

“MacIntyre and Lonergan” Revisited

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Introduction

In the fall of 1999, I drafted two essays for the annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association (ACPA), which took place in St. Paul, Minnesota during the first week of November 1999. The essay that I presented, “Insights into and in the History of Philosophy,” was later published in the *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*.¹ The second essay, “MacIntyre and Lonergan on the History of Philosophy,” was not presented at the ACPA. In the spring of 2000 I reworked this essay and submitted it to *The Thomist* for publication with the title “MacIntyre and Lonergan: Metaphysical Genealogies?”²

Nineteen years later I am revisiting the essay I submitted to *The Thomist*. Why? Some things have happened in the last 20 years that have significantly changed my perspective regarding the effectiveness of comparing these two thinkers. Indeed, my perspective on the effectiveness of comparing any two or more thinkers has changed significantly, and I feel moved to articulate reasons for the change, as it calls into question a basic expectation and procedure of academic practice. What was I doing in the original essay? Why did it make sense to compare the two thinkers then, but it does not now? What difference does my change in perspective make? To whom might it make a difference?

I. That Was Then

A. Skimming and Scanning “MacIntyre and Lonergan: Metaphysical Genealogies?”

Skimming and scanning are techniques that I teach Mexican undergraduates who must attain a qualifying score on the BULATS³ exam

¹ *Insight and Inference*, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, volume 73 (1999): 109–124. This essay is available on academia.edu (<https://itesm.academia.edu/JamesGerardDuffy>).

² The article was never published. It also now available on academia.edu (<https://itesm.academia.edu/JamesGerardDuffy>).

³ BULATS (Business Language Testing Service) is a multilingual assessment test (in English, Spanish, French and German) that is used by companies, schools, and universities worldwide to assess language ability.

in order to graduate. The techniques are especially important for managing the time allotted to answer questions about readings of more than one or two paragraphs. Skimming entails reading titles, sub-titles, first and last sentences of paragraphs, and the goal is to get the main idea and the general flow of the text. Scanning involves jumping from the text to read the questions, then returning to the text to quickly find the answers. Since the topics of readings on many if not most standardized tests that are accepted by English-speaking academic and professional institutions may or may not be of interest to the student, the technique helps manage “¿y a mí qué?”⁴ anxiety. For example, the following sentence might not be of interest to a particular student taking a standardized exam: “Stickleback fish use sign stimuli in their systems of behavior.”

Skimming my 1999–2000 essay, I find the names of two 20th Century philosophers, the phrase “metaphysical genealogy,” and a question mark. Four sections follow. In the first section I dealt with some guy named Lonergan, in the second section I dealt with another guy named MacIntyre. In the third section I introduced the word “horizoned” in quotation marks and the topic history of philosophy, and in the fourth section I posed two *Wh-* questions, one about metaphysics (whose), the other about first principles (which). Unlike the readings on the BULATS and other standardized exams, there are a number of footnotes (eighty-two) in the essay, but there are no questions at the end of the article to check reading comprehension.

Skimming individual paragraphs takes a bit more time, but by doing so I glean a general impression, something like the following. In the first paragraph I added the names of three other philosophers to the discussion—Lyotard, Marx, and Hegel—and note that Lyotard does not believe in the “metanarratives” of the other two, which leads him to name a “legitimation crisis.” Here I refer to a “genealogical method” that Lyotard and others are adopting because “transcendental analysis” is inadequate for dealing with contingencies and singularities. In the second paragraph I brought Lonergan and MacIntyre into the discussion and identified them as two thinkers who, possibly, implement a “genealogical method” as well. Three footnotes are added to support this possibility.

The third paragraph adds tension, problems, a *however*. There I provided reasons for doubting Lonergan’s and MacIntyre’s affinity with Lyotard and commented that it is possible that the two of them want to have their cake (genealogy) and eat it too (metaphysics). After posing some questions, I repeated the word “traditions” a number of times, so that must be an important term, especially for MacIntyre, who identifies three traditions. Then I posed a question about Lonergan possibly being in cahoots with another guy named Kant, who might have been in cahoots with Marx and Hegel. Finally, in the fourth paragraph, I announced the aim of the essay:

⁴ This is a short version of “¿Y a mí que me importa?” which means “What does that have to do with me?” or “Why should I care?”

The purpose of this essay is to answer these questions by comparing the ways MacIntyre and Lonergan approach the history of philosophy—a history which they both acknowledge remains largely to be written—and conceive of metaphysics. There are notable similarities in the ways they relate philosophical positions and traditions to questions posed by earlier philosophers and to an ongoing philosophical dialectic. At the same time, their respective conceptions of metaphysics diverge in some fundamental ways. I will examine one way in which their metaphysics differ, and in particular how this difference reflects differences in their readings of Aquinas.⁵ In the final part of the essay I will comment on the possibility of metaphysical genealogy.

I divided each of the first two sections of the essay into two subsections. There I wrote that while both Lonergan and MacIntyre have a historical focus, Lonergan's focus is on what he calls "positions and counterpositions" while MacIntyre's focus is on "three rival traditions." I also noted that metaphysics for Lonergan has something to do with conceiving, affirming, and implementing an "integral heuristic structure," while for MacIntyre metaphysics concerns itself with "first principles" and "final ends."

Skimming the third section, I find that I noted some similarities. Neither Lonergan nor MacIntyre believes in a "pure" history of philosophy, which means each of their histories of philosophy is "horizoned" by what each considers achievements and failures in other areas of inquiry. Moreover, both employ something called a "retortion argument," and consider personal development an important element for doing philosophy. Finally, both claim their history of philosophy lines up with the metaphysics of Aquinas.

In the fourth section, "Whose Metaphysics? Which First Principles?" I noted some differences between Lonergan and MacIntyre and dropped a number of new names into the discussion: Maréchal, Kuhn, Suarez, Scotus, Leo XIII, Kleutgen, Maritain, and Gilson. In this section I referred to Gerald McCool, who wrote on Thomistic philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries and contends that Aquinas' philosophy actually excludes the possibility of a perennial system.⁶ Finally, I named some critics of MacIntyre and Lonergan and pointed out doubts that had been raised

⁵ The note in the original essay reads: "In this essay I am prescinding from Lonergan's "later" (post-*Insight*) works and from MacIntyre's *Dependent Rational Animals* (Chicago: Open Court, 1999)."

⁶ *From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989) and *Nineteenth Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989). See "The End of the Neo-Thomistic Movement," in *From Unity to Pluralism*, 224–230.

regarding the ways these thinkers interpret Aquinas. There are those who claim that statistical and empirical methods, hermeneutics, and genealogy are antithetical to the legacy of Aquinas, while both Lonergan and MacIntyre hold that a genuine development of Aquinas requires embracing methods and approaches that evolved after the 13th century.

B. Why, How, and What to Compare?

At the time of writing the essay, I had an eye on presenting the paper at the American Catholic Philosophical Association and, a few months later, I had hopes of publishing the article in *The Thomist*. Most likely there were other motivations, e.g., an expense-paid opportunity to do some sightseeing in the Twin Cities.⁷ Saint Mary’s University of Minnesota, where I was teaching at the time, is not heavily into research, but it would have helped my tenure review to have a couple of publications.⁸ My undergraduate teaching load included ethics,⁹ so virtue ethics was on my mind as I set out to compare Lonergan and MacIntyre.

How was I comparing and contrasting the two thinkers? I was trying to find some common ground, or points of apparent agreement, as well as points of disagreement. In the paper I did not focus much on significant influences on the two thinkers,¹⁰ but rather explored similarities and differences in their respective metaphysics.

⁷ Typically our motives for attending workshops, conferences, and other gatherings, not to mention motives for publishing articles and books, are mixed, and could include things like an addition to a curriculum vitae to help with a job search or tenure review, intellectual tourism, an escape from an unfriendly climate, or some finite good, including receiving an honor or an award. In any case, it is no easy task to self-read Aquinas’ ordered list of eight candidates for happiness—wealth, honors, fame or glory, power, bodily good, pleasure, good of the soul, or any created good (*Prima Secundae*, question 2, arts. 1-8: “Things in which man’s happiness consists”). See further note 34 about “being in form” and note 36 about “transmuting present desires and fears.”

⁸ Would have? The tenure review never happened, even though the inside word was that I would have been granted tenure. In the summer of 2001, I moved to Mexico to learn Spanish and obtain a TEFL (Teach English as a Foreign Language) certificate in hopes of landing a job teaching ESL (English as a Second Language), which I did in the fall of 2001.

⁹ Part of my teaching load included core “interdisciplinary” courses, one of which was “Perspectives on the Good Human Life from Greek Antiquity to the Middle Ages.” A required text for that course was Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*.

¹⁰ Besides Aquinas, some key figures in the history of philosophy for both Lonergan and MacIntyre are Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Nietzsche and Rawls appear in works of MacIntyre, not so much for Lonergan; Scotus and Newton appear in the works of Lonergan, not so much for MacIntyre. These are impressionistic observations based on the indexes of *Insight*, *After Virtue*, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry*, and *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* With today’s technology and electronic books, one could arrive at precise numbers.

In the paper “Insights into and in the History of Philosophy” that I presented at the ACPA in November 1999,¹¹ I had noted that MacIntyre does not consider philosophy to be a discipline distinct from other disciplines and within which specifically philosophical problems provide philosophy with its own subject matter. I referred to an article published in *Soundings* where he describes philosophy as a second-order reflection:

Philosophy just *is* conceptually self-conscious enquiry in whatever field. There are philosophical physicists, historians, linguists, theologians, and psychologists; but ‘the’ philosopher, who is philosophical *an sich*, but not any of these, nor a philosophical mathematician nor a . . . (the list is as long and as indeterminate as are the descriptions of intellectual enquiry) is a mythological beast.¹²

On a similar note, in the Introduction to *Insight* Lonergan also describes philosophy as a second-order reflection:

Let us say that his noetic activity is engaged in a lower context when it is doing mathematics or following scientific method or exercising common sense. Then it will be moving towards an upper context when it scrutinizes mathematics or science or common sense in order to grasp the nature of noetic activity.¹³

Since both Lonergan and MacIntyre had read Aquinas, and since I had hopes of publishing the essay in *The Thomist*, it made sense at the time of writing the article to compare their respective interpretations of Aquinas. I did so in light of *Aeterni Patris*, an encyclical issued by Pope Leo XIII in August 1879.¹⁴ It was there that I found an apparent point of divergence. MacIntyre claims Gilson faithfully recovered Thomistic realism: “start with being.” To do otherwise “dooms Thomism to the fate of all philosophies which give priority to epistemological questions: the indefinite multiplication of disagreement.”¹⁵ In his *Verbum* study, Lonergan claims that the either/or of where to begin—with “being” or

¹¹ See note 1 above.

¹² Alasdair MacIntyre, “Philosophy, the ‘Other’ Disciplines, and their Histories,” *Soundings*, 65 (1982), 142.

¹³ *Insight*, CWL 3, 20. Later, in the article “*Insight* Revisited,” Lonergan remarked: “The first eight chapters of *Insight* are a series of five-finger exercises, inviting the reader to discover in himself and for himself just what happens when he understands.” *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J.* Edited by William F.J. Ryan, S.J., and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S.J. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 269.

¹⁴ The encyclical was subtitled “On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy in Catholic Schools in the Spirit of the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas.”

¹⁵ *Three Rival Versions: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 75.

with “consciousness”—is not the critical issue, and in fact presupposes a false dichotomy.¹⁶ As he conceives it, the critical problem is “moving from an infinite potentiality commensurate with the universe towards apprehension that seizes the difference of subject and object in essentially the same way that it seizes any other real distinction.”¹⁷

What was I comparing? I was comparing and contrasting (A) and (B):

(A) Lonergan’s (i) emphasis on “positions and counterpositions” in the history of philosophy and (ii) insistence that something called “psychological facts”—which he claims are common to all areas or fields of study—are important for moving beyond something called “latent metaphysics” to “problematic metaphysics” and beyond to something called “explicit metaphysics”

(B) MacIntyre’s (i) division of the history of philosophy into “rival traditions” and his belief that moral philosophy can progress if thinkers in rival traditions engage in critical exchange, and (ii) identification of “first principles,” “final ends” and a “metaphysics of being (*esse*)” as the best way to adjudicate between different, rival, or incompatible traditions

Is this clear enough? Is this fair enough?

It might have been clear and fair enough at the time of writing the original essay, but nowadays I would say, no, it is not clear enough; nor is it fair.¹⁸ But then what would make this comparison—or any other—fair enough?

¹⁶ The subject/object split is phenomenologically untenable if what one means by consciousness is a perfection within being, not something outside or over against being. See further note 76 of “Lonergan and MacIntyre: Metaphysical Genealogies?”

¹⁷ *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 2, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 99. In the 1958 Halifax lectures on *Insight*, Lonergan spoke about the importance of “completing the circle”: “One can begin from what is prior *quoad nos*, what is first for us, or one can begin from what is prior *quoad se*, what is first in reality. As long as one completes the circle, the same thing will be said, but it will be said at different points along the line.” (*Understanding and Being. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 5, ed. Elizabeth A. and Mark D. Morelli [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990], 178).

¹⁸ Why are there so many quotation marks in (A) and (B)? Indeed, why are there so many quotation marks throughout the entire first section of this essay? Is there a way to remove them? See note 92.

II. Meantime Developments

A. Reading and Writing Economics

In 2005 I was asked to tutor a student whose level of English was too advanced for him to benefit from being in the most advanced course. He was studying business, so together we read the first two chapters of *Economics for Everyone*¹⁹ while I tried to make sense of the first three chapters of *For a New Political Economy*.²⁰ Now, fourteen years later, I have a perspective on two-flow analysis as well as the basic blunder of orthodox one-flow analysis.²¹

The key point, or key issue, is to notice and begin to appreciate that the production of consumer goods and services relies on things like maintenance, the production of tools for maintenance, and innovations, none of which are consumed by consumers but rather ‘consumed’ by the production of consumer goods and services. In other words, there are two distinct circuits of supply and demand functions, one of which is the supply and demand for basic goods and services; the other circuit involves the supply and demand of non-basic (surplus, non-capital, whatever²²) goods and services.²³

Ordinarily we eat fish and berries, but we do not eat fishing poles or machines used for collecting berries any more than our ancestors ate the baskets they used to collect berries. Ordinarily we have an appreciation of the worthwhileness of certain community members constructing fishing weir even though we know the fruits of their labor do not enter into the flow of fish bought and sold at the market. In orthodox economics, the two circuits are fused into one.²⁴

¹⁹ Philip McShane, *Economics for Everyone: Das Jus Kapital* (Axial Press, 1998). The intention of the author was “to make economics available to the common reader” (7).


²⁰ *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 21, ed. Philip McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

²¹ See James Duffy, “Minding the Economy of *Campo Real*,” *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education* vol. 29, no. 1 (2018), 1–24.

²² This is an important “whatever” if you are trying to understand, e.g., the phenomenon of a crown submerged in water or, in this case, flows of basic goods and services, non-basic goods and services, and counter-flows of money. A possibly helpful context is the discussion of Newton “turning to a field of greater generality” than Kepler and Galileo, *CWL* 21, 6.


²³ A short, helpful text for getting the basic insights is the “Preface” to the 3rd edition of Philip McShane, *Economics for Everyone: Das Jus Kapital*, iii–v. See also “The Key Diagram” and “Inventing the Plough,” chapters 2 and 3 in Philip McShane, *Profit: The Stupid View of President Donald Trump* (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2016), 7–18.

²⁴ See further “Minding the Economy of *Campo Real*,” 14–15. On page 15 I include the diagram of circular one-flow of macroeconomic activity found in the 19th edition of Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, *Economics*



The Primary Circuit

The following diagram represents two distinct circuits, and shows how a certain percentage of basic outlay of a small tortilla shop crosses from the primary (basic) circuit to the secondary (non-basic) circuit.²⁵



A Percentage of Basic Outlay Enters the Non-Basic Circuit

Money might be understood functionally as a medium of exchange to manage the magnitude and intricacies of modern exchange economy.²⁶

(India: McGraw Hill, 2010), on page 388, and I note that their diagram is essentially the same as *The Primary Circuit*.

²⁵ This diagram corrects an error in Figure 4 “Basic Wages Entering the Secondary Circuit,” in “Minding the Economy of *Campo Real*,” at page 11. It is a percentage of basic outlay—not wages—that enters the secondary circuit.

²⁶ See *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 15, ed. Frederick Lawrence, Patrick

In other words, there are monetary flows that correspond to or “match” the flows of production of basic and non-basic goods and services. Some payments are operative while others are distributive. Since producers of (tortilla) machines have to eat, a percentage of surplus outlay flows into the primary (basic) circuit—which is not represented in the diagram above.²⁷ The activity of buying and selling houses, stocks, and bonds pertains to redistribution—which is also not represented in the diagram above—not, then, to the production of goods and services, but to a distinct type of exchange, a distinct economic function.

B. Implementing Convenient Symbols

In 2007 I was asked to teach “Ethics, Person and Society” to undergraduates. The questions “What do you want?” and “What do we want?” were staples in my classes before I retired from the business of teaching ethics in December of 2015.²⁸ These two questions took various forms, for example, “What is it you plan to do with your one wild and

Byrne, and Charles Hefling (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 37–40.

²⁷ See Figure 5 on page 12 of “Minding the Economy of *Campo Real*,” which adds to the figure above a second large arrow “% of Non-Basic Outlay Enters the Basic Circuit.” Note that a correction similar to the one mentioned in note 25 needs be made. It is a percentage of non-basic outlay—not wages—that enters the primary circuit.

²⁸ Institutional expectations made it very difficult for me to meet, greet, and guard students and invite them to carry out exercises and embrace their nearest neighbors. My inclination was to invite symbolic self-appropriation in and with film and literature, for example José Emilio Pacheco, *Batalles en el Desierto* and the film “Mariana, Mariana” based on Pacheco’s novel. The institutional expectation was to teach “philosophy,” the cycled, cycling academic discipline about various “-isms” and schools of thought that are compared and contrasted, sometimes applied to case studies. The spontaneous expectation of students, “which is merely a reflection of the culture, is that there is a huge disjuncture between philosophical ‘theories’ (virtue ethics, deontology, utilitarian) and/or various ‘-isms’ (pragmatism, empiricism, idealism, utilitarianism, critical realism) and real life. In addition there is an expectation that studying ethics is going to be easier than studying statistics, molecular biology, agro-biotechnology, international political economy, and medical nutritional therapy in surgery. Students know from their high school study of philosophical figures, schools, periods, and ‘-isms,’ that philosophers have a hard time agreeing on pretty much everything.... How could ethics possibly be anything more than using common sense to tweak opinion?” James Duffy, “Ethics as Functional Collaboration,” *Journal of Macroeconomic Analysis*, volume 7 (2012), p. 128.

precious life?”²⁹ and “What are we to do about the traffic problems in Morelia?”³⁰

There are “What do you want?” scenes in both *Good Will Hunting* (1997) and *The Notebook* (2004) that hit home with undergraduates. Towards the end of the former film Sean (Robin Williams) asks young, brilliant Will (Matt Damon) to do some soul-searching, but Will cannot tell him what he wants, so he sarcastically says, “I want to be a shepherd.” Sean then throws him out of his office. In the latter film Noah (Ryan Gosling) asks Allie (Rachel McAdams), his sweetheart from years gone by who is now engaged to marry another fellow, to do some soul-searching as well.

Noah: “Will you do something for me? Please? Will you just picture your life for me, 30 years from now, 40 years from now? What’s it look like? If it’s with that guy, go. Go! I lost you once, I think I could do it again. If I thought it’s what you really wanted. But don’t you take the easy way out.”

Allie: “What easy way? There is no easy way! No matter what I do, somebody gets hurt!”

Noah: “Would you stop thinking about what everyone wants? Stop thinking about what I want, what he wants, what your parents want. What do you want?” (Allie shakes her head) “What do you want?”

Allie: “It’s not that simple.”

Noah: “What do you want? Goddammit, what do you want?!”

Allie: “... I have to go.”³¹

My undergraduate students were studying everything from law and international business to animation and robotics. Their answers to the two want-questions varied. Answers also varied when we began to divide up the questions into short-term, mid-term, and long-term. In the short-term most students simply wanted to survive the semester, make it to graduation, and manage to have some fun along the way. In the mid-term many wanted to work in a small- or medium-size business, or start their own. For many this implies relocating, as the businesses in Morelia are

²⁹ “Tell me, what is it you plan to do with your one wild and precious life?” Mary Oliver, “A Summer Day.”

³⁰ The city has grown considerably over the last fifteen years, beyond the imaginings of those who originally planned city streets. Bottle-necks at peak hours make commuting unpredictable at best. There is limited housing in the neighborhoods surrounding the university, so most students and faculty have to commute. When I first moved here in 2001, driving from point A to point B took 20–25 minutes at most. Nowadays it is unpredictable how long it might take to get from one place to another.

³¹ *The Notebook* Script - Dialogue Transcript (available at: http://www.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/n/the-notebook-script-transcript-mcadams.html).

mostly what a colleague calls “mom and pop stores.” A decent number mentioned wanting to pursue an M.A. or specialization. Typical long-term aspirations included having a family, achieving financial stability, and traveling a bit both inside and outside Mexico.

On two occasions I scribbled the graph of the derivative of the function e^x on the board, and asked students what they thought about the possibility of growing acceleratingly in their lives, becoming a stranger to themselves from one year to the next by growing, developing old and new skills alike. A few responded in wonderment about the possibility of growing over a lifetime. For most students the graph of $f'(e^x)$ smacks of a technique they either did or did not master, and it simply does not indicate an exciting range of potential growth. Expressions like “settling up” (instead of settling down) and humor about ordering a “one-with-all” pizza from Dominos and having 1.5 cars, a 1.7-story house, and 2.3 children before the age of 30 were more effective expressions.

So, it took some cunning and fancy footwork to concern myself for student well-being and growth in undergraduate courses, where course syllabi were largely defined by topics, periods, figures, and/or approaches.³² There was an antecedent expectation to compare thinkers, schools, and –isms, sometimes made explicit in final term papers where students were asked, per a university requirement, to put into their own words how one or more figure or school approaches a contemporary problem.

What I found immensely challenging with undergraduates, more so with graduate students, was to endure the tension between being able to express initial, descriptive meanings of “virtue” or “happiness,” on the one hand, and not being able to communicate—without notes or footnotes, with a convenient symbol or two, as well as memories, anecdotes, analogues—in a performance³³ about either the desiring subject or desired objects that hits the Mark or Maria, on the other. The challenge was and

³² Topics are distinguished by results, and would include ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of art, and philosophy of the person. Periods are distinguished not so much by results as by historically ordering the data under investigation: ancient, medieval, modern, nineteenth century, or postmodern philosophy. Division by figures refers to seminars, journals, or conferences dedicated to the works of one figure, for example Husserl Studies. Divisions by approach are those courses, journals, and conferences that embrace and embody a family resemblance among a group of thinkers and emphasize a general way of proceeding. Examples of these would be a course on British empiricism or transcendental Thomism and the “Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy.”

³³ See further the long paragraph on “the problem of identification” on page 582 of *Insight*.

is to be in form,³⁴ addressing craving³⁵ subjects as subjects as craving subjects as subjects—a huge challenge indeed, given the longly-cycled “Babel of our day.”³⁶

With undergraduates I would introduce a story about the Mexican family on vacation in Acapulco into the set of required readings.³⁷ The narrative involves two parents, their two children, a grandmother, and an uncle planning next July’s beach vacation. The two children are now teenagers, thus no longer interested in building sand castles. Grandmother enjoys playing bingo with others and has recently rediscovered a devotion to praying the rosary. Uncle Rigoberto likes his tequila, while Carlos (dad) enjoys watching soccer games, and Maria (mom) prefers shopping with her favorite credit card. How can the roles and tasks involved in planning the next beach vacation be divided up in such a way that the holiday plan meets everyone’s needs?

Narrative helps to liven up the question “How are we to plan our next vacation?” in a way accessible to undergraduates, some of whom would rather spend the next beach vacation with their friends rather than mom and dad. However, narrative is not enough to think seriously about and intervene resolutely and effectively in the dialectic of history playing out in grade schools and universities, street markets and supermarkets, and political elections in your town and mine.³⁸ How do I keep in mindful teaching the reversal of nearly three centuries of “doctrines on politics, economics, education, and through further doctrines, [which] have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to make human life

³⁴ “To be in form is to be bone-wise open. To be bone-wise open is to reach for the echoing of primitive compactness in post-axial mystery-laden integrality.” Philip McShane, “Towards a Luminous Darkness of Circumstances: *Insight* after Forty Years,” at page 16. This translation of “*Hacia una oscuridad luminosa de las circunstancias: Insight, cuarenta años después*” (*Universitas Philosophica*, 32 [1999], 11–41) (available at: <http://www.philipmcshane.ca/archive2.pdf>). McShane describes the axial period in *A Brief History of Tongue* (Axial Press, 1998), 38–48.

³⁵ We “tend to center an infinite craving on a finite object or release: that may be wealth, or fame, or power, but most commonly it is sex.” “Finality, Love, Marriage,” *Collection. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 4, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 49. See also note 7. In this same essay Lonergan writes about being “startled by a beauty that shifts the center of appetite out of self; and such a shift is effected on the level of spontaneity by *erôs* leaping in through delighted eyes and establishing itself as unrest in absence and an imperious demand for company.” (31–32)

³⁶ *Insight*, CWL 3, 267.

³⁷ See “Ethics as Functional Collaboration, 134–136.

³⁸ To “think seriously” is to wordplay as pauper poet and “to proclaim with Vico the priority of poetry [and] to proclaim that the human spirit expresses itself in symbols before it knows, if ever it knows, what its symbols literally mean.” CWL 4, 241.

unlivable”³⁹ in words and images accessible to young adults? Other words, besides those of narrative and poetry, are wanting, some of them appropriate for undergraduates and graduates.

Here I will briefly comment on two diagrams, or meta-words, from my many years teaching undergraduates in Mexico. The daily challenge was to muster up patient, two-fold attention in order to glean the meaning of the symbols empirically, i.e., by self-appropriating exercises,⁴⁰ puzzles, jokes, or a text such as Plato’s *Meno*. In any and all cases, the challenge was and is to bring forward best student-selves by bringing forth my best self by recovering my three year-old self’s whating and whying and ising.⁴¹

(1) MA₁C // McA₂

This symbolism makes a clear-headed “*this* is not *that*” distinction symbolized by “//”, which is short-hand for “not the same,” or better, “not even close to being the same thing.” “M” represents “Mind” on both sides. Both big “C” and little “c” represent “concept,” while “A₁” represents “What?” or “Why?” and “A₂” represents analysis.

MA₁C symbolizes the questing child, wanting to understand, wanting to know what’s what and why. It is also you at your best, and me at my best, living my lonely questions. McA₂ is what Scotus, Kant, and a host of others would have us believe: concepts unconsciously, mysteriously come to mind, then we analyze them, whence the name of the so-called “analytic tradition.”⁴²

³⁹ Bernard Lonergan, *Topics in Education: The Cincinnati Lectures of 1959 on the Philosophy of Education. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 10, ed. Robert Doran and Frederick Crowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 232.

⁴⁰ I have tried teaching “Weight the crown in water!” (CWL 3, 27) using bananas, a hanger, and a bucket of water, as well as a version of the menu exercise (see J. Benton, A. Drage, and P. McShane, “The Joy of Choice,” *Introducing Critical Thinking* [Axial Publishing, 2005], 78–82). Students are amused and mostly applaud the shenanigans, but the circumstances do not favor patient and kind twofold attention. One student remarked to me: “James, the university is not the place to do this kind of thing.” See further the text at notes 43–46 below.

⁴¹ See chapter 2, “The Move Beyond Spontaneity,” in *Introducing Critical Thinking*. Recovering three year-old self is no cake walk given the messy situation. See notes 137 and 135.

⁴² The technique of making “conceptual maps,” which is popular nowadays in primary, secondary, and high schools, is haunted by McA₂, as are most if not all new-fangled pop pedagogies. Note that you can read a page, paragraph, essay, book, or the complete works of any author with MA₁C // McA₂ in mind—in your mind, in your empirical minding of your minding and of your favorite author’s minding. See further Philip McShane, SOFDAWARE 6, “Rambles in *Method* 250” (available at: <http://www.philipmcshane.org/sofdaware>), at pages 2–5.

When the circumstances at lower, middle, and higher educational institutions do not patiently and kindly promote the emergence of “Whats?” and “Whys?” students are forced to memorize stuff that they quickly forget. One day a student asked me about her classmate Penelope’s rendition of the “Dynamics of Knowing” diagram:⁴³ “James, do we need to learn this diagram for the exam?” I did not know how to reply at the time, but nowadays I would say something like: “Do the best you can to make it your own; it is about you at your philosophical best.”⁴⁴

(2) W0

Sensitive Integration = Perception
 Knowledge = Correct Understanding of Experience (CUE)
 CUE → Reality
 Perception // Reality

Imagine walking into a classroom full of students and loudly proclaiming: “Well, *that* is simply awesome!” The spontaneous reaction on the part of students would likely be: “Professor, what are you talking about?” *That* points to something, a *what*, unless the professor is simply pulling the students’ legs.

W0, like MA₁C // McA₂, helped me manage the joker⁴⁵ and invite students to appropriate their spontaneous orientation to the real deal, to “get real,” to “be real.” We ask “why?” or “what?” in order to understand (U) our experience. We ask “really?” and “could it be?” in order to correctly (C) understand (U) our experience (E). Other things being equal, a desire to “see” if there is more “there” than meets the eye of perception spontaneously emerges within the child. “Mommy, what is an ‘alligator?’” Mommy points her finger at the big, greenish thingy “out there” in the zoo and says, “That is an alligator.” But the little one might persist: “But, mommy, why is that an alligator?”

⁴³ See Bernard Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic*. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 18, ed. Philip McShane (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 322. Penelope’s diagram is on page 12 of “Words, Diagrams, Heuristics” (available <https://itesm.academia.edu/JamesGerardDuffy>).

⁴⁴ “A basic set of analogous terms whose meaning develops with the development of the person indicates the fruit of self-appropriation, the basis that makes the difference between the plaster cast of man [or woman] and the philosopher.” *Understanding and Being*, CWL 5, 48.

⁴⁵ “Now there is a joker in this business of self-appropriation. We do not start out with a clean slate as we move towards self-appropriation. We already have our ideals of what knowledge is, and we want to do self-appropriation according to the ideal that is already operative in us.” *Ibid.*, 17.

Other things might not be and indeed are not equal.⁴⁶ And unfortunately the educational industrial complex does not encourage us to live questions and entertain the possibility for months if not years that “seeing if there is more there than meets the eye,” or CUE, somehow gets us to the real world. Optical allusions can help in the discovery that our seeing, and indeed every aspect of our living, is mediated by “all we know ... present and operative ... it lurks behind the scenes.”⁴⁷ The symbol // is a friendly reminder that the real pine tree, dog, and bone are nothing like the merely perceived pine tree, dog, and bone.⁴⁸

The words and symbols invite unhurried exercises—*spirobics*,⁴⁹ not aerobics—that help nudge discussions about what’s “real” and “good” from a familiarity with these two words and the ability to use them commonsensically, without looking like a fool, to and into “a humble and docile process of learning” by which “anyone can move beyond his [or her] original ordinary languages and its common sense and come to understand other ordinary language and their varieties of common sense,” perhaps “moving out of the realm of ordinary languages into the realm of theory,” perhaps even “finding one’s way into interiority,”⁵⁰ perhaps even reading again, for the first time, that “even in the sphere of practice, the last word does not lie with common sense and its panoply of technology,

⁴⁶ Why other things are not equal is tantamount to asking “Why, then, is the longer cycle of decline so long?” (CWL 3, 258) and how might we get ourselves out of the mess of lower- and higher-rung academic disciplines? The unequalness likely stretches back to 4000 B.C., if not further. A context is “The Feminine in History,” *Introducing Critical Thinking*, 43–47.

⁴⁷ *Insight*, CWL 3, 303.

⁴⁸ “Dogs know their masters, bones, other dogs, and not merely the appearance of things. Now this sensitive integration of sensible data also exists in the human animal and even in the human philosopher. Take it as knowledge of reality, and there results the secular contrast between the solid sense of reality and bloodless categories of the mind.” *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, CWL 2, 20.

⁴⁹ *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* is a clarification of the meaning of *spirare* (“to spirate”) in the works of Aquinas. “[O]nce one grasps the *procession intelligibilis* of inner word from uttering act of understanding, there is not the slightest difficulty in grasping the simple, clear, straightforward account Aquinas offered of proceeding love.” (211) The issue here is not Trinitarian doctrine, but rather you and me “being interested enough in human intellect” (*ibid*) to live our lonely questions for months and years in the hopes of one day suffering (see *pati* in the index to CWL 2) the emergence of a concept “as part of a context, loaded with the relations that belong to it in virtue of a source which is equally the source of other concepts.” *Ibid.*, 238. “The fundamental difficulty is not linguistic, nor is it theological; it is philosophical.” Editors’ note f on page 262.

⁵⁰ Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Seabury Press, 1972), 85.

economy, and polity.”⁵¹ Such exercises might kindly lead an undergraduate to ask, in native bewilderment: “Are we human? / Or are we dancer?” afraid to take one step out of line?⁵²

Like MA₁C // McA₂, the symbol W0 is at first strange. But it can help both willing teacher and interested, puzzled students to focus inquiry, to slowly move ‘into the realm of theory,’ to distinguish this from that, and to move from obscurity and sloppy thinking towards clear-headed dichotomies.⁵³ By no means is it easy to cajole self and students to keep the symbols in mind for the duration of the semester, let alone the duration of their undergraduate studies, for they imply patient and kind self-reading, something which is mostly foreign to lower and higher education, indeed mostly foreign to lower and higher educators.⁵⁴ Secondly, and relatedly, reading the images requires regular exercises, if not the “five-finger exercises” in the first eight chapters of the book *Insight*, then simpler exercises.⁵⁵

In my experience, both as student and as teacher, overcoming spontaneous animal extroversion⁵⁶ and a fascination with names and expressions—e.g., “apprehension of values in feelings,” “levels of consciousness,” and “being in love with God”—and initial meanings has

⁵¹ *Insight*, CWL 3, 259.

⁵² The lyrics are from “Human,” The Killers. The (grammatically incorrect) lyric was inspired by a comment made by the author and journalist Hunter S. Thompson, who stated that America was “raising a generation of dancers, afraid to take one step out of line.” James Montgomery, “Killers Brandon Flowers Stands Behind ‘Killers’ Chorus, Leathery Jacket,” *MTV News*, October 30, 2008. (available at: <http://www.mtv.com/news/1598299/killers-brandon-flowers-stands-behind-human-chorus-feathery-jacket>)

⁵³ See *Insight*, 548.

⁵⁴ See further notes 28, 32, 34, 35, 40, and 113.

⁵⁵ My position on these eight chapters is that they are not easily read, digested, intussuscepted. See further James Duffy “Refining Foundations,” *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education*, 28/2 (2017), the first paragraph on page 234.

⁵⁶ “Some people have the impression that, while Tertullian and others of his time may have made such a mistake, no one repeats it today. Nothing could be further from the truth. For until a person has made the personal discovery that he is making Tertullian’s mistake all along the line, until he has gone through the crisis involved in overcoming one’s spontaneous estimate of the real—and the fear of idealism involved in it—he is still thinking just as Tertullian did. It is not a sign that one is dumb or backward. St. Augustine was one of the most intelligent men in the whole Western tradition, and one of the best proofs of his intelligence is the fact that he himself discovered that for years he was unable to distinguish between what is a body and what is real.” Bernard Lonergan, “Consciousness and the Trinity,” *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1858–1964. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 6, ed. Robert Croken, Frederick Crowe, and Robert Doran (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 130.

not been easy. Diagrams and heuristics have helped orient and sustain the slow process of converting *ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem*,⁵⁷ but obviously “no amount of pedagogic and linguistic skill will eliminate the necessity of the effort to learn.”⁵⁸

III. This Is Now

A. Not Comparing Business Ethics

A.1 MacIntyre on Unjust Debt

In the area of virtue business ethics, MacIntyre has been cited more than any other philosopher besides Aristotle.⁵⁹ Citing his work has become nearly obligatory for those writing on business ethics from a perspective on the (business) practices that develop virtues and the institutions which promote or threaten these same virtues.

On June 3, 2010, MacIntyre gave a lecture sponsored by the Jesus College, Cambridge Science & Human Dimension Project and *Prospect* magazine in which he focused on this issue. In his lecture MacIntyre claimed that the 2008 economic crisis can be understood in terms of the activity of financial traders, money-men, whose craft involves transferring as much risk as possible. John Cornwell was present at the lecture and observes the following regarding MacIntyre’s view of the “success” of financial traders:

“Successful” money men, moreover, fail “to take into account the fate of the victims of collateral damage resulting from market crises.” Hence only by ignoring the human costs of transactions in the financial markets can traders function according to their version of cost-benefit analysis. To cap it all, the focus of traders “is almost exclusively on the present and the short term.”⁶⁰

⁵⁷ A context is “Cognitional Structure,” *Collection*, CWL 4, 205–221, see page 219. Add the context of Dialectic “making conversion a topic and thereby promoting it. Results will not be sudden or startling, for conversion commonly is a slow process of maturation.” *Method in Theology*, 253. We should not expect integral displacement, “changing a concrete synthesis in living, and that change necessarily involves a whole retinue of emotions” (CWL 18, 292), to occur overnight, overdecade, overcentury. Here I invite you to stretch your imagination while reading “Philosophy and Conversion” (CWL 18, 289–91), chapter 13 “Subject and Horizon,” forward, into chapter 14 “Horizon, History, Philosophy.” See also notes 38 and 98.

⁵⁸ *Insight*, CWL 3, 581.

⁵⁹ See Ron Beadle, “MacIntyre’s Influence on Business Ethics,” in *Handbook of Virtue Ethics in Business and Management. International Handbooks in Business Ethics* (London: Springer, 2015), 1–9.

⁶⁰ “Alasdair MacIntyre and the ‘Irrelevance of Ethics,’” *Prospect*, October 2010. (available at: <http://wontfail.myzen.co.uk/Rustat/media/documents/MacIntyre2010.pdf>).

There is either a lack of character or simply bad character in the financial sector even though it appears to be a “benevolent engine of growth in a globalized and globalizing economy.” This decadent situation presents a rather sizeable gap between economics and ethics, one which MacIntyre relates to a widespread mis-understanding of money. If the value of money is “no more and no less than the value of the goods which can be exchanged,” there would be “no reason for anyone to want money other than for the goods they buy.”⁶¹ In this scenario financial traders would have little if any role to play.

But money is not just a measure for the exchange of goods, it is also for the exchange of money itself when trading in derivatives and in derivatives of derivatives. In this scenario, those who work in the business of buying, selling, or trading derivatives are cut-off from the basic function of money in everyday life.

To remedy this situation, MacIntyre points to a particular vice that needs to be cured—the unjust infliction of debt. Here he cites the ideas of Marx:

Surplus value is the difference between what the labor of productive workers earns in wages and what capitalists receive for the products of that labor. It is only because capitalists are able to appropriate that difference – their profits – and to invest it in their business that capitalism is a growth economy.⁶²

The expansion of credit in modern capitalism has exposed the average citizen to a risk that many are not even aware of having been exposed to. “Engineers of debt” benefit from the massive overextension of credit and in many cases are exempt from the consequences of their trade. Unjust debt has become part of the moral climate of “the economic system of advanced modernity, and is in its most basic forms an expression of the vices of intemperateness, and injustice, and imprudence, and until it is described in these terms it has been underdescribed and misdescribed.”⁶³

MacIntyre maintains that we cannot understand economic relationships divorced from moral relationships, and to spell out what he means he cites both Marx’s views on surplus value and Aquinas’ condemnation of usury. “We need to bring Aquinas and Marx together, in characterizing the economy and in laying down the principles that should inform our attitude to unjust debt.”⁶⁴ He advocates principles involving “issues of deserving,” “responsible risk-taking,” and “setting limits to the burdens of debt.”⁶⁵

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

A.2 Lonergan on Basic Rhythmic Flow

Like MacIntyre, Lonergan had great admiration for Aquinas and Marx,⁶⁶ although his economic analysis has no place for the kind of marriage (“bringing together”) of Aquinas and Marx that MacIntyre proposed in 2010. He knew he was after a “more profound viewpoint” calling “for a readjustment of the less general correlations,”⁶⁷ while “not discussing wealth or value, supply and demand, price levels and price patterns, capital and labor, interest and profits, production, distribution, and consumption.”⁶⁸ The key point, or key issue, for understanding the function of money and the virtues of traders, bankers, and financial advisors, is what dawned on me as I began to think seriously about baskets and berries, economic flows and accelerations, and walked around my local neighborhood trying to make sense of flows of tortillas and pesos.

The production of consumer goods and services relies on things like maintenance, the production of tools for maintenance, and innovations that are not consumed by consumers, but “consumed” by the production of consumer goods and services. In the “two flow” analysis that Lonergan discovered, the distinction throughout is that there are basic goods and services that pass into a standard of living—so many kilos of eggs and tortillas, so many liters of gas, so many haircuts, and so many therapy sessions every month or year—and non-basic or secondary⁶⁹ goods and services that support the flow of basic goods and services.

In the *Divyadaan* article I noted some oddities of two-flow economic analysis:

⁶⁶ Regarding Marx, Lonergan’s analysis of “the longer cycle of decline” resulting from a combination of “general bias” and “group bias” “leads to the strange conclusion that common sense has to aim at being subordinated to a human science that is concerned, to adapt a phrase from Marx, not only with knowing history but also with directing it.” *Insight*, 253. See also “Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965–1980. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 17, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 366–69. Regarding Aquinas, see the Epilogues of *Verbum* and *Insight*, as well as *Method in Theology*, 352, the third paragraph. The only mention of Aquinas in *CWL* 15, besides the Editors’ Introduction, is where Lonergan refers the reader to “my study of Aquinas, *Grace and Freedom*” (94–95).

⁶⁷ *CWL* 21, 6. In the two paragraphs that follow, Lonergan provides two examples of what he means by the emergence of a more profound viewpoint. One is from the history of astronomy, the second is from the history of geometry.

⁶⁸ *CWL* 21, 9.

⁶⁹ Here I am refraining from using the words *capital* and *surplus* to avoid confusing what they might mean in a functional analysis with what they typically mean in sociological or proprietorial interpretations. Some readers might spontaneously read *surplus* as the difference between the value workers give a commodity and what the workers earn in the form of wages. See also note 22.

First, owners of tortilla shops are also consumers of their tortillas. Should they purchase them? Sound business practice would require they do, although regularly they do not. Secondly, owners of the tortilla machine making companies are also consumers of tortillas, so they are somehow in both circuits at the same time. The same can be said for the employees of the company producing tortilla machines. Finally, up to the point nothing has been said about the price I pay for tortillas, the wages paid to the workers in the tortilla shop, or the profits of the shop owner. That might seem odd to you, depending on your education and antecedent expectations.⁷⁰

Is money a means of amassing and storing, possibly hoarding wealth? If the money never moves from under the bed or the bank account, it has no function and it matters little whether the money stored is gold, currency, cigarettes, or stones. If the money is hoarded with the intention of being used some day, “then any dummy of constant value will give him just as much for his store as will gold.”⁷¹ As a “dummy” money functions to bridge intervals, be they short or long, between contributing to a productive process and sharing in its products. And, given enough time and further developments (*D*) in culture (*C*), indeed a deepening cultural overhead (*DCO*) releasing men and women from working 9-to-5 to leisure (*L*), it might be possible “to transform agriculture into a superchemistry, to clear away finance and even money, to make economic solidarity a memory, and power over nature the only difference between high civilization and primitive gardening.”⁷²

Obviously we are not there yet, and in a sense there are no data for interpreting the following description of “it”—what might happen when the show is on the road:

It will move to a higher synthesis that eliminates at a stroke both the problem of wages and the complementary problem of trade unions; it will attack at once both the neglect of economic education and the blare of advertisements leading the economically uneducated by the nose; it will give new hope and vigor to local life and it will undermine the opportunity for

⁷⁰ “Minding the Economy of *Campo Real*,” 12–13.

⁷¹ *CWL* 15, 40.

⁷² *CWL* 21, 20. I include the capital letters simply as a reminder that the meanings of these words, which are typed so easily, are not fixed, that “definitions are not unique: on the contrary, for each term there is a historical sequence of different definitions; there is a learned explanation for each change of definition; and there is no encouragement for the sanguine view that would exclude further developments in this changing series,” “Dimensions of Meaning,” *Collection*, *CWL* 4, 243. In *Profit: The Stupid View of Donald Trump*, McShane offers four meanings of “profit” and relates the fourth meaning to “overhead primary products of what.” (136)

peculation corrupting central governments and party politics; it will retire the brain trust but it will make the practical economist as familiar a professional figure as the doctor, the lawyer, or the engineer; it will find a new basis both for finance and for foreign trade.⁷³

B. Not Comparing Virtue

B.1 MacIntyre on Virtue

A traditional account of virtue defines it as *arête*, as excellence in making judgments and acting effectively while pursuing certain desired ends. It is not to act against one's inclination, but rather to act from a cultivated inclination, which is more a matter of education than it is of defining and enforcing laws. Whatever might be said about the "Ideas of the good," in concrete human living doing what is good is a matter of acquiring the right habits, or virtues.⁷⁴ "Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or, rather, all the difference."⁷⁵

In *After Virtue* MacIntyre contrasts moral philosophy rooted in the Aristotelian notion of the virtues as excellences in human practice with modern moral philosophy of "the Enlightenment project" that results in an autonomous, emotivist self who is living in a culture of bureaucratic individualism. In chapters 14 and 15 of *After Virtue*, he defines virtues in terms of practices, whole human lives, and traditions. He also maintains that relationships play a fundamental role in the development of virtuous practice. "For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from the past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships."⁷⁶

Among the virtues, for MacIntyre there is a particular virtue of "having an adequate sense of the traditions to which one belongs or which confront one."⁷⁷ In the two books that followed *After Virtue*—*Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (1988) and *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990)—MacIntyre examined the role that traditions play in judgments about truth and falsity. In these two works he contrasts tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive rationality with "liberalism" and the "Encyclopedic tradition" respectively.

⁷³ CWL 21, 36–37.

⁷⁴ See *Nichomachean Ethics*, Martin Oswald (trans.) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1962). I, 6 1096b 27 to 1097a 14.

⁷⁵ *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1103 b 23–25.

⁷⁶ *After Virtue* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 205.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 207.

In his more recent book, *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity*,⁷⁸ he inquired into proper and improper relationships between practical reasoning and desire. In this work MacIntyre claims that the great challenge posed by modern “Morality”⁷⁹ is to break with individual preferences shaped by market conditions and to become a “sufficiently reflective practical agent.”

NeoAristotelian⁸⁰ practical reasoning is what MacIntyre proposes as a counter to both Morality and contemporary “expressivism,” which some believe has debunked the pretentious view that “virtue” and “vice” could mean something more than the expression of emotion and changing preferences of individuals. A reflective person will find conflicting feelings, so her challenge is to find sound reasons for desiring what she desires. The judgments of practical reasoning “provide us with reasons for treating one object of desire as better than its rivals.”⁸¹ MacIntyre interprets Aristotle’s account of deliberation in terms of agents rightly-disposed by virtues. “It is the central characteristic of human beings that they are born with the potentiality of becoming reasoning and desiring animals, agents who desire to act as reason directs, who desire to act for the sake of the good and the best.”⁸²

B.2 Lonergan on Genetic Method

One of my critical observations about my original essay comparing MacIntyre and Lonergan has to do with what how we commonly use the

⁷⁸ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative*. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016); cited hereafter as *ECM*.

⁷⁹ “Morality” is “the presently dominant moral system of advanced societies, which presents itself as morality as such” (*ECM*, 77). On pages 115–16 MacIntyre elaborates on certain features of Morality: self-contained, universal, and constraining; highly abstract and general, but binding on all individuals; and conflicted insofar as individuals cannot avoid circumstances where they feel compelled to violate one or other universal, abstract rule.

⁸⁰ One of the reasons MacIntyre prefers calling it “Neo” is stated in *After Virtue*, chapter 12 “Aristotle’s Account of the Virtues”: “On the one hand he is *the* protagonist against whom I have matched the voices of liberal modernity; so that I am clearly committed to giving his own highly specific account of the virtues a central place. On the other hand I have already made it clear that I want to regard him not just as an individual theorist, but as the representative of a long tradition, as someone who articulates what a number of predecessors and successors also articulate with varying degrees of success. And to treat Aristotle as part of a tradition, even as its greatest representative, is a very unAristotelian thing to do” (137). In the later work he describes NeoAristotelianism as a tradition “to the development of which a number of Aristotle’s Islamic, Jewish and Christian interpreters contributed, most of all Aquinas.” *ECM*, 31.

⁸¹ *ECM*, 37.

⁸² *Ibid.*

prepositions “on” and “of.” For example, MacIntyre’s recent book is subtitled “An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative.” So he is writing *on* or about desire, practical reasoning, and narrative. Likewise, if Rose and Olive write two essays expressing their views *of* the benefits of eating dark brown chocolate, and I were then to compare their views, I could title the essay “Rose and Olive on the Benefits of Eating Dark Brown Chocolate.”⁸³ So the essay I wrote in 2000 could have been titled “MacIntyre and Lonergan on Metaphysical Genealogies” or “MacIntyre and Lonergan on Metaphysics and Genealogy.”

In the original essay, I was comparing two interpretation (mine) of two thinkers. Some years later I took a step back to ask this question: What is happening when I interpret a text for a second audience, be they students or readers of an essay?

Consider how Georg Ernst Stahl (1660–1734) might have interpreted Aristotle on the topic fire for his students. In his youth Stahl believed in alchemy, but eventually he would alter his views and issue a warning against the frauds of alchemy. Stahl studied medicine and lectured on chemistry, eventually becoming professor of medicine and chemistry in the Fridericiana University, established in Halle in 1694. In 1703, in his long commentary on Johann Joachim Becher’s *Physicæ subterraneæ*, Stahl renamed *terra pinguis* as *phlogiston*, and described it as “the matter and principle of fire, not fire itself,” which escapes from burning bodies.⁸⁴ In 1697 Stahl had given an elaborate demonstration showing that the flame of burning sulfur is due to the escape of phlogiston, and thus “proving” that phlogiston was something material—sometimes dry and earthy, sometimes invisible, sometimes found in fire, other times found in sulfur, fats, and oils—that can be transferred from one body to another.

How might Stahl have interpreted Aristotle for students of medicine and chemistry at the Fridericiana University? He would have done so in light of prior experimentations and the understanding that he brought to Aristotle’s texts and to his students. This would lead him to ask his students to perform the experiments involving sulfur which had convinced Stahl that there was a better way to explain *fire* than claiming it was the addition of the properties “hot” and “dry.”

The story of the interpretation of *fire* would change in 1785 when Lavoisier claimed that phlogiston was hypothetical and unnecessary, leading to further changes in the story of fire when efforts were made to explain that it as a special kind of chemical reaction involving oxygen, a fuel source (solid, liquid, or gas), and a source of heat. Nowadays, when

⁸³ I could also give it the title “Duffy on Rose and Olive on the Benefits of Eating Dark Brown Chocolate.” Normally we do not include our names in titles but underneath them. Our views, our positions, are implicit. They become explicit when doing the (structured) Dialectic exercises laid out on page 250 of *Method in Theology*.

⁸⁴ J.R. Partington in *A Short History of Chemistry* (New York: Dover Publications, 1989), 86–87.

we use natural gas, or methane, to cook in our kitchens, the phenomenon is represented using symbols from the periodic table: $\text{CH}_4(\text{g}) + 2\text{O}_2(\text{g}) + \text{heat} \rightarrow \text{CO}_2(\text{g}) + 2\text{H}_2\text{O}(\text{g}) + \text{heat}$.

In the story of *fire*, which obviously is not over, an open heuristic structure, which may be represented by the question, “What is *fire*?” or “What is the nature of *fire*?” or “What might fire be?”⁸⁵ or “What might the *X* we call fire be?” provides the constant through which Aristotle, Becher, Stahl, Lavoisier, you, or I might interpret the successive explanations of fire. In general, if concepts result from understanding, and not the other way around,⁸⁶ then successive explanations—the efforts towards them, their attainment, and going beyond them—imply an ongoing variation in the content of concepts with an open-ended question “What might the *X* we call fire be?” that remains constant.⁸⁷

This leading or cutting-edge view of fire would include the most comprehensive context of questions and answers, one that would provide a narrative of itself as an achievement, “something better than was the reality,”⁸⁸ including a view of the acquisition of convenient symbols that guide the search for the known unknown.

Note that the comprehensive context of questions and answers would include the adventuring question “What might fire be?” just as those who enjoy cooking look into the refrigerator and cupboards asking “What might that be?”⁸⁹ In addition, note that comparing Aristotle with Lavoisier

⁸⁵ *CWL* 18, 322–323. As the editor notes, “the distinction between the two types of what-question is modal” (320). See also notes 89 and 90.

⁸⁶ See note 1 on page 336 of *Method in Theology*. The symbol MA_1C introduced above represents concepts resulting from understanding, while McA_2 represents the other way around. The diagram on *CWL* 18, 322 is a more detailed diagram than MA_1C .

⁸⁷ *Phenomenology and Logic*, *CWL* 18, 113–114. “The contribution of science and of scientific method to philosophy lies in a unique ability to supply philosophy with instances of the heuristic structures which a metaphysics integrates into a single view of the concrete universe” (*CWL* 3, 455).

⁸⁸ *Method in Theology*, 251.

⁸⁹ The University of Central Lancashire has a Centre for Fire and Hazards Science where research is being done on fire retardancy and toxicity. Cf. Y. Liping, F. Siyu, H. Yunchu, & F. Youhua, “Effect of char sulfonic acid and ammonium polyphosphate on flame retardancy and thermal properties of epoxy resin and polyamide composites,” *Journal of Fire Sciences* (September 15, 2017). (This article is available at: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0734904117720121>). In parts of Southern California, dry and hot Santa Ana wind conditions exacerbate forest fires in the months of September and October. There are ways to control the wind using fire, or what are called “controlled fires,” which reduce the available fuel for uncontrolled fires. Fire can also be used to heat up hot tubs, and it appears in different colors based on the fuel source and heat level. Imagine a creative use of fire in colorful nocturnal hot tub rituals involving

is not on the mind of those currently asking about fire's future at the University of Central Lancashire. This is not to deny that Aristotle and Lavoisier played their respective roles in the ongoing genesis of the story of fire, nor is it to deny the relevance of a year-long seminar focusing on appropriating the history of fire.⁹⁰ It is simply to acknowledge that a bit of progress has been made in the last 2000 years, that there is no reason to repeat the experiments of Stahl today, and that "it would be absurd to demand that modern chemists express their thought in terms of Aristotle's four elements."⁹¹

In Chapter 15 of *Insight*, Lonergan expresses a meta-view of organic, psychic, and human development.⁹² There he writes of a genetic method for studying plant, animal, and human development. This is a decent place to find out what he has to say about virtues, albeit once removed, since he is writing about genetic method, i.e., the way to go about studying plant, animal, and human development. It is meta-position regarding virtues and feelings, desires and fears, "whose significance lies not in the future but in the present."⁹³ This was not acknowledged, much less developed, in my 2000 essay comparing MacIntyre and Lonergan.

How might we go about investigating the development of virtues? The suggestion Lonergan makes is "to follow the lead of the successful scientists, the physicists, the chemists, but to imitate them not slavishly but intelligently."⁹⁴ If we are to study organic development, then we will have to work out structures and invent convenient symbols to link physiology with biochemistry. Such symbolic images are needed to

song and dance, meeting adolescent needs while preventing hot Santa Ana winds from destroying homes.

⁹⁰ Lecturers and students alike study the history of the development of understandings of the *X* fire while making "use of an analogy with the development that takes place in the mind of" themselves. This development of lecturers and students "ought to parallel the historical process by which the science itself developed." Lonergan, *Understanding and Method*, (1959), in *Early Works on Theological Method 2. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 23, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Danial Monsour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 175–7. Michael G. Shield's translation. See also *Interpretation 2*, "Some Contexts of the Interpretation Series." (available at: <http://www.philipmcshane.org/interpretation>)

⁹¹ *Insight*, CWL 3, 451.

⁹² Part of my unfair reading of *Insight* in my original essay was to use the words "genealogy" and "genealogical" twenty-eight times without considering "Genetic Method" (*Insight*, 484–507), the operator of development (493–94, 599–600), the development of language (593–95), or the evolution of language and literature that makes possible a cultural milieu for the genesis of adequate self-knowledge (558–560). Another oversight was to interpret and compare two thinkers without considering the canons of methodical hermeneutics (608–616). See further the paragraph below at notes 138–140.

⁹³ *Insight*, CWL 3, 508.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 488.

understand “regularities beyond the range of physical and chemical explanation.”⁹⁵

A possibly convenient set of symbols for studying organic, psychic, and human development might look like this:⁹⁶

$$f(p_i ; c_j ; b_k ; z_l ; u_m ; r_n)$$

This is a heuristic that identifies the structure of any and all material reality, whether the reality is a rainbow, a butterfly, a feeling, or a friend. If the object being studied is the movement of a pendulum, then the subscripts *j*, *k*, *l*, *m*, and *n* are empty. If the object under investigation is *Pepto Bismol*, then the subscripts *k*, *l*, *m*, and *n* are empty. If my life ambition is to understand how the colorful roses in my garden do what they do, then *l*, *m*, and *n* are empty and, as a student of development, I do the three step “study of an organism.”⁹⁷ An important difference between the water cycle taught to grade-schoolers and cycles involving human organs, psyche, and intelligence is that we develop, so “there results the problem of formulating the heuristic structure of the investigation of this triply compounded development.”⁹⁸ The phrase “systematization of otherwise coincidental manifolds” sounds like a possible description of a *habit*, and indeed the same heuristic structure for studying plant development “is applicable to the study of psyche and of intelligence.”⁹⁹

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 489.

⁹⁶ See the Epilogue of Philip McShane, *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations* (Exposition Press, New York, 1973.) and *A Brief History of Tongue* (Halifax: Axial Press, 1998), pages 116–125.

⁹⁷ The three steps are outlined on page 489 of *Insight*: (1) descriptively differentiate parts; dissect if necessary; (2) accumulate insights that related described parts to organic events, occurrences, and operations; and (3) move from thing-for-me to thing-in-itself by grasping “conjugate forms systematizing otherwise coincidental manifolds of chemical and physical processes” (489). To do the third step “appropriate symbolic images of the relevant chemical and physical processes have to be invented.” *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *CWL*, 3 495. On the next pages Lonergan writes of a “law of integration” (*Insight*, 496–97) that involves sexuality and dreams (499). Integral human development is organic and animal (496). So charity is a higher integration of the organic, talking, laughing animal’s biochemistry, and a “transformation of sensitivity and intersubjectivity penetrating to the physiological level” (763). The focus in *Insight* is primarily ontic, but you could read pages 484–504 phyletically, i.e., intelligence, sexuality, reasonableness, and dreams becoming “mine” somewhere over the rainbow, in the second time of the temporal subject. (See Question 21 “What is the analogy between the temporal and the eternal subject?” in *The Triune God. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 12, ed. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007], 399–412.) I dare say that such a reading could, would transform squeaky clean, planar talk about “intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.”

⁹⁹ *Insight*, *CWL* 3, 492.

If I ask “How do you do that?” to a swinging pendulum, the object asked about is not nearly as complex as the object doing the asking. If I ask “How do you do that?” to a single-celled amoeba, the object asked about is more complex than a swinging pendulum. And asking “How do you do that?” to my significant other or significant self—who might ask “What is it I plan to do with my one wild and precious life?” or “Goddammit what do I want?”—is quite a hairy How-question that is clearly unmanageable without the aid of convenient symbols.

Note that a good diagram, like the printed image of a symphony, calls us, if not to actual reading, at least to admiration. The heuristic $f(p_i; c_j; b_k; z_l; u_m; r_n)$ helps keep me honest about not being able to speak playfully, beautifully, seriously, integrally about a daffodil or butterfly, or about virtues emerging in history.¹⁰⁰

C. Now, Is There a Reason to Compare?

Both Lonergan and MacIntyre speak about the virtuous man, and might agree that businessmen and businesswomen must find a way to deal with the desire to expand and expand. Both would likely agree with the general claim that morality has a basis in and an application to the aggregate of deliberations and decisions surrounding the buying and selling constitutive of exchange economies. But *economic virtues*, for example *prudence*, which arise out of economic process and promote ethical business practices, are simply words. The effective meaning of specifically economic precepts “be temperate, just, and prudent” are a function of economic analysis, which is a matter of understanding how money might function in a sane economy in generating cultural overhead (*CO*) and the releasing of men and women to genuine leisure (*GL*), whatever those two phrases might mean.¹⁰¹

MacIntyre sides with Marx in criticizing the profits capitalists make and take through the extension of credit and infliction of debt that characterize a capitalist growth economy. His economic analysis does not consider short-term and long-term accelerations, nor the possibility of normative capital surges.¹⁰² In his analysis, what ails modern economies are widespread vices of intemperateness, injustice, and imprudence, unjust debt and situations that might require forgiving debt. He adopts a Marxist definition of surplus value—the difference between what labor of productive workers earns in wages and what capitalists receive for the products of their labor—and identifies profits as the difference. Lonergan does not focus on workers and capitalists in the same way, and indeed focuses on distinct economic rhythms, the combinations of which yield

¹⁰⁰ Adding the symbols $H \sum$ to the original series of symbols might help “date” habits good and bad. H symbolizes emergent in history, while \sum refers to ‘the sum of things historical’ as possibly, probably or actually recurring. See *A Brief History of Tongue*, 120–121.

¹⁰¹ See note 72.

¹⁰² See “Flows and Surges,” *Economics for Everyone*, 21–48.

distinct economic phases, one of which is a capitalist phase that transforms means of production.

If only the matter were as simple as word-searching “business ethics” and “business cycles” in the works of these two thinkers and in the secondary literature. Doing a search of “trade” and “traders” would turn up a bit more data,¹⁰³ but we would still be faced with the problem of interpreting the data—understanding the author, his words, and the object(s) that he is trying to understand, not to mention understanding my own efforts to understand the object, not to mention that objects are not fixed, but have histories and futures. Try as you might to compare and contrast the two following statements, and ask yourself if there is a way, measure or reason to compare them.

MacIntyre: “Just as the successful training of a boxer will destroy his prospects as a violinist, so the inculcation of qualities of moral character is no way to prepare someone for a rewarding career in the financial sector. Ethics is not just irrelevant. It is a probably insuperable disadvantage. ... Investors, analysts, quants, managers of different kinds, all are unlike traders in various ways. But all of them are able to function as they do only because insofar as traders function as they do. So that it is the financial sector as a whole that is from the Thomistic Aristotelian point of view a school of bad character, while from the point of view of those at work in it, it is, if rightly conducted, a benevolent engine of growth, productive of goods conferred on very many people by a globalized and globalizing economy.”¹⁰⁴

Lonergan: “There exist two distinct circuits, each with its own final market. The equilibrium of the economic process is conditioned by the balance of the two circuits: each must be allowed the possibility of continuity, of basic outlay yielding an equal basic income and surplus outlay yielding an equal surplus income, of basic and surplus income yielding equal basic and surplus expenditure, and of these grounding equivalent basic and surplus outlay. But what cannot be tolerated, much less sustained, is for one circuit to be drained by the other. That is the essence of dynamic disequilibrium.”¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ In “The Irrelevance of Ethics,” *Virtue and Economy: Essays on Moralities and Markets* (New York: Routledge, 2015), MacIntyre claims that meticulously good traders fail by the moral standards of morality not in spite of being good traders but because they are good traders. On trade cycles and traders in Lonergan, see the index of *CWL* 15 and *CWL* 21.

¹⁰⁴ “The Irrelevance of Ethics,” *Virtue and Economy*, 12.

¹⁰⁵ *CWL* 15, 175. See also *Economics for Everyone*, 85–100. Lonergan did not write much about business ethics per se, but there are sufficient pointers for

What, then, would be the virtue of a charitable financial advisor in 2120? Even if MacIntyre had not overlooked charity in his 2010 Cambridge lecture “The Irrelevance of Ethics,”¹⁰⁶ what could it possibly have meant to him or to his audience? What might charity mean to the relatively small group of readers of *Collected Works of Lonergan*,¹⁰⁷ many if not most of whom do not implement convenient diagrams or cherish homely heuristics?¹⁰⁸

Today I profess that there is no reason, no measure, to compare MacIntyre and Lonergan, although that is how I was taught to do things. Those concerned about intervening in one or other messy situation either meet the challenge and “conceive [and implement] human development as a triply compounded movement of successive higher systems” in a way that was beyond the life and times of Aristotle,¹⁰⁹ or we continue doing the usual heuristic-less common sense comparisons that keep ourselves and our audience comfortably on the plane of generally biased common sense rolling down the ages, “the blind leading the blind, and both heading for a ditch.”¹¹⁰

De facto, I could not have written sections A. “Not Comparing Business Ethics” and B. “Not Comparing Virtue” when I set out to compare Lonergan and MacIntyre in 2000. In the original essay I was doing the best I could, the best I knew. For the most part, I had yet to implement diagrams and heuristics while teaching undergraduate

developing his view. For example, in the last paragraphs of “Healing and Creating in History,” he placed demands on economic and moral theorists alike and asked for “an interdisciplinary theory that at first will be denounced as absurd.” The relevant dynamic for meeting desperate needs in ecology and economics is an eightfold structure, the “third way” beyond the academic discipline mess in which we live and move, think and publish. See further “A Rolling Stone Gathers *Nomos*,” *Economics for Everyone*, 99–121 and *Æconomics* 5 “Structuring the Reach towards the Future,” a presentation at The 3rd Peaceful Existence Colloquium, Helsinki, Finland, June 13–14, 2019 (available at: <http://www.philipmcshane.org>).

¹⁰⁶ “We are given an Aquinas that no historical scholar any longer believes in, an Aquinas without the theology. Where is Aquinas’s emphasis on the supernatural light of charity? MacIntyre says little about charity even though for Aquinas there is no full justice without it.” John Milbank, as quoted by John Cornwell, “MacIntyre on Money,” *Prospect Magazine*, November 2010.

¹⁰⁷ I will not attempt to assemble all relevant texts, but consider the following: epilogue *Insight*, *CWL* 3, 763 (see notes 38 and 98); *CWL*, 10, 91; *CWL* 12, 473–79; and *Method in Theology* 286–288.

¹⁰⁸ “[T]he challenge of heuristics: a protection of humanity’s **what** and **Om** and **home** in each and all from stupidity and evil.” Phil McShane, *Æconomics* 3 “A Common Quest Manifesto,” at note 42 (available at: <http://www.philipmcshane.org/economics>).

¹⁰⁹ In the long “seventhly” paragraph on page 507, Lonergan assesses what he thinks Aristotle did and did not grasp.

¹¹⁰ *Insight*, *CWL* 3, 265.

philosophy. I had not yet spent days and weeks trying to interpret a single sentence in *Insight*,¹¹¹ nor had I tried to get straight the facts regarding basic and non-basic flows of goods and services while walking around *Campo Real* wondering about the flows of tortillas and pesos and local standards of living. While I was physically present in the local economy, I was not psychologically present, except descriptively and practically. The exercise yielded a better perspective on the phrase “noetic activity engaged in a lower context”¹¹² and the basic blunder of orthodox academic philosophy,¹¹³ as opposed to “philosophy as a way of life”¹¹⁴ and a preparation for death in which every effort directed to ‘apparently trifling problems,’ as well as every movement and every word in the classroom and cafeteria, is the result of the right life of my imagination.¹¹⁵ Finally, I had not yet begun to ask what methodical interpretation might look like, and how the task of comparison that I good-willingly attempted in 2000 is shifted to (future) elders doing *Comparison*, a sub-task of Dialectic.¹¹⁶ This is a huge claim. How might I defend it?

¹¹¹ In 2013 a colleague in Mexico asked me about the meaning of this sentence from *Insight*: “It follows that, when the prior conditions for the functioning of a scheme of recurrence are satisfied, then the probability of the combinations of events constitutive of the scheme leaps from a product of fractions to a sum of fractions.” (CWL 3, 144) So I took three months to write “*El azar, la probabilidad emergente y la cosmópolis*,” [Randomness, Emergent Probability, and Cosmopolis] (*Revista de Filosofía* [Universidad Iberoamericana] 135: 313-337, 2013.)

¹¹² See note 13 above.

¹¹³ See further notes 28, 32, 34, 35, and 40. The blunder is addressed by Lonergan in “Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response.” There he notes a “big block ... the novelty of training teachers that (1) can thematize their own conscious activities and (2) help their pupils do likewise.” (CWL 17, 372).

¹¹⁴ Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercise from Socrates to Foucault*. Cambridge, Blackwell, 1995.

¹¹⁵ “Every movement you make on stage, every word you speak, is a result of the right life of your imagination. If you speak any lines, or do anything, mechanically, without fully realizing who you are, where you came from, why, what you want, where you are going, and what you will do when you get there, you will be acting without imagination.” Constantin Stanislavski, *An Actor Prepares*, translated by Elizabeth Reynolds Hapgood, Routledge, New York, 1964, 71. See further my essay for the 2011 West Coast Methods Institute “English as My Second Language.” (available at: <https://itesm.academia.edu/JamesGerardDuffy>).

¹¹⁶ *Comparison* has a precise technical meaning that is central to the enterprise of globology, whole earth care, futurology, or whatever name you care to give to the “new and higher collaboration” (*Insight*, 740). *Comparison* is of any achievement of anybody with the established standard model geohistorical genetics of the time. Since it is still early to talk about and try wrapping our minds around the dynamics of *Comparison*, it is helpful to lean on analogies, such as the one I offer in the following paragraphs.

A possibly relevant image for grasping the flaw in the practice of comparing (interpretations of) two thinkers is to consider the intelligent poise of Dr. House and his team interpreting an object that is a human subject.¹¹⁷ They are poised to analyze, diagnose, operate, amputate if necessary, and prescribe medicine, possibly one or other therapy. Their poise is not one of gaping at the patient ‘already out there now,’ but an informed poise that is the fruit of years of education and experience. They are open to the possibility that the illness might be something strange, e.g., Fields’ disease.¹¹⁸

Imagine a particular case where House and his team are treating a 37 year-old Vietnamese woman who recently suffered a concussion in a speed soccer match and now appears to be speaking with an Italian accent. House and his team have reason to believe she has Foreign Accent Syndrome (FAS).¹¹⁹ Among their research finds is a 2016 case study,¹²⁰ so they are reading it and following up on the numerous references mentioned. They are open to the possibility that a possible cure could be strange as well, e.g., the use of arsenic¹²¹ or *Vin Mariani*¹²² with or after dinner.

How did House and team come to share an up-to-date understanding of strange illnesses and strange cures? Surely they have read about the discovery of strange illnesses and uncommon treatments. I imagine they had a decent organic chemistry teacher in high school and they are

¹¹⁷ *House* is an American television medical drama that takes place at fictional Princeton Plainsboro Teaching Hospital in New Jersey. Dr. Gregory House approaches health problems of his patients as would a medical Sherlock Holmes. The series originally ran from November 2004 to May of 2012. See also references to Dr. House in McShane’s *Interpretation* 1, “A Fresh Start; *Interpretation* 9 “Contexts and Situations;” *Interpretation* 10 “The Genetics in Genetics in Mibox;” *Interpretation* 11 “Mibox Control of Interpretation;” and *Interpretation* 12 “Exercises in Interpretation.” (available at: <http://www.philipmcshane.org/interpretation>)

¹¹⁸ Kirstie and Catherine Fields, from South Wales, are the only two people on the planet who suffer from this condition, a neuromuscular disease that causes muscular degeneration. After losing their voices in 2008, the twins each received an electronic speech machine for their 18th birthday in 2012.

¹¹⁹ A speech disorder that causes a sudden change to speech so that the speaker is perceived to speak with a “foreign” accent. This condition is most often caused by brain damage resulting from a stroke or traumatic brain injury.

¹²⁰ Stefanie Keulen, Peter Mariën, Peggy Wackenier, Roel Jonkers, Roelien Bastiaanse, and Jo Verhoeven, “Psychogenic Foreign Accent Syndrome: A New Case,” *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, vol. 10 (2016), available at: <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2016.00065/full>

¹²¹ A critical ingredient in Chinese medicines and cures for malaria. Victorian women even used it as a cosmetic.

¹²² Invented in 1863 by the Italian chemist Angelo Mariani, it consists of red wine mixed with cocoa leaves.

comfortable using symbols common in the practice of medicine to help guide the search for what ails their patient, make a diagnosis, and prescribe treatment. Moreover, thanks to a decent group of teachers in medical school, they are willing “to follow the lead of the successful” neuropsychologists, but they follow “them not slavishly but intelligently.”¹²³

Even before searching for particular healings for this or that patient, House and his team spent time learning what the prior generation of neuropsychologists had invented: appropriate symbolic images of the relevant biological, chemical, neuropsychological, and physical processes. These symbols are a tremendous aid for House and his colleagues to “grasp by insight the laws of the higher system that account for regularities beyond the range of physical and chemical explanations.”¹²⁴ They are not reductionists, so they know that chemistry is not the whole of organic development or organic healing. But they also know that if their patient suffers from FAS, sending her to a spiritual director is not the best remedy.

What is that competence of House and his team? They have a decent genetic grip on the geohistorical developments of medicines and their applications. So when they are interpreting and diagnosing a cure for a particular illness, their standard is their genetic understanding. They know that “there is the genetic sequence in which insights are accumulated by man.”¹²⁵ Perhaps House could list the names of scientists and healers who have contributed genetically or dialectically to the geohistorical development of the standard,¹²⁶ but his interpretation of what ails the Vietnamese woman and how to treat her is in light of a genetic understanding. Normatively the same is true when interpreting a treatise or any other text.

IV. Looking Forward

Imagine a children’s fairy tale that begins: “Once upon a time there was a virtuous banker living in a small village ...” After hearing the fairy tale,

¹²³ *Insight*, 488. “They are well read and as they tackle the detecting of a strange illness and its possible cure, they have each a pretty coherent view of illnesses and their history, and on the texts written about them, each with an edge in their own culture. Think of the little Chinese lady who was a member of the team at one stage, bringing deeper expertise than others on the history of Chinese treatments like acupuncture.” Phil McShane, *Interpretation* 1, “A Fresh Start.” (available at: <http://www.philipmcschane.org/interpretation>).

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 489. You can surmise from this footnote and the prior one that House and colleagues have a handle on pointers from *Insight*. This does not necessarily mean they have read the book. There are to be sequences of series of texts and teachers involved in the methodical reorientation of extrascientific opinions and battered, arrogant common sense.

¹²⁵ *Insight*, CWL 3, 609.

¹²⁶ See further note 90.

the wonder-filled five year-old asks her teacher: “What is a virtuous banker?” Wow, what a question. What might be a virtuous banker (*VB*) be in 2120?

Fairy tales and other forms of literary writing typically do not include diagrams, convenient symbols, and exercises. The advantage of implementing heuristics in secondary and high school—in this case naming the known unknown virtuous banker *VB*—is that they help teacher James and students alike to orient the search and not confuse fairy-tale meanings with the ongoing tale (story) of what *VB* might mean in 100 years. *VB* is shorthand for someone, a person (*P*), whose biochemical enjoyment, intention, choice, deliberation, and consent¹²⁷ are informed by a decent understanding of what banking (*DUB*)¹²⁸ might be in the oscillations of the glocal economy (*GE*)¹²⁹ and who sizes up situations wisely, i.e., mindful of the concrete good, which is a history and future. He or she will experience biochemical pleasures and pains ‘in the right manner’ and ‘at the right time’ while doing specialized tasks.¹³⁰

There is, then, now, and forever will be, a significant difference between implementing convenient symbols in our search of efficient and beautiful meanings of “virtuous banker” and the usual academic comparison of Amy and Betty, or Alasdair and Bernard. It is quite possible that “the difference lies in the fact that modern science has made it possible to distinguish very sharply between preliminary description and scientific explanation.”¹³¹

¹²⁷ Reading Aquinas’ Treatise on Happiness, *Summa theologiae*, Ia IIae, QQ. xi–xv “better than was the reality.” See also notes 98, 106, 107, and 131.

¹²⁸ In the present context, think of *DU* in terms of a mature, genetic understanding similar to that of Dr. House pivoting on an understanding of “a flexible circle of schemes of recurrence” of a laughing, talking, discerning, banker humbly carrying out his or her “critical, checking, admonitory” (Joseph Schumpeter, *Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process* [New York and London: McGraw Hill 1939], volume I, 116) role, so not “forcing money upon people” (*Business Cycles*, volume II, 640).

¹²⁹ The word “glocal” indicates that supposing “a number of economies, each with its own basic and surplus circuits and redistributive functions” (*CWL* 21, 197). A glocal banking poise and vision is analogous to that of a captain of a ship, who would be remiss to focus solely on the pleasant weather on the horizon. See further Phil McShane, *Æcornomics* 7 “International Trade: Beginnings” and *Æcornomics* 8 “The Incomparable” (available at: <http://www.philipmcshane.org/ecornomics>).

¹³⁰ Those collaborating in managing the glocal economy will experience analogous pleasures and pains. A significant challenge for beginning to grasp what business ethics (*BE*) might be in the next millennium is to conceive of ethics geohistorically, a massive project of luminous collaboration. I provided some analogies for this project in “Ethics as Functional Collaboration,” 124–127.

¹³¹ *Insight*, *CWL* 3, 511.

Comparing and contrasting two or more thinkers is a common academic practice. Substitute other names for “MacIntyre” and “Lonergan,” and another topic for “business ethics” or “virtue” and you can generate countless titles of countless courses, seminars, conferences, articles, and books. Many courses and seminars, at both the undergraduate and graduate level, implicitly ask students to compare two or more figures.¹³² Such comparative courses and seminars are not unique to Jesuit undergraduate and graduate philosophy programs. They are the stock-in-trade of much of what happens in higher education, and questioning the worthwhileness of the standard raises uncomfortable doubts about the major authenticity¹³³ of these academic conventions. I wonder if a genuine way of life “has to be won back through a self-scrutiny that expels illusion and pretense.”¹³⁴

In the last 20 years my appreciation of how important convenient symbols and heuristic devices are for being and becoming a Socratic character in the classroom and beyond has developed. I learned that the messy situation at the university where I taught, “not some intelligible whole but rather a set of misshapen, poorly proportioned, and incoherent fragments,”¹³⁵ did not welcome Socratic characters. Since then, my belief in a “heuristic structure applicable to the study of the psyche and of intelligence,” as well as to the study of feelings, desires, and virtues, has become a foil for planar, sometimes sophisticated commonsense treatments of these topics.

¹³² My philosophical formation was no exception. As an undergraduate in the early 1980s I took a course on “British Empiricism” one semester and wrote an essay comparing Lonergan and Rahner the next. Later, in the mid-1980s, I took courses such as “Contemporary German Philosophy” and “Descartes and the Cartesian Tradition.” Still later, in a 1991, in a graduate seminar on “Contemporary Thomism” at Fordham University, the professor asked me to compare the “Transcendental Thomists” Joseph Maréchal (1878–1944), Karl Rahner (1904–1984), Bernard Lonergan (1904–1984), and Emerich Coreth (1919–2006).

¹³³ See the discussion of minor and major authenticity on page 80 of *Method in Theology*.

¹³⁴ *Insight*, CWL 3, 500. How do you or I integrally encourage forth “the appropriate perceptiveness and feelings,” “enlarge present perceptiveness,” and “transmute present desires and fears” (CWL 3, 496–97) when “present” is 0.000014522219% of cosmic joy and zeal? (See Michael Shute, “Functional Collaboration as the Implementation of Lonergan’s Method Part 2: How Might We Implement Functional Collaboration?” *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis* 8 (2015): 94–95, at notes 6 and 7.) See also notes 7, 34, 38, 41, 57, 98, 105, and 137.

¹³⁵ *Method in Theology*, 358. The citation ends with a note (4) in which Lonergan cites *Insight*, pp. 191–206, 218–232, 619–633, and 687–730. In the following paragraph he writes that “the messy situation is diagnosed differently by the divided community.”

Academic disciplines have made and continue to make comparisons like the one I am evaluating in this essay “‘our life, our culture, the way we make our living.’ Who is to up-girt our robe so that we might dance wildly, less than a king, and more?”¹³⁶ How do I shake off a perspective when it is the stock-in-trade of the educational industrial complex rolling down the ages? Well, I “fake it until I make it,” ever-repentantly.¹³⁷

This does not mean that common sense contributions are tossed out the window. On the merely practical side, such comparisons are often times expected of those jumping through various academic hoops. One has to cunningly survive and live a kind of double life. On the intellectual side, there exists the possibility of an explanatory interpretation of commonsense meanings,¹³⁸ for example, of “Augustine’s penetrating reflections on knowledge and consciousness, Descartes’ *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, Pascal’s *Pensées*, Newman’s *Grammar of Assent*.”¹³⁹ The second canon of hermeneutics requires that interpretation be explanatory, relating “the totality of documents and interpretations not to us, but to one another.”¹⁴⁰

What do you and I want in our ordinary living that is not ordinary drama? How might we behave before others, artistically transforming elementary aggressivity and affectivity?¹⁴¹ Cherishing and implementing convenient symbols when interpreting *fire*, *money*, or *virtue*, is not a “philosophic school” type of thing in which Alasdair’s school is better than Bernard’s or vice versa.¹⁴² It is a matter of being humble and walking alongside Socrates.

¹³⁶ “Ethics as Functional Collaboration,” 146.

¹³⁷ Ever-repentance is a phenomenologically verifiable way to crawl into bed, climb out again the next morning, and proceed to stumble and bumble through the day. It is a way to align oneself with the joy and zeal of the groaning universe. See further *Insight*, 722 and Philip McShane, “*Insight and the Interior Lighthouse*,” *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education* 28/2 (2017) 277–98.

¹³⁸ See the long paragraph that begins “To avoid confusion and misunderstanding ...” on page 610 of *Insight*.

¹³⁹ *Method in Theology*, 261.

¹⁴⁰ *Insight*, CWL 3, 609. In this dense, difficult, high-flying, lonely (out in space) rocket man chapter 17 of *Insight*, Lonergan sought to indicate “a methodical hermeneutics on the analogy of the canons of empirical method in such a science as physics.” *Ibid.*, 601. The possibility of explanatory interpretations of the works of Gadamer, Heidegger, Habermas, Derrida, Ricoeur, Foucault and others are intimated in the dense “to avoid confusion and misunderstanding” paragraph on page 610. But the canons of methodological interpretation have not been tried, and it is safe to say that the methodical hermeneutic revolution, pivoting “on the analogy of the canons of empirical method in such a science as physics,” is still some years away.

¹⁴¹ *Insight*, CWL 3, 212.

¹⁴² My interpretive evaluation of an ongoing assembly is that, in fact, Bernard “merely founded a school” (CWL 18, 285) and that “what is hidden

Might this essay be a contribution, a minor increment yielding results? Asking a fundamental question about the prevalent academic practice of comparing Jones and Smith on X, Y, or Z might touch a nerve or two. My hope is that I am making manifest “the defects in current thinking” and in so doing “chang[ing] that thinking.”¹⁴³

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from” those who insist on assimilating the *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* to academic philosophy and theology, comparing Bernard to Hans-Georg, Edith, René, Pope Francis et al in the usual unscientific way, and asking their students to do the same, “is not entirely without any fault on their part (using ‘fault’ in the broadest sense possible).” *CWL* 18, 283. See also note 116.

¹⁴³ *CWL* 18, 309.

