest, must appear. A sequence of degrees thus emerges, whose members are of different values, depending on how close or how far they stand apart from what comes last, which is the real purpose. The human counts as the purpose of nature, though in this case it is not the human as the individual. Instead, it is the idea of the human, which can be fully realized not by the individual but only by the totality. As such, the end goal can only be the totality. In regard to it, all people cannot be of equal rank, but only of a higher or less worth, depending on whether the material they draw from is closer or further from the centre point. The more the common element lives in them, the higher they stand; the more they act only for themselves, for their individual aims and for their own preservation, the lower. A person is elevated and ennobled in relation to how much he or she serves the totality. The regular warrior, standing in the same rank with the others, is proud in this feeling of community, of which he knows he is a member. He serves; the commander rules. But the commander in turn is also only a means and not the end, so that in general one can say: he who rules the most, is he who serves the most. In the natural course of things, those who lived earlier serve the succeeding generations; the descendants enjoy the shade of the tree that their fathers, with much effort, planted and cultivated. The later time rejoices in the truth that an earlier time achieved through fighting, toil and even pains of all kinds. No one complains that his actions are beneficial to those living later. In truth one would not feel demeaned, but rather elevated, if one were justified in regarding himself as born not for himself, but for the whole (non sibi sed toti natum se credere mundo).³³

One can recognize as a human feeling the wish that all humans would stand at the same rank, but it is a futile effort to set aside differences that, instead of first deriving from the world of freedom, were already designated in the intelligible world and hypothetically predetermined by the idea. It is futile to try to [530] eradicate an

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³³ Lucan, Civil War, II.383 (reference IG).
inequality that, instead of being made by humans, comes from an order that reaches beyond this world and is the consequence of that great law of all being [alles Seyenden], according to which not only no state, as Aristotle says, but also no community can consist of only pure equals (ἐξ ὁμοίων [ex homoión]). Community requires beings that are different from each other according to the idea, and thus in accord to their inner worth (ἐξ εἴδει διαφερόντων [ex eidei diapherón̄tōn]). There can be no type of order of possible or real things, in which one does not stand apart from the other, from birth onwards, by virtue of the fact that the one rules while the other is ruled. This law, that Aristotle declared as a general, as a natural law, is the power that each feels and also reveres without even wanting to, the power that allocates to each his own (suum cique), allotting to each the position in the world that is his to fulfill by virtue of an innate, natural right. To overstep such a right would have pernicious consequences for him. It is not, moreover, left up to the whim of another to respect or not respect it. It is imperative that one accept that the will by virtue of which one wills oneself be directed to the position for which one is determined. It is imperative, for this law does not come from man. Nor does he escape the law by making himself independent from God. On the contrary, it was by stepping to the side of the other [of that which is, des Seyenden] that he has made himself subject to the law. The law appears for those who know nothing of God [531] as an independent, self-enthroned power. It is independent of God, elevated to his equal (actually taking his place). It appears as a power that towers above the human, and as the source of natural “law [Recht], common to all,” of law that “precedes the real community and any agreement amongst men.” It was not developed or apprehended through the understanding, but is a system of laws which of itself makes itself felt by all:

For their life is not of today or yesterday, but for all time, and no man

34 Aristotle, Politics, II.2, 1261a24-33. The chapters of the Politics are indicated by roman numerals in the margins of the Sylburg text (Friedrich Sylburg [ed.], Aristotelis Politiorvm et Oeconomicorvm libri qui exstant [Frankfurt: Wechel, Marni & Aubrig, 1587]) referring, it appears, to the Zwinger edition (Theodor Zwinger [ed.], Aristotelis Politiorvm libri octo [Basel: Eusebii Episcopii opera ac impensa, 1582]).

35 Aristotle, Politics, I.2 (Schelling gives ‘I.5,’ corr. IG), 1251a22-24: Τὸ γὰρ ἄρχεν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ καὶ εὐθύς ἐπὶ γενετῆς ἑνα διέστηκε, τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι, τὰ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν (Tò gàr árchen kaì árchesthai ou mónon tōn anankaíon, allà kai tōn sympheróntōn esti kai euthyús ek genetês èná diéstēke, tà mèn épi to árchesthai, tà d’épi to árchein). (Authority and subordination are conditions not only inevitable but also experient; in some cases things are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or to be ruled). As Aristotle says here, the relation belongs to the “advantageous”, yet he equally says: “slavery for the one and mastership for the other are advantageous” Politics I.2 [1255b7]). Compare Aristotle, Politics, I.5. On the originally organic society, compare 1 Cor. 12, 12.14.15-26, trans. IG.

36 “humana qua parte locatus es in re (discè),” in Persius’ famous phrase. Persius, Satires, III.72-3: “what is your position in the human commonwealth.”
knows when they were first put forth.37

These are the familiar words of Sophocles’ Antigone, which Aristotle did not fail to mention at that juncture where he speaks of a general premonition of the human race, the premonition of a power which, before and independently of any human contract, determines right and injustice.38 This same power, in so far as it actually manifests itself, was celebrated in Greek antiquity as Dike, which, according to the old saying that Plato always mentioned in the Laws, always appears in the entourage of Zeus. As the tragic chorus reminds us,39 the inviolability of Dike had been invoked by Antigone (pure, but now consecrated to death) when she had earlier called upon eternal justice. The sudden emergence of Dike in unusual human destinies was perceived with terror, also in the general opinion of the people.40

[532] It is here where even Kant exceeds the limits imposed on theoretical reason. As a moral being [Wesen], humanity is not released from the intelligible world, and what would be outside of the domain of the former (theoretical reason), is not so for practical reason. This is reason; for it too has as its last content the purely intelligible, that which is [das Seyende]. It is practical, because precisely this intelligible imposes itself as a law to the will that has become self-acting or acting as its own, demanding its submission. In this sense the moral law is therefore also to be named the law of reason, because it is namely the law that originates from the intelligible order and by virtue

37 Sophocles, Antigone, 456-457.
38 Aristotle, Rhetoric I.13, 1373b7-10: ἐστι γὰρ, δὲ μαντεύοντας τι πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον, κ’ ἀν μηθημεία κοινωνία πρὸς ἄλληλους ἢ, μηθημένη συνήκη, οἷον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλεός φαίνεται λέγουσα κ.τ.λ. (ésti gàr, dè manteúontas ti pàntes, φύsei koiónn díkaion kai ádikon, k’ án mēthηmēia koïnōnia pròs álhlouς h, mēthēmēnē συνήκη, oìion kai h Sophokleous faïneita leγousa k.t.l. (For there is something of which we all have a presentiment, being a naturally universal right and wrong, even if there should be no community between the two parties nor contract, to which Sophocles’ Antigone seems to be referring). It is contained in the μαντεύοντας (manteúontas) that it is not of this world and is not in the intellect.
39 Sophocles, Antigone, 853-5: “Forward and forward still to farthest verge / Of daring hast thou gone, / And now, O child, thou fallest heavily / Where Right erects her throne” (trans. IG). In the speech against Aristogeiton, Demosthenes says of Dike: ἢν ὁ τὰς ἀγιωτάτας ἠμῖν τελετὰς καταδείξας Ὀρφεὺς παρὰ τοῦ Διός θρόωου φησὶ καθημένην (hēn ho tàs agiōtátas ēmîn teletàs katadeíxas Orpheùs parà toû Diós thróōou phēsì kathēménēn) (inexorable and sacred Justice who, as we are told by Orpheus, our instructor in the most holy ordinances sits by the throne of Zeus). Hesiod, Works and Days, 248: Ὡ βασιλεῖς, ὑμεῖς δὲ καταφράζεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸι τὴν δίκην. (HÔ basileîs, hymeîs dè kathēménēn (you princes, take notice of this punishment). Schelling possibly intended to cite 259, where Justice “sits beside her father Zeus,” (trans. IG). Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonnus, 1384: Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνὸς ἀρχαίως νόμοις (Díkē xýnedros Zēnòs archaíois nómois) (Primeval Justice sits enthroned with Zeus [trans. IG]).
40 Compare the discussion on the inhabitants of Malta in Acts 28:4: ὡς δὲ εἶδον κρεμάμενον τὸ θηρῖον (τὴν ἔχιδναν) ἐκ τῆς χειρὸς τοῦ Παύλου, ἔλεγον πρὸς ἄλληλους. πάντως φονεῖς ἐστίν τὸ ἀνθρώπος οὕτως, ὃν διασωθέντα ἐκ τῆς ταλασσῆς ἢ δίκη ἥν οὐκ εἶσαι (hôs de eidon kremámenon to thērion (tēn échidan) ek tēs cheirōs toû Paulou, elégon prōs álhlous. pántōs fōneis estin ho ántrōpos outhos, hōn diasōthénta ek tēs talassēs he dikē zên ouk eiæsai) (When the islanders saw the snake hanging from his hand, they said to each other, “This man must be a murderer; for though he escaped from the sea, the goddess Justice has not allowed him to live, trans. IG)).
of which the intelligible is also in the world. At one point in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant states about conscience: “by means of this we become aware of a nature [Wesen] that is distinct from ourselves, yet is most intimately present to us.” After “nature” he adds the explanation: “of moral, legislative reason.” Indeed we cannot oppose this addition, if the thought is to be fended off that this nature would be God (for, in Kant’s scientific and moral character, the asserted autonomy of reason, i.e., the moral law’s independence from God, is one of its deepest—and despite what shallow, superficial people may bring against it—one of its most admirable features).\(^{41}\) In contrast, we must however protest against thinking that this nature refers to human reason, as the unfortunately chosen expression of autonomy seems to say. It is not the latter; it is reason that lives in being itself that subjects the will to itself. (This reason is certainly autonomous, i.e., it does not receive its law from God.) That which in theoretical reason is only as latent (as an object of pure contemplation) has become, in relation to the will that is a practical end for itself, active. This intelligible power does not address itself to human reason, but only to the will \(^{533}\). The consciousness of this is not called reason, but conscience. It is called conscience to express the constant and ever-recurring nature of this knowledge, the unremitting and untiring power by which it acts.

The end result of our last considerations is that an intelligible order precedes the real or external community between people. The sheer content of this order, however, would lose all meaning in a world of factual being \([\textit{Seyn}]\), if, with that content, the law did not also pass over, i.e., if the latter did not also receive a factual existence, appearing as a power, not merely in a person, i.e., in his conscience, but also outside of him—if thus a constitution armed with actual force did not enter into this world, a constitution in which domination and submission occur. This external order of reason equipped with coercive power is the state,\(^{42}\) which, materially considered, is a sheer fact, and has only a factual existence. But it is sanctified by the law that lives in it. It is a law neither of this world nor of human invention. Instead, it directly originates and emerges from the intelligible world.\(^{43}\) The law become actual power is

\(^{41}\) Kant discusses conscience in Königlichen Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), *“Critique of Practical Reason,” Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5 (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900-), 98-9 (in English see Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 82ff). Later discussion will show how important it is that Kant “secularised” morals. A Frenchman commends Pascal’s *Provincial Letters*: “elles ont beaucoup fait, pour seculariser l’honnêté, comme Descartes, l’esprit philosophique.” (“They have done much to secularise honesty, as Descartes has done for the philosophical mind,” trans. IG).

\(^{42}\) In the state one lives \(\textit{katá tina nòn kai tágín öρθήν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν (katá tina noín kai táxin orbēn, échousan ischín).}\\ Ariostotle’s terms in Nicomachean Ethics, X.9, 1180a18: “by a certain intelligence, and by a right system, invested with adequate sanctions.” This last corresponding in what follows to: \(δύναμις ἄνεγκαστική (trans. IG).\)

\(^{43}\) Just as this intelligible order in the world is independent of the individual and without his will, it is also self-initiating from itself, in that its natural existence \([\textit{DaSeyn}]\) is given in the family (paternal power).
the answer to that act by which human beings posited themselves outside of reason. This is reason in history.

Lecture 23

[534] The domain into which we are now entering is that of practical philosophy. This is the part of my presentation that could easily appear as the most questionable, if for no other reason than that it concerns what seems to be, quite apart from science, the closest and most important thing to everyone. As a result, no one hesitates to make their own judgement. Moreover, because it is a topic that so many regard as of such ultimate importance that it alone seems able to fill the whole scope of a human spirit, there are few who will understand why, in the context of the present lectures, it cannot appear for its own sake and be examined accordingly. Instead, it is much rather the case that for it in particular (or at least above all), what we find ourselves emphasizing is not what leads one to cling to it, but what impels one to hurry beyond it.

In fact now, however, we see the I—as previously noted, the only thing that remains to which a further development can attach itself—, we see the I in consequence of the law, lost and having completely strayed (déchû) from all that it wanted, from being-for-itself, from being which is only itself, from Being which is the real absolute, i.e., from being [Seyn] free of everything, where it would have nothing in common with anything else (a ἀµιγές [amigés] in the sense of Aristotle), and would be a law only for itself. In contrast, the I is now restricted by the law, which imposes itself on its will as something unwanted. It is delimited by the universal, and no longer belongs to itself, but to a different and foreign power, whose effect on the I can only be displeasure and rebellion against the law as it strives to free itself and [535] take possession of its own will. One craving against the other. The ἀρχόμενος [archómenos] wants to be the ἀρχṑn [archôn]. This is the necessary other side of the matter. It should be just as much considered and recognized as is, from the other side, the holiness of the law.

Liberation from the law could at first be purely factual, a simple stepping beyond. Given that according to the law the I remains the unconditioned lord of his own action, nothing could withstand this, if it were not the case that, in reference to this world of purely, factual existence, the law itself had become the factual power that guarantees its fulfillment independently of the will. The obligation that had been imposed from within appears thus as an external, compulsive force (δύναμις ἀναγκαστική). This power of reason emerges from the purely factual rejection of the law (the law does not always inhibit reason, but avenges and thus restricts it). Existing as a factual force, this power of reason is, as we have already seen, the state.

I do not doubt at all that such a factual power will bring offence to most, because it oppresses individual freedom before it can express itself. For it is firmly
established that for the majority, and this is also an opinion favored by Kant, the law itself makes human beings free, for it can in fact only be directed at moral beings. But insofar as it renders each of them responsible for their part in the real achievement of the community (where no one can do anything for this unless they all want it, and specifically, not a single time, but always want it and thus cannot do anything else but want it)—to this extent, the individual has no freedom either to act for or against the law, unless it is made impossible for everyone to act against it. To act for the law would make a person the victim of his legal disposition. To act against it would be to know that all others would later do to him what he did to them, so that his action would be absurd. And just as I am prevented from observing the law if all do not observe it, likewise I also cannot exert what I am entitled to, for example, make myself the lord of something, if all do not recognize it. It is thus evident that by virtue of the law alone people would be much rather unfree than free. The individual is only free at all, when, independent of one's solitary will while yet making it possible, the community already exists. This factual presence of the community—factual, i.e., independent of reason and thus also of the law—is thus a practical postulate of reason itself. It is a presupposition without which the law would not have any relation to the individual as such, and by which a moral disposition is first made possible to the individual. As the saying goes, the state, or as Kant more precisely states, the juridical legislation, is indifferent to the moral disposition. It would be more correct to say that it regards itself as the presupposition, without which the moral disposition would be impossible, and that it cannot demand that which only becomes possible first through it. Herein, as well as in the fact that it considers crime a priori as impossible, conceding its existence only in accord to the obvious proof that a crime has been committed, the state shows the proper feeling for its meaning. It is the same for the individual, who, from the mere lawfulness of his actions, does not make an immediate conclusion about his moral disposition. Nor does he impute to anyone a particular virtue for not attacking either the person or the property of another. In this way an individual seems to have a good intuition of the proper order of things. It is the most important consequence of a factually existing rational order, and furthermore of the state, that it elevates the individual to personhood. Before and outside this order, there would be individuals, but no persons. The person is the subject to whom actions can be imputed. But outside of the factually-existing legal order, there would be no imputation of guilt [Zurechnung] and the individual would be responsible for nothing. The war of all against all is according to Hobbes the state of nature that preceded the state as such. That it did not precede the state in actuality was clear enough. It should be equally clear that in such a state of nature there can be neither moral freedom, nor blame or responsibility. That the individual is morally free and a person first through the state is also attested to by the fact that whoever goes against its law, and above all whoever revolts against it and so sets himself outside of the state, ceases to be a person for it and can therefore be completely deprived of the exercise of his freedom and the
circumstances of his personal existence (for this world).

“The human who enters into the state sacrifices his natural freedom,” so one says; but it seems rather to be the opposite, only in the state does he find and acquire real freedom. At the same time here, another delusion vanishes; for how, without freedom, could individuals discuss together and conclude on a voluntary agreement, a contract, which would lead to the state? Admittedly, this theory of the original contract presents many additional inadequacies (which David Hume, among others, already pointed out) that would keep a reasonably perspicacious observer from trying to build an explanation of the state on such an operation. But one finds it nevertheless useful to consider the state as if it originated in this manner, so that, for example, one would not admit any right, unless it could be assumed that everyone would have completely consented to it. Nor could one allow any new law and new institution to arise, for which, as they say, the collectivity—here meaning really each individual—had not given its consent. As the latter is impossible, so this path leads directly to the institution that subjects the individual to the most oppressive tyranny, subordinating him to the will of a contingent majority and thus to a despotism. This is ill-concealed by the fact that the individual is understood not as bound by duties, as formerly, but as having rights. They call such a state a state of reason. They do not mean by reason, however, that objective reason, in which things themselves live. Such reason demands, for example, natural inequality. Instead, they have in mind the reason of the solitary individual, of someone who could accept and agree to such an arrangement. That they deduce the state from this human, subjective reason can be seen from the fact that they believe they are able to make states and constitutions, and, to this end, to convene constituent assemblies. The attempts turned out poorly enough, and the total futility of all that was organized in this direction for the last half a century or so had to finally bring the most determined actors to completely cast aside the appearance of universality and of reason, in order to proclaim pure, unconcealed individuality as carrying within itself its own unique and absolute justification. To this end, they had to reach beyond the merely historical even into the supra-historical, seeking to sweep aside all differences, including those that had the sanction of the world of ideas, such as property and ownership, by virtue of which people are able to rise above the merely material to achieve a state of grandeur that, because of the exclusivity that belongs to its nature, introduces inequality. Their goal was to sweep it all aside, especially “all authority and power,” in order to establish as quickly as possible heaven on earth, without awaiting the lord, with whose arrival Christianity consoles poor and clueless humanity.


Schelling references above Romans 13:1: “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for
Reason determines the content of the state—but surely not the spurious reason of the individual, rather reason that is nature itself, the abiding totality of what truly is [das Seyende] which stands above merely phenomenal being [Seyn]. But the state itself is even more, it is the act of eternal reason that has become active in view of this factual world. It is reason become precisely practical, an act that is no doubt recognizable, but cannot be investigated, i.e., that does not allow itself to be drawn into the circle of experience as an object of research. The state itself has, in this sense, a factual existence. But from nothing of this sort is contingency to be excluded. Even in nature, contingency thwarts the eternal order, but is never able to break it. It can cast a seed of grain that requires a strong sun in order to fully develop into a sunless place, or it can expose to the sun that which would thrive better in the shade. Contingency, in a similar way, surely also possesses humans, so that, by overcoming contingency, a real, eternal (not simply imaginary) destiny can be actuated. Thus, as reason that has become factual power, reason cannot expel contingency. This contingency that belongs to it is the price by which the essential, i.e., reason itself, is obtained. [539] In this sense, there seems to be little understanding of the issue in such truisms as that factual right should yield more and more to rational right, continuing as such until a pure realm of reason is established. It is as if the goal were to make all personalities superfluous, removing the thorn from the eye of envy, which, in certain moments, extends all the way to regions, where one should not suspect it. For only in the face of the factual is there space for human ambition. The time that brings it about that the factual could be completely dismissed and discarded might think itself able to do well without its great men. Just this is foretold for our own time by its so-called spokespeople. With the pure realm of reason, the paradise of all mediocrity would be opened. My concern is not to please whatever party of the day. In general, I walk here a lonely path, one that must become more and more lonely, the more it leads to such matters as the state and constitution, matters about which everyone nowadays can judge and about which everyone has an opinion. Only those who have followed this entire development will be able to accept, from the mere necessity of thought (from the trust and belief in thinking) the idea of an act of the intelligible world that anticipated all of human thought.

For the rest, the very factual side of the state raises the expectation that this act has a historical side through which it might become accessible to the less practiced. The law of the community, as we have seen, is namely a law for the species. The individual is incapable of serving the community for himself alone. He must thus expect and insist that the law really become a law for the species, that it be a power independent from individuals through which it becomes possible for each
individual to fulfill his part. For even the most favored (someone who belongs to
one of the ἀρχοντῶν [archonts], of which as Aristotle said⁴⁶ there are many types) is
not therefore free from the subjugated. They must also be an end for him, [540] and
he is responsible for the realization of the community. The question is then how the
law can be brought out and away from the individual, how it can be seen as imposed
on the species and thus as a power independent of the individual. To this end the
means lie precisely in the distinction between rulers and ruled⁴⁷ that is already posed
separate from the individual and derived from the world of ideas. Amongst these
individuals, one will easily be found who is sufficiently equipped with the power
to in fact subordinate the others to himself. This will not happen by deliberation
or agreement, it will instinctively happen. The ruling of an individual only over the
family, then over the whole tribe, then over several tribes, whereby a people is created,
is the first and oldest, the natural monarchy. In this way, then, the act by which the
order of reason is realized can be historically explained and proven. From this natural
(unconscious) monarchy runs the path to self-conscious monarchy, proceeding, as
it is the fortune of humanity, through its opposite (through republican ideas). Self-
conscious monarchy has compulsion as its basis but freedom as its product, not the
reverse, which is why it grows into the most developed society. That initial monarchy
cannot be the self-understanding one. Because the state belongs to the things that are
from nature and arises independently of human intelligence, we must assume that
for all that it addresses and concerns (the rulers themselves not exempt) it begins in
a blind, non-recognized way, as something purely factual. Understanding first comes
afterward. The perfectly constituted and self-constituting state is achieved only in a
progressive way, whereby earlier aspects of the idea of the state will be there before
the state takes on its true meaning. In this succession, however, no contingency is
exercised. The state becomes the idea that hovers above the successive forms and
which it contains philosophically (a priori). For this reason, the forms of the state
do not emerge haphazardly but in a predetermined [541] succession. This can now
be recognized philosophically, as the subject of philosophy, and in particular of the
philosophy of history.⁴⁸

The state is that which, we say, first makes a moral disposition possible for
the individual. But it itself never demands it. Precisely because it does not demand
it, but only makes it possible, satisfying itself with external justice and caring only for
it, the state makes the individual free and leaves him a place for voluntary (and thus
also for the first time for personal) virtues, e.g., that one is fair. Instead of asserting

⁴⁶ Aristotle, Politics I.2 [1254a24-5; Schelling wrongly locates the passage at I.5, corr. IG]: Ἐιδὴ πολλὰ
καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων ἐστιν (Ｅιδὴ πολλὰ καὶ ἀρchaiοντων καὶ ἀρχομένων εστιν) (there are many kinds
both of rulers and subjects [trans IG]).
⁴⁷ See SW XI: 529ff above.
⁴⁸ The negative side of the same. Compare SW XI: 569n1 below. It is not hereby said or implied that
the idea of the perfect state has ever manifested itself in reality [note trans. Sean J. McGrath].
his own right to the detriment of others (ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χείρον [akribodikaios epi to cheirion] as Aristotle said),\(^\text{49}\) he prefers to give up something himself, even if the law would be backing him. Or one is brave. (It is true that Aristotle specifically mentions bravery under the virtues demanded by the state, because the law forbids anyone to leave his post in the battle array, to flee and to throw away his weapons.\(^\text{50}\) Even so, bravery is not merely a virtue of the battlefield. The bravery that is demanded of us—the one that, as for the ancient Romans, one has no choice but to endure or to be punished to death at home—is not necessarily a personal one). Or one is truthful, faithful to his promise, even when he cannot be forced to keep it, or communicative, benevolent, caring. These are virtues that reason alone cannot prescribe or realize. They are virtues that are purely personal and can also be called social. With them, there arises above the involuntary community the voluntary and therefore higher community. This is what we will call society. In this respect, the state is the bearer of society. For regarding what Kant says—freedom must be the principle [542] and condition of all constraint\(^\text{51}\)—the opposite is rather true. One would also have to say that purpose might also be called the principle, and therefore be the condition under which something that is not for its own sake nevertheless is. Kant, however, did not mean this; this is evident from how he applies this principle. The state should be the bearer of society, but it can also hinder or cut off the development of society, just as inversely from society the attempt can arise to weaken or subdue the state. From this the following types ensue.

The ruler is a despot, who does not allow any space to the voluntary virtues or any development to society. To speak in Kant’s way such a ruler does not understand that freedom is the purpose of constraint. If the beginning of history and the first great empires were supposed to be in the East, and if furthermore it is true what Aristotle says, that the Asian peoples are by nature more inclined to servitude than the Europeans,\(^\text{52}\) then it was no accident that the first empires were monarchies of a despotic kind. It was just as little fortuitous that the most aware and intellectual of the Greeks only came after the first, still paternal reign of hereditary kings had passed through different intermediary stages (including self-declared rulers that governed for a short time) that led to—especially after a glorious end to the Persian wars, by which

\(^{49}\) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.10, 1138a1: the equitable man “does not stand on his rights unduly” [trans. IG].

\(^{50}\) Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.1, 1129b20ff.


\(^{52}\) Aristotle, Politics, III.9 [Schelling gives III.14, which does not exist. Therefore 1285a20-22: “the barbarians are more servile in their nature than the Greeks, and the Asiatics than the Europeans [and hence] endure despotic rule without resentment.”]. Aristotle, Politics, VII.7 [possibly IV.3, 1306a35-40] [ref. IG].
they defended themselves against the Persian yoke, but also liberated their kinsmen in Asia minor—that definitive form of popular rule or democracy in which, as one could say, the state is completely subdued by society and society makes itself the bearer (the fundament) of the state. Such a state has surrendered to the fluctuations of society, and fundamentally and rightly considered, is little more a state than the despotically governed realm can be called a state. This is the case because the state is neither an issue for the despotic ruler, who seeks only himself, nor for democracy, where the state is only the tool of personalities, the fate of all democracies [543] [worauf alle Demokratie hinausläuft]. This is all the more unavoidable, the greater the appeal of a rule so acquired and disputed. If the appeal is minimal in peasant democracies, it increases according to the extent to which the power serves a mighty will and a great talent. In the same way as personality, talent also becomes free and, in all directions, a free course and path is opened to it. It asserts itself not only at the head of armies or popular assemblies, but extends also into art and science. For where despotism rules, truth and beauty are also subject to a fixed type. Where society has become free, both strive to find a canon whose law is not determined by command [Vorschrift] but instead by general and voluntary agreement. If, in Asia, the despotic rule of one and, in Athens, the unlimited rule of the people, did not give rise to the standing of the state, it is an impressive spectacle to see how Rome fulfills its destination by making the whole majesty of the state appear. The state was never wanted for its own sake more than in Rome, where, on the one side, everything was subordinated to it. Even the priesthood was a state title. The augurs and the pontifex maximus were magistrates, who, once bestowed these dignities, were members of the senate. Even after the expulsion of kings, a rex sacrorum remained in the place of some of these performed, sacred ceremonies.53 On the other side, the person—not the one who goes beyond the state, but who is in the state—has become the highest point of attention for a legislation which, from the first beginnings to the most exhaustive achievement, developed with a necessity in a form which remains valid as a model for all times. There is in the Roman essence something that disappears neither with the expulsion of the kings, nor with the later passage to individual rulers of a different kind. Those who call the constitution introduced by that change republican are wrong. The form of the state was a republic, but the spirit of the state was monarchic in the highest sense. [544] The state could not be so wanted that it could appear as the end goal, unless it were fulfilled and driven by the idea of singular absolute rule, i.e., world domination. The Republic did not dissolve because of internal disputes or because of

53 Montesquieu, “Politique des Romains dans la Religion,” in Oeuvres de Montesquieu, vol. 1, ed. Destutt de Tracy (Paris: Dalibon, 1827), 373. “The Kings of Rome had a kind of priesthood: there were certain ceremonies only they could conduct. When the Roman Kings were deposed, there was a fear that the people would notice some change in their religion; this led to the establishment of a judge called rex sacrorum, who, in sacrifices, provided the functions of the ancient kings .... This was the only vestige of royalty that the Romans preserved amongst themselves” [trans. and ref. IG].
the fighting of the plebeians against the patricians. This could have been appeased by concessions, without any change in the great course of the state. Nor was it endangered by the vices of society, which had been more and more powerfully erupting since the Punic victories, but especially since the submission of Greece. The problem was not participation in science and the arts, with which formerly no free citizens, but only freed ones occupied themselves, and in which traditionally minded people alone had already sensed an Augustinian age. Not because of all of this did the Republic perish, but only because of its attained greatness and the fulfillment of its purpose. For what Aristotle says of the Lacedaemonians could also be said of the Romans: they sustained themselves as long as they waged war, and they were lost, because they didn’t know how to begin anything at leisure. The latter point says, in the sense of Aristotle, nothing more than that the state is only an end for them, and cannot at the same time become a means for other, higher goods. The urge to unrestricted rule, satisfied from the outside and without object, had to turn itself inward, back to the source, to Rome itself. What conquered the world was not also powerful enough to rule it. As the world had become a kingdom, the ruler also had to be only one, and even he could only be a god, a principle which was not derived from this world, i.e., the Roman world. Through the dark and fumbling quest for this necessary principle, which it is however impossible to reach, the Roman world was set outside of itself. From this the uncanny and atrocious aspects of the history of emperors is explained: on the one side, the unhesitating deification of rulers, on the other, the religious faithlessness of the people itself, the [545] downright atheism, professed by many Romans, and in contrast, the fondness for Eastern religions, in which there was more mystery, because there was more unity. These customs spread most widely in the city, where, as Tacitus complains when mentioning the infiltration of Christianity into Rome, everything atrocious and repulsive came together and was celebrated. Even the better rulers were affected by the growing despair, by the fact that neither purpose nor truth was anymore recognized in anything, not even in one’s own action. The melancholy of the whole world view can be found in the writings of someone like Marcus Antonius, just as we recall the madness of Elagabalus, who wished that the Syrian god whose name he bore (and whom he served as a priest) should be the only one honored in Rome, recommending not only that all that was sacred to the Roman religion (the fire of the Vesta, the palladium, etc.), but also all that the religions of the Jews and the Samaritans

54 Montesquieu actually says the same thing in chapter six of “Grandeur et decadence des Romains,” in Oeuvres de Montesquieu, vol. 1, ed. Destutt de Tracy (Paris: Dalibon, 1827), 166ff.
55 Aristotle, Politics II.9, 1285b8-19 and VII.13, 1334a8-10 [ref. IG].
56 Tacitus, Annals XV.44 (“Nero fastened the guilt and inflicted the most exquisite tortures on a class hated for their abominations, called Christians by the populace. Christus, from whom the name had its origin, suffered the extreme penalty during the reign of Tiberius at the hands of one of our procurators, Pontius Pilatus, and a most mischievous superstition, thus checked for the moment, again broke out not only in Judæa, the first source of the evil, but even in Rome, where all things hideous and shameful from every part of the world find their centre and become popular” [note: IG]).
regarded as venerable ought to be brought together and revered in one temple. And because the emperor himself had assumed for himself the name of God, the thought arose, as Montesquieu presents it, that he should make himself over into the one unique God. The Romans sought monarchy, but in a way which it could not be achieved in the world. They went beyond the state and sought a world empire which was possible only for Christianity. Because they felt this lack, they became irreligious. They tried this with a secular monarchy, but in vain, because another principle had to come. The Roman Empire had only served another, the real world empire, laying its foundations. Constantine had to clarify the independence of religion from the state. By doing so, he made it clear that the state had now recognized itself as a means. With Christianity, the state received a different and higher end, i.e., one situated beyond itself. When this spiritual power later wanted to show itself as a state power, it was a misunderstanding and error. Beyond the fact that the spiritual power thereby reduced itself to a secular means, the state was once again robbed of its (higher) end. Naturally, then, in the same way that the higher (that for which the state was supposed to act as a bearer) sank, the state rose again in every way (Louis XIV). This triggered, however, as the contradiction against the state, the revolt of the individual principle. The Reformation protested against the false theocracy. This was the real deed of the German people. Everyone knows through which means the Reformation was pushed back in certain parts. In this great event, the historical destiny of the Germans and their never-to-be-abandoned vocation expressed themselves: to recognize and realize—above the political unity, which, because of the Reformation, had to disappear—a higher unity. With the destruction of the idol, the Germans took over the task of setting in its place true theocracy. This could not express itself in the rule of proxies or priests. It could only show itself as the rule of the recognized, divine spirit itself.

Let us return now, however, to where we began. It was our task to show that the state (certainly not just any state), instead of suppressing individual freedom, far

57 Aelius Lampridius, *Antoninus Elagabalus III*, in David Mach (trans.), *Historia Augusta II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1924) [ref. IG].
58 Montesquieu, “Grandeur et decadence des Romains,” in *Oeuvres de Montesquieu*, vol. 1, ed. Destutt de Tracy (Paris: Dalibon, 1827), 114. (“Heliogabalus had even formed a resolution to destroy every object of religious veneration in Rome, and to banish all the gods from their temples, that he might place his own in their room” [trans. IG]).
more makes it first possible. The state is that which raises the individual to a person. From this it does not follow, however, that the state is not nevertheless felt by the I as compulsion. It cannot be otherwise. The striving to escape this compulsion is only natural, and there is nothing to object to this, if it is deployed in the right manner. Even more, among those to whom the topmost direction of the affairs of the state is entrusted, the ones who are always taken to be the wisest are the ones who have made it the law for themselves to leave individuals as free as possible, while retaining for the general population a sharp eye and, where necessary, a sharp sword. The wisdom of our ancestors knew, moreover, the importance of forming certain autonomous circles within the state, inside which the individual knew himself to be free from the state. The honor conferred to each by his social estate (even the peasant and artisan) raised him above the humiliation of complete submission to the state.

It is otherwise, when the striving to make oneself independent from the state becomes the attempt to abolish the state itself, i.e., the state in its basis—practically, by a coup d’État, which, if it is planned, is a crime equal to no other. Only a parricide (parricidium) is similarly regarded. Theoretically, this can be found in doctrines that seek to make the state as comparable and suitable to the I as much as possible—completely contrary to the truth. For indeed, the state is not established to cater to or reward the I, but rather for its punishment. What it demands, we owe it, i.e., it is a debt which we must repay or clear. One can say: the intelligible order of things, from which a person has detached himself, is transformed into a debt owed to the state. Even so, these doctrines have met with near universal approval and have spread irresistibly. (No one could have suspected the number of learned men of the state who shared this attitude in the time that has just passed us by.) This general approval compels us to acknowledge that these doctrines emerged from something that speaks for them in every human being. In the final instance, this can only be that principle that, after it has once willed itself, now also wants to be complete of its own self. Feeling itself to be more powerful than reason, it creates a reason for itself. It is this reason at the service of the I [548] that the edifying orators of the most recent times hold to be reason itself. This in turn serves as a pretext to attribute all sorts of calamity, including the political, to reason, and to proclaim that, as a result, it is now all over with reason.

It is this reason, as I have said, that serves the I, and which here—where a practical interest, and not a purely theoretical one prevails—can only be sophist, and can only consistently lead to the total self-aggrandizement of the people, i.e., the undifferentiated masses. As a result, because an appearance of constitutionality is nevertheless not to be avoided, the people must be both sovereign and subject: as Kant explains, the sovereign as the people united, the subject as the scattered crowd. With reluctance (as one clearly sees), but conforming to the once accepted principles, Kant has to recognize the republic as the only rational and even legitimate constitution. Such a republic can accordingly only be the democratic one, which he himself says...
is the most all-comprising, the most intricate, i.e., to speak without beating around the bush, the most contradictory of all constitutions. In general, with regard to these questions, Kant differs from his descendants, Fichte and others, by his great practical understanding, and by the honesty of his deliberation, qualities of which the contradictions, which his doctrine of right could not always avoid, are only results and witnesses.

We have recognized as justified and necessary a striving of humanity to overcome the burden of the state. But this overcoming must be understood as internal. With the application of an old word, we could say: first seek this inner realm, then the inevitable oppressiveness of the lawful external order will no longer be present for you, and you will not be especially bothered by “the insolence of office” that Hamlet mentions as one of the intolerabilities which could drive us out of this life. To exist beyond the state inwardly—not only may I,  but I should. Each should himself be an example of an independent moral disposition, and, if this moral disposition becomes that of an entire people, it is more powerful against oppression than the praised idol of a constitution, which, even in the country of its origin, has in many respects become a fable convenue. Do not envy England a constitution that owes its origin alone to the addition of non-reason—not through contract, but through force and violence. Indeed, it is unreason (in the liberal sense) that has ensured up to now its continuance and permanence. Be as little envious of England for its constitution as you would be for its large, raw masses, or its insular position that permits many things for their constitution (like that of Crete at one time) that other states are denied by geography. Even worse, it can mislead an unscrupulous government through devious machinations to stir up insurrections in foreign states, even while afterwards easily leaving their implements high and dry. They incite a state of war that cannot be responded to, or, at least cannot be responded to by weak governments.

Let yourselves in contrast be scolded as a non-political people, because most of you crave more to be governed (although this is often not granted them and if so, badly enough) than to govern, because you esteem the leisure (σχολή) that leaves the spirit and the mind free for other things, for a greater than an annually

61 Kant, “Metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of right,” §47. Compare §51 of Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 459, 479-80; Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6, 315-6; 338-9. Compare in the Akademie der Wissenschaften edition, 320 and in the aforementioned translation, 463: “For a people to be authorised to resist, there would have to be a public law permitting it to resist, that is, the highest legislation would have to contain a provision that it is not the highest and that makes the people, as subject, by one and the same judgment sovereign over him to who it is subject. This is self-contradictory” [note provided by IG].

62 Precisely in England the time is approaching in which public political struggles no longer revolve around rights of closed classes, but around the interests and ambitious plans of individuals [trans. KB]. Addition from IG: [The phrase “fable convenue” comes from Helveitus’ De l’esprit (Paris: Durand, 1758), 592: “L’histoire n’est qu’une fable convenue [history is only a fable agreed upon.]”]

63 Compare Aristotle, Politics, II.10, 1271b20-1272b22.
recurrent political bickering that leads only to the formation of political factions—factions, whose worst aspect is to permit even the most incapable to gain a name and importance. Let yourselves deny all political spirit, because, like Aristotle, you regard as the first duty of the state is to grant leisure. Neither the rulers nor those who live without participating in the state are in a dishonorable position. Finally, as the teacher of Alexander the Great [550] might tell you, it is possible that even those who do not command land and sea will accomplish beautiful and felicitous things.

The state is the intelligible order itself become factual in the face of the factual world. The state thus has a root in eternity and is the enduring, never-to-be-abolished [nie aufzubebende] and no-more-to-be-investigated ground [Grundlage] of all human life and all further development. Because it is the precondition, true politics has to be prepared to mobilize all resources for its preservation, just as in war, where the state is the goal. Insofar as it is the ground [Grundlage] it is not itself the goal, but the eternal (and thus never to be abolished or put into question) starting point for the higher goal of all spiritual life. Because the state is not an object, but only the presupposition of all progress, it is to be treated accordingly. How much better would it be, if this view were universal—not to search for progress in the state.

With regard to the ground of the state, we want the purpose of reason and the necessity of the matter to prevail. It is important not to jeopardize the higher goods for which the state is a prerequisite by false malleability in regard to principles. Progressive development will also benefit, for it [the State] participates in progress without being its principle. The state itself is the stable (the thing of the past). It should rest in silence, allowing only

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64 Aristotle, Politics II.10, 1273a34-5: ὅπωσ οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἀσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἰδιωτεύοντες (һорош бе велитисай схолазей кай мед' асехомоней, мे монон архонте алла мед' идизионтес) (the best citizens may be able to have leisure and may not have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only in office but also when living in private life,” trans. IG). Compare Aristotle, Politics VII.14, 15.

65 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.8, 1179a4-5: Δυνατὸν καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντας γῆς καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλὰ (Dynaton кай мед' архонтес гес кай сталатас пратtein та кала). (It is possible to perform noble deeds without being ruler [trans. IG]). Concerning the Greek race, Aristotle says that it is “ἐνθυμον καὶ διανοητικόν” (энтимон кай дияноетикон) (remaining free therefore)—“καὶ δυνάμενον ἄρχειν πάντων, μίας τυχόν χάριν πολιτείας” (кай динаменон арчейн пантон, миас тухон харин политейас) (... both spirited and intelligent ... and capable of ruling all mankind if it attains constitutional unity [trans. IG]). Aristotle, Politics VII.7, 1327b30-33.

66 The presupposition here cannot be once again put into question. It is a fact buried in an abysmal past, and, as Kant himself says (Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6, 318-9), is inexplicable in a practical regard. But to bring about ruin, it is not necessary to question this last fact. The intention to combat all that is factual in the state is already pernicious enough, especially when it cannot be foreseen where this aspiration will stop and be restrained; whereas at the moment in which it would have been possible to eliminate all that is empirical and irrational, the state would have to dissolve, because it only in the empirical does it have its stability and strength. In fact, all those who get onto this slope cannot stop until even ethical imperatives—marriage, property, possession—would have been eliminated.

67 One finds oneself in error thus regarding the causes of the revolution when one believes that the state is guilty, whereas that depends in fact on that which is situated beyond it.
reform (not revolution). Like nature, it can be embellished, but it cannot be made to be other than it is. It must remain as long as this world exists. To make itself insensitive, as nature is insensitive, to grant the individual rest and leisure, to be the means and the impetus to the attainment of the higher goal: that is what the state should do. In this alone lies its perfectibility. The task is therefore: to provide the individual with the greatest possible freedom (autarchy), freedom, namely, that rises above and, as it were, beyond the state. But it should not react back on the state or in the state. For with this the exact opposite occurs from what should happen, as our constitutional arrangements show when they allow the state to absorb all. Instead of granting leisure to the individual, it pulls him rather into everything. It claims everyone for itself, making each bear the burden of the state. True monarchy sees in the active working participants in the state not those who have privileges, but instead those bound by duty. This is what allows others to enjoy the advantages alone.

As a purely external, factual community in the face of the factual world, the state cannot be an end. For precisely this reason therefore, the most perfect state is not the goal of history. There is just as little a perfect state as there is (in the same line) a completed human being. The most perfect state certainly has its place in the philosophy of history, but completely on the negative side.68 There was a time in which it was natural and forgivable to think an ideal as the goal of history and to seek it in the perfect state, in the state of accomplished right. But it is in general a false presupposition that there could be an ideal state of affairs inside this world that, if it were ideal, it would also necessarily have to be enduring and eternal. We see that this world, as simply a passing state of affairs, cannot endure. The present order is not an end, it is only to be wiped away. It is thus not this order itself that is the goal, but the goal is the order that is determined to take its place. Even the “moderate” monarchy, in which the state knows itself merely as a ground, is not the ideal of a political constitution perfectly in accord with reason.69 When one seeks a perfect state in this world, (apocalyptic) fanaticism [Schwärmerei] is the result.70

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68 See SW XI: 242 above. Here—on the negative side—reason only asks: What does the idea of the state (the community) entail? What possibilities? What goal? The positive side is that which divine providence comprehends as the agent of history).

69 Monarchy is incidentally in any case already moderate in that there are still only partial states.

70 “Qualemunque formam gubernationis animo finxeris, nunquam incommodes et periculis cavebis,” Hugo Grotius, *De jure belli et pacis*, book II.
Lecture 24\textsuperscript{71}

In reference to the higher development, the state is thus nothing more than foundation, assumption, entry-point, and it also only in this sense that it was treated in these lectures. Progress lies in that which passes beyond the state. But that which surpasses it is the individual. It is with him, and his internal relation to the law, that we are now once again concerned. For as beneficial as the observation of the law that is imposed from the outside (by the state) is, when one reflects on how weak most men’s adherence to duty is, it is still not enough. For the law itself concerns the inner life, and, because the state is indifferent to moral disposition, the assessment of the latter is left up that much more to the individual. No one is in bondage to the state, but each is unconditionally bound to the moral law. The state is something with which one comes to terms, in relation to which one can behave in a completely passive manner. This is not the case with the ethical law. The state, as powerful as it is said to be, can only lead to an external, i.e., factual justice. Inversely, as impotent as the state might be, especially if it were to dissolve completely, that internal [554] law that is written in the heart remains and is all the more urgent. The external law of the state is itself only the consequence of this inner compulsion, and therefore no longer comes into consideration once we speak of this.

But here it comes to light what the I has gotten itself into in getting away from God. Separated from God, it is held captive under the law as if under a distinct power of God.\textsuperscript{72} It can neither go beyond this power, because it is completely bent under it, nor can it escape it, for the law is, so to speak, intertwined with the will of the I and engraved into it. Nor is the I happy with itself under the law. Aversion for and antipathy toward the law is its first and natural feeling, and so the more natural, the more harsh and unmerciful, the law appears to it.\textsuperscript{73} For, as something universal and impersonal, it cannot be otherwise but hard. As a power of reason, it knows so little of personality that it does not even leave an iota for the sake of the person. Even if its requirements are completely satisfied, it gives no thanks to the person (even if

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\textsuperscript{71} In its present shape, this lecture was not extant among the author’s literary remains. The completed manuscript ends with [an] announcement to the German people towards the end of the forgoing lecture. From there until the end of this lecture however the following arguments are fully extant in several conceptual outlines, so that it required only that these be put together in order to produce the lecture in its present form [note K.F.A. Schelling, trans. IG].

\textsuperscript{72} It is absurd to conceive of the moral law immediately as divine, or to want to mingle God with natural law. God is rather hidden by the law, and must remain so, so that the law can be disciplinarian. If one wanted to subordinate all to religion, there would be no more morality or doctrines of rational rights; it would be as if one wanted to deny rational science in general. Certainly, if there was no God, there would also be no reason (reason would not be a power). But one must not conclude from this that the moral law only has meaning for us as divine law (and that morality is to be entirely reduced to theology).

\textsuperscript{73} “Therefore, the more the law dictates what he cannot do, the more hostile the human is towards it,” says Luther in the preface to Paul’s Letter to the Romans.
everything is done, we are nevertheless still futile slaves). Even being commanded would not be so bothersome to the I if only it originated from a person, but to be subjugated by an impersonal power is degrading. He, who wants to be himself, has to see himself subjected to the universal.74

[555] But peace would not be achieved even if one actively resisted the aversion that, after all, is more a matter of form than content (form, since the law is commanded, while the I wants to be entirely free). Even if one could find for himself what is best in the law (due to the intelligible side of his being, always a possibility), peace would still not be achieved.75 In the very moment one realizes this, it becomes apparent that the law leads a person to death. How can it possibly be fulfilled, when one lacks the moral disposition76 that the law itself is unable to give? The law is unable to give man a heart that would be equal to the law. Instead, it increases the power of sin. Instead of wiping away the disparity between the law and man, it enhances it in many different ways. This happens to such a high degree that in the end all moral behavior appears reprehensible and all life fragile and flawed.77

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74 The imperfection inherent to the law itself rests on the impersonality of the law. But one is tempted to deny this, when the law is represented as divine. As impersonal and general is the law 1) concerned merely with the common, and there is nothing in it for the individual. It speaks to the individual, but its aim is only the human race; 2) it also does not say what to do and is thus purely negative (in fact, this was already expressed in the first point); 3) the moral has no goal in the sense that, even if I have accomplished everything, nothing has nevertheless been achieved. Therefore, the law is just an incidental achievement (ὅ νόμος παρεισῆλθε [ho nómos pareisēlthe], Romans 5, 20). It has its end in another, and, when it is there, it stops in this form of imperfect law τέλος τοῦ νόμου Χριστός (telos tou nóou Christós) (“The end of the law is Christ”), Romans 5, 20. Kant does not see this incompleteness of the law and thereby deprives himself of the true path to reach where he wants to go. Here, his critical sense abandons him.

75 Compare with the unequal struggle of the man of good will with the overburdening flesh, in chapter 7 of Paul’s Letter to the Romans.

76 There is no morality in Kant’s meaning, i.e., from pure respect. As Luther says, that requires “a voluntary, cheerful heart.” Self-respect keeps us from misfortune, but it does not make us happy. Even Kant admits that when he lets happiness be something foreign. [Note added by IG: In section V.B of the Introduction to Part II of “The Metaphysics of Morals,” in Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4, 387ff, Kant undertakes to demonstrate that only others’ happiness, and not my own, can furnish an end that is also a duty. At VI: 393, he entitles this “Fremde Glückseligkeit,” or ‘the happiness of others,’ and happiness is explained as a mere “accompaniment” in the “Critique of Practical Reason,” in Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, 22].

77 “But nobody can give such a heart, except the spirit of God, that makes the human equal to the law, in such a way that with all of his heart he desires the law,” Luther, Preface to St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans (1522).

78 Compare the passages on human wretchedness in the Greek poets, Iliad, XVII, 446 (“There is
However, it is exactly here, at the point where the end of the law, the negation of the I, is almost achieved, that a turning point occurs. The possibility presents itself namely to the I, not to abolish itself in its godless and baleful condition, but to renounce itself as an acting being, to withdraw itself into itself, to surrender its selfhood. In doing this it has no aim other than to withdraw from the insanctity of action, to flee from the demands of the law into the contemplative life. For this purpose, it is solicited by the moral conscience itself, for it is conscience (the potential God) that draws it away from its own self-wanting. But, with this step from the active to the contemplative life, the I also passes over at the same time to the side of God. Without knowing anything of God, it seeks a godly life in this ungodly world. Because this seeking is done in the renunciation of the very selfhood through which it separated itself from God, it is able once again to touch the divine itself. The spirit, namely, that withdraws into itself, gives space to the soul. But the soul by nature is that which can touch God. It is the real θεῖον [theîon] in its nature\(^79\) that emerges here. But this emergence does not happen on the level of the genus, but only in the individual.\(^80\) This possibility of the spirit to withdraw itself into itself, proves to be the power [Potenz] to turn back towards God, a power that that active being retained in itself as it turned away from God. It is A\(^80\)’s essence that emerges, after the contingent within it (that which defected from God) was broken and reduced to nullity. The entrance of the I into contemplative life is thus a rediscovery of God (making God once again objective for it), but of course, as we will see, God only as an idea.

This rediscovery of God however has different degrees, which must be considered similarly as stations of the return to God. The first stage is that in which the I seeks to execute the act of forgetting itself, the abnegation of itself. It presents itself in that mystical piety, whose sense we find expressed most acutely by Fénelon. It consists in a person’s quest to become like nothing (but not to annihilate oneself) and at the same time to regard as nothing whatever contingent \(\text{Seyn}\) one is faced with.\(^81\)

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79 Τὸ βέλτιστον ἐν ψυχῇ (Tò béltiston en psychē) (“the best part of the soul”), [trans. IG]. Plato, Republic, Book VII 532c.

80 The genus or the race has only an indirect relation to God, namely precisely in the law, where God dis potential to him, i.e., enclosed; only the individual has a direct relationship to God, can seek it, and when he reveals Himself, receive it.

81 In his Démonstration de l’Éxistence de Dieu, Fenelon expresses this abandonment of selfhood thus: nous désapproprier notre volonté (abandon possession of our will) and describes this mystical piety in these words: “Nous avons rien à nous que notre volonté, tout le reste n’est pas à vous. La maladie enlève la santé et la vie; les richesses—les talens de l’esprit dependent du corps. L’unique chose, qui est véritablement à vous, c’est votre volonté. Aussi est-ce elle, dont Dieu est jaloux. Car il nous l’a donnée non afin que nous la gardions et que nous en demeurons toute entière, telle que nous l’avons recue et sans en rien rétenir. Quiconque reserve le moindre désir ou la moindre repugnance en propriété, fait un larcin à Dieu.—Combien d’amis
The second stage is the art by which the I makes itself akin to the divine (ὁμοίωσις), seeking to bring forth a divine personality in order to fuse with it. It is the art that produces enchantment, in which the spirit becomes soul (in completely selfless production). It is something that only happens to artists of the highest calibre. Without them knowing or [558] understanding it, it unfolds through a true inner determination of their nature.

Following art, as the third stage, is contemplative science. In this, the I elevates itself above knowledge that is practical and merely natural [dianoetic], in order to touch being-for-its-own-sake (ἀυτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ, αὐτῷ τῷ νῷ [autēi tēi psychēi, autōi tōi nōi]). Spirit that withdraws into itself and renounces the practical attains the pure θέα [théa], where it immediately touches the intelligible. Thus νοῦς [noûs] has the same relationship to the purely intelligible that sense has to the sensible (τὸ νοεῖν ὡσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι [tò noeîn hṓsper tò aisthánesthai]). Insofar as spirit seeks to make itself potentiality, it behaves passively. Coming thereby into possession of itself, it returns again to the (theoretical) life that contemplates of God. This was the life that was initially destined for A and that spirit, after making its whole journey, now considers as its highest goal.

Here is thus what the I can attain in its search to escape its insanctity and to save itself in its world. The I indeed seems to have its satisfaction in the good attained proprietaires d’elles- mêmes?” For the full text, consult François de Salignac de La Mothe-Fénelon, “Démonstration de l’existence de Dieu, tirée du spectacle de la Nature et de la connaissance de l’homme,” Traité de l’existence et des attributs de Dieu, in OEuvres de Fénelon, vol. 1 (Versailles: Lebel, 1820). The cited passage in English: “We ourselves have nothing but our will, all the rest is yours. Disease removes health and life: wealth, the talents of the spirit depend on the body. The one thing that is genuinely yours is your will. It is this, too, of which God is jealous. For he gave it to us not so that we might keep it and that it remains for us entirely as we received it from you without your keeping any of it. Whoever retains the least desire or the least loathing for property makes theft from God. How many souls own themselves?” [trans. IG].

Fenelon even calls this self-renunciation (self-expropriation) entire indifférence même pour le salut (“complete indifference towards salvation” [trans. IG]) [Cf. “Lettre du 13 mai 1967 au marquis de Blainville”].

82 To show the place of art in rational philosophy, compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.4, 1140a1-23 [trans. IG].

83 Here the Nous appears in its highest degree as awakening science and producing it freely. It should be noted that rational philosophy like contemplative science enters here itself as a moment in the development of contemplative science.

84 ("with the soul itself, with the intellect itself"). See notes to SW XI: 316 and 356. It is νοῦς [noûs] that in the highest science again frees the soul, raises it from the potency in which it had placed it and, with the free soul (αυτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ [autēi tēi psychēi] knows the eternal [trans. IG].

85 (“Thinking is analogous to perceiving,” [trans. IG]). Aristotel, De Anima, III.4, 429a14.

86 Just as here art and sciences are degrees of beatitude (but as we will see, of a purely negative beatitude), in the same way for the Greeks poetry (Homer) and visual arts (Phidias) are liberating in regards to the legal state and legal religion. That which for us is the entrance of spirit in the soul is ἀθανάτιζειν (athantízein) (making oneself immortal) for Aristotle. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.7, 1177b35. Compare, further, the entire seventh chapter, in which the contemplative life is described as the most godlike. Equally notable is the passage in Plato’s Theaetetus 176a[b]: διὸ καὶ περὶσσαι χρῆ ἐνθένδε (ἀπὸ τῆς θνητῆς φύσεως) ἐκάστος φιάγειν ὅτι τάχιστα: φυγή δὲ ὡμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (dión kai peinásthai.
through contemplation, for it has God, from whom it separated itself in practice, once again in knowledge. The I has an ideal in God [559] by which it raises itself above itself, thereby coming free of itself. But it only has an ideal relation to this God and cannot have any other relation to him. Contemplative science leads only to the God that is end, and that is not the actual God. It leads only to the one who is God in essence, not God in actuality.\textsuperscript{87} Maybe the I could be satisfied [560] with this purely

\textit{chrē enthénde [apò tēs tinhêtes phýseos] ekete phèugein bòti táchista: phygê dè homoiosis tòi theòi katà tò dynatón}. (Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth (from mortal nature) to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible [trans IG]). Compare Plato, \textit{Philebus}, 62. [At 62ab, Socrates defines a man concerned with divine knowledge as having “sufficient knowledge, if he is master of the divine circle and sphere” as well therefore as of “our human sphere and human circles” [note and trans. IG; IG adds that “Escape is not abandonment, seems to be Schelling’s point”].

\textsuperscript{87} Here is historically the point at which ancient philosophy arrived at God as final cause, to A\textsuperscript{4} in its pure self-being. The highest distinction was already made between Being in being [\textit{Seyende seyn}] and the self-being of God [\textit{Selbstseyn Gottes}]. Through separating itself outside being, A\textsuperscript{4} in the rational philosophy is set in pure self-being. In this separate state it is (and it is thus that we find it in Aristotle) pure \textit{heautoù ýchei} (\textit{beautóù échon}) (self-possession), fixed, eternally identical to itself, passive, final cause, not efficient cause (\textit{aítion télkon}, \textit{ou poiëtikòn}), or, as Aristotle states in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, X.8 1178b21, \textit{tòi práttein áprakrímmenos, éti dé mállon tôn toù poieiù (tòi práttein áphaironimenas, eti dè mallon tôn poiêtaù)} (if action is withdrawn, creation even more so). It is that which moves all, but only as end, such that it does not move itself (\textit{hò pánta kínoùn às télòs, autòs akínêtos}) (ho pánta kinôn hòs têlos, autòs akínêtos). As inactive towards the exterior, it thinks and intuits only itself, it is thought of thought (\textit{noëseos nóësis}), that which is certainly something completely different than thought on thought, about which one has often cited in an incorrect and forced manner. The real sense of the expression is this: God is only the infinite act of thinking—the infinite, i.e. always thinking anew (and not an external object that would limit him) (Cf. Aristotle, \textit{Eudemian Ethics} VII.12, 1245b17-18: \textit{ou yáv oúto ò thèse ò ýchei, allá àphairon hé òstí òllo tò noeî par' autòn (ou gár bouïto bo theoi ét h échei, allá àphairon hé åste állo tò noeî par' hautón}) (it is not thus that god is happy, he is too good to think of anything else but himself). The difficulties which one finds in Aristotle regarding the closer determination of the self-vision of God, one finds in Aristotle, \textit{Magna Moralia} II.15, 1212b34-1213a7. The same difficulty can be felt in Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} VII.14, 1154b26-32, ([=] \textit{Eudemian Ethics} VI.14).

God is here, according to the expressions of German philosophy, the \textit{Subject-Object} which begins and cannot quit himself. Those who only see arbitrariness in philosophy do not know to which point, in completely different individuals, the identical concepts have reappeared, thus proving their necessary activity: for those who discovered this philosophy where God begins as the Subject-Object only had an inferior knowledge of Aristotle than that which has been able to be attributed to them. If, for Aristotle, God is only at the end and \textit{ápraktos tás ýxò práxeis} (\textit{ápraktos tás év práxeis}) (“accomplishes no action towards the outside”), so God is for him thus no more than a simple concept. Even if Aristotle possesses this last (term) as existing, it is as if it did not exist, seeing as it cannot do anything, and with it nothing can begin. One could find it inconceivable to which point the negative side of this determination has been invisible, just as much in Aristotle as in modern philosophy. As that which possess itself, without being able to leave itself, he is spirit only by essence, only ideal spirit, but it is an abuse [\textit{Missbrauch}] to speak here of absolute spirit.

If God in his self-being is in Aristotle that which possess itself (\textit{ýchei éautòtou} (échon éautòtou)), then for Plato, in this separate state, it is that which is willed because of itself. In this regard one is unjust to Plato when he speaks simply here of the idea of the Good. Of concern for him is
ideal God if it could stay in the contemplative life. But that is plainly impossible. The renunciation of action does not allow itself to be implemented—it must act. But as soon as the active life picks up again, reality reasserts its right, and the ideal (passive) God is no longer sufficient. With this, the former despair returns. For the discrepancy is not abolished. Accordingly, the question poses itself as to what is still possible for the I and to where it will turn.

But even though we will not attain the end of the whole development here, we have already reached the goal of this science, the pure science of reason, and now we must linger on this issue before we move on to the next.

The task of the science of reason is to have the principle $A^0$ in its being-for-itself, free in regard to beings, and thus to have it as a principle, i.e., as the last and highest object ($τὸ μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην$ [$tò málista epistētón$]). This is now achieved. For it all came down to the I’s declaring itself as non-principle and subordinating itself under God (which it certainly had at the same time to acknowledge again). As soon as that had happened, the $A^0$ remained the real, the only and true principle, and this indeed in complete seclusion. For it had already been set in seclusion once the I had put itself forward in order to establish itself as the beginning of a supra-divine world [$561$], i.e., a world excluding God. But just as the principle centered in the self gives way to the higher and only true principle, in the same way now science (the only science valid up to now) gives way to a second science, in regard to which we said earlier that it is in fact for this science (the second science) that the principle was sought in the first place—for this is the science we actually wanted. The first now appears in reality as what it is: the philosophy which moves towards the principle. As such it is now certainly not the last and highest, but it remains the general (universal) science, the science of all sciences, insofar as it seeks the object both for all particular sciences and for the highest. For, as you remember, the first science ($ἡ πρώτη ἐπιστήμη$ [$hē prṓtē epistḗmē$]) arose from the fact that we simply let the possible principles come into play. As they emerged they became the causes of a being articulated into degrees, a succession of objects each of which can become the object of a science. In accord
to this succession, a particular series of sciences was given, from which one is derived that can rightfully be called the science of all sciences. But in the same way, it is also the initiator of that one science that begins with the principle from which the rest can be deduced. Because it concerns itself with the one supreme object that, at the end of the first science, still remains standing as the problem to be resolved, it is itself a particular science, not the science, but a science like all others. If philosophy did not have a particular object, it could not itself be a science, it would only be the science, i.e., universal science. This particular object can only be that for which there is no other science and which thus must be either excluded from all science or else constitute its (philosophy’s) own object, the object that suits it in the particular. As the last object found, it is the highest object and the one most worth knowing. In contrast with it, philosophy had regarded all the objects that came before it as nothing, as having no value for it. [562] Insofar therefore as the first science makes it possible for the second science (philosophy as a particular science) to possess its object, and insofar as it is however itself also philosophy, we must consider it correct when it is said that the object of philosophy can only be known through philosophy itself. But, as soon as the first philosophy has made the principle possible or produced it, it has achieved its end; for it can only produce the principle, not realize it. Therefore, this preliminary philosophy is also called negative philosophy. As important and indispensable as it is, it nevertheless knows nothing in relation to what alone is worth knowing and what can be deduced from it. For it only posits the principle by elimination, and thus negatively; it has the principle as what is alone truly real, but only as a concept, as a simple idea. Because in searching for the principle it looks only for the possibility of a philosophy, it is critique, as was the task for Kant.

Rational philosophy, or as we now call it, negative philosophy, has, we would say, only made the principle possible. For this was first found in pure thought; after that, the project was to wrest it from its potentiality. Once this has occurred, the principle thus produced is still only the principle found in thought; nothing has changed here (with regard to existence) to alter the standpoint of pure thought. But through the process of the science of reason, the nature of the principle has been demonstrated or confirmed, namely that it is the natura necessaria, as that which is actus essentiâ (essentially actual) (ὅù ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια [hoû hé ousía energeia]). God is now posited outside of the absolute idea, in which he was very nearly lost, and now appears in his idea. As such, though, it is still only idea. We find God in a concept, but not in actual being [Seyn]. For in this science everything is enclosed in reason, and thus also God, even though he is now rightly conceived as he who, in himself, is not enclosed [563]

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90 See SW XI: 368.

91 In the absolute idea is not only being [das Seyende], rather that which the being is also belongs there together with potency; substance in the highest sense, which, because it cannot transition into anything else (for there is no mere capacity in it) remains standing as pure actuality and nevertheless emerges from indifference only as a final possibility [trans. IG].
in reason, i.e., in eternal ideas. And even if, as Kant says, each proposition of existence is synthetic, i.e., a proposition through which I go beyond the concept, this does not apply to the pure *that* (freed of all universality) as it is left standing at the end of rational science. Clearly, the pure and abstract “that” is not the object of a synthetic proposition.

But if, now, what is *actus essentiâ* is also posited outside of its concept, so that it is not only the *essentiâ* or *naturâ*, but *actu* and actually the being that really is (*das actu Aktus Seyende*), then the principle is no longer posited as a principle in the same sense that we demanded of it as the goal of the philosophy of reason. In that moment, we wanted to have it free from the being [*Seyenden*] that really is. It was sought as a result, and it was only a question of the (abstract) principle. Now, rather, it stands as a *principle* in the real sense of the word, namely as *beginning*—as the beginning of that science that has that which is real being (*das Seyende*), the real being itself (*αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν*), as a principle, i.e., as that from which everything else derives. Up to this point we designated it simply as the science for whose sake we were searching (through the means of the first science) for the principle. Now, we call it, in opposition to that first (negative) philosophy, positive philosophy. The former is negative because its only concern is the possibility (the “what”). Whatever it recognizes it recognizes in pure thought, independent of all existence. Existing things were deduced from it (otherwise it would not be a rational science, i.e., an *a priori* science for which there is an *a posteriori*). But what was not deduced from it was the fact that things exist.

This philosophy is negative because whatever it has exists only in the *concept*, even the ultimate [*das Letzte*] that is act in itself (what thus exists over and beyond existing things). This new philosophy, in contrast, is positive. It begins and goes out from existence [*ausgehen*]—from [664] existence, i.e., from the *actu* actual-being of that which was found, in the first science, as existing necessarily in the concept (as “natura Actus”). The new science initially has this only as the pure “that” (*Έν τι*), from which we go forward to the concept, to the “what” (to the being that is), to lead this existent to the point where it proves itself to be the actively (existing) Lord of being [*Herrn des Seyns*] (Lord of the world), as the personal real God. With that, all other being is simultaneously also explained in its *existence* as derived from this first *that*. In this way, a positive system is established that actually explains reality.

Thus, the difference of the two sciences in view from the beginning of this philosophical development reveals itself here to be the *opposition* of negative and positive philosophy, and so here would be the proper moment to discuss this opposition completely. But seeing that this discussion is extensive (the entire history

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92 “Critique of Practical Reason,” in Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, 139: “Every existential proposition—that is, every proposition that says, of a being of which I frame a concept, that it exists—is a synthetic proposition” [note and trans. IG].

93 See SW XI, 361ff.

94 Idealism does not explain actuality [*Wirklichkeit*], rather the type of actuality, Cf. p. 376 above.
of philosophy demonstrates a fight between negative and positive philosophy) and that it forms a complete series of lectures, I constrain myself here to the following brief remark. The first science, in its end, arrived at something that does not allow itself to be known by means of its method. It had thereby exhausted itself, and that which remained in the end unknown and for it unknowable, it handed over to the second philosophy. But this establishes for the second only an external, not an internal dependence. The latter would only be the case if negative philosophy were to hand its object over to positive philosophy as something already known. Positive philosophy could possibly begin for itself, with the simple claim: “I want that, which is beyond being” [“Ich will das, was über dem Seyn ist”], and as a matter of fact we will see how the actual transition to positive philosophy does happen through such a willing. But if positive philosophy is from the start a philosophy offset from and different from negative philosophy, the correlation, indeed the unity of the two is nevertheless to be affirmed. Philosophy is at the same time one, namely philosophy, which both searches for its object, and has its object and brings it to knowledge. The positive is what is real in the negative, but not yet as actual. [565] Rather, it is there as that which searches for itself, as was shown in the whole trajectory which has now come to its end.

If the principle is taken as a beginning, as the beginning of another science that is no longer the science of reason (for reason is not able to begin anything with it), then it ceases as well to be simple idea or in the idea: it is posited outside of its concept. It is freed from the reason in which it was trapped; indeed, it is expelled [ausgestoßen] from reason. At the same time there is a reversal of the previous relation between that which being is [dem was das Seyende ist] (A⁰) and the being that it is [dem Seyenden] (- A + A ± A). Because the first of these becomes the beginning (prius), the latter (which by the way is inseparable from it) cannot precede it. It must thus follow it, and the first problem will be to demonstrate how this is possible, though for now we are not yet so far. For we still have to resolve the main question: who or what shall originate the expulsion of A⁰ from reason and with it the corresponding reversal of reason (the transition to positive philosophy)? Here it must be said that the transition cannot come from thought. While it is true that what pushes us to the second science lies in the last concept of the first, it is also true that thought can begin nothing with this pure that (which comes last in rational philosophy). In order for science to arise, the universal, the “what,” must be added on. It can now only be consequent, and not antecedent. The science of reason thus actually drives beyond itself and pushes toward the reversal; but this itself cannot come from thought. For that, a practical impulse [Antrieb] is required. In thought there is nothing practical, the concept is only contemplative and is only concerned with the necessary, while here it is a question of something situated outside of necessity, of something willed. There must be a will from which the expulsion of A⁰ outside of reason, this last crisis of the science of reason, must proceed. It is a will that with inner necessity demands that God be more than simply an idea. We are speaking of a last crisis of the science of reason. The
first was namely the expulsion of the I outside of the idea. [566] This changed the character of the science of reason, but it itself remained.\textsuperscript{95} The great, last and real crisis consists now in that God, the last to be found, is expelled from the idea. With that expulsion, rational science is itself abandoned (rejected). Negative philosophy thus culminates in the destruction of the idea (just as Kant’s critique actually culminates in the humiliation [Demütigung] of reason). Or, in other words, its final result is the recognition that what truly is (das wahrhaft Seyende) is not the idea, but is first what lies outside of the idea, and is therefore more than the idea, κρεῖττον τοῦ λόγου [kreítton toû lógou].\textsuperscript{96}

But there can be no doubt as to what this will is exactly that provides the signal for the turn, and thus results in positive philosophy. It arises from the I that was abandoned in the moment it had to leave the contemplative life behind and the ultimate despair took hold of it. Even though the I had penetrated with noetic knowledge all the way to A\textsuperscript{0}, that did not help it in any way. It is still not free from the vanity of existence that it contracted and must now feel even more deeply after it has once again tasted knowledge of God. For only now does it first recognize the gap that lies between itself and God — and the extent to which the fall from God, which led to a being-outside-of-God, lies at the base of all moral action, rendering the I itself doubtful, in such a manner it has no rest, no peace, before this break is reconciled. The I is helped by no holiness [Seligkeit] other than that which would simultaneously redeem him. That is why he now calls out for God himself. Him, him, he wants to have, he wants to have the God that acts, the God in whom there is providence, he who, as a God who is himself factual can counter the facticity of the fall. It is he, in short, who is the LORD of being (not only transmundane, as is the case with God understood as final cause, but supramundane). In this God alone does he see the actual, highest Good. Even the sense of the contemplative life was no other than to penetrate beyond the universal all the way to personality. For person seeks person. However, through contemplation, the I can at best only [567] find the idea, and thus only the God that is in the idea. Such a God is enclosed in reason, in which he cannot move. The God who is sought is instead the God who is outside and above reason. To him only is possible that which for reason is impossible. Equal to the law, he can free us from the law. This is the God that the I wants now. And because the I certainly cannot assign himself the task of attaining him, it is necessary that, with his cooperation, God come to meet him.\textsuperscript{97} But what the I can do is to want God and hope to participate thanks to him in a salvation [Seligkeit] that—because neither moral action

\textsuperscript{95} See above [SW II/1] p. 421.
\textsuperscript{96} Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics VII.14, λόγου δ’ ἀρχὴ οὐ λόγος, ἀλλὰ τι κρεῖττον (lógou d’ arkhē ou lógos, allâ ti kreítton) (the starting point of reason is not reason but something superior to reason [trans. IG]).
\textsuperscript{97} “And do not hope to see the end of your suffering, before God comes to relieve you” (πρὶν ἂν θεὸς τις διάδοχος τῶν σῶν πόνων φανῇ (prin an theôns tis diádochos tôn sòn pònôn phanei) says Hermes to Prometheus (Schelling’s reference is “v. 1006-1007”; consult Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, 1027-8 [additional ref. IG]).
nor the contemplative life can reconcile the gap—would not be a *deserved* salvation (something proportioned, as Kant wanted), but an undeserved one, a beatific state that is incalculable and over-abundant. In Kant, who also wants to surpass the law, it is not the I, but only philosophy and proportionality that aspire, beyond the law, to a happiness that would thus be *deserved*. Such happiness would not amount to true union with God, but would instead remain relatively external and thus actually be sensuous.  

But I demand rather a bliss that would be removed of all particular being and also individual morality. The anticipated state of bliss would be clouded for me if I had to consider it again as an (at least mediated) product of my action.  

If it were nothing but a proportioned blessedness, it would be the ground of an eternal dissatisfaction. And thus the only option that remains (and no philosophical pride should hold us back here) is to accept with gratitude that which we otherwise can never achieve, but must be bestowed upon us undeservedly and through grace.

[568] The demand for this acting God and for redemption is, as you see, nothing other than the manifest need for—religion. With this, the path pursued by the I comes to an end. The I hopes to attain the joy of existing that it did not find by its own means, once it has God in reality and finds itself unified (reconciled) with him, i.e. through religion. Without an active God (which is not just an object of contemplation), there can be no religion—for this presupposes an effective, real relationship between God and man. Nor can there be history, for God acts in history as providence.

Within the science of reason there is no religion, and therefore in general there is no *rational religion* at all. At the end of negative philosophy, there is

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98 See Kant, “Critique of Practical Reason,” in Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, 114-5 below. Note IG: [“... that a virtuous disposition necessarily produces happiness is false not absolutely but only insofar as this disposition is regarded as the form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently false only if I assume existence in the sensible world to be the only kind of existence of a rational being; it is thus only conditionally false. [...] It is not possible that morality of disposition should have a [...] necessary connection, as cause with happiness as effect in the sensible world, if not immediately yet mediately ... a connection which, in a nature that is merely an object of the senses, can never occur except contingently and cannot suffice for the highest good.”]

99 According to Kant in the “Critique of Practical Reason,” in Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, 110-111: “Now inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute possession of the highest good in a person, and happiness distributed in exact proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy) constitutes the highest good of a possible world, the latter means the whole, the complete good, in which, however, virtue as the condition is always the supreme good, since it has no further condition above it, whereas happiness is something that, though always pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and in all respects good, but always presupposes morally lawful conduct as its condition.” Happiness is only a secondary element of the highest good, which is correct if the second is the higher. It is not pursued as the wages of morality, but as something higher, that the latter does not satisfy [ref. and trans. IG].

100 Negative philosophy certainly tells us what blessedness [*Seligkeit*] consists in, but does not help us attain it.

101 Through a philosophy of reason, a philosophy of the active history is impossible, even though we admit that the philosophy of history also has a negative side. See above, SW XI, 542.

102 One cannot object that, after the preceding, we have ourselves posited religion as a moment of
nothing but a possible religion. Instead of real religion, there is only a religion “within the boundaries of mere reason.” It would be an illusion to discern in the conclusion of rational philosophy a rational religion. Reason does not lead to religion, and it is thus also Kant’s theoretical conclusion that there is no rational religion. We know nothing of God: this is the conclusion of all authentic rationalism that understands itself. With the passage to positive philosophy, we enter for the first time into the domain of religion and of religions, and it is only now that we can hope that the philosophical religion emerges which has been the subject of this whole presentation, i.e., the religion that is called upon to really comprehend the real religions that are either mythological or revealed. Through this, we can now also see in a clearer manner that what we call philosophical religion has nothing to do with so-called rational religion. For, supposing that there would be such a religion, it would belong to a completely different sphere, and not to the sphere in which the philosophical has made itself manifest to us.

It has thus been shown, how the need for the I to possess God outside of reason (and not only God in thought or in the idea) is born out of the practical. This willing is not contingent, it is a willing of spirit that, by internal necessity and in the aspiration of its own freedom, cannot remained enclosed in thought. As this demand cannot come from thought, it is thus also not a postulate of practical reason. It is not a rational postulate, as Kant wants, but only the individual that leads to God. For it is not the universal in the human that seeks salvation, but the individual. If man is obliged (by moral consciousness or practical reason) to regulate his relation to other individuals according to the standard of the world of ideas, that can only satisfy the universal in him—reason—and not himself as an individual. The individual for himself can only aspire to happiness. By this, and from the beginning, i.e., from the moment the species is subjected to law, the following difference emerges: everything that is subsequently only postulated is done so by the individual, not by reason. For this reason it is also the I that, being itself personality, demands personality. It is the I that requires a person outside of the world and above the universal, someone who can hear him, a heart that would be the same as his own.

the science of reason; in any case, no one who wants a rational religion would admit or accept a religion that returns completely into the subject and cannot be separated from the ascetic, and which stands as a contradiction to all science. Rational philosophy knows nothing of a rational religion that would be at the same time a science (it is such a religion that all rationalists invoke, exactly as if they possessed it in an indubitable way, when in fact we would not find two people in agreement, if it were that we demand them to really erect it, rather than to simply continue to invoke it).

103 See above SW XI: 243ff and the beginning of the eleventh lecture. Compare also SW XI: 386 [additional ref. IG].

104 This search for the person is the same search which drives the state to a kingdom. The monarchy makes possible that which is impossible by the law, for laws, for example, which are valid in the state, are not valid for the state. Further, because it is necessary to take responsibility, it is necessary that a person exists who would be responsible (in front of a higher tribunal than that of the law), the king, who offers himself in sacrifice for the people. Furthermore, reason and law [570] are without love, only the person
The I is thus the one who says: I want God outside of the idea, and with that said demands the reversal mentioned above that we will now determine more closely in its consequences.

This willing concerns only the transition. That by which positive philosophy itself begins, is by the A₀ freed of its presupposition, recognized as prius. As that which is totally free of the idea, it is the pure that (“Ἐν τι [Én ti]). It is just as it remained standing as the residue of the preceding philosophy, except that now it is posited as beginning. But here is the position it must occupy in reality. For A₀ is, not because –A+A ± A is, but because of the opposite: there is –A+A ± A because there is A₀ (although it itself is not without the being of that which is [Seyende]). It is thus also that which is beyond being. The formulation “I want God outside of the Idea” designates the same thing as “I want that which stands above the beings that are” [über dem Seyenden]. But it is in its indefinite being (“Ἐντι-Seyn)—and not in its Idea-Being)—that there exists what is irreducible and indissoluble by which it alone could be the indubitable beginning, as we saw earlier. But there is no A₀ apart from what is. Without something by which it would show itself as existing, it would be so good as not existing at all. There would be no science concerning it (and thus also no positive philosophy). For there is no science there where there is nothing universal. It is thus necessary to show of the “Ἐν τι in which manner it is a being that really is [das Seyende]—and how the latter can only be manifest as the posterior and the consequence of the former. The question becomes the following: how is it possible that –A+A ± A could be the consequence of A₀? Once this question is answered, God is again understood in his relation to the idea. He is understood as the Lord of everything that is, but initially only of everything that is in the idea (not yet of the things that are outside of the idea). Only after this is it of secondary concern to show that he is also the Lord of everything that is outside of the idea, i.e., of existing, empirical things. By this means, God would for the first time be introduced into experience and, in this sense (what was actually desired) into existence; he would be recognized in it. For if God not only has a relation to beings in the idea, but also to beings outside of the idea, i.e., to existing things (for that which exists is outside of the idea)—by this he shows his reality independent of the idea. It is a reality that subsists even when the idea is negated. In this way, God reveals himself as the actual Lord of being.

This does not complete the demonstration [Beweis] that is the subject of positive philosophy, but it has led to what is essential. This demonstration (of the

105 The Position of God corresponds in the state to the position of the king. A₀ provides the archetype for the position of the king and his majesty, without which we could not ground it. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.10, 1160b4-5: οὐ γάρ ἐστι βασιλεύς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται (οὐ γάρ εἰσί βασιλεῖς ho mē autárkēs kaì pâsi tois agathoi hyperechōn ho dè toioûtos oudeînos prosdeîtai) (The king is an independent being and surpasses others in all sorts of goods; such a man needs nothing”).

106 In the Thirteenth Lecture.
existence of the personal God) does not simply lead to a certain point, for example not just to the world as the object as our experience. For just as when I am with people who are important to me, I am not satisfied simply to know that they exist, but instead require continuous confirmations of their existence, the same thing holds here as well. We require that the Godhead [die Gottheit] always come closer and closer to human consciousness; we demand that she become an object of consciousness not only in her consequences, but in herself. But this can also only be achieved by degrees, especially since the requirement concerns that the Godhead enter not only the consciousness of some individuals, but of humanity; and since we see that this proof is a proof that passes throughout all of reality and through the whole history of the human race, it can never be regarded as a proof that has been completed. Instead, it a proof that is always in process and extends into the future of our species just as it reaches back into its past. It is above all in this sense that the positive philosophy is *historical* philosophy.

This is thus the task of the second philosophy; the transition to it is the same as the transition from the old covenant to the new, from the law to the gospel, from nature to spirit.

[572] But with regard to the initial question, “How is it possible that, if A is *prius*, everything that is and can be [das *Scyende*], that is, everything that arises by virtue of the higher necessity of reason, happens to be posited with it?”—it is a question that is still to be answered by rational means. To this degree, it also belongs to these lectures. If in this form it is something new, it nevertheless already exists from before in another form—In the *Investigation of the Source of Eternal Truths.*

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107 This investigation is arranged in its historical development and leads to the solution of the question indicated above, in the edited essay in the annex “On the source of the eternal truths,” which forms thus the apex of this *Presentation of the Purely Rational Philosophy.*