‘What-To-Do?’: The Heart of Lonergan’s Ethics

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1. An Incarnation of a New Ethic

“What am I to do? I can’t put all of Insight into the first chapter of Method.” Lonergan paced his agitated sixth-floor room in Regis College as he posed the question to me and to himself. It was the summer of 1966, as I remember, and he was in recovery mode a year after his lung surgery. I had no answer for him then, nor had he. Later, when I came to index the book, the question was still with me as I worked on the text, and I watched for his strategy. The rather shabby index of mine contains the three obvious references but not the key one of pages 286-7, pages that delighted me when I reached them. There he states his foundational stand in his list of nine categorial developments.

There are many such instances of moments of major ethical dilemmas in Lonergan’s life that could be grist for a large biography at a

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1 The index was done in a hurry in Oxford with pen and paper in the month before Christmas, 1971: John Todd’s deadline. Over the years Fred Crowe and I joshed each other about the indices to Insight and Method. His index, of course, is a remarkable piece of work: Method needs such an index. But we talked, those times, about the limitations of a pre-publication index by an incompetent. Crowe smiling told me that there was a lot more about feelings in the index of the new edition of Insight. I wish to note here, however, one key omission in Insight’s index, since it is relevant to the detecting of Lonergan’s ethics. It is the omission of a serious, extended entry on Implementation. The entry in the new edition merely mentions two pages. Here I list a convenient but nonexhaustive set of direct references to implementation in the text of Insight. The new edition’s numbers are given in brackets, here and elsewhere:

229 [254], 234 [259], 236 [261], 238 [263], 266 [291], 357 [381], 391 [416], 392 [417], 396 [421], 469 [493], 493 [517], 507 [530], 521 [544], 524 [547], 541 [565], 685 [708], 726 [748].

2 I add—again, relevant to the detecting of his ethical pointing—that the middle paragraph of page 286 is a hilarious nudge, one I did not notice for decades: with the help of these personal developments you should be able to rewrite the first part of the book.

3 I would note that the statement belongs properly within the task of lines 26-27 of page 250 of the book. Further, I would note his omission of functional specialization as a developed category: were he less tired and less close to the completion of the book he would have, I think, listed it as (10).
much later date. One might even expect progress in explanatory biography that would include what has been attempted for others: a fuller psychology of the dynamics of his decisions, a psychology indeed that he himself was not unaware of. In one of his many letters to Fred Crowe he wrote: “Incidentally, re anxiety, what the Freudians call the Super-Ego is Aquinas’ cogitativa: just as the little birds know that twigs are good for building nests and the little lambs know that wolves are bad, so little human beings develop a cogitativa about good and bad; it reflects their childish understanding of what papa and mamma say is good or bad and in adult life it can cause a hell of a lot of trouble.”

A short essay like this cannot take account of these many instances or these many layers. It had best, indeed, be deliberately colorfully impressionistic if it is to give you a lift into the strange world of this genius. Think about—as an astonishing instance of his decision-making—his opting to build the massive book of Jean Ladrière into his lectures on Logic in 1957. It is important and wondrous in itself, but I wish now to contrast it with his option for the presentation of *Insight* in the summer of 1958. But first the story of that crazy opting of 1957. The lectures were to begin on Monday, July 8th. On Wednesday, July 3rd, he received Ladrière’s freshly published 705-page book. Thursday was the usual class holiday; Friday was also a holiday, being the Feast of the Sacred Heart. Lonergan reported working hard on the book for three days and revising, in the light of that work, the second day’s lectures on logic. Further, if he did not carry his typewriter with him to Boston that weekend, the notes for the lectures were completed before Lonergan flew to Boston to begin his jet-lagged lecturing.

I add my memory of a late conversation with Lonergan—perhaps indeed my last face-to-face with him—when he raised the question of the meaning of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem(s). It manifested his

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4. This is quoted from the 13th of 129 written communications of Lonergan to Crowe, some as short as Christmas cards, some letters several pages long. This letter is dated 27 December 1955. I have no doubt but that these letters will eventually appear in some published form, but meantime I avail myself of Fr. Crowe’s generous permission to quote from archival material that has not been published.


powerful ethics of completeness about a zone of discontent. Obviously, those three days in 1957 were not sufficient to get into that complex area adequately: I myself had spent two summers in the 1960s struggling with Gödel. But I had no serious light for him in our conversation of twenty years later.

I return now to his options regarding presenting *Insight* the following summer. For me, his opting for summary treatment was a key shift of direction towards what I would consider to be *haute vulgarization*. The question with which I began this essay, posed to me nine years later, was one he must have nursed in private that spring of 1958: “I can’t put all of *Insight* into two weeks of talk.” His option for a type of *haute vulgarization* would, in my opinion, haunt his options and his presentations for the rest of his life. In the next summer, 1959, he was invited to lecture on education at Xavier University, Cincinnati. He managed to back off from *haute vulgarization* by focusing on certain topics: as he remarked to me in the early 1970s, “I was just trying to

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7. This is the underlying theme of the present essay. There is a canon regarding complete explanation in both sets of canons in *Insight*, but here the important one is the canon of complete explanation in chapter 3. I have a functional interpretation of it in “Lonergan’s Meaning of Complete in the Fifth Canon of Scientific Method,” *Journal of Macrodynamics Analysis* (2004), 53-81 (http://www.mun.ca/jmda/vol4/mcshane.pdf). Perhaps I could briefly identify its relevance here by noting that there is a need to be luminous about its presence in the full heuristic of “the study of the organism” (*Insight* 464 [489]) whether the organism be plant, animal, or human. There is a correlation of the two sets of canons in *Cantower* 14, “Communications and Ever-ready Foundations,” but the fuller consideration of complete explanation in hermeneutics is a project for *Field Nocturnes Cantower* 117, which will deal with the transposition of the canons into functional specialist operational norms.


10. A context here is Fred Crowe’s “Editor’s Preface” to *Understanding and Being*, vol. 5, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), especially xiii-xv.
work out a few things.” But careful reading can detect the pressures to sketch, summarize, skimp.

He was in Rome now, teaching undergraduates, with some graduate classes. He talked to me entertainingly long after the experience—we were in his room in St. Mary’s Residence, Boston College, in the late 1970s—about his options in the undergraduate courses. The case he made for lecturing to the bright guys was that if he lectured “low” the bright guys wouldn’t listen, whereas by lecturing to the top something trickled down. But he had no choice in the matter of doing old-style coverage, to his personal detriment: “Well—those things are practical chores, that you have to do if you are teaching a class of 650 people.”

“As Damon Runyon’s character put it: ‘How are you doing?’ ‘I’m doing what I can.’”

But there is a sad sense in which he was such a character right through his life, handicapped as he was by a professional position and an academic environment that was quite unconducive to the serious melody-making of a Beethoven. Nor was he silent in the matter. I recall, for instance, him telling me more than once with a grin about Lorentz’s comment on Peter Hoenen being placed in the Gregorian University: “What a waste of a good man.”

I must return to Insight and to Lonergan’s absence of option in going to Rome in 1953. Lonergan asked Crowe in 1952 to intervene on his behalf: he needed another year. Further, it is relevant here, as

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11 Robert Doran gives relevant details in the “Editors’ Preface” to Topics in Education, xi-xii.
12 A careful reading of Topics in Education shows the problem turning up regularly. I note its occurrences in chapter 10, “History,” since a transposition of that chapter and topic is a drive of this essay: what is needed to solve “the problem of history, which is the real catch” is a regionalization in geohistory of functional specialization that I have named the Tower of Able. At all events, in that chapter there is evident popular compacting and explicit statements about it, e.g., “Let us try, then, to grasp this notion of regional culture.” Topics, 251.
14 Ibid., 212.
15 Peter Hoenen had done graduate work under Lorentz, the man famous for the Lorentz Contraction. In 1957 I studied Hoenen’s thick Latin text, Cosmologia: it was, indeed, a waste of a good man’s energy. Hoenen’s subtle work on mind and geometry is referred to by Lonergan in various places; see especially Lonergan’s brilliant essay on “Geometric Possibility” in Collection, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran, vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 92-107.
16 “Perhaps you could arrange a postponement of my departure for Rome for another year or so.” The letter is dated December 23, 1952. It is available in “Images of Lonergan,” Part 2 of Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, Bernard
pointing to a massive cut-back on his heartfelt option, to draw attention to a letter Lonergan wrote to Eric O’Connor in 1952. In it he remarked, “I must try to finish and arrange for the publication of a first part of my work before my departure. It would be entitled, Insight, and the remainder could be named Faith, or Insight and Faith. This leaves me with a long row to hoe yet.” The effect of the too-soon move to Rome is a contrafactual search beyond this essay; it certainly left those final chapters of *Insight* as massively compressed achievements. One non-effect, however, must be noted: the non-inclusion in *Insight* of considerations of personal relations is a feature of its concrete theological context. The point is made in the 1970 Florida interview in a way that throws light on a certain minimalism in Lonergan’s view of the task and achievement of *Insight*: “There is in *Insight* a footnote to the effect that we’re not attempting to solve anything about such a thing as personal relations. I was dealing in *Insight* fundamentally with the intellectual side—a study of human understanding—in which I did my study of human understanding and got human intelligence in there, not just a sausage machine turning out abstract concepts.”

But the personal achievement was massive. It can be summed up, I would say, by a piece of *Insight*, chapter 16, a piece that I consider as a fundamental invariant of future cultural collaboration, what I would call a foundational expression of a *comeabout* person: “So it comes about that the extroverted subject visualizing extension and experiencing duration gives place to the subject orientated to the objective of the unrestricted desire to know and affirming beings differentiated by certain conjugate potencies, forms, and acts grounding certain laws and frequencies.” We shall return to this in the conclusion.

But I wish now, in the context of that named defining of *comeabout*, to pause over the word heartfelt at the top of this page and also the word heart in this essay’s title. What do I mean by heart in either of these places? I would first have you go back in creative memory to Lonergan’s retreat and his retreat notes of 1937. Late in those notes

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17 The complete letter, dated July 23, 1952, is available in Part 2 of the Lambert-McShane biography, *Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas*, 156. (I have quoted the sentences as they appear in the original; there, the book titles in the second sentence lack underscoring).

18 I would note that, implicit in the placement of personal relations on the third line of *Method in Theology*’s display (page 48) is a powerful ethic about personal relations as being dynamic, creative. This is enormously important in the activity and the theoretic of adult growth, inequalities of age, doctrinal communications as luminous. See note 73 below, and, for a fuller context, note 99 and the series of notes listed there.


20 *Insight*, 514 [537].
Lonergan writes: “God is striving for my heart.” The story of the growth of that meaning in him is a distant possibility for a large psychobiography, but I would make a few points. By the time he had completed *Insight* his view of it, and his intussusception of it, had risen to the heuristic heights symbolized by my word *comeabout*. What, then, is the heart? It is not the heart described either by Paul or by Pascal: it is the heart of the basic position, heuristically conceived within the statement of metaphysics that emerges after page 458 [484] of *Insight*. The “study of the organism” that is integral to the philosophy of biology, psychology, and prayer lifts Paul and Pascal into the context of a new heuristics of theology. The fields mentioned, and other related areas, will take generations to reach a respectable content of the heuristic, but the heuristic is there, was there, in the *comeabout* man, an evolutionary sport of shocking improbability.

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21 The 54 pages of his retreat notes are not generally available as yet. The comment is, as I recall, on page 50.

22 *Insight*, 388 [423]. For comments on the position and its context see *Prehumous 2. Cantower* 9, “Position, Position, and Protopossession” is also a useful context. Protopossession, however, can now be more adequately envisaged in the light of the direction given in notes 73 and 99 below.

23 It is important to be luminous about this transition in the book. It occurs at the beginning of his consideration of genetic method in section 7 of chapter 15. One has to be alert for his shot at metaphysical terms that sublate older scholastic terms, e.g., capacity-for-performance as an effort to refresh the *potentia activa* of chapter 3 of *Verbum*. See *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran, vol. 2, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). The refreshing is not simple or one-to-one. On the problem of reconceiving virtue see *Quodlibet* 3, “Being Breathless and Late in Talking about Virtue.”

24 *Insight*, 464 [489]. My series of 41 essays, *Field Nocturnes*, is a 300-page reflection on the paragraph that begins with this phrase.

25 This is the undeveloped area into which the present essay points. But it is an old message of mine, presented at some length in the two recent website books, *Method in Theology: Revisions and Implementations* and *Lonergan’s Standard Model of Effective Global Inquiry*. In this essay fresh, flesh, further pointing is helped forwards by a concatenation of footnotes, beginning with note 29 and weaving towards note 99. Implicit here there is an aggreformic answer to a present crisis in psychology—apart from muddles about subjectivity and objectivity—that emerges from the surge in chemo- and neurodynamic analyses. That problem is present, of course, in the nominalistic debate among Lonergan scholars about the place of feelings in psychodynamics.

26 Lonergan remarks in the *Rice Interviews* (about 400 pages, from 1981) that man is the most improbable of creatures. What Lonergan means by *human* is a massively complex topic. His view by the time he left Rome was one that identified the human as a leap in evolution such that at the heart of desire there was the *ineffable*, a word he used in that regard in thesis 12 of *The Incarnate Word* (1964) which is in process of publication in the *Collected Works*. This
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The failure of Lonergan to express this heuristic more fully, or to point to applications of it, is quite comprehensible in the light of the cut-back on his ethic, his ethos, that was his fate in the Jesuits. Was he sensitive to it? The letter to his superior mentioned in the previous note gives early evidence to it, and I find suggestive of a wide range of sensitivities his marking in a book that I put together for him at the time of his seventy-fifth birthday, Lonergan’s Challenge to the University and the Economy. I quote here one marked passage which indicates, I would claim, a hearty agreement with Samuel Beckett’s sentiments and, curiously, gives lead to a general contention I make in this essay. Prior to the Beckett quotation I made mention in that essay of Walter Benjamin’s view of documents of civilization becoming documents of barbarism—a point relevant to our later musings about nominalisms as well as to the general contention. The same relevance is to be noted for my lead-in sentence to the quotation from Beckett, which is marked ‘on both sides’ by Lonergan: “The achievement has been expressed, and the expression is a possibility of the betrayal of the achievement.” At all events, here comes Beckett commenting on Joyce’s Work in Progress: “Here is direct expression—pages and pages of it. And if you don’t understand it, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is because you are too decadent to receive it. You are not satisfied unless form is so strictly divorced from content that you can comprehend the one almost without bothering to read the other. This rapid skimming and absorption of the scant cream of sense is made possible by what I may call a continuous process of copious intellectual salivation. The form that is an arbitrary and independent phenomenon can fulfill no higher function than that of a stimulus for a tertiary or quartary conditioned reflex of dribbling comprehension.”

ineffability seems to be a pointer towards a fuller identification both of the natural desire treated in his pre-Rome De ente supernaturale and of the exigence discussed in his lectures on existentialism (see CWL 18, Phenomenology and Logic, the index under Exigence).

27 This is a large and tricky topic, one treated with some adequacy in Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas. A key to, and symbol of, the issue is the long letter of January 1935 to his Provincial Henry Keane, where Lonergan is vigorous in his identification both of his own possibilities and of the muddledness of his superiors.

28 Published by University Press of America in 1980, it is now available on the usual website—indeed it is a copy of Lonergan’s own copy which is in the Toronto archives, so the markings can be checked: some point to agreement with sentiments, like the one from Beckett on page 67 of the book; some point to worthwhile references. I must add that the other gift was a metal mug, inscribed to him with words from the last paragraph of Proust’s great book, Remembrance of Things Past: “for the man on giant stilts.” Years later he talked of not knowing the source: Proust was not part of his reading-background.

29 Samuel Beckett, “Dante... Bruno. Vico.. Joyce,” in Our Examimation Round His Factification for Incarnation of Work in Progress (New York:
He might well have said the same about his massive achievement in economics. He had produced at least two versions of it in the early 1940s, and he gave two to Eric Kierans, an economist and later a finance minister of a Canadian government, and possibly to others. They were not read. Think, now, of his opting to put the one of which he had a copy, the 1944 typescript, back in his file: does it not express the powerful historical ethic of the hand that closed the cabinet? Twenty-four years later he was to be sufficiently annoyed by reading Metz to send me two postcards on two consecutive days; the first asked me to find an economist, since he had a relevant typescript; in the second he gave the reason he sent the first: he had been reading Metz, and it was time to get beyond discussions of the family wage. Note the year, 1968: he was still in the midst of Method in Theology, and perhaps the opting to get back in the game came simply from reading Metz in relation to that work. Or was he nudged, that year of 1968, by academic unrest around the world, or by the madness of McNamara’s take-over of the world bank?

His amazing commitment to the invention of a scientific economics emerged out of spare time struggling over about fourteen years, during which time he was thematizing both his phylogenetic and his ontogenetic ethics. There is a powerful optimism in his phylogenetic ethics: the what-to-do of history was to be a dialectic weaving forward in Christ towards...
a lying down of lamb and lion together. What of his ontogenetic ethics, meshed, of course, with the former? One finds its thematic emerging within the context of his doctorate work, and I can only touch briefly on that limited\textsuperscript{32} emergence by noting the few references in that work to Thomas’ classic and brilliantly self-attentive venture into that dynamic.\textsuperscript{33} His sublated and hurried version of that analysis is in \textit{Insight} chapter 18. In Appendix A of \textit{Phenomenology and Logic} there are included two diagrams that capture that invitation to self-discover what one is about when one is reaching for what-to-do answers.

Here I would note a problem that emerged from Lonergan’s legitimate compacting of the two what-questions: what is, and what ought to be. They are modally distinct, but they are both questions about being, both questions with roots within the notion of being. The thematic of the second question, however, requires very refined self-appreciation of the flesh’s bent towards action.\textsuperscript{34} This bent, within the thematic of that refinement, needs integral expression such that its molecularity be given the dignity of the cosmic “order’s dynamic joy and zeal.”\textsuperscript{35}

The last paragraph talked of refinements: refinements, moreover, that should be carried back into a revisioning, a fresh—or should I say flesh?—reading of chapter 12 of \textit{Insight}. But here I wish to add simpler points, points that belong in what I would call the elementary grammatology of knowing and doing.\textsuperscript{36} The points gather round

\textsuperscript{32} I am not talking here of some limitation regarding feelings that has become a conventional topic among Lonergan scholars, but of the fact that the work predates the climb into what I call “the flesh” that resulted in the \textit{Verbun} articles.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Prima Secundae}, qq. 6-17. An elementary exercise towards detailed self-appropriation is given in \textit{Joistings} 3, “The What-to-do Questions.” But now I would have you think of that elementary exercise and of the reading of Thomas in the context of what was written above in note 29. Think, then, of the savoring of some few entrées on the menu in its skin-reality, a consent before a choice. Then How, \textbf{HOW}, might you re-write or talk out Thomas’ brilliant self-attentive 50 pages so as to lift the listener to their own skin-search of desire?

\textsuperscript{34} \textbf{Flesh}? My loaded word in this essay, sublated from Merleau-Ponty and Colette (see note 99). It is a matter of an aggreformic self-appreciation that was way beyond those gallant searchers and bringing forth skin-wise the word of that flesh, so that the flesh is made word and the word becomes the \textbf{Home Of Wonder}. This is to be the third stage of meaning, with its eschatological reach towards a divine circumincessional achievement, the ultimate intimate action that expands everlastingly (see note 83 below).

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Insight}, 700 [722].

\textsuperscript{36} Section 5.2.3 of chapter 5 of \textit{Lack in the Beingstalk} is titled “Elementary Grammatology.” That chapter is the original Appendix A of \textit{CWL} 18, \textit{Phenomenology and Logic}, during the editing of which the importance of this elementary approach dawned on me, as opposed, say, to Jacques Derrida’s
Lonergan’s expression of the transcendental invariants. It is best to quote the key relevant text. “Progress proceeds from originating value, from subjects being their true selves by observing the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible. Being attentive includes attention to human affairs. Being intelligent includes a grasp of hitherto unnoticed or unrealized possibilities.” What I would draw attention to is that being intelligent is here identified with the what-to-do question, and that there is thus manifested an unfortunate ordering of the transcendental. An elementary grammatology of knowing and doing requires that one splits the modes into their normal behavioral patterns, as did Aquinas. Then the transcendental read—fitting thus with the diagrams of Appendix A of *Phenomenology and Logic*—be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be foresightful [or adventurous, or a planner, or whatever], be responsible.

And is it not wonderful to identify the transcendental “be adventurous” as the dominant transcendental of Lonergan’s life? The context of his adventure in minding is magnificently expressed in a single long sentence from his economic typescript of, perhaps, late 1941. Should we not savour a reading of it now? “In any stage of human history from prehistoric caves to the utopias which our prophets describe with such vivid detail, among primitive fruit gatherers, among hunters and fishers, in the first dawn of agricultural civilization, along Egypt’s Nile and Babylon’s Euphrates, under India’s mysticism, China’s polish, Greek thought, Roman law, through the turmoil of the dark age and the ferment of the medieval period, in the European expansion and the modern world, everywhere one finds the pulsating flow, the rhythmic series, of the economic activities of man.” And from there he points forward to distant leisure and smaller delicate cares. “Nor is it

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37 *Method in Theology*, 53. I would note here the difficulty of conceiving of elementary grammatology properly when in fact a culture of Lonerganism takes the transcendental in their general form and in their details (e.g., the orientations towards “seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting” *Method in Theology*, 6) in a pretty settled nominalism. Elementary grammatology is a key to proper popularization of Lonergan’s viewpoint, but progress in culture demands the transitions required by the ethics of *Insight* and its re-emphasis on pages 286-87 of *Method in Theology*. There is a massive problem here of “The Self-Appropriation of Inner Parts” (the title of the relevant *Field Nocturne* 12).

38 It was, of course, connected with a spirituality of *Adventiat regnum tuum*, and with Ignatius’ view of doing everything as if it depended on yourself, knowing that it all depended on God. This is a profoundly significant element in the dynamic of prayer and behavior about which Lonergan was luminous. Add the comments of note 57 below.


40 See the index, under *Leisure*, of *For a New Political Economy*. 
impossible that further developments in science should make small units self-sufficient on an ultramodern standard of living to eliminate commerce and industry, to transform agriculture into a superchemistry, to clear away finance and even money, to make economic solidarity a memory, and power over nature the only difference between high civilization and primitive gardening.”

So, he battled forward in a fantasy of “the vastly ambitious task of directing and in some measure controlling future history.” His battling forward was a twisted tired tale from that typing of the middle of chapter seven of Insight to the ecstatic page of February 1965, a copy of which I attach. The brutally pragmatic vision was “mine and catholic” with a small “c,” and in 1969 he published a sufficient version of it in Gregorianum. He had known its desired characteristics by the time he had finished typing chapter 7 of Insight, and they were all there, as was a pragmatics of the aspiration he expressed repeatedly at the conclusion of the book: “a new and higher collaboration.” That pragmatics did not take pragmatic hold of the imagination of his disciples. Was there a little sadness about it in his writing, ten years later, of healing and creating in history? “Is my proposal utopian? It asks merely for creativity, for an interdisciplinary theory that at first will be denounced as absurd, then will be admitted to be true but obvious and insignificant, and perhaps finally be regarded as so important that its adversaries will claim that they themselves discovered it.” When asked in 1981 by Valentine Rice about moving personally into functional specialization, he remarked that he was leaving that to his disciples. In the year 1975, indeed, he envisaged having a shot at teaching the economics in Boston College, considering it a possibility of following up on his renewed interest of the late 1960s. And here again there was, it seems to me, an option of

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41 CWL 21, For a New Political Economy, 20.
42 One begins, of course, by thinking here of fantasy in the popular sense, but with a pragmatics that places it in continuity with the present emergent probabilities. Fantasy, however, needs a full psychochemical heuristic to bring into luminosity its dynamics and difficulties. Field Nocturne 4, for instance, raises the issue of a cultural superego, a psychochemical entrapment.
43 Insight, 233 [258].
44 The file containing Lonergan’s leap to functional specialization was the subject of Darlene O’Leary’s master’s thesis in Regis College Toronto, 1999, Lonergan’s Practical View of History. I include Lonergan’s key page here as an Appendix.
45 I draw this out in Joistings 22, “Reviewing Mathews’ Lonergan’s Quest, and Ours.”
46 Insight, 721 [740]. There are 29 occurrences of the word collaboration in the pages that follow.
47 The lecture was given in the Thomas More Institute, Montreal, ten years and three months after his discovery. It is available both in A Third Collection and in volume 15 of the Collected Works, which deals with Macroeconomic Dynamics.
consequence. His first effort at presenting the economics was to be in the spring of 1978. In preparation for the effort I began assisting him both through puttering in libraries in search of fellow travelers and by preparing to present his economics at the Boston Workshop of 1977. He already had the book mentioned previously, Lonergan’s Challenge to the University and the Economy, with two essays there relating his work to other dissenters, and he was reading The Economic Journal on the advice of Eric Kearns. I hunted down articles and books that might be of value, as well as doing a search of his own early scribbles, of which he did not have a copy. Further, the typescript of For a New Political Economy was missing, indeed unheard of, at that stage. But now, to the decision of consequence, one that affects us still, one that was assumed to be self-evident by me in my Workshop presentation of June 1977. I still recall vividly entering his room in St. Mary’s Hall in the Autumn of 1977, bearing whatever relatively useless gifts of references. He looked up grinning at me: “Well, I know how I’m going to teach the economics ... I’m going to read it at them twice!”

Why was the decision, in my view, of such consequence? It seemed the way to go, whether the presentation was read or not. It suited his purpose, which was to revise the typescript in a way that would lead to the production of a primer. But it clouded the basic challenge, as I had clouded it before and since, as others have also done. The presentation of the whole topic leads to comparisons with other theories and practices. Comparison: there’s the rub, to which I return here and there and you will, I hope, come to glimpse its danger not just in economics but in the most general context of implementing functional specialization. But you can note the problem in economics of scattering interest into an haute vulgarization. Yet I have followed the same foolishness for most of my life. Only recently has the proper menu of operation dawned on me: so obvious, like Columbus standing the egg on its end.

The situation is similar to the situation Lonergan describes in Method in Theology with regard to basic philosophical stances. “Empiricism, idealism, and realism name three totally different horizons with no

48 I later edited these fragments into Part 2 of For a New Political Economy, but that year I gave him short introductory fragments that were helpful for his presentation. On the evolution of the teaching notes over those years 1978-83, see Charles Hefling’s analysis in volume 15, Collected Works, xi-xxxiii.

49 Comparison has a quite precise defined place, from page 250 of Method in Theology, in functional collaboration. See Quodlibet 6, “Comparison and Integral Canons of Inquiry.”

50 As Lonergan told it, Columbus posed the problem to a gathering of grandees when talking of discovering America: afterwards it seems easy. I leave the solution of the egg problem to your puzzling delight.
common identical objects.” So too with horizons in economics. I do not need to enter into detail here: I make the point quite clearly in Part 3 of the biography by presenting, not a summary of his economic theory, but a single class given successfully to grade 12. The clear problem of present non-scientific economics—no more scientific than phlogiston theory—is the error at the beginning of not having the right variables. Thus, talking with them—or folks interested in Lonergan—about the mis-measured incomes, profits, taxes, investments, bank-loans, imports, whatever, is simply gossip. Lavoisier found progress to be a matter of taking a more serious approach to the burning of a candle; in the case of economics, it is a matter of examining the running of a small business in which one has to make sure one is burning the candle properly at both ends.

So we arrive at his last serious option in Boston College: if it was an option. He seemed quite clear on not wanting to leave Boston, but he was moved anyway. The move has to be accepted as his dark option within Faith and vocation: it led to the discomforting fading of a genius.

2. An Invitation To a New Ethic

The fundamental issue is the collaborative structuring of global care. It is an issue that has already been concretely raised by Richard Branson in his constitution of a group of global elders. Is he on the right track? Curiously enough yes, and later you may consider it in the light of what I

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51 Method in Theology, 239. Being luminous on this would cut down enormously the comparative studies that I mention in note 49 and elsewhere in the text.

52 The presentation is given in Part 3, chapter 11 of the Lambert-McShane biography (see note 27 above). It is available, too, in Field Nocturnes CanTower 46 and in Preambulous 1, both of which point to strategies of communication. For my latest effort, see Philip McShane, Method in Theology 101 AD 9011: The Road to Religious Reality (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2012), 56-64 (“Appendix: The Road to Economic Promise”).

53 There are two very sad letters of 1983 in the Lonergan Archives [they were in the Rice Collection] from the youngest brother, Gregory, to the second youngest brother Mark, and his wife Anne, regarding the progress of Lonergan’s health. Lonergan was out of context in so many ways. But no doubt the Jesuits can defend the relocation of the genius as part of their humble uniformity. Fred Lawrence found those two letters very distressing when he read them in 2008: he had tried to be positive in conversations with Lonergan, who was negative, about the transfer to the north. I myself pushed for the inclusion in his luggage of his small record player and his little collection of records: they were left in Boston.

54 He did this in July of 2007. Information on it is available on the internet under Richard Branson, Global Elders.
would call minimalist functional specialization.\textsuperscript{55} Is Lonergan’s view utopian? Since 1969 I have been pointing to history as mother of the need that is recognized\textsuperscript{56} and thematized by Lonergan as foster-father.

But first I must speak of the fundamental ethical orientation pressed on the cultural community by Lonergan. It was expressed neatly and bluntly by Lonergan in a question session at a Boston Workshop in the 1970s, in answer to the question, “How much physics should a theologian know?”\textsuperscript{57} Lonergan’s immediate reply was “Well, he should be able to read Lindsay and Mar
genau.” The reply expresses a long-held foundational stand. I took it sufficiently seriously as a context of his minding that I devoted to it the entire first chapter of the three chapters in the biography that deal with his “leading ideas.” It is the mood and drive of the book \textit{Insight}.\textsuperscript{58} It brings to my mind a remark he made in the first week we spent together, Easter 1961, in Dublin: “they’re just big frogs in little ponds.” He had been talking about the shrinkage of theology and philosophy in the aftermath of the council of Trent. Few contemporary Lonergan scholars take him seriously. Yet there it stands, discomfortingly, summed up in the Epilogue of \textit{Insight}: “the defenders were left in the unenviable position of always arriving on the scene a little breathlessly and a little late.”\textsuperscript{59}

And I would have you notice that it is not just a matter of defense: it is a matter of prayer: the actual context of Bethlehem, includes the reality

\textsuperscript{55} I deal with this both in \textit{Method in Theology: Revisions and Implementations}, chapter 1 (a book on the website), and in chapter 3 of \textit{Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism} (Halifax, N.S.: Axial Publishing, 2002).

\textsuperscript{56} His initial recognition was as solving the problem of theology, but it grew towards a global perspective over later years. Karl Rahner noted the generality of the analysis in his article on the specialties in \textit{Gregorianum} 1971: Rahner is responding to the version of chapter 5 of \textit{Method} published in \textit{Gregorianum} in 1969. “Die theologische Methodologie Lonergan’s scheint mir so generisch zu sein, dass sie eigentlich auf jede Wissenschaft passt.” Karl Rahner, “Kritische Bemerkungen zu B.J.F. Lonergan’s Aufsatz: ‘Functional Specialties in Theology,’” \textit{Gregorianum} 51 (1971), 537. In translation: “Lonergan’s theological methodology seems to me to be so generic that it actually suits every science.”

\textsuperscript{57} As I recall, the Workshop was on “Theology as Public Discourse.” Theology is not, of course, public discourse. The \textit{Scientific American} is a sort of public discourse, but it is not science. But there are huge problems here of a common sense of religiosity and prayer, of cultivating it as Tower People but of going beyond it within the saving Tower. I deal with problems of foundational prayer and of mysticism in the \textit{Prehumous} essays, numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8.

\textsuperscript{58} Part 3, chapter 10, of the Lambert-McShane biography (see note 27 above) focuses on this bringing out the significance of Lonergan’s work on Maxwell and on reaching for the significant redefinition of prime matter in terms of energy.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Insight}, 733 [755].
of Betelgeuse and beyond. There is within the cosmic call, and within Christianity in a deep tri-personal sense, a call to the kataphatic. “For the glory of the Father is this, that just as he eternally speaks the Word in truth and through the Word breathes forth Love in holiness, so also in the fullness of time he sent his incarnate Son in truth so that by believing the Word we might speak and understand true inner words; and through the Word he sent the Spirit of the Word in holiness so that joined to the Spirit in love and made living members of the body of Christ we might cry out, ‘Abba, Father!’” The Explanation of God, the Theory of God, is the Word, and flesh was made Word that we might be swept up into the love of the Invisible.

This call to mindingly “embrace” the cosmos is a call to all those who would reach for a contemporary normative culture, a grasp of and by progress. “Theoretic understanding, then, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view.” This is an ethic astonishingly beyond the contemporary disease of specialization: it is an ethic, as we may slowly come to see, gently imposed by the collaborative cycling of functional collaboration. But at the moment it is a sore topic, a discomforting policy, both for theologians and for all unfocused specialists. “Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company.” Yet I certainly cannot bring myself to apologize to the polite company.

The road there, in the providence of “The Concrete Intelligibility of Space and Time,” is a gentle slope of longer cycles of incline. In our flesh and hearts we are inclined that way. But where are we on that

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60 I like to think of the light from the eye of the infant Jesus reaching this star in the shoulder of Orion pretty well at the time of the Council of Ephesus.


62 “Ad amorem invisibilium rapiamur,” a phrase from the Preface to the Christmas Mass. The issue of human explanation is complex, relating to problems of the molecularization of minding. There are also eschatological considerations that are relevant here, fantasies of the ultimate divinization of molecularity.

63 One needs to keep, or rather cultivate, in mind, the full heuristics of embrace. Relate this back to the previous note and to note 99 below.

64 Insight, 417 [442].

65 Method in Theology, 299.

66 The final section-title of chapter 5 of Insight, with its very difficult suggestions that are to blossom in the metaphysics of chapters 15 and 16 of the book.

67 See note 34 above. Lonergan attended to that bent in different contexts and with cumulative results. What is the natural desire to know God? In what sense is it an exigence? (See CWL 18, Phenomenology and Logic, the index under Exigence). Does its identification, perhaps, require a sublating of
long slope home? There was a time when I would write of the next million years. But earth has at least 2 billion years of planetary cycling before sun-seethe. If Eve can be moved back 7 million years, where might she not travel when the earth becomes discomfortingly hot? Did not Lonergan point to this larger view of long intervals of time? His pre-Insight notes contain large numbers, which might have found their way into chapter four of the book. And there are his comments in the interviews, Caring About Meaning, which I quote here, as they were in the original interview and as they are in the published work:

_Caring About Meaning_, p. 175: the published text reads:

C.T.: You do expect that the time-range for your work to permeate the culture is about a hundred years?

B.L.: At least. McShane speaks of the second millennium as being more plausible.

Lonergan’s reply in the interview was:

B.L.: Well, at least, eh? McShane speaks of the second million years as being more plausible.

_Caring About Meaning_, p. 203: the published text reads:

N.G.: What about the third stage of meaning—was that a breakthrough for you?

B.L.: Yes.

Lonergan’s reply in the interview:

B.L.: Yes. And for McShane, eh? He thinks it will come in the second million years.

This longer view and its ethics, its pragmatic embrace, is hard to fancy, to figure, to formulate, and so is hard to injest. I recall now—and perhaps Ken, in my present audience, remembers—the talking-pacing round Montreal with Ken Melchin in the winter of 1979 as he brooded over the unwritten concluding chapter in his thesis, later a book, _History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability_. Neither of us came up with anything like an ethics of functional collaboration as a set of recurrence-schemes emerging out of the mess of the axial period’s refinements and

Thomas’ struggle with natural resultance (see CWL 2, Verbum, 145), so that nature’s exigence becomes ineffable (see Thesis 12 of The Incarnate Word)? E.g., _Lonergan’s Challenge to the University and the Economy_, chapter 6, “Economic Theory and the Economic Rhythms of the Second Million Years.”


_Kenneth Melchin, History, Ethics, and Emergent Probability_ (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1982 and recent printings). An earlier version of the present essay was first presented at the Lonergan Centre for Ethical Reflection in Concordia University, Montreal, November 1st, 2008.
fragmentations of flesh’s minding, much less to fantasize towards the genesis in history of our share of Godspeak and Godclasp.71 “The antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset every interference either with intellect’s unrestricted finality or with its essential detachment and disinterestedness. The antecedent willingness of charity has to mount from an affective to an effective determination to discover and to implement in all things the intelligibility of universal order that is God’s concept and choice.”72

So we may ask again, and indeed must heartily ask, Where are we on this trek of longer cycles of incline? We are a seed, bursting out of the ground of energy’s finality, edging towards being a shrub, a sapling, a tadpole.73 History’s and God’s glory is that we conceive of the tree, the frog, even if stupidity and wickedness bombastically cut off growth within this recognizable finitude. But we are called also to conceive of the next small stumbling steps. How to thus conceive? That second last section of Insight, chapter 20, section 5, agonizes over the identification of the solution, and in the ten pages collaboration is printed on our nerves over thirty times.

And a third time we may ask about being in love, in love with “the world of sense,”74 sharing “its yearning for God.”75 But has the cock crowed yet?

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71 Later, in the paragraph of note 91, I touch on the large topic of nominalist control of meaning. It is a piece of the problem of “Haute Vulgarization,” the title of chapter 3 of Lack in the Beingstalk, the conclusion of which raised the general problem of ex-plain-ing, making achievements of serious understanding resonant within common sense. There is a wealth of pastorally relevant theology available in Lonergan’s Latin works, even for a teacher or preacher who has little more than a nominal control. One has to find language that turns self and audience towards the grounds in subjectivity. One then talks, for instance, of good conversation, of understanding and speaking and listening. One may talk—I certainly find it useful in my sermons—of Speak, Spoke, Clasp as participants in the trinitarian conversation. One may talk of Cosmic Endtimes, not as a Big Crunch but as a Big Clasp.

72 Insight, 726 [747-8].

73 Here I find the transition from tadpole to frog helpful as lifting both phylogenetic and ontogenetic fantasy. In these times of axial adult staleness and stagnation it seems that ontogenetic normativity of accelerating growth is hard to envisage, much less realize in practice. Useful here are my reflections on retirement age in “The Importance of Rescuing Insight,” in The Importance of Insight: Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin, ed. John J. Liptay Jr. and David S. Liptay (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 199-225. More elementarily, pages 161-63 of Lack in the Beingstalk.

74 Insight, 724 [745].

75 Ibid.
The axial period\textsuperscript{76} has produced some evolutionary sports. So, for instance, “we just have to admire Aristotle,”\textsuperscript{77} who, “not without labour,”\textsuperscript{78} conceived of matter and form and left inadequate printed tracks of his achievement. Lonergan’s achievement shares that inadequacy but he enlarged massively, in the privacy of his minding, the conception. In our reach for the cosmos and the mindings of these sports we need a core cultivation of our seedling status. “What is lacking is knowledge of all that is lacking and only gradually is that knowledge acquired.”\textsuperscript{79} We need a strategic grammar of ascent, recognized luminously as such. So, we must order our print and print our stumbling collaboration.

History as mother and Lonergan as foster-father invite us to link the fragments of our disciplinary stumbings and our follies of laws and economics and government and churchiness in a minimal order that would change the statistics of global well-being. Each aggregate of little sporting shifts has fractional probabilities of mind-bending towards progress. Yet, “a sum of proper fractions is always greater then the product of the same fractions,”\textsuperscript{80} and the sum is to emerge in global cyclic collaboration, so that “then the probability of the combination of events, constitutive of the scheme, leaps from a product of fractions to a sum of fractions.”\textsuperscript{81} “This control of the emergent probability of the future can be exercised … by mankind in its consciousness of its responsibility to the future of mankind.”\textsuperscript{82}

I would note that I have said nothing here of levels of consciousness, of varieties of questions, of subjectivity and objectivity, whatever. History’s message is a message of divine patience but it adds a message regarding standing in the light, indeed gradually in an

\textsuperscript{76} I discussed my enlarging of Jaspers’ view of the axial period in “Middle Kingdom: Middle Man (T’ien-hsia: i jen),” chapter 1 of Searching for Cultural Foundations, edited by Philip McShane, (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1984), 21-22. The axial period can be thought of as some 5,000 years between the first and the third stage of meaning as Lonergan sketched them in Method in Theology chapter 3. These in turn can be considered as the first and second times of the temporal subject considered in CWL 12, The Triune God: Systematics, 405.

\textsuperscript{77} My rough translation from the Latin, page 580, of The Triune God: Systematics, given in a relevant context, Appendix B of CWL 18, Phenomenology and Logic, note 4.

\textsuperscript{78} CWL 2, Verbum, 38.

\textsuperscript{79} Insight, 536 [559].

\textsuperscript{80} Insight, 121 [144].

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{82} Insight, 227 [252-3].
increasing self-luminousness. So I point in this Part Two of the essay to the grounding of collaboration in present omnidisciplinary needs. Simply put, I place “The Need for Division” before “The Ground for Division,” reversing Lonergan’s presentation.

Said with a same difference, I put the discovery of Insight after the discovery of the divisions of functional collaboration. What, you may genuinely ask, could I possibly mean by that? The discovery of Insight, in and by a real ascent, is at present the kink of sports. What is to bring forward the struggle of adult growth that it names doctrinally is the cyclic pressure of global collaboration.

Part of that collaboration, now, among his followers is the becoming incipiently sensitive to this, so that we add a popular ethos to Lonergan’s and history’s ethical demands. “Popular tradition, whether it be poetry, fiction, or acceptable history, is something essential to human living. … It is a constitutive component of the group as human. It is an aesthetic apprehension of the group’s origin. The aesthetic apprehension of the group’s origin and story becomes operative whenever the group debates, judges, evaluates, decides, or acts—and especially in a crisis.”

And we have a crisis, both a global crisis and a parochial crisis within the group of Lonergan students. It seems strategic to conclude with a helpful illustration of that parochial crisis, helpful especially as illustrating a road ahead, identifying anomalies good and bad, in an evolution of the first functional specialty. I should add that this essay is in no specialty: in my classification of functional conversations it might be identified as C5 9.

Before I turn to my illustration I add a single note:

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83 See note 76 above. A fourth stage of meaning, not necessarily sequential to the third stage, is defined in Field Nocturnes CanTower 44, “The Fourth Stage of Meaning.” I am indebted in this refinement to a paper of John Dadisky presented at the Boston Workshop of 2008: “Is There a Fourth Stage of Meaning?” The ultimate stage of meaning is an everlasting expansiveness of flesh that is grounded in the fact that, as Thomas and Lonergan hold, no finite minding, not even that of Jesus, is capable of comprehending God.

84 Method in Theology, ch. 5: I quote above the titles of sections 2 and 3.

85 Later pursuits of history and dialectic are to reveal this in the story of the past sixty years of Lonergan studies. But there is no harm in giving a single discomfiting instance, the result of a gathering in Concordia University, Montreal, to someway tackle Lonergan’s hermeneutics. We didn’t. The printed result is Lonergan’s Hermeneutics: Its Development and Applications, edited by Sean E. McEvenue and Ben F. Meyer (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1989).

86 I have spent much of my time since 1969—when I noted the pressure towards functional collaboration in musicology—pointing to the crisis in particular disciplines. Perhaps these disciplines, in an in-group self-discovery of need, will by-pass old-style philosophy and theology?

87 Lonergan, CWL 10, Topics in Education, 230.

88 See my A Brief History of Tongue (Halifax, N.S.: Axial Press, 1998), 108, for a display of the set of inner communications within specialized work.
foundational suggestion to our context: that the sports of the axial period—Jesus is included—have given rise to an available naming of our position in being. That naming is not recognized luminously as such and what results are muddles of arrogance or exaggeration or intolerance. So we have, for instance, a well-established Lonergan nominalism that needs to become a tutored nominalism. We are invited—the ethical call already mentioned—not only to admire Aristotle and his brilliant finding, of matter, form, and concept, but to imitate in a contemporary fashion. How Aristotle did it still baffles me, since, as Lonergan repeatedly points out in *Insight*, we have the advantage, future to him, of the push towards form and concept that is the story of four centuries of physics. Aristotle, of course, availed of the best efforts of his time, and added to them. Now the question that rises in us, I hope, is: have we, have I, really got into my psychic skin sufficiently—with a sufficiency mediated by up-to-dateness—to find my what lurking in my nerves? To find what Augustine found? To find “what every schoolboy does not know.” And I mention thus the schoolboy—and the schoolgirl that Lonergan included implicitly in those bad old days—to make, in passing, a positive point about present needs and strategies.

There is a sense in which untutored nominalism can move history along towards light. I think this is best illustrated by my appealing to my own short experience of schoolboys during five weeks in St. Ignatius College, Sydney, Australia. I have, of course, in my fifty years of focusing on myself through Lonergan’s print, come some distance beyond a tutored nominalism, but the strategies I evolved in teaching various classes can be availed of by beginners, who are normally largely nominalist in their use of Lonergan words. Further, the availing is the basis of a twofaced shift in teaching. But first, my main point: I used a

It is an 8-by-8 matrix, but the core cyclic collaboration is represented by the sequence $C_{s,s+1}$, where $s$ goes from 1 to 7 to zero in a repeating cycle.

89 See Lonergan’s comment on his finding of the inner word. *CWL* 2, *Verbum*, 6-7. Augustine’s ten-year struggle with body is mentioned pretty regularly by Lonergan. It seems to me that the present situation in Lonergan studies demands that we pause, alone or with a friend in the same boat, finding slowly that we are perhaps nominalist when we talk of insight within image. It is an enormous achievement to tune into one’s psychic skin, finding there the subtle shades of pattern differences that go with conceiving and with the various is-ings. There is no serious literature, even in Lonergan, on the psychodynamics of this. It desperately needs the power of linguistic feedback mentioned only twice by Lonergan: *Method in Theology*, 88, note 34 and on 92. The latter mention is not in the published text: line 12 of that page should read: “linguistic feedback is achieved, that is in the measure that explanations...” I have boldfaced the missing words. The note on 88 ends with the key pointing: “expressing the subjective experience in word and as subjective.”

90 *Insight*, 7 [31].

91 This is a large topic, relating the two-facedness of generalized empirical method (see *A Third Collection*, 141, top lines) to classroom performance. The
simple classroom strategy of writing on the board, before the class began, **WHAT IS A SCHOOLBOY**. Some alert student might immediately comment: ‘sir, you have left out the question-mark.’ I would reply that, no, I had not. And we took it from there. I mimicked, for instance, the stance of a goalkeeper in soccer, an alert what; or talked of either of the Williams sisters poised to return a serve. **What** is Venus. **What** is Serena. **What** is each of us. And we discover that, ever-lifting our discovery, by teaching within whatever level of nominalist control of meaning we have. So, there is the Childout Principle: “when teaching children geometry one is teaching children children,” with its two-faced meaning. But of course, developing it into an effective detailed classroom-ethos: that is a larger cultural challenge.

Still, there is my claim, that “the existential gap”\(^\text{92}\) of untutored nominalism is the reality of much Lonergan-talk. It leads to glib criticisms and silly comparative work: but let us not get further into that. Let me rather illustrate a profitable struggle towards and of functional research by turning to what I might call an unfinished business of *Phenomenology and Logic*.\(^\text{93}\) It is the reach of Lonergan into and around the world of existentialism that he expressed as the subject’s reaching for the “subject as subject.”\(^\text{94}\) The concluding words of his lecture notes on teacher is then teaching and self-teaching and teaching the children to self-teach about themselves, all in the same tone of classroom linguistic feedback. It seems tortuous: I try to capture it in the **Childout Principle** given shortly. For a lengthier reflection on education see my four articles in *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education*. “The Reform of Classroom Performance,” 13 *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education* (2002), 279-309; “The Wonder of Water: The Legacy of Lonergan,” 15 *Divyadaan* (2004), 457-75; “How Might I Become a Better Teacher?,” 16 *Divyadaan* (2005), 359-82; “What Do You Want?,” 17 *Divyadaan* (2006), 248-71.

\(^{92}\) See *CWL* 18, *Phenomenology and Logic*, section 2 of Chapter 13.

\(^{93}\) I already reflected on the unfinished business concerning Gödel (see above, note 8). But one can sense the unfinished phenomenological business in the ending to Lonergan’s notes on existentialism (214-15), where he is pointing to the task of dealing with the “subject as subject,” and one should connect this with his anticipation of Merleau-Ponty’s final book (278), which did not appear till 1964. *Le Visible et l’invisible; suivi de notes de travail* (Paris, Gallimard: 1964). The English translation by Alphonso Lingis is *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Merleau-Ponty struggles gallantly on the edge of subject-as-subject: see *Field Nocturnes* 23 and 28 on this. See my comments below on the work of Renaud Barbaras.

\(^{94}\) See the index to *Phenomenology and Logic* under *Subject*, and also the previous note and note 89 above. Obviously, the word “as” is not to be taken abstractively: an elementary but important pointer to linguistic problems. In the *Field Nocturnes* after number 20, while I do not venture into any Lonerganswake language, I try out devices like the boldfaced **whathere** to bring the reader’s attention to the reality of the neuropsychic layering that is meshed with the what-skin. So, **whathere** is you, here and now, you-as-subject.
existentialism are “unless we find it there, we shall not find it at all.” My thesis above is that most of Lonergan’s disciples have not found it, and that the road to finding it and to moving into the third or fourth stage of meaning is through humbly facing the ethical imperative of functional collaboration. Eventually—in a hundred years or so—the research I write of will have become respectable, analogous to say contemporary physics, where there is a Standard Model shared by those competent enough to work in the advancement of physics. But I write now of present suggestive stumblings. I do so by pointing to a recent successful book by a promising phenomenologist and asking, What are we to make of it? The book is Renaud Barbaras’s *Desire and Distance*, with the subtitle *Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception*. Let me quote from the first paragraph: “Perception is indeed what opens us up to what ‘there is’—in other words, to being understood in the sense of what is given to us originarily before any determination, as the basis and condition for any determinability; being first takes the form of ‘something,’ and it is therefore indisputable that an inquiry concerning being refers back to perception as originary access to it.” What do you make of that, you, the *whathere* of a psychic skin most likely unknown to yourself as such. Make of it? Of course, you could make of it a doctorate thesis, never battling with the subject-as-subject, yet nonetheless producing one of those crazy theses, “Bernard Lonergan and Renaud Barbaras: A Comparison.”

Or you might approach the book, not mythically applying Lonergan, but applying yourself as you are: most likely, brutally incompetent as a serious functional researcher. Then you labour over the perceived print, as it “opens [you] up to what ‘there is’”; not even pushing yourself to an understanding of where the push might go, but simply picking out, highlighted perhaps—for later stewing let me say—little suggestions that might illuminate. Illuminate what? Yes. Illuminate *what*: the *whathere* you, “not an isolated atom detached from all context, but precisely as part of a context, loaded with the relations that belong to it in virtue of a source which is equally the source of” all contexts, all horizons,

edged by me, perhaps effectively, towards subject-as-subject, print reaching to rescue you from out-there seeming.

95 *CWL* 18, *Phenomenology and Logic*, 215.

96 Translated by Paul B. Milan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). I can only doodle with the first paragraph here. A full essay deals with it more adequately: *Field Nocturnes CanTower* 48, “Desire Undistanced.”

97 Lonergan, *CWL* 2, *Verbum*, 238. I am twisting a quotation about concepts, a pointing profoundly relevant to a theory of adult growth. But am I really twisting the quotation? For are we not talking of the self-duplication of the self?
glimmers of the **field**. So, you have the context of Lonergan’s printed invitation to you, remembered words, a grammar of ascent easily mistaken for a mountain peak. The core task of these next generations is to become luminous about that mistake about sporting goods. A help in that task is to take seriously the genuine searchings of people such as Colette and Merleau-Ponty, gasping and grasping for a meaning for **flesh**. Renaud Barbaras’ effort belongs there. In a later culture of functional collaboration the researcher will detect anomalies, good and bad, anomalies to be cycled by the global community of the Tower of Able to reach the streets, here and there, in refreshing flesh. But to move onto that long slope of cycles of incline, we need to get our heads and hearts into the mud and straw of our truncated exile.

In a 1954 May letter to Fr. Fred Crowe, Lonergan typed: “The Method of Theology is coming into perspective. For the Trinity: Imago Dei in homine and proceed to the limit as in evaluating \([1 + 1/n]^{nx}\) as \(n\) approaches infinity. For the rest: ordo universi. From the viewpoint of theology, it is a manifold of unities developing in relation to one another and in relation to God.”

Fred sent me the relevant part of the letter, probably in the 1970s. I suspect that he did not have much clue what Lonergan was on about, excited about, and he thought, wrongly, that I might. My brooding about

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98 See the index to *Phenomenology and Logic*, under **Field**. Lonergan borrowed the word **field** from phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty as a suggestive subjective correlative to **being**.

99 In a series of previous notes here (especially 29, 33, 34, 67, 93, 94), beginning with Beckett’s statement at note 29, I have been twisting us towards the possibility of a tadpole envisagement of new human talk. **Flesh** becomes a word of consequence of Merleau-Ponty, but it had altogether more complex resonances for Colette: “When my body thinks ... everything else falls silent. At those moments, my whole skin has a soul.” These are the final words quoted from Colette in that great chapter 6 of Julia Kristeva’s *Colette, or the world’s flesh*: “The Metamorphic Body: Plants, Beasts, and Monsters.” The desire distorted by Augustine and Freud unto death needs to be aggreformed towards life. (On the transformation to life-wish, see note 20 of *Field Nocturnes CanTower 29*.) This is Kristeva’s third volume of a trilogy on Hannah Arendt, Melanie Klein, and Colette, and I would recommend serious tadpole openness to its final chapter 10, “Is There a Feminine Genius?” I would like to acknowledge here my indebtedness to Dr. Christine Jamieson, who led me towards Kristeva and Colette through her 1998 doctorate: *The Significance of the Body in Ethical Discourse: Julia Kristeva’s Contribution to Moral Theology*.

100 What I typed above is precisely what is in the letter that I quote from: Lonergan’s letter to Fred. See above, note 4, regarding the letters.

It gives one pause to slowly intussuscept that it would be ten years and ten months before Lonergan suffered his hearty way to his ecstatic ethical grip on the due character of the emergent cyclic manifold, “a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.” *Method in Theology*, 4
that paragraph for decades has helped me towards thematising both adult growth and the phylogenetics of history.\textsuperscript{101} But none of us have much clue about what this \textit{comeabout} man was about, (about)\textsuperscript{3}.\textsuperscript{102} Last week, puzzling over the struggle with Lonergan’s biography, I wrote a substantial letter about it to my colleague Pierrot Lambert, and reached a conclusion that I end with here, leaving it in the boldfaced large print that I used in the letter: \textbf{What then of his biography? The meaning of his life eludes us until that life is effective in these next generations. A serious biohistorical account is, then, beyond us for some centuries.}

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\textsuperscript{101} See \textit{Field Nocturne} 4: “Lonergan’s 1954 View of Theology in the New Context,” which deals also with the problem of growth.

\textsuperscript{102} My \textit{ChrlSt in History}, section 2 of chapter 2, titled “(about)\textsuperscript{3},” gives an introduction to this odd symbol, and it gives me a fitting note on which to end this essay. “What am I to do?” was very much the psychodynamics of Lonergan after his February 1965 discovery. It seems, from that file V.7, that he knew the cyclic structure to be a lift beyond Thomas’ axiomatic approach in the \textit{Summa}: he has bits of that part of Thomas in his file. He scribbled out fully a sketch of a first chapter and began it, leaving behind about ten initial pages as well as others scattered in other files: a much denser effort than what ending up in \textit{Method in Theology}. In the typed pages he describes three orders of consciousness, from which I move to my symbol, (about)\textsuperscript{3}. The orders point to a possession of a perspective on the being of procedures. Spontaneity is a first order; method is a reflective luminosity about any such spontaneous procedure. But there is the larger perspective on the geohistory of methods, analogous to zoology as dealing with the geohistory of animals. That is to be the search for the field that is method-o-logy. It leads to the solution of the problem named in note 1 of page 153 of \textit{Method in Theology}.
The Discovery Page of Functional Specialization.