Assembling Lonergan’s Heart

Meghan Allerton, James Duffy, and Philip McShane

Introduction (James Duffy)

This series of Assembly\textsuperscript{1} essays seeks to make a beginning on the structured dialectic task specified so compactly by Lonergan in section 5 of Chapter 10 of Method in Theology.\textsuperscript{2} I discussed how the series might be developed at the end of the Preface.

What, you may ask, do we mean by “heart” in the title? The directive we three are following in this series indicates that assembly “includes the researches performed, the interpretations proposed, the histories written, and the events, statements, and movements to which they refer.”\textsuperscript{3} Are we assembling Lonergan’s researches, interpretations, and histories? That would likely exclude Insight, which is neither a history, nor an interpretation per se—although it does provide instances of problems of interpretation as well as answers,\textsuperscript{4} and canons for methodological hermeneutics\textsuperscript{5}—nor an exercise in research along the lines of Lonergan’s two studies of Aquinas.\textsuperscript{6}

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\textsuperscript{1} The final word of page 249 in the 1972 edition of Method in Theology. Assembly is the first of six italicized words in this section 5. See further note 16 and the text at note 69.

\textsuperscript{2} The three objectifications are mentioned and introduced in lines 20, 24, and 28 on page 250. This is the exercise recommended to those interested in getting to grips with the character of dialectic operators. Notice the ambiguity of the phrase “character of dialectic operators.” Recall the occurrence of the word “character” on line 12 of Method in Theology, 356. This adds a twist to the fourth line of section 5 of Chapter 10.

\textsuperscript{3} Method in Theology, 250, lines 1–3.

\textsuperscript{4} See, for example, Insight, CWL 3, 186–88.

\textsuperscript{5} Insight, CWL 3, 608–16.

\textsuperscript{6} Which specializations are intimated in Insight? There are random dialectics at the end of Chapters 4 and 14; dense doctrines, for example in Chapter 5; and foundational expressions, for example: “So it comes about that the extroverted
There is a sense in which what we are attempting to do in this exercise is *include* the sequence of exercises in *Insight* as central to Lonergan’s lifelong quest to discover a method that is not “sheer make-believe,” one that does not “exclude from scientific consideration the heart of the matter.”

Certainly *Insight* was “somehow with” him as he wrote *Method in Theology*, “present and operative within” and “lurking behind the scenes.” In the summer of 1966 he succinctly expressed a particular concern in the question and assertion, “What am I to do? I cannot put all of *Insight* into the first chapter of Method!”

There are three appeals in *Method in Theology* to read *Insight*. In this article, three individuals assemble one of them—Lonergan’s enthusiastic claim, in the present context of the fifty years of its neglect, that “one can go on.” Here is the claim:

Such differentiation vastly enriches the initial nest of terms and relations. From such a broadened basis one can go on to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs, to the carriers, elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning, to the question of God, of religious experience, its expressions, its dialectical development.

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7 See Lonergan’s letter to Henry Keane, January 22, 1935 (noting that a method then in vogue in Catholic philosophy “is sheer make believe but to attack a method is a grand-scale operation calling for a few volumes”), published in Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, *Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas* (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2010), 153; *Insight*, CWL 3, at 736.

8 *Insight*, CWL 3, 303.

9 Quoting Philip McShane from a conversation in the sixth-floor room of the old Bayview Regis College. This conversation has been reported by McShane in various places.

10 *Method in Theology*, 287; CWL 14, 269. The other two appeals appear in a note in Chapter 2, “Method,” and in Chapter 10, “Dialectic.” “Please observe that I am offering only a summary, that the summary can do no more than present a
Lonergan knew that what he had written in Part One, “Background,” was inadequate and descriptive, but in the paragraph assembled here he takes his stand on his own performance. The issue for him had always been an effective explanatory foundation for genuine progress. The differentiations he writes of are listed after he points to the achievement of the basic self-luminosity normative for theologians. In the paragraph on page 286 leading up to the key paragraph and the two paragraphs on pages 287–88 that follow it, he footnotes various sections of Insight. In the key general idea, that the process of self-appropriation occurs only slowly, and, usually, only through a struggle with some such book as Insight.” Method in Theology 7, end of note 2. “To say it all with the greatest brevity: one has not only to read Insight but also to discover oneself in oneself.” Method in Theology, 260; CWL 14, 244.


13 Recall the 10th, 11th, and 12th points at the end of Chapter 1, “Method.”

paragraph itself he points to the background chapters of *Method in Theology*. Taken together, the two motions imply a double sublation. Might I suggest that the meaning of *Heart* in the title of this article is this double sublation, one that elevates the entire cycle, yielding a bit of progress?\(^{15}\)

This, then, is our *Assembly*, and now each of us will bring ourselves towards articulating our position regarding it. We do this in the procedure that Lonergan lays out in the final paragraph of section 5 of Chapter 10, “Dialectic,” while strategically skipping the previous part of the challenge, except for the activity of *Completion*.\(^{16}\) Suffice it for the moment to draw attention to the brilliant, albeit existentially uncomfortable strategy of the three objectifications identified by Lonergan in that final paragraph.

Various discomforts, alas, may be yours, if you have not been serious about the challenge of *Insight*. “To say it all with the greatest brevity: one has not only to read *Insight* but also to discover oneself in oneself.”\(^{17}\) Recognizing the challenge as “yours” has been a general problem in what I consider a positive reception to the previous attempt by five individuals to do the exercise.\(^{18}\) There was approval and suggestions that “this exercise is worthwhile,” as well as some pointed criticisms. The hope of the five of us who participated in that exercise was threefold: (1) that those interested in the structure of dialectic would read the essay; (2) that some would venture to do the exercise with a group of colleagues; (3) that theologians would

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\(^{15}\) The suggestion is that when dialectic persons hand on to foundations persons increments of development and reversal, the hand-on eventually yields “cumulative and progressive results” (*Method in Theology*, 4; CWL 14, 8) in grade schools, fish markets, and town hall meetings. A diagram such as W3 on page 160 below is helpful for thinking about such fruit-bearing collaboration.

\(^{16}\) At a later stage, no doubt, some group will tackle the difficult tasks of *Comparison*, *Reduction*, *Classification* and *Selection*. See further note 69 below.

\(^{17}\) Quoted at the end of footnote 10 above.

\(^{18}\) I refer to the first exercise in this volume, “Effective Dialectical Analysis.” The co-authored article was submitted to *METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies* for publication but later rejected. Our correspondence with the editorial team is appended to the exercise, beginning on page 40.
scrutinize, debate, discuss, develop, or refute McShane’s proposed solution to the problem in *Insight* (763–64) regarding the mystical body. One sociologist wrote:

> After my third reading of these exercises, I am struck with a shock that is anything but “delighting.” The writers all accept the close connection between dialectics and the mystical body of Christ. As a sociologist, rather than a theologian, I can’t see myself as contributing to a treatise on the mystical body. These exercises make me feel “excommunicated” from the Lonergan community. That’s a painful shock.

An answer to this criticism in an exercise-positioning would reveal to the sociologist that he was not excommunicated from any community, but simply not distinguishing between a general categorial position and the special categorial position of a mature Catholic tradition.

Only three of us do the present exercise. The point now is to effectively invite you—and the sociologist—to do the exercise regarding re-writing the chapters of *Method in Theology* that Lonergan implicitly refers to in the assembled paragraph of our exercise, Chapters 2 through 4. And if Chapter 4, “Religion,” is bothersome, there is sufficient challenge in simply homing in and honing in on Chapter 2, “The Human Good,” and/or Chapter 3, “Meaning.”

**First and Second Objectifications**

A. Meghan Allerton

I was fortunate to have been introduced to “the basic terms and relations” mentioned in the Assembled paragraph in my final year of high school, in a philosophy course given by John Benton. The course centered on the book, *Introducing Critical Thinking*, and its continuing influence in my subsequent undergraduate and graduate education has allowed me to develop my own professional area of expertise, the life sciences, in a way that coaxed and coached my thinking towards the larger perspective. In particular, the “Botany” section in the book opened entirely new vistas for the younger me, and it expresses with more literary flare than I am capable of, my first objectification.

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Should we not learn from seed, sapling, spruce? Should we not listen to the sunflower? But our present listening is crippled by the pretense of science that passes for botanical science. We juggle with genes and myths of information-flows and flows of nutrients. But we do not listen, as a genuine scientist would, to a heart-held flower. The listening comes from within, from the wonder that in some few has not been trampled down by convention.  

Because of my great good fortune in being introduced to botany in this way, I was able to approach my undergraduate and graduate work in a more enlightened way, helping me to notice the hidden flaws of truncated and reductionist botany and zoology. Only later (and less adequately) did I begin to face the problem of identifying hidden flaws in the field of theology. I must be more tentative here, of course, and lean into my own particular area of inquiry. But even in that field, despite its flaws, there is a positive positioning that I share with regard to the “one can go on to a developed account” of which Lonergan writes. One just cannot go on with some limited Linnean perspective: one is forced to face the worlds of modern physics and the chemistry of botany.

The facing does not at all rise to the self-luminosity required by Lonergan when he writes, for example, of inventing “appropriate symbolic images of the relevant chemical and physical processes.” But there are imagings that lift us beyond Linnean obscurity.

Such imagings are necessary for the larger ‘going beyond’ that Lonergan writes of in the Assembled paragraph. They are mainly absent in the “Background” chapters of Method in Theology, and even the table laying out the structure of the human good requires layerings of the kind I mention in my final paragraph. To the extent that Lonergan’s followers fail to reach for adequate symbolization, or fail even to attempt to reach, they — symbols and symbolizers — remain absent from their discussion of those early chapters of the book, and the discussion remains less than Linnean and quite ineffective.

Thus far I have staked out my position with respect to a kind of pre-scientific myopia and complacency concerning the need for adequate and “appropriate symbolic images” in the process towards explanatory science. That position is a useful transition towards the issues that belong to the second objectification. The central issue is the need to shift to explanation

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20 Introducing Critical Thinking, 183.
21 Insight, CWL 3, 489.
in the world of theology. Linked to the needed shift to explanation is a peculiar block in theology regarding recognizing the need for that shift. I say “peculiar,” because there is a sense in which the need is obvious to anyone educated in some variation of the scientific world. Why, then, the block? In the world of human studies the pressure is felt and followed. There is, for example, a chemistry and physics of attention-deficit disorders.

The theological community following Lonergan, however, seems to be content with a simple meaning of such a slogan as “be attentive.” There is a conspicuous difference between drinking a cup of coffee every morning and knowing something about the chemistry of attention. The theological community following Lonergan appears not to notice the difference. Think of this mundane example as an illustration of something much larger: that ‘not noticing’ introduces distortions all along the line. It may even account for the failure of that community to notice Lonergan’s suggestion regarding the need for a “developed” re-writing of the “Background” chapters of *Method*.

Thus, there seems little to say about “indicating the view that would result from developing what he has regarded as positions,” except perhaps some version of “fare lo stupido.” From the perspective of someone in the life sciences, Lonerganist theology is not doing a good job of accepting and facing the challenge of explanatory science; rather, it seems to revel in description and remain stranded there. It is as if theology’s “ivory tower” is holding the “queen of the sciences” prisoner in a pre-scientific world.

The development that is needed is working in an analogy with Lonergan’s advice about botany: “there have to be invented appropriate symbolic images,” a task McShane undertook in his 2nd *Prehumus* essay, “Metagrams and Metaphysics,” where he produces a series named *W*1. I do not wish to delve further into this; no doubt my co-authors have more to say about the key absence in present theology of technical symbolizations. I simply draw attention to McShane first symbol, *W*1. It is the representation of any finite thing by *f*(*p*1; *c*1; *b*1; *z*1; *u*1; *r*1). For a flower, for example, *l* = *m* = *n* = 0. Does this symbolism, then, shed light on the

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23 *Phenomenology and Logic*, CWL 18, 351 (“to play the fool”). The current conventional discourse around Part One of *Method in Theology* is a being silly that is on the edge of a “pretend to be silly.” *Ibid.*


25 This essay is available at: http://www.philipmcshane.org/prehumous.
flower in your garden? Or does it seem to you otiose? The question helps us diagnose the success (or not) of our own struggling towards the luminousness of our own intellectual and rational process.

For those pushing towards a scientific view of the flower, and of themselves, there is a further and important point to be made, even in this brief context. As he points out elsewhere, the semi-colon in McShane’s “appropriate symbolic image” of physical, chemical, botanical, etc., processes carries a depth of heuristic meaning and precision one might otherwise not suspect. It has the significance of being between the comma of reductionism and the colon of vitalism. To come to grips with it, thus sublating Aristotle in rising to aggreformism, is no easy task and indeed not an evident achievement of theology. There is needed “an inward aspect such that the mind pivoting on the insight, is able to conceive, not without labor, the philosophic concepts of form and matter.”

B. Philip McShane

For me, the issue is shockingly simple, and the full meaning of shock is to emerge only when we, our group of three, articulated then by James, come to the third and final objectification. But let us start the shock where Lonergan starts it in the paragraph. “One can go on to a developed account of the human good.” He starts his paragraph’s musing, pretty explicitly, with the first sentence of Chapter 2 of Method. Existentially, gob-smacked, gap-shocked, I would ask you to read that little sentence again now, and again at the end of my thousand words. “What is good, always is concrete.” You could, of course, take in the first paragraph, grappling with what he means by “assembling,” but then we would be looking towards 300,000 words, the big book that was to follow and sublate Insight.

So it is best that I assemble in the ambivalence of, perhaps, enriched academic commonsense reading badly, the positioning required in the

26 “It is a searching question. . . . the question would be otiose if already I knew what the intelligibility in question was.” Lonergan, “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” A Third Collection, 173–74.
27 Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, CWL 2, 38.
28 Insight, CWL 3, 754, line 1.
29 Pause here and do “not be afraid to laugh” (Insight, CWL 3, 649, line 9) at how you first read the end of the final sentence of Lonergan’s discussion of common sense: “[O]ur account of common sense relates it to its neural basis and relates aggregates and successions of instances of common sense to one another.” CWL 3, 269.
first objectification. Then I wave my hand at my first serious article on positioning, written in the winter of 1960–61, and move on to my second relevant assembling, the positioning to which Lonergan invited me as he paced his room in the old Regis College of Bayview, with that massive summary nudge. “What am I to do? I can’t put all of Insight into the first chapter of Method.” He and I stayed luminously in that poise for the next years, and I faced the next big leap of positioning as I indexed Method’s galley pages in December 1971. My poise throughout was in a quest of “what did he do,” and hitting page 286 was a jackpot lift in gold. It was only years later, of course, that I began to savor the crazy paragraph that is our topic. Perhaps I might suggest, as a symbol of that savoring, my 41 essays written around a single paragraph of Insight. Are you with me so far, and if so how far, and how far can your sense of humor reach in tickling your poise? Without heavy and subtle closeted humor, “one runs the risk of misleading one’s” self. The humor must needs come out of the closet in “a final objectification of horizon,” but here, at the halfway house of my thousand words, I must assemble the “further objectification of horizon” in too-evident shocking ambivalence of “academic discipline” haute vulgarization.

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31 The nudge led me eventually, after 53 years, to glimpsing Insight better in titling Chapter 17 “Engineering as Dialectic.” We need to step away from bourgeois Aristotle and his followers in the humanities and the sciences. We need to think out, in a full context of the feeble sunflower of finitude, the geohistorical and eschatological genetic heuristics of “bolder spirits.” Method in Theology, 3, line 10.

32 The paragraph is on Insight 489, beginning “Study of an organism begins ...” The essays are the series of 41 essays titled “Field Nocturnes Can Tower,” available at: http://www.philipmcshane.org/field-nocturnes-cantower.

33 The context is “Possible Functions of Satire and Humor,” in Insight, CWL 3, 647–49.

34 Quoting that first paragraph of Chapter 2 of Method in Theology.

35 Method in Theology, 250, line 28.

36 Ibid., line 24.

37 See Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958–1964, CWL 6, 121, 155. Lonergan writes about “academic disciplines” in the second paragraph of Chapter 1 of Method in Theology, a paragraph on our axial detour. Recall note 31 above.
LOL: “the view that would result”? Well,

Here is direct expression—pages and pages of it. And if you don’t understand it, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is because you are too decadent to receive it. You are not satisfied unless form is so strictly divorced from content that you can comprehend the one almost without bothering to read the other. This rapid skimming and absorption of the scant cream of sense is made possible by what I call a continuous process of copious intellectual salivation. The form that is an arbitrary and independent phenomenon can fulfill no higher function than that of stimulus for a tertiary or quaternary conditioned reflex of dribbling comprehension.

“The answer is easily reached.” You simply lift my recent venture, “Method in Theology: From \( [1 +1/n]^{nx} \) to \( \{M(W_{3})^{000}\}^{4} \)” into the context of my essay, Æcornomics 17, “Engineering as Dialectic.” There you have a brief “Scientific American” assembly of “the view that would result from 

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38 Method in Theology, 250, line 26. We need group laughter here, as we move to hear here Lonergan’s neurolift in marking of the Beckett quotation. That will point to the seed in you of the beginning: a resulting view of our gross mistake in misfitting Lonergan into the world of “big frogs in little ponds” (A Dublin remark of Lonergan, Easter 1961). It was the same week that he told his story of Einstein being asked to put his stuff in simple words, “I’m not good at math” (this was in the first of his lectures, the one we failed to record). Incidentally, how do you feel about “the natural bridge over which we may advance from our examination of science to an examination of common sense.” Insight, CWL 3, 163. This is the beginning of Chapter 5, on “Space and Time.” LOL.


40 Insight, CWL 3, 195.


42 This essay is available at: http://www.philipmcshane.org.
developing” the position of Lonergan that I share. Now, let’s have your “cards on the table.”

C. James Duffy

In a previous essay, I highlighted the importance of implementing diagrams and heuristics in one’s thinking, planning, and teaching. The focus of that prior exercise was a proposed theological discovery. My positioning now focuses on what I consider to be a key paragraph in Method in Theology, the paragraph quoted in our Introduction.

The context of the paragraph where Lonergan writes about someone(s) developing what he had written in Chapters 2–4 is Chapter 11, “Foundations.” The larger context is the book Method in Theology, the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, unpublished letters, and even informal conversations. Insight is a sub-word of Method, just as the economic manuscripts are a sub-word of Insight.

A month and a half before my 20th birthday, I was invited to read Insight by journaling. After years of trying to read the book this way—sometimes taking my eyes off the page to do what-exercises, why-exercises, and how-exercises—and various efforts to teach sections to

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43 Method in Theology, 250, line 26.
44 Ibid., 193.
45 See the text beginning on pages 24–26 in “Effective Dialectical Analysis.”
47 When I first read Insight in Philosophy 498, “Lonergan: Creation & Method” (spring 1981), Mark Morelli asked me to write in a journal. At the time, I knew next to nothing about Aquinas, Kant, Wittgenstein, or even Lonergan, but I learned from Mark that philosophy has much to do with self-appropriation.
48 What did Archimedes discover? What is the significance of symbolism? How do convenient symbols facilitate pivoting between the concrete and the abstract? Why is the square root of 2 irrational? What is an inverse insight? Why was “the nature of weight” not enough for Galileo, and why did he have to experiment? What is the meaning of probability? In 2013 a colleague in Latin America asked me about the meaning of this sentence from Insight: “It follows that, when the prior conditions for the functioning of a scheme of recurrence are satisfied, then the probability of the combinations of events constitutive of the scheme leaps from a product of fractions to a sum of fractions.” CWL 3, 144. So I
undergraduates,\(^{49}\) I have come to realize that *Insight* is quite an achievement, one that falls into the category of a classic—a work that is well beyond my horizon—and that making the author’s words my own pivots on exercising my natural right to do “apparently trifling problems” as best I can. Luck would have it that, when working on problems, I more or less spontaneously doodle diagrams and implement convenient symbolism, “which itself takes over a notable part of the solution of problems.”\(^{50}\) Here I repeat a claim from the first positioning exercise: Implementing diagrams and heuristics is the way to proceed. Lonergan says as much in the paragraph that precedes the one we are assembling in this article,\(^{51}\) and five pages later notes that the general categories occur in any of the functional specialties.\(^{52}\)

My position regarding the paragraph on general categories is that it implies an ethics of reading suggested by my use of “sub-word” above. The paragraph implies someone has self-read *Insight* well enough to rewrite the first four chapters of *Method in Theology*. Based on many years trying to do the genetic sequence of exercises, and a keen awareness of paragraphs and

took three months to write “El azar, la probabilidad emergente y la cosmópolis” [Randomness, Emergent Probability, and Cosmopolis], *Revista de Filosofía* (*Universidad Iberoamericana*), vol. 135 (2013), 313–337.

\(^{49}\) I have tried teaching Chapters 6 and 7 of *Insight* while skipping the previous chapters on heuristic structures and canons of empirical method, the complimentary of statistical and classical knowings and knowns, and space and time. Former students—one of whom is in London (University of Oxford) to pursue an MA in Public Policy, another one applying to the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy—still joke around about cosmopolis. But they do not live the question, “What is this not easy, not busy, timely and fruitful, not pushy dream team called cosmopolis?” How well, then, did I succeed in sowing the question: “What is the X cosmopolis?”

\(^{50}\) CWL 3, 42. See also the end of note 46 above.

\(^{51}\) The verifiable group of terms and relations can be differentiated in a number of manners. Lonergan mentions nine on pages 286–87. The sixth in the list reads: “the diverse heuristic structures within which operations accumulate towards the attainment of goals: the classical, statistical, genetic, and dialectical heuristic structures and, embracing them all, the integral heuristic structure which is what I mean by a metaphysics.” *Method in Theology*, 287.

\(^{52}\) *Method in Theology*, page 292, the last paragraph.
chapters that are still beyond my horizon,\footnote{While writing the article mentioned in note 48, I discovered paragraphs in Chapter 2 of \textit{Insight} that I could not, still cannot read. In “‘MacIntyre and Lonergan’ Revisited” (\textit{Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis}, vol. 12 (2020), 60–95), I tried to make heads or tails of what the second and third canons of methodical hermeneutics in Chapter 17 of \textit{Insight} ask of interpreters. I appreciate that Lonergan is trying to make a case for scientific hermeneutics, but I find the analogy with the canons of empirical method (CWL 3, 601) at once intriguing and baffling. See also McShane’s remarks on the need for group laughter and our skirting, shirking, and shrinking of Lonergan’s challenge in note 38 above.} I do not see myself rewriting those chapters any time soon.

At the same time, one of the things resulting from my position is that the current fascination with themes such as “the human good” (feelings, values, beliefs, progress and decline), “stages of meaning” (art, symbols, realms and stages of meaning), and “religious experience” (self-transcendence, religious experience, faith, religious belief) will, in good time, be significantly transformed by those working in Foundations, whose work will be passed along to others in the forward specialties, and finally bear fruit in the lives of those people who “do the world’s work.”\footnote{See \textit{Method in Theology}, 97, 304.} Part of what needs to be done on earth\footnote{The allusion is to a letter written by thirty-year-old Lonergan to a Jesuit superior: “What on earth is to be done? I have done all that can be done in spare time and without special opportunities to have contact with those capable of guiding and directing me as well as to read the oceans of books that I would have to read were I to publish stuff that is really worth-while.” Bernard Lonergan, Letter to his Jesuit Provincial, Henry Keane, dated January 22, 1935, published in Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, \textit{Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas} (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2010), 154.} to transform the cumulative mess of life unlivable, “the greatest evil in the world is the evil that is concretized in the historic flow,”\footnote{“The greatest evil in the world is the evil that is concretized in the historic flow, the capital of injustice that hangs like a pall over every brilliant thing, that makes men and nations groan over others’ glory, that provokes anger and suicide and dire wars, that culminates in the dull mind and sluggish body of the enslaved people or the decayed culture.” \textit{Essay in Fundamental Sociology}, a fragment from a 1934 essay by Lonergan published in Shute, \textit{Lonergan’s Early Economic Research}, 43.} is for this generation of teachers and scholars and the next to upgrade our ethics of reading and teaching \textit{Insight}, taking a month or...
three to read a sentence when necessary, and naming the known unknown \(X, Y, \) or \(Z\).\(^{57}\)

**Third Objectification**\(^{58}\)

It is important to imagine as concretely as possible the honest to-and-fro that occurred between the three of us regarding the adequacy of our efforts and the push towards the future. McShane’s view of the task was obviously more developed than that of the other two, and we prescinded from his complex heuristics to focus on the simpler heuristics represented by \(W_3\). (See the diagram below, page 160). Furthermore, note that the suggestion made in the Introduction about focusing only on the second and third chapters of *Method* means that we can prescind from discussing the bottom part of the diagram, what I might call the *Trinitarian Line*.\(^{59}\) Finally, note that while we are doing a structured dialectic exercise, as best as each individual can, we are focusing on the content of the box labelled *FOUNDATION* as it is arrowed into in the diagram from the dialectic operators of the box at the other end.\(^{60}\)

The focus is and was dominated, for all three of us, by the image at the top of the diagram: \(HSf (P_1; C_j; B_k; Z_l; U_m; R_n)\).\(^{61}\) There are tricky points here that perhaps escape your attention. How much meaning, for instance, is to be given to \(R_n\) in a general categorial consideration?\(^{62}\) Again, what is

\(^{57}\) See note 48 above and the paragraph about the importance of diagrams and heuristics on page 24 above.

\(^{58}\) The third objectification was written by Duffy.

\(^{59}\) Obviously, you need to ignore the “3” in the top line. To get a more general religious perspective write “n” instead of “3.” For the atheist, \(n = 0\).

\(^{60}\) The diagram is in need of various changes. “Dialectics” should be singular, whereas “Foundation” and “Doctrine” should be plural. Some if not all of the arrows should be bidirectional. See further the discussion of Communications “backfiring” into Systematics in Meghan Allerton, “Functional Collaboration in Ecology,” *Seeding Global Collaboration*, ed. Patrick Brown and James Duffy (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2016), 214–15.


\(^{62}\) This question pertains to the acceptability of Chapter 19 of *Insight*, expressed in a broader manner in the beginning of Chapter 4 of *Method in
the meaning of the “;” that precedes Rn? Indeed, there is the puzzle about how univocal the meaning is of “;” right across the line. McShane would have us focus on the exercise that Lonergan requires, on page 489 of Insight, to give “;” a fundamental meaning.63


63 The quotation immediately following the image provides you with the chance to take stock of your position if you are seriously facing this exercise. That taking stock requires the reading to be a detailed recollection of your journey through its various phrases. Honestly taking stock reveals whether you are capable of re-writing the way Lonergan suggests. Think of the problem of being competent in the topics of Insight Chapter 8 and being able to shift to the richer meta-perspective of Chapter 15.
There have to be invented appropriate symbolic images of the relevant chemical and physical processes; in these images there have to be grasped by insight the laws of the higher system that account for regularities beyond the range of physical and chemical explanation; from these laws there has to be constructed the flexible circle of schemes of recurrence in which the organism functions; finally, this flexible circle of schemes must be coincident with the related set of capacities-for-performance that previously was grasped in sensibly presented organs.\textsuperscript{64}

For the three of us there was no need to add the complex indication of Lonergan from his discussion of genetic method in \textit{Insight}. We moved around it to notice different enriched appreciations that had occurred to each of us. So, for Allerton, there is the enrichment of her biological research into river flows and micro-organisms that indeed grounds her comfort— not initially shared by me, James, in the fuller heuristic (W\textsubscript{3})\textsuperscript{64T}. Such research demands, for comprehensive collaboration, imagining latitudes and longitudes through time, and indeed on a global scale.\textsuperscript{65}

My imagination was stretched differently while writing “English as My Second Language” for the West Coast Methods Institute 2011.\textsuperscript{66} To begin to ask how Helen Keller signed “water” or how I type the printed marks appearing in front of you now, it is best to employ convenient symbols.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Insight}, CWL 3, 489.

\textsuperscript{65} In our “final objectification” exchanges, Allerton pointed us to the masterly work of H. B. N. Hynes, e.g., “The Ecology of Flowing Waters in Relation to Management,” \textit{Journal (Water Pollution Control Federation)}, vol. 42, no. 3 (March, 1970), 418–424, and “The Stream and its Valley,” \textit{Verhandlungen der Internationalen Vereinigung für Theoretische und Angewandte Limnologie}, vol. 19 (1975), 1–15. In the latter article he takes a stand against modeling that departs from, so to speak, the stream of reality—something in line with McShane’s push for accurate situation-room analyses. Allerton also drew our attention to various modern techniques of imaging and collaborative control.

\textsuperscript{66} The essay is available at: https://itesm.academia.edu/JamesGerardDuffy.

\textsuperscript{67} On page 20 of “English as My Second Language,” I commented on the symbolism that appears in Philip McShane, \textit{A Brief History of Tongue} (Halifax: Axial Press, 1998), 122–23. “V {W(p\textsubscript{i}; c\textsubscript{j}; b\textsubscript{k}; z\textsubscript{l}; u\textsubscript{m}; r\textsubscript{n}) symbolizes the spoken word ‘water’ as the actuation of a capacity to tongue-forth that is a higher integration of lower physical, chemical, biological manifolds in the human thing. > HS (p\textsubscript{i}; c\textsubscript{j}; b\textsubscript{k}; z\textsubscript{l}; u\textsubscript{m}; r\textsubscript{n}) symbolizes the fact that the outer spoken or written
How do either or both stretches of the imagination—Allerton’s or mine—strike you, in regard to assessing your competence for transposing Chapters 2 and 3 of Method into effective explanatory openness? I suspect that for many readers that sounds downright daft. That sounding, I would venture to say, is related to the absence of any serious thematic worldview that would play the role of the word Comparison, a highly refined search for “affinities and oppositions” that is hard for me to imagine except by way of analogy.

For the three of us there were startling moments in this third objectification. Especially shocking was a glimpse of the practical road to “theology possesses” that McShane has been emphasizing for a number of word of the human thing points to an inner word, which is also an actuation of capacity that is a higher integration of lower manifolds. H symbolizes the pointed-to inner word as emergent in history, while S refers to ‘the sum of things historical’ as possibly, probably, or actually recurring.” See further ibid., 120–21. The outer word might be signed, as was the case with Helen Keller’s joyful entry into linguistic meaning.

It would have been good to have disagreements thematized here, but surely embarrassing since such disagreements would have at their centers a fundamental rejection of Lonergan’s positioning expressed in the two canons of explanation. In later mature cyclings of Assembly, there will be refined disagreements regarding the statistically effective heuristics of progress. Further, I would note that at that stage specialization will be evident. At present these assembly exercises are open to all. We must all face the humbling fact that so far our explanatory efforts have been pitiful, and that when it comes to heuristic luminosity, the “inquiry was voraussetzunglos.” Insight, CWL 3, 600.

An analogy that I find helpful is “House,” an American television medical drama that takes place at fictional Princeton Plainsboro Teaching Hospital in New Jersey. See further “MacIntyre and Lonergan’ Revisited,” Journal of Macrodynmac Analysis, vol. 12 (2020), at 90–91. The meaning of Comparison pivots on having a decent grip on the front-line standard model. That is the whole present trouble we face. In this exercise and the first one assembling McShane’s proposed solution to a problem posed by Lonergan in Insight (CWL 3, 763–64), we have skirted the problem of moving through the stages named Comparison, Reduction, Classification, and Selection. Performing these activities pivots on the dialectician having a fairly decent handle on the genetics of viewpoints that is their basis. At this stage we are simply not up to that task. I imagine that at an advanced stage of later times, the meaning of Comparison and the other three italicized words that follow will have a cultural obviousness. That advanced stage depends on us, in these next decades, facing our failure to take seriously Lonergan’s push towards a scientific hermeneutics.
years. Allerton and I sense that his push for a complex diagrammatic structure of situation rooms, global topologies of interferences in such rooms—parliaments, business offices, bedrooms, cinemas, etc.—could actually work to bring the human “animal to a habitat” where an aesthetic glimpse of human loneliness would “dominate his [or her] whole way of life.” Thus, for us the end of page 250 became a beacon of hope for a future statistics of foundational interference, when globally and effectively “positions are developed and counterpositions are reversed.” This for me shines light on Lonergan’s realistic, optimistic view of history as progressing towards a time when nations will not aim missiles at one another.

One of the communications that occurred during our exchanges regarding the third objectification was an e-mail on the topic sent my McShane to a larger interested group. I conclude with his communication.

Greetings all,

There has been no response to my push for a new exercise round that shocking exercise proposed by Lonergan: rewrite Chapters 2–4 of Method within the horizon of Insight. Should I risk another push? So: one may ask, “Does it really matter that the Lonergan leadership, and so the taught population of its students, are settled in an old descriptiveness?” There are various ways for me to go in considering this question, and I ask you to pause over three.

First there is the Epilogue of Insight, where Lonergan steps out as a theologian and makes two normative statements, one about established incompetence (Insight, 755, line 17 “breathless”) one about unestablished competence, “theology possesses relevance” (ibid. 766, line 29). Theology does not so actually possess, but it could if its level of mediation rose to parallel the competence of the core engineers of physics’ standard model and thus poured into the competent members of the civilized community the somewhat lower level of competence that yet is effective in engineering progress in civilization engineering components that are within physics. The “pouring in” is what is thematized later in the challenge symbolized by me as “FS > C.” To get that far, in perhaps the next millennium, religious people’s leaders have to face the climb to understanding the WHAT that is at the heart of progress, the WHAT of explanation. The climb will be manifested in theology then possessing, e.g., the manifest countervailing power of a symbolism—aesthetic and explanatory—that is fully isomorphic to truncated secular symbolisms of progress. That climb became the center of my articles in Divyadaan

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70 Insight, CWL 3, 498, line 11.
71 Ibid., line 15.
72 The conclusion of Section 5 of Chapter 10, Method in Theology (1972), end of page 250.
73 See the conclusion to Lonergan’s 1934 Essay in Fundamental Sociology.
30/1 (2019) on “Converging Religions” and its manifestation depends on the seeding of the beginning of that climb in symbolizations that are hopefilled and aesthetic.

Secondly, that first push is as remote as Lonergan’s answer to the “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” (CWL 17) which answer was of course shelved. But I think now of Lonergan’s two communications with me by post in 1968, the first asking me to find an economist, the second expressing his irritation at the chit chat of descriptive theology about family wage. I would note that I put the asking re an economist into the full formal context in the fifth and last Divyadaan (2019: 1) article “Finding an Effective Economist: A Central Theological Challenge.” Central means central: the foundational center that is to hold and spin the cycle of progress through its caring global hands in later millennia. My foundational and occasional pastoral push for effective searching has been no more successful than Lonergan’s.

So then, thirdly, I return to the question posed at the beginning, “Does it really matter that the Lonergan leadership, and so the taught population of its students, are settled in an old descriptiveness?” The hidden answer of the locked-in ethos of leadership and students is “NO.” The exercise proposed by me AND LONERGAN is one that requires a self-exposing NO: one that expresses the worldview behind the NO and adds the miserable heuristic of where it is leading us. Might I not suspect that the leadership will not take up my challenge? The exercise, of course, is Lonergan’s, stated in blunt and beautiful simplicity. The refusal to do it? Might that be because there is a suspicion that it would bring out in the open a refusal to accept both canons of explanation, a refusal of Lonergan’s fundamental shift in Christianity to an effective control of hopefilled Isaian history, a refusal “to form a concept of history,” (Topics in Education, 236) adequate to solving “the problem of general history, which is the real catch.” (ibid.)

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