An Apparent Anomaly in Lonergan Scholarship

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Introduction

In 2011, Philip McShane invited colleagues to participate in an online seminar in the functional specialties, beginning with Research. He encouraged a search for anomalies in the data of specific zones of study that might be promising for functional recycling. In response, two reports were submitted by Robert Henman related to the study of Lonergan’s thought. The first listed the results of a search for the occurrence of the term ‘implementation’ in three of Lonergan’s texts: Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (2nd edition), Understanding and Being and Method in Theology. It emerged that many of Lonergan’s references to ‘implementation’ in the text were not indexed. The second report was an effort to interpret the results: It considered to what extent this discrepancy was significant and if so, to what extent it might reflect a neglect of emphasis on functional specialization by Lonergan scholars.

The initial search was for the term ‘implementation.’ Later we expanded the search to include the term ‘implementation’ and its variants, ‘implement,’ ‘implements,’ ‘implementing’ and ‘implemented.’ The results of this second search expanded the results considerably.

especially for *Insight*. We located 46 occurrences of the term ‘implementation’ and its variants in the Collected Works edition of *Insight*. The index of both the reprinted 2nd Edition of 1970 and the Collected Works edition, however, each noted only 5 occurrences under two main headings.⁴ This seemed significant.

What follows is a presentation and contextualization of the results of our research. The decisive question for us as researchers was whether or not the results obtained are in fact anomalous and worth recycling. If they are, then we believe we have uncovered significant data worth being taken up by those in the remaining seven specialties. In what follows we are primarily concerned with presenting the relevant data, that is, with staying within the objectives of functional research. While we try to avoid interpreting the data, it was necessary to provide a context for why we consider this particular research and its results significant. In that light, we make some suggestions for efforts in the other specialties, particularly Interpretation.

**The Background and the Research**

The original interest relates to a study Bob Henman conducted on how to effectively define an audience.⁵ The focus was on Communications; he wanted to figure out how to effectively communicate a new idea to a settled audience, that is, an audience that in all likelihood would be initially unresponsive.⁶ As the research progressed, he wondered about the connection between Lonergan’s references to ‘implementation’ in *Insight* and the development of functional specialization. To his surprise, the many occurrences of the term, ‘implementation’ in *Insight* were not reflected in the index.

At the time of the original study he found 19 usages of ‘implementation’ in the three texts, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (2nd edition)*, *Understanding and Being* and *Method in Theology*. When we returned to this research, both *Insight* (the Collected Works edition) and *Method* were available in a Kindle edition, and we ran an electronic search for the term, expanding the search to include all

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⁴ (1) Under ‘Implementation: definition of metaphysics, 421; of meaning, 381’ (2) Under ‘Metaphysics: implementation of integral heuristic structure of proportionate being), 415—21.’ See the Appendix below.

⁵ See Robert Henman, “The Halifax Regional School Board: A Functional Analysis of a Scheme of Educational Activity.”

the variants of ‘implement.’ The results were as follows. We found 46 occurrences of “implementation” and its variants ‘implement,’ ‘implements,’ ‘implementing’ and ‘implemented’ in the text of *Insight*. Of the reference to ‘implement’ specifically, 4 were in verbal form, while there was 1 instance of ‘implement’ used as a noun at page 530 [507]. There were 2 entries in the index referring to ‘Implementation.’

(1) Under “Implementation: definition of metaphysics, 421; of meaning, 381.”
(2) Under “Metaphysics: implementation of integral heuristic structure of proportionate being), 415—21.”

The indices for both 1958 second edition and the 1970 reprint edition do not include these two instances, nor any other. The entries in the Collected Works edition cover 5 of the occurrences of “implementation” and its variants, leaving the remaining 41 not referenced in the index. Turning to *Understanding and Being*, we found 5 occurrences of “implementation” and its variants. These occurrences were not referenced in the index. There was one instance of ‘implement’ used as a noun. The index of the original *Method in Theology* had one reference to ‘implementation’ under “Dialectic, implementation of D. (378)” and that covers the only occurrence of the term in the text.

The occurrences listed in *Insight*, while varying in context, predominantly, though not exclusively, occur in two contexts: (1) elements related to the dialectic of history discussed in chapters 6, 7, 18, 19, 20 and the Epilogue and; (2) with respect to the implementation of metaphysics. In *Understanding and Being*, of the 4 occurrences as a verb, 3 related to the implementation of metaphysics and 1 to implementation in history. The number of occurrences in *Insight* and *Understanding and Being* that clustered around the two contexts of metaphysics and the dialectic of history caught our attention.

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7 An electronic concordance of the Lonergan’s text would greatly facilitate an exhaustive search. One of the possibilities of general research “someday, perhaps, it will give us a complete information-retrieval system” (*Method in Theology*, 127).

8 See entry 26 under ‘insight’ in the Appendix under A. *Insight*.

9 See entry 4 in the Appendix under B. *Understanding and Being*.

10 See the entry in the Appendix under C. *Method in Theology*. The term ‘implemented’ is used in the context of dialectic. This reference is omitted in the index of the *Collected Works* edition of 2017.

11 A complete list of the occurrences of ‘implementation’ in *Insight* can be found in the Appendix below. ‘Implementation’ and its variants also occur in his discussion of invariance in chapter two (entry 1 in the Appendix), in the discussion of the canon of complete explanation and the canon of statistical residues in chapter 3 (entries 2–4), and in the context of the instrumental act of meaning in chapter 12 (see entry 19).
Our initial concern was to establish, however tentatively, the relevance of the problem of implementation in Insight to the subsequent development of functional specialization. In this context it becomes interesting that most of the occurrences of ‘implementation’ and its variants are missed by the indexers. Certainly the interests of researchers shift and indices are revised, to reflect this. We can easily verify this in the case of Insight by comparing the indices of the 1958 revised edition with the 1992 Collected Works edition. Was this anomaly, then, more than a simple lacuna in the indexing? To what extent do Lonergan’s own presentations of functional specialization mute the connection? Would it be fair to characterize the gap as a failure among the indexers to fully grasp the connection between Lonergan’s concern with implementation in Insight and his discovery of functional specialization? Finally, what are the implications of this for future functional scholarship?

**Implementation In Insight**

When Lonergan reached chapter 12 in Insight he declares “explicit metaphysics is the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being.” The phrase ‘implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being’ becomes a motif throughout the rest of the book, one that is repeated in his 1958 Halifax Lectures (Understanding and Being). Though Lonergan includes the notion of implementation in Insight, both in the context of explicit metaphysics and in the context of the problem of reversing the longer cycle of decline, he did not explore how to effectively implement the heuristic structure of proportionate being. Chapters 1 to 13 focused on the conception and affirmation of a cognitional theory in preparation for the discussion of Metaphysics in chapters 14 through 17. In chapter 7 specifically he opens up the possibility of a yet unknown ‘x’ named ‘cosmopolis’ that would provide the leading voice in a cultural reversal of the longer cycle of decline. He writes: “There will be common decisions to be reached and to be implemented. … What is necessary is a Cosmopolis…that implements itself primarily through that allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored.”

At the beginning of chapter 18 he writes: “Metaphysics was conceived as the implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. The fundamental question of the present chapter is whether ethics can be conceived in the same fashion.” While we might

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12 Frederick Crowe compiled the 1958 index; Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran compiled the 1992 index.
13 CWL 3, 416 [391].
14 CWL 3, 263 [238].
15 CWL 3, 618.
expect ethics to be the fitting place for an account of implementation, Lonergan for the most part dodges the issue and deals only with the possibility of ethics. Because he must content with the problem of evil and the problem of human liberation that follows from the ‘fact’ of evil, there is need of a further transcendental context. Chapters 19 and 20 lay out the transcendental positions to be affirmed in any solution to the problem. Lonergan connects the solution to the problem of implementation to the theological virtue of charity. He writes: “The antecedent willingness of charity has to mount from an affective to an effective determination to discover and to implement in all things the intelligibility of universal order that is God’s concept and choice.”

Clearly, Lonergan was deeply interested in the problem of effective implementation but, other than to sketch the general features of a possible solution and to affirm the fully transcendental character of any effective implementation, he did not solve the problem to his own satisfaction. As he wrote in chapter 7: “Cosmopolis is not Babel, yet how can we break from Babel? This is the problem.” The answer, for him, was not simply a matter of religious faith, hope and charity. As chapter 20 of Insight makes clear, the push was for more than an dogmatic affirmation of the theological virtues. It was effective intervention of a “new and higher integration.”

Why did Lonergan not take up more fully the question of implementation in Insight? Lonergan’s original intention was to write a much longer book. However, he was called to teach in Rome in 1952 and had to ‘wrap things up.’ So, he sought a publisher for what was to become Insight and envisaged a second volume to be called ‘Faith’ or ‘Insight and Faith.’ At that point, he had not yet worked out how to

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16 CWL 3, 747-748.
17 The term ‘collaboration’ is mentioned 103 times in Insight and with increasing frequency in the last two chapters and the Epilogue. Clearly, as he was winding up this long work, the problem of effective collaboration was on his mind. On this see, Michael Shute, “‘Functional Collaboration as the Implementation of ‘Lonergan’s Method’ Part 1: For What Problem is Functional Collaboration the Solution?” Divyadaan: Indian Journal of Philosophy and Education, vol. 24, No. 1 (2013): 1-34. [Re-printed Journal of Macrodynanic Analysis, Vol. 8 (2015)].
18 CWL 3, 267. This sentence was missing from the first two editions of Insight. The editorial notes say this “both MSS have this sentence, lacking in the proofs; somewhere on the way it disappeared without a trace (793).” Michael Shute, Lonergan’s Discovery of the Science of Economics, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) situates this statement within the context of a discussion of implementation and collaboration as a massive project of functional specialization that had been on Lonergan’s mind since the 1930’s.
19 CWL 3, 745.
concretely break the babel methodically. He knew it involved the institution of some ‘x’ named cosmopolis that would guide the implementation of heuristic structure of proportionate being and that it involved effective charity. However, as metaphysics provides the unification of all the sciences, this was no small project, even if we prescind from the reality of the social surd and the need for effective charity.

To what extent was the problem of implementation on Lonergan’s mind while he taught at the Gregorian, in the period after writing *Insight* and prior to his discovery of functional specialization? Certainly, the challenge of lecturing to large classes of students from a variety of cultures and academic backgrounds in a pre-Vatican II setting was significant.\(^2\) Lonergan’s lectures at the Gregorian and the summer institutes he gave in North America during this period reveal his increasing attention to the question of method, especially from 1959 to 1964.\(^3\) The long-term context is Lonergan’s early interest in the theory of history, itself a response to the challenge of meeting Marxist, liberal and fascist philosophies of history that largely informed the secular political and cultural landscape.\(^4\) The more proximate operator seems to have been his engagement with hermeneutical philosophy and existentialism.\(^5\)

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\(^2\) See *A Second Collection* where we find the following on the relationship between *Insight* and *Method*: “A principle source of the difference between these two works is that I was transferred from Toronto to the Gregorian University in the summer of 1953. For the first ten years, I lectured in alternate years on the Incarnate Word and on the Trinity to both second and third year theologians. There were about six hundred and fifty strong and between them, not individually but distributively, they seem to read everything (276).” Lonergan would characterize the Catholic educational approach at the Gregorian as fundamentally unchanged since the Renaissance. See *Caring About Meaning*.

\(^3\) Volumes 23-25 of the *Collected Works* are devoted to his extensive lectures and institutes on theological method from this period.

\(^4\) Lonergan writes: “There is needed, then, a critique of history before there can be any intelligent direction of history (*CWL* 3, 265).” Both Patrick Brown and Michael Shute connect Lonergan’s work on history in the 1930s with the discovery of the functional specialties. See Pat Brown, “Implementation in Lonergan’s Early Historical Manuscripts” *Journal of Macrodynanic Analysis*, vol. 3 (2003)): “It was a concern with effective practice not only within the natural and human sciences but on the level of our times, on the level of constituting and, in part, directing history” (7), and Michael Shute, “‘Let Us be Practical’ – The Beginnings of the Long Process to Functional Specialization in the ‘Essay in Fundamental Sociology.’” John Dadosky, (ed.). *Meaning and History in Systematic Theology: Essays in Honor of Robert M. Doran, S.J.* (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2009), 465-485.

In hindsight, the link between implementation and the method of functional specialization may seem obvious, yet Lonergan had not yet put together the eightfold structure of functional specialization. The problem of implementation clustered around (1) the problem of how to reverse the longer cycle of decline and (2) the question of how to effectively implement the heuristics of proportionate being. With respect to the first problem he had gotten as far as postulating an unknown ‘x he named cosmopolis. With respect to the second, he had developed a method of self-appropriation for making explicit an implicit metaphysics operating in all humans. In Understanding and Being both questions remain active. In Method in Theology he has his answer.

In writing Method Lonergan does not draw out explicitly the history of the problem of effective implementation in his own thought. The gains of Insight are incorporated into his account of transcendental method and the human good in the chapters 1 and 2. The only references to “implementation’ occur in the chapter on Dialectic where he writes: “Accordingly, let us see what happens, first, when the dialectic is implemented by a person that has undergone intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and, secondly, when it is implemented by a person that has not yet undergone intellectual or moral or religious conversion.”26 The lack of explicit attention to the connection between the problems voiced in Insight and the solution obtained in Method in Theology should not surprise us. He was presenting the solution. The problem itself was now addressed in terms of the two prevailing approaches to method, as “more art than science” and in imitation of “the conspicuously successful science.”27 His concern was “to work out the basis for…a third way” in theology.28 That third way was functional specialization. An expansion of the general structure of transcendental method provides the basis for the eightfold structure of functional specialization. The general dynamic pattern of movement and rest is refashioned in terms of method, that is, “a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”29 “Execution generates feedback” and “the result of such attention to feedback will be that policy and planning become ongoing processes that are continuously revised in light of their consequences.”30

26 Method, 251-52.
27 Method, 3-4.
28 Method, 4. Lonergan suggests that the relevance of the method discovered has applications beyond theology and he proposed explicitly its relevance to integrated studies in chapter 12 See CWL 3, 364-365. Karl Rahner regarded functional specialization as applicable to all fields. See Karl Rahner, “‘Some Critical Thoughts on ‘Functional Specialties in Theology’” in Foundations of Theology, ed. by Philip McShane. (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, Ltd, 1971).
29 Method, 4.
30 Method, 366.
As was typical of Lonergan, once he worked something out to his own satisfaction, he moved on and his written expression reflects this. For example, while Lonergan acknowledged Newman’s significant influence on his thought, he very rarely referenced Newman in his published work. In this respect it is good to keep in mind that it is after ideas are communicated that there arise researchers with questions about origins and development.\(^{31}\) As Lonergan wrote about his discovery of the basic economic variables in *For a New Political Economy*: “To discover such terms is a lengthy and painful process of trial and error. *Experto crede*. To justify them, one cannot reproduce the tedious blind efforts that led to them; one can only appeal to the success, be it great or small, with which they serve to account systematically for the phenomena under investigation.”\(^{32}\)

In short, Lonergan did not make explicit the connection between the problem of implementation and the solution of functional specialization and as a consequence it perhaps does not surprise us that most scholars did not fully catch the connection.\(^{33}\) We say ‘fully’ because it is clear that there has been some development. While the 1958 and 1970 editions included no indexing of implementation, *The Collected Works* edition did capture 5 instances. In addition, the index of *Method in Theology*, included the only reference in that text.

**An Anomaly Worth Recycling?**

Before discussing whether or not this apparent neglect of implementation in the indices is an anomaly worth recycling, it would be helpful to explain what we mean by an anomaly in Research. The ‘norm’ is what is expected in the context of the contemporary understanding of the field under consideration. A departure from the norm is a failure to meet that reasonable expectation. To take a well-known example, consider the placebo effect in medical research. If we administer a pain medication for a certain duration and then replace it with a salt water

\(^{31}\) See Lonergan’s discussion of Collingwood’s view of history and Schleiermacher’s views on interpretation in *Method*, 165-167.

\(^{32}\) *CWL* 21, 112.

\(^{33}\) I report the following correspondence from Philip McShane in response to reading an earlier draft of this article: “From 1958 on I was looking for the answer to the Cosmopolis question. When Lonergan sketched the stuff to me in Regis College in the summer of 1966 it was quite clear that Lonergan had it: the invention of a specialty focused on implementation. I began envisaging the whole workings that summer. The leap in the Bodleian library in 1969 re: musicology was a good back up to the full range of functional specialization.” On this, see Philip McShane, *Plants and Pianos: Two Essays in Advanced Methodology* (Milltown Press, Dublin, 1971) and *The Shaping of the Foundations: Being at Home in the Transcendental Method* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1977).
solution, the expectation is that the patient’s pain will not be alleviated. However, in statistically significant instances, patients respond to a salt water solution just as they did to the pain medication. It would be reasonable in the context of our understanding of the chemistry of pain management to expect that if you removed the pain medication the pain level would continue or even increase. But to a significant degree in experiments, it does not, and researchers do not really know why. The results challenge our understanding of the biochemistry of pain. Anomalies spur further research and are often important in the advance of a science. In the case of the placebo effect, for example, questions are raised about the connection between human intentionality, mental states and the biochemistry of pain. Lonergan himself explores their significance for the emergence of higher viewpoints in mathematics and in his discussion of the role of inverse insights in the advance of science.

In the context of the indices of the Lonergan works cited, we have noticed that the occurrences of ‘implementation’ in the text were for the most part missed in the index. This insight into that non-event raises the question; “Why not?” Does the non-event justify its designation as an anomaly? Indices reflect the horizons of the indexer and the community of scholars addressed. To what extent is the lacuna a function of a lag in the community in making the connection or a failure to take full note of the significance the problem implementation had for Lonergan in the discovery of functional specialization?

We have pointed to what we take to be a significant anomaly. Noticing the lacuna in the indices and considering it significant is a reflection of our own context. As researchers we do yet know its significance. As a full understanding is lacking, any judgment is premature at this stage. Researchers may determine, as we have, that it is worth communicating the anomaly to the community. We suspect it has significance. However, it is up to functional interpreters to determine the meaning in the context of Lonergan’s work, to functional historians to locate that meaning in the context of development in the field and, finally, to dialecticians to take the results of these three specialties determine the validity of the accounts and position taken in terms of basic positions. And so on through the remaining specialties. The researcher’s job in a functionally differentiated feedback loop is to notice and that noticing is in the context of their own development in the field. Further questions will follow. Did Lonergan himself understand functional specialization to be the solution to the problem of

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34 This involves issues in statistical method. The researcher observes and selects data intelligently; intelligence notes the existence of patterns and the absence of patterns. The recognition of a departure from the norm relates to the canon of selection. See CWL 3, 94ff.

35 CWL 3, 7-41 and 45-46.

36 Method, 251.
implementing the metaphysics that he presented in *Insight*? What are the implications of this for future scholars? If the anomaly is significant, what are the implications of the neglect of discovering and working out the relationship between implementation and functional specialization? These questions, and many others, are left unanswered by the functional researcher. They are matters for specialists in the remaining seven specialties.

**Recycling**

In the following section, we wish to point ahead to some possible implications of our results for functional interpretation. In addition, our remarks will likely shed further light on why we picked up on the clustering of occurrences under ‘dialectic of history’ and ‘metaphysics’ and why we were interested in this particular research in the first place.

In *Insight*, Lonergan grounded his account of metaphysics on the cognitional theory uncovered in the first 11 chapters of the book. To paraphrase Lonergan, his metaphysics presupposes his epistemology and his epistemology presupposes a cognitional theory. In the first chapter of *Method* all this is subsumed under transcendental method. He writes:

> Very precisely, it is a heightening of consciousness that brings to light our conscious and intentional operations and thereby leads to the answers to three basic questions. What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it? The first answer is a cognitional theory. The second is an epistemology. The third is a metaphysics where, however, the metaphysics is transcendental, an integration of heuristic structures, and not some categorial speculation that reveals that all is water, or matter, or spirit, or process, or what have you.37

It is clear, then, that the dynamic metaphysics of *Insight*, now incorporated into his account of transcendental method, is relevant to theological method. Would not the problem of implementation of a metaphysics, then, also be relevant to functional specialization? Lonergan goes on to say “that transcendental method is only part of theological method” for it does not address “the specifically religious component.” In order to address religion “we must first say something about the human good and human meaning.”38 In the chapter on the human good, Lonergan provides us with a brief sketch of the three

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37 *Method*, 25.
38 Ibid.
primary elements of progress and the dialectic of history. In the chapter on meaning we find a sketch of the stages of meaning which emerged first in his early writings on the dialectic of history. The last section of that chapter raises the problem of undifferentiated consciousness in the later stages of meaning which we might fruitfully connect to the problem of the babel. Among other things, in the chapter on religion Lonergan addresses religion as a response to the problem of cumulative decline. He writes, “Without faith, without the eye of love, the world is too evil for God to be good, for a good God to exist;” “Faith has the power of undoing decline; “religious hope...can enable men [sic] to resist the vast pressures of social decay;” and “human possessiveness and human pride have to be replaced by human charity.” If, in some sense, Lonergan considered Part One of Method in Theology a compression and development of Insight, then both the metaphysics in Insight and the dialectic of history are relevant in the discovery of functional specialization. This lends further significance to the clustering of the occurrences of ‘implementation’ and its variants around the two contexts of metaphysics and the dialectic of history. It was this possibility that informed our research.

Further Remarks

This study provides what we think is relevant data on the relationship between the implementation of metaphysics and functional specialization. We speculate further that a firm functionally differentiated grasp of this relationship should have implications for the unification of the sciences. As Lonergan writes: “An account of scientific method stands to cognitional theory as the less to the more

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39 Method, 52-55. The section heading is ‘Progress and Decline.’ The second to last paragraph ends with the prospect of ‘cumulative decline.’ However, he ends the section and the chapter with reference to the third element as follows: “Finally, we may note that a religion that promotes self-transcendence to the point, not merely of justice, but of self-sacrificing love, will have a redemptive role in human society inasmuch as such love can undo the mischief of decline and restore the cumulative process of progress” (55).

Throughout his writings Lonergan links the structure of the human good and the structure of history. See especially, Topics in Education [CWL 10], chapter 2-4.


41 CWL 3, 267. See footnote 17 above.

42 Method, 117.

43 In his account of the general categories of “Foundations” in Method, he cites all of Insight except Chapter 19. See Method, 286-288. As an aside, an exploration of why chapter 19 was excluded might be worthwhile.
general, so that no firm barrier separates science, scientific method, and general cognitional theory.” An adequate cognitional theory is the way forward to the unification of the sciences. “It (philosophy) has further, secondary functions in distinguishing, relating, grounding the several realms of meaning and, no less, in grounding the methods of the sciences and so promoting their unification. Lonergan was generally reticent to draw out the implications of his method in theology for other sciences. However, in the Epilogue of Insight, he was quite pointed about the relevance of theology to the human sciences and of the human sciences to theology. In the last chapter on Communications in Method, he proposes an integrated study which extends functional specialization to human scholarship and the human sciences. He writes: “The possibility of each integration is a method that runs parallel to the method in theology.” Given the full reach of generalized empirical method, might not this relationship be extended to include the method in the ‘natural’ sciences? If this is so, then the method of functional specialization would provide a method for an adequately differentiated integration of all the sciences far beyond the scope of current efforts in Grand Unification Theory in Physics. In this context, might we discover some further significance to the references to implementation in the sciences found in chapters 2 and 3 of Insight?

Appendix: References to Implementation and its Variants

Using the search feature in the Kindle edition of the Collected Works edition of Insight, we found 46 occurrences of “implementation” and its variants ‘implement,’ ‘implements,’ ‘implementing’ and ‘implemented’ in the text of Insight. Of the occurrences to ‘implement’ specifically, 4

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44 Method, 248.
45 Method, 95.
46 CWL 3 766-68.
47 Method, 364.
49 The Kindle search feature has benefits for research and for indexing over even the best eye scan. Philip McShane in Lack in the Beingstalk, page 17, footnote 13 notes the three citations in the Index and finds 11 further occurrences of the term “implementation” on pages 254 [229], 259 [234], 261 [236], 263 [238], 416 [391], 517 [493], 530 [507], 544 [521], 546 [524], 708 [685], 748 [726]. We expanded the search to include variants of the term which accounts for the almost all of the additional entries. In addition, in the course of this search we uncovered a further, unnoticed, occurrence of ‘implementation’ at 729 [707]. See entry 42 below.
were the verb ‘implement’ while in 1 instance ‘implement’ was used as a noun. For the latter, see page 530 [507].

There are 2 entries in the index referring to ‘Implementation.’

(1) Under ‘Implementation: definition of metaphysics, 421; of meaning, 381.’

(2) Under ‘Metaphysics: implementation of integral heuristic structure of proportionate being), 415—21.’

The indices for both the 1970 reprint of the 1958 second edition and the 1992 Collected Works edition of Insight were identical with respect to entries on implementation. These entries cover 5 of the occurrences of ‘implementation’ and its variants, leaving the remaining 41 not referenced in the Index.

In Understanding and Being we found 5 occurrences of “implementation” and its variants. It was not referenced in the Index. There is one instance of ‘implement’ used as a noun. See entry 4 below.

The index of Method In Theology has one reference to ‘implementation’ under ‘Dialectic, implementation of D. (378),’ and that is the only occurrence of the term in the text. The reference is not found in the Collected Works edition of 2017.

What follows lists the references to implementation and its variants in Insight, Understanding and Being and Method in Theology. Our intent is to help establish the context in the text of each occurrence. Following each reference, we list the chapter and section in order to indicate the context of the reference. Occurrences of ‘implementation’ and its variants are placed in italics. The page reference at the front of each entry refers to the actual occurrence in the text. In case where the entry spans to pages, this is indicated in parentheses at the end of the entry.

A. Insight

1. CWL 3, 65 [41]

Context: Chapter 2, Section 2.5 Invariance

Hence, if physical principles and laws are independent of any movement of observers, they should be equally independent of any similar movement of reference frames. But observers may be moving with any linear or angular velocity, provided the motion is continuous and provided it involves no excursions into the imaginary sections of a manifold constructed by introducing complex numbers. It follows that physical
principles and laws should be independent of similar movements of reference frames. Accordingly, by the principle of equivalence the mathematical expression of physical principles and laws is to be expected to be invariant as long as transformation equations are continuous functions of real variables.

To implement this conclusion, which is no more than a general anticipation based on cognitional theory, two further steps are required. First, the broad invariance that we have described has to be conceived precisely. Secondly, appropriate empirical hypotheses have to be formulated and verified (64-65).

2,3. CWL 3, 66 [42]

Context: Chapter 2, Section 2.5 Invariance

A less general anticipation of invariance is contained in the basic postulate of special relativity. Already in illustrating inverse insight we have had occasion to put this postulate in the form of an explanatory syllogism, in which the major premise expressed an anticipation of invariance and the minor premise enounced the defect of intelligibility in inertial transformations. On the present analysis, then, the difference between the anticipations represented respectively by general and by special relativity is that, while both expect invariant mathematical expression to result from the abstractness of principles and laws, general relativity implements this expectation by invoking a direct insight into the significance of measurements, but special relativity implements it by invoking an inverse insight into the insignificance of constant velocity (66-67).

4. CWL 3, 107 [84]

Context Chapter 2, Section 6 The Canon of Complete Explanation

Fifthly, there is a canon of complete explanation.

The goal of empirical method is commonly stated to be the complete explanation of all phenomena or data.

In a sense, perseverance in the pursuit of this goal is assured by the canon of selection, especially when it is implemented by the canon of operations. Any particular investigator may overlook or ignore certain data. But his oversight or disregard will normally be corrected by other investigators substantiating their hypotheses and refuting those of their predecessors by appealing to hitherto neglected facts.

5. CWL 3, 111 [87]

Context: Chapter 3, Section 6 The Canon of Statistical Residues
Moreover, there does not seem to exist any universal scheme that controls the emergence and survival of the schemes that we know. Accordingly, in the last analysis we are driven to accept the second alternative. There does not exist a single ordered sequence that embraces the totality of particular cases through which abstract system might be applied to then other by law, still the laws reveal only the abstract component in concrete relations; the further concrete component, though mastered by insight into particular cases, is involved in the empirical residue from which systematizing intelligence abstracts; it does not admit general treatment along classical lines; it is a residue, left over after classical method has been applied, and it calls for the implementation of statistical method.

6. CWL 3, 240 [215]

Context: Chapter 7, Section 4 The Tension in the Community

Yet the ineluctable privacy of each one's experience provides no premise for a monadic theory of man. For the bonds of intersubjectivity make the experience of each resonate to the experience of others; and besides this elementary communion, there are operative in all a drive to understand and an insistence on behaving intelligently that generate and implement common ways, common manners, common undertakings, common commitments.

7. CWL 3, 245 [220]

Context: Chapter 7, Section 6 Individual Bias

The precise nature of egoistic interference with intellectual process calls for attention. It is not to be thought that the egoist is devoid of the disinterestedness and detachment of intelligent inquiry. More than many others, he has developed a capacity to face issues squarely and to think them through. The cool schemer, the shrewd calculator, the hardheaded self-seeker are very far from indulging in mere wishful thinking. Without the detachment of intelligence, they cannot invent and implement stratagems that work. Without the disinterestedness of intelligence, they cannot raise and meet every further question that is relevant within their restricted terms of reference. Nor can one say that egoism consists in making intelligence the instrument of more elementary desires and fears. For as long as the egoist is engaged upon his problems, the immanent norms of intelligent inquiry overrule any interference from desire or fear; and while the egoist refuses to put the still further questions that would lead to a profound modification of his solution, still that refusal does not make intelligence an instrument but merely brushes it aside.

8. CWL 3, 248 [223]

Context: Chapter 7, Section 7 Group Bias
However, this formation of social groups, specifically adapted to the smooth attainment of social ends, merely tends to replace one inertial force with another. Human sensitivity is not human intelligence, and if sensitivity can be adapted to implement easily and readily one set of intelligent dictates, it has to undergo a fresh adaptation before it will cease resisting a second set of more intelligent dictates. Now social progress is a succession of changes. Each new idea gradually modifies the social situation to call forth further new ideas and bring about still further modifications. Moreover, the new ideas are practical; they are applicable to concrete situations; they occur to those engaged in the situations to which they are to be applied.

9. CWL 3, 249 [224]

Context: Chapter 7, Section 7 Group Bias

The bias of development involves a distortion. The advantage of one group commonly is disadvantageous to another, and so some part of the energies of all groups is diverted to the supererogatory activity of devising and implementing offensive and defensive mechanisms. Groups differ in their possession of native talent, opportunities, initiative, and resources; those in favored circumstances find success the key to still further success; those unable to make operative the new ideas that are to their advantage fall behind in the process of social development. Society becomes stratified; its flower is far in advance of average attainment; its roots appear to be the survival of the rude achievement of a forgotten age. Classes become distinguished, not merely by social function, but also by social success; and the new differentiation finds expression not only in conceptual labels but also in deep feelings of frustration, resentment, bitterness, and hatred.

10,11,12. CWL 3, 254 [229]

Context: Chapter 7, Section 8.2 Implications of Longer Cycle

Finally, at each stage of the process, the general bias of common sense involves the disregard of timely and fruitful ideas; and this disregard not only excludes their implementation but also deprives subsequent stages both of the further ideas to which they would give rise and of the correction that they and their retinue would bring to the ideas that are implemented. Such is the basic scheme, and it has three consequences.

In the first place, the social situation deteriorates cumulatively. For just as progress consists in a realization of some ideas that leads to the realization of others until a whole coherent set is concretely operative, so the repeated exclusion of timely and fruitful ideas involves a cumulative departure from coherence. The objective social situation possesses the intelligibility put into it by those that brought it about. But what is put in, less and less is some part of a coherent whole that will ask for its
completion, and more and more it is some arbitrary fragment that can be rounded off only by giving up the attempt to complete the other arbitrary fragments that have preceded or will follow it. In this fashion social functions and enterprises begin to conflict; some atrophy and others grow like tumors; the objective situation becomes penetrated with anomalies; it loses its power to suggest new ideas and, once they are implemented, to respond with still further and better suggestions. The dynamic of progress is replaced by sluggishness and then by stagnation. In the limit, the only discernible intelligibility in the objective facts is an equilibrium of economic pressures and a balance of national powers.

13. CWL 3, 259 [234]

Context: Chapter 7, Section 8.4 Reversal of Longer Cycle

In the first place, there is such a thing as progress, and its principle is liberty. There is progress, because practical intelligence grasps ideas in data, guides activity by the ideas, and reaches fuller and more accurate ideas through the situations produced by the activity. The principle of progress is liberty, for the ideas occur to the man on the spot, their only satisfactory expression is their implementation, their only adequate correction is the emergence of further insights; on the other hand, one might as well declare openly that all new ideas are taboo, as require that they be examined, evaluated, and approved by some hierarchy of officials and bureaucrats; for members of this hierarchy possess authority and power in inverse ratio to their familiarity with the concrete situations in which the new ideas emerge; they never know whether or not the new idea will work; much less can they divine how it might be corrected or developed; and since the one thing they dread is making a mistake, they devote their energies to paper work and postpone decisions.

14, 15. CWL 3, 261 [236]

Context: Chapter 7, Section 8.4 Reversal of the Longer Cycle

Secondly, as there are sciences of nature, so also there is a science of man. As the sciences of nature are empirical, so also the science of man is empirical; for science is the resultant of an accumulation of related insights, and scientific insights grasp ideas that are immanent not in what is imagined but in what is given. If the sciences of nature can be led astray by the blunder that the objective is, not the verified, but the ‘out there,’ so also can the human sciences; but while this blunder in physics yields no more than the ineptitude of Galileo’s primary qualities and Newton’s true motion, it leads zealous practitioners of scientific method in the human field to rule out of court a major portion of the data and so deny the empirical principle. Durkheimian sociology and behaviorist psychology may have excuses for barring the data of consciousness, for
there exist notable difficulties in determining such data; but the business of the scientist is not to allege difficulties as excuses but to overcome them, and neither objectivity in the sense of verification nor the principle of empiricism can be advanced as reasons for ignoring the data of consciousness. Further, as mathematics has to deal not only with direct intelligibilities but also with such inverse instances as primes, surds, imaginaries, continua, and infinities, as the physicist has to employ not only the classical procedures and techniques that deal with the systematic but also the statistical procedures and techniques that take into account the nonsystematic, so also human science has to be critical. It can afford to drop the nineteenth-century scientific outlook of mechanist determinism in favor of an emergent probability. It can profit by the distinction between the intelligible emergent probability of prehuman process and the intelligent emergent probability that arises in the measure that man succeeds in understanding himself and in implementing that understanding. Finally, it can be of inestimable value in aiding man to understand himself and in guiding him in the implementation of that understanding, if, and only if, it can learn to distinguish between progress and decline, between the liberty that generates progress and the bias that generates decline. In other words, human science cannot be merely empirical; it has to be critical; to reach a critical standpoint, it has to be normative. This is a tall order for human science as hitherto it has existed. But people looking for easy tasks had best renounce any ambition to be scientists; and if mathematicians and physicists can surmount their surds, the human scientist can learn to master his (260-61).

16, 17 CWL 3, 263 [238]

Context: Chapter 7, Section 8.5 Context Culture and Reversal

Marx looked forward to a classless society and to the withering of the state. But as long as there will be practical intelligence, there will be technology and capital, economy and polity. There will be a division of labor and a differentiation of functions. There will be the adaptation of human intersubjectivity to that division and differentiation. There will be common decisions to be reached and to be implemented. Practical intelligence necessitates classes and states, and no dialectic can promise their permanent disappearance. What is both unnecessary and disastrous is the exaltation of the practical, the supremacy of the state, the cult of the class. What is necessary is a cosmopolis that is neither class nor state, that stands above all their claims, that cuts them down to size, that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence, that commands man's first allegiance, that implements itself primarily through that allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored

18. CWL 3, 291 [266]
Already we have noted the aesthetic liberation of human experience from the confinement of the biological pattern and the further practical liberation of human living that is brought about inasmuch as man grasps possible schemes of recurrence and fulfils by his own action the conditions for their realization. Now we must proceed to the root of these liberations. They rest on two facts. On the one hand, inquiry and insight are not so much a higher system as a perennial source of higher systems, so that human living has its basic task in reflecting on systems and judging them, deliberating on their implementation and choosing between possibilities. On the other hand, there can be in man a perennial source of higher systems because the materials of such systematization are not built into his constitution. For an animal to begin a new mode of living, there would be needed not only a new sensibility but also a new organism. An animal species is a solution to the problem of living, so that a new solution would be a new species; for an animal to begin to live in quite a new fashion, there would be required not only a modification of its sensibility but also a modification of the organism that the sensibility systematizes. But in man a new department of mathematics, a new viewpoint in science, a new civilization, a new philosophy has its basis, not in a new sensibility but simply in a new manner of attending to data and of forming combinations of combinations of combinations of data. Seeing and hearing, tasting and smelling, imagining and feeling are events with a corresponding neural basis; but inquiring and understanding have their basis, not in a neural structure, but in a structure of psychic contents. Sensation supposes sense organs; but understanding is not another type of sensation with another sense organ; it operates with respect to the content of sensation and imagination; it represents a still further degree of freedom. A multicellular formation is an immanently directed aggregation of aggregates of aggregates of aggregates. Sensibility is a higher system of otherwise coincidental events in the immanently directed aggregation. Intelligence is the source of a sequence of systems that unify and relate otherwise coincidental aggregates of sensible contents. Just as the famous experiments on sea urchins reveal the immanent direction of the aggregation of aggregates of aggregates of aggregates, so the constructive and repressive censorship exercised preconsciously by intelligence reveals a still higher immanent direction that controls the sensible and imaginative contents that are to emerge into consciousness.

19. CWL 3, 381[357]

Acts of meaning are of three kinds. They are (1) formal, (2) full, (3) instrumental. The formal act of meaning is an act of conceiving, thinking, considering, defining, supposing, formulating. The full act of
meaning is an act of judging. The instrumental act of meaning is the *implementation* of a formal or of a full act by the use of words or symbols in a spoken, written, or merely imagined utterance.

20. *CWL* 3, 416 [391] 
**Context:** Chapter 14, Section 2, A Definition of Metaphysics  
Now let us say that explicit metaphysics is the conception, affirmation, and *implementation* of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. The meaning and implications of this statement have now to be explored.

21. *CWL* 3 417 [392] 
**Context:** Chapter 14, Section 2, A Definition of Metaphysics  
Secondly, if the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being were conceived, affirmed, and *implemented*, then latent metaphysics would become explicit. For latent metaphysics is the dynamic unity of empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness as underlying, penetrating, transforming, and unifying the other departments of knowledge. But an integral heuristic structure of proportionate being would perform these offices in an explicit manner. As heuristic, it would underlie other knowledge. As the questions which other knowledge answers, it would penetrate other fields. As dialectical, it would transform these answers. As integral, it would contain in itself the order that binds other departments into a single intelligible whole.

22, 23. *CWL* 3 421 [396] 
**Context:** Chapter 14, Section 3 Method in Metaphysics  
Perhaps enough has been said to clarify what we mean by metaphysics. The detached and disinterested desire to know and its unfolding in inquiry and reflection not only constitute a notion of being but also impose a normative structure upon man's cognitional acts. Such a structure provides the relations by which unknown contents of the acts can be defined heuristically. This heuristic structure is immanent and operative in all human knowing, but initially it is latent, and the polymorphism of human consciousness makes it problematic as well. Nonetheless, it can be conceived, affirmed, and *implemented*, and from that *implementation* there follow a transformation and an integration of the sciences and of the myriad instances of common sense. But knowing is knowing being. So the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, as determined by the sciences and common sense, is knowledge of the organizing structure of proportionate being. As has been said, such
a metaphysics is progressive, nuanced, factual, formally dependent on cognitional theory and materially dependent on the sciences and on common sense, stable, and in its outlook explanatory.

24. CWL 3, 445 [420]

Context: Chapter 14, Section 4.4 Commonsense Eclecticism

Fifthly, commonsense eclecticism cannot be critical. Not only is common sense a variable but also it is subject to a dramatic, an egoistic, a group, and a general bias. Once the aim of philosophy is brushed aside, once the resources of its natural growth are ignored, once a vain program of incompetent judgment is established, not only common sense but also its bias are in charge, and they are there to stay. Distinct philosophies emerge for the changing tastes and fashions of racial, economic, regional, national, cultural, religious, and antireligious groups and even subgroups. Spice and originality are added by the special brands of common sense peculiar to psychoneurotics, assertive egoists, and aspiring romanticists. And if human society tires of muddling through one crisis into another, then there arises the temptation that the only means to attain an effective community of norms and directives is to put the educational system, the press, the stage, the radio, and the churches under the supervision of a paternal government, to call upon social engineers to channel thought and condition feeling, and to hold in reserve the implements that discipline refractory minds and tongues. For common sense eclecticism is incapable of criticizing common sense. It is not by discouraging theoretical understanding that the polymorphism of human consciousness can be grasped, and it is not by appealing to what common sense finds obvious that the correct meaning of such terms as reality, knowledge, and objectivity is to be reached.

25. CWL 3, 517 [493]:

Context: Chapter 16, Section 2 Relations

Accordingly, our first problem seems solved. Because we conceived metaphysics as the implementation of integral heuristic structure, we had to affirm that it regarded proportionate being as explained, and so we had also to affirm that real relations are relations that would still be affirmed in a definitive explanatory account of this universe. By distinguishing in concrete relations between their primary relativity and their secondary determinations, it was possible to locate the relative component of the concrete relation entirely within the list of metaphysical elements. Scientific laws and systems are successive approximations to the relations between conjugate forms. Scientific probabilities are approximations to the relations between forms and acts of existence and occurrence. Finally, the emergent processes investigated
by genetic and dialectical method contain the relations of successive levels of conjugate forms and the sequences of relations between successive stages in the development of conjugate forms.

26. CWL 3, 530 [507]

Context: Chapter 16, Section 3.4 The Significance of Metaphysical Equivalence

The significance of metaphysical equivalence is twofold. On the one hand, it provides a critical technique for the precise control of meaning. On the other hand, it is an implement for the development of metaphysics.

28. CWL 3, 544 [521]

Context: Chapter 16, Section 5 Metaphysics as Science

Our study of human intelligence revealed the necessity of distinguishing sharply between ordinary concepts, that express and result from insights, and the notion of being, that has to have quite a different origin and ground. For if the notion of being expressed and resulted from an insight, that insight would have to be an understanding not merely of the whole of the actual universe but also of the total range of possible universes. Such an understanding would be identical with Aquinas's actus totius entis, that is, with God. Since man possesses a notion of being yet obviously fails to satisfy Aquinas's concept of God, man's notion cannot result from an act of understanding. Accordingly, we were led to the discovery that the notion of being has its origin and ground in an anticipative desire to understand, in a capacity to inquire and reflect. Further, we were led to conceive metaphysics, which traditionally is the science of being, as an implementation of the integral heuristic structure of the realm of being that coincides with the field of possible experience. From this conception of metaphysics there followed a formulation of a method of metaphysics, and to test this method we have devoted two chapters to the elements of metaphysics and to metaphysics as science.

29. CWL 3, 547 [524].

Context: Chapter 16, section 5 Metaphysics as Science

No doubt, every reader will have his further questions, for our excursion into metaphysics has aimed solely at illustrating and testing the concrete possibility of a method. For that reason, it would be missing the point entirely to put the further questions to me instead of endeavoring to work out the answers oneself. My purpose has been to reveal the nature of insight as knowledge by showing in a concrete fashion that metaphysics
can be a science with a sharply defined objective, with strictly imposed limits, and with a criterion that is effective in excluding mere disputation. But the clear-cut proof of possibility is the fact. Accordingly, I have not been content to define metaphysics as the conception and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of our knowing in an endeavor to ground, penetrate, transform, and unify the scattered knowledge of common sense and the sciences. I also have tried to indicate just how that integral heuristic structure could be reached and applied to the task in hand. I have not been content to limit metaphysics to the structure of proportionate being as explained, but repeatedly I have illustrated the meaning and the implications of that limitation. I have not been content to show that the discoveries of human intelligence may be formulated as positions or as counterpositions, but also I have illustrated how that cardinal principle of critical dialectic cuts like a knife through disputes on the nature of the real, of the objective, of development, of distinctions, of relations, of the metaphysical elements, of matter and spirit.

30. CWL 3, 565 [541]

Context: Chapter 16, Section 1.3 Mythic Consciousness

If one cannot claim that the explanatory viewpoint is established in the human sciences, if there is a note of optimism in the assertion that its position is secure in the natural sciences, then the incompleteness of our own victory over subjective and anthropomorphic projections should make us understand how rife, almost how inevitable, those fallacies were before science and philosophy existed as distinct forms to give a concrete meaning to the explanatory viewpoint. If counterpositions today lead men to refuse to distinguish sharply between experience and insight, between their own insights and those of others, at least there should be no difficulty in reaching another basic feature of primitive mentality. For the primitive not only lacks examples of successful implementation of the explanatory viewpoint but also lacks the techniques of mastery and control that the study of grammar imparts to the use of words, the study of rhetoric to the use of metaphor, the study of logic to the communication of thought. The primitive cannot begin to distinguish accurately between what he knows by experience and what he knows inasmuch as he understands. His understanding of nature is bound to be anthropomorphic, and his understanding of man is fettered by his inability to conceive other men with a mentality different from his own (564-65).

31. CWL 3, 601 [579]

Context: Chapter 17, Section 3.5 Interpretation and Method
However, one may grant readily enough that meanings form a genetically and dialectically related sequence of unknowns and that expressions develop from the undifferentiated to the specialized. The two basic assertions are sound, but where do they lead? Though the actual *implementation* of a method cannot be tucked into the corner of a chapter on a more general topic, still some sketch seems desirable. To meet this reasonable demand, let us first envisage in summary fashion the ultimate results that may be anticipated, let us secondly confront the counterpositions that distort interpretation, and thirdly let us endeavor to indicate the canons of a methodical hermeneutics on the analogy of the canons of empirical method in such a science as physics.

32, 33. *CWL* 3, 606 [583]

Context: Chapter 17, section 3.7 Counterpositions

Fourthly, commonly it is contended that an author has to be interpreted in his own terms. Plato is to be interpreted by Plato, Aquinas by Aquinas, Kant by Kant. This common contention possesses three indisputable excellences. In the first place, it *implies* the lexicographical principle that the meanings of words emerge from the sentences in which they occur, so that the meaning of an author's words has to be settled by appealing, at least proximately, to his own usage. In the second place, it *implies* the epistemological principle that an explanation forms a closed system; if one understands, then the content of one's understanding can be formulated only through a set of mutually determining and determined terms and relations; accordingly, if one understands Plato or Aquinas or Kant or anyone else, then the formulation of one's understanding will be some closed system, and both the elements of the system and the relations between the elements can be found in the original author's own statements. In the third place, the rule that an author must be allowed to speak for himself tends to exclude the intrusion of another's mentality into his meaning. Inasmuch as the author's usage determines his meanings, other meanings are excluded; and inasmuch as the author's system determines the relations between his meanings, other systems are excluded.

34, 35. *CWL* 3, 618 [595]

Context: Chapter 17, The Possibility of Ethics

Metaphysics was conceived as the *implementation* of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. The fundamental question of the present chapter is whether ethics can be conceived in the same fashion. Our answer, which prolongs the discussion of questions raised in the chapters on common sense and in the study of human development, meets the issue in three steps.

36. *CWL* 3, 628 [605]
Context: Chapter 17, Section 1.5 The Ontology of the Good

The justification of this generalization of the notion of the good is that it is already implicit in the narrower notion. Objects of desire are manifold, but they are not an isolated manifold. They are existents and events that in their concrete possibility and in their realization are bound inextricably through natural laws and actual frequencies with the total manifold of the universe of proportionate being. If objects of desire are instances of the good because of the satisfactions they yield, then the rest of the manifold of existents and events also are a good, because desires are satisfied not in some dreamland but only in the concrete universe. Again, the intelligible orders that are invented, implemented, adjusted, and improved by men are but further exploitations of prehuman intelligible orders; moreover, they fall within the universal order of generalized emergent probability, both as consequents of its fertility and as ruled by its more inclusive sweep. If the intelligible orders of human invention are a good because they systematically assure the satisfaction of desires, then so also are the intelligible orders that underlie, condition, precede, and include man's invention. Finally, intelligible orders and their contents, as possible objects of rational choice, are values; but the universal order which is generalized emergent probability conditions and penetrates, corrects and develops every particular order; and rational self-consciousness cannot consistently choose the conditioned and reject the condition, choose the part and reject the whole, choose the consequent and reject the antecedent. Accordingly, since man is involved in choosing, and since every consistent choice, at least implicitly, is a choice of universal order, the realization of universal order is a true value.

37. CWL 3, 652 [629]

Context: Chapter 17, Section 1.5 Moral Impotence

Clearly, both the outward conditions and the inner mentality prevalent in social decline intensify to the point of desperation the tension, inherent in all development but conscious in man, between limitation and transcendence. One can agree with Christian praise of charity, with Kant's affirmation that the unqualified good is the good will, with existentialist exhortations to genuineness. But good will is never better than the intelligence and reasonableness that it implements. Indeed, when proposals and programs only putatively are intelligent and reasonable, then the good will that executes them so faithfully and energetically is engaged really in the systematic imposition of ever further evils on the already weary shoulders of mankind. And who will tell which proposals and programs truly are intelligent and reasonable, and which are not? For the only transition from the analytic proposition to the analytic principle is through concrete judgments of fact, and alas, the facts are ambivalent. The objective situation is all fact, but partly it is the product of
intelligence and reasonableness, and partly it is the product of aberration from them. The whole of man is all fact, but it also is malleable, polymorphic fact. No doubt, a subtle and protracted analysis can bring to light the components in that polymorphic fact and proceed to a dialectical criticism of any proposal or program. But to whom does it bring the light? To how many? How clearly and how effectively? Are philosophers to be kings or kings to learn philosophy? Are they to rule in the name of wisdom subjects judged incapable of wisdom? Are all the members of our democracies to be philosophers? Is there to be a provisional dictatorship while they are learning philosophy (652-53)?

38. CWL 3, 655 [632]

Context: Chapter 17, Section 3.5, The Problem of Liberation

The problem is real. In the present work it has been reached in the compendious fashion that operates through the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being and the consequent ethics. But the expeditiousness of the procedure must not be allowed to engender the mistake that the problem resides in some theoretical realm. On the contrary, its dimensions are the dimensions of human history, and the fourth, fifth, and sixth volumes of Arnold Toynbee's Study of History illustrate abundantly and rather relevantly the failure of self-determination, the schism in the body social, and the schism in the soul that follow from an incapacity for sustained development.

The solution has to be a still higher integration of human living. For the problem is radical and permanent; it is independent of the underlying physical, chemical, organic, and psychic manifolds; it is not met by revolutionary change, nor by human discovery, nor by the enforced implementation of discovery; it is as large as human living and human history. Further, the solution has to take people just as they are. If it is to be a solution and not a mere suppression of the problem, it has to acknowledge and respect and work through man's intelligence and reasonableness and freedom. It may eliminate neither development nor tension yet it must be able to replace incapacity by capacity for sustained development. Only a still higher integration can meet such requirements. For only a higher integration leaves underlying manifolds with their autonomy yet succeeds in introducing a higher systematization into their nonsystematic coincidences. And only a still higher integration than any that so far has been considered can deal with the dialectical manifold immanent in human subjects and the human situation.

39. CWL 3, 659 [634]

Context: Chapter 19, General Transcendent Knowledge

If there is or if there is to be a higher integration of human living, then it will be known only through a knowledge that goes beyond the various
types that hitherto have engaged our attention. But if the new knowledge is to be continuous with the old, then it will conform to the basic characteristics with which we have become familiar.

Perhaps the most fundamental of these characteristics appears in the distinction between a heuristic structure and its determination. The simple fact that man knows through intelligent inquiry and rational reflection enables him to determine in advance certain general attributes of the object under investigation. So the methods of the empirical sciences rest on the anticipation of systems of laws, of ideal frequencies, of genetic operators, of dialectical tensions. So the metaphysics of proportionate being has been conceived as an implementation of the integrated heuristic structures of empirical science. So the present chapter on general transcendent knowledge is concerned to determine what we can and do know about transcendent being prior to the attainment of an act of understanding that grasps what any transcendent being is. To employ the terms that will be more familiar to many, the present chapter is concerned with the knowledge of God that, according to St Thomas Aquinas, consists in knowing that he is but not what he is.

40. CWL 3, 707 [684]

Context: Chapter 19, Section 11 Comparisons and Contrasts

The good is the intelligible, and so the primary being also is the primary good. As intelligibility without intelligence would be defective, so also would truth without affirming, or the good without loving; but God is without defect, not because the act of understanding is complemented by further acts, but by a single act that at once is understanding and intelligible, truth and affirming, goodness and loving, being and omnipotence.

Our subject has been understanding in its genesis. It arises in intelligent and rational consciousness, but before it arises it is anticipated, and that anticipation is the spontaneous ground that, when reflectively enucleated, becomes the methods of science and the integral heuristic structure implemented in the metaphysics of proportionate being. But the fundamental anticipation is the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to understand correctly; the fundamental assumption is that the real is coincident with the grounded intelligibility to be known by correct understanding; the fundamental reflective enucleation of all intelligent and rational anticipation and assumption is to conceive the idea of being, and thereby the notion of God, and to affirm that the real is being, and thereby to affirm the reality of God.

41. CWL 3, 708 [685]

Context: Chapter 20, Section 11 Comparisons and Contrasts
What, then, is critical method? It is method with respect to the ultimate, method applied to the most basic issues. Now it has been seen that the method of the empirical sciences rests on the heuristic structure of man's desire and capacity to understand data correctly. In similar fashion the method of metaphysics consisted in integrating and implementing classical and statistical, genetic and dialectical methods. Critical method differs from other methods only in its subject matter. As they, so it takes its stand on the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to understand correctly. As they, so it grasps and affirms an object correlative to the desire. As they, so it insists both that general statements can be made about the object before it actually is understood and that such statements, though valid and true and useful, fall far short of what is to be known if understanding is attained. In brief, critical method neither is nor can be the bland procedure of consigning transcendental issues to oblivion. Just as scientific method does not repudiate the notion of nature but makes it explicit and precise as the indeterminate function to be determined, as the ideal frequency from which actual frequencies cannot diverge systematically, as the genetic operator, as the dialectical tension and opposition between the pure desire and human sensitivity, so critical method does not repudiate the notion of God but formulates it as the unrestricted act of understanding and works out its general attributes. Just as scientific method does not confuse knowledge of method with its fruits, so critical method does not confuse our formulation of unrestricted understanding with a claim that we understand everything about everything. Just as the scientist is ready to abandon every scientific hypothesis and theory without losing confidence in the correctness of scientific method, so the metaphysician affirms the reality of what the scientist seeks to know, and the critical thinker does not allow developments in the notion of God to generate any doubt that it is one and the same being to which all men refer whether they are more or less successful in conceiving him, whether correctly they affirm his existence or mistakenly they deny it.

42 CWL 3, 729 [707]

Context: Chapter 20, Section 4.2 The Analysis of Belief

The proximate and concrete part of the theorem is involved in a question of fact. There can and to some extent there does exist a collaboration of men in the advancement and the dissemination of knowledge. On that collaboration there rest the invention and development of languages, the erection of schools and universities, the use of scientific methods and the publication of scientific journals, our domestic, economic, and political institutions, and the whole network of communications of the civilized world with their implicit, and often explicit, reprobation of perjury, deceit, and propaganda. Now insofar as this collaboration is conducted properly, there is an implementation of the essential detachability and
communicability of truth. To a common fund each may contribute inasmuch as he grasps the virtually unconditioned; to that common fund each does contribute inasmuch as he expresses exactly the unconditioned that he grasps; and from the common fund each may make his own appropriations inasmuch as intelligently and critically he believes the truths which others have grasped.

43. CWL 3, 743 [722]

Context: Chapter 20, Section 5 Resumption of the Heuristic Structure of the Solution

In the twenty-fifth place, as the problem of evil exists because God respects man's freedom, so the existence of the solution leaves human freedom intact. Accordingly, one is to expect not only that man's collaboration in the solution will be marked by deficiencies and failures but also that these indications of aberration will be marked by their human origin. The scotosis of the dramatic subject will betray itself both by excessively spiritual pretensions and by excessive interest in the sensible. Individual bias will forget that man's basic role in the collaboration is faith and that the contributions he can make are limited to grasping and clarifying and expressing the significance, the implications, and the applications of the truths of faith. Group bias will replace a single, universally accessible solution by a multiplicity of solutions for different classes and different nations. General bias will introduce the counter-positions. For in virtue of its failure to grasp that the real is being and that being is known by a rationally uttered yes, it will account the truths of faith to be mere words or mere symbols, and it will insist that man contacts reality only on the level of the experience that is prior to all questions and all answers. In turn, once the counterpositions become operative, whether fully as in modernism or in some mitigated form, the new and higher collaboration of men under God is stripped of its meaning; its implementing procedures and institutions are denied validity and competence; and the hope and charity that would reinforce man's pure desire and transform his willingness are left without the motivation and guidance of an intelligently formulated and reasonably accepted faith (741-42).

44. CWL 3, 744 [723]

Context: Chapter 20, Section 5 Resumption of the Heuristic Structure of the Solution

In the twenty-seventh place, though the solution as a higher integration will be implemented principally in man's intellect and will through conjugate forms of faith and hope and charity, it must also penetrate to the sensitive level and envelop it. For, in the main, human consciousness flows in some blend of the dramatic and practical patterns of experience,
and as the solution harmoniously continues the actual order of the universe, it can be successful only if it captures man's sensitivity and intersubjectivity. Moreover, as has been seen, all exercise of human intelligence presupposes a suitable flow of sensitive and imaginative presentations, and again, inasmuch as intelligence and reasonableness and will issue into human words matched with deeds, they need at their disposal images so charged with affects that they succeed both in guiding and in propelling action. Again, besides the image that is a sign of intelligible and rational contents and the image that is a psychic force, there is the image that symbolizes man's orientation into the known unknown; and since faith gives more truth than understanding comprehends, since hope reinforces the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know, man's sensitivity needs symbols that unlock its transforming dynamism and bring it into harmony with the vast but impalpable pressures of the pure desire, of hope, and of self-sacrificing charity.

45. CWL 3, 748 [726]:

Context: Chapter 20, Section 5 Resumption of the Heuristic Structure of the Solution

For the supernatural solution not only meets a human need but also goes beyond it to transform it into the point of insertion into human life of truths beyond human comprehension, of values beyond human estimation, of an alliance and a love that, so to speak, brings God too close to man. No doubt, once man was established within the supernatural solution, all would be well. For such a solution would be a higher integration; of its very nature it would respect and indeed foster the proper unfolding of all human capacities; and just as the organism attains the height of its complexity and versatility under the higher integration of animal consciousness, just as the psyche reaches the wealth and fulness of its apprehensions and responses under the higher integration of human intelligence, so also would human excellence enjoy a vast expansion of its effective potentialities under the higher integration of the supernatural solution. Still, generalities can be very misleading. It is not to be forgotten that the solution is a harmonious continuation of the present order of the universe, that it is constituted through conjugate forms that develop, and that its realization and development occur through acts of human acknowledgment and consent that accord with probability schedules. The assent of faith is the starting point for an ever fuller understanding of its meaning, its implications, and its applications. The antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset every interference either with intellect's unrestricted finality or with its essential detachment and disinterestedness. The antecedent willingness of charity has to mount
from an affective to an effective determination to discover and to implement in all things the intelligibility of universal order that is God's concept and choice. Accordingly, even in those in whom the solution is realized, there are endless gradations in the measure in which it is realized, and by a necessary consequence there are endless degrees in which those that profess to know and embrace the solution can fail to bring forth the fruits it promises in their individual lives and in the human situations of which those lives are part (747-48).

46. CWL 3, 757 [735]

Context: Epilogue

Again, I do not believe that an answer to the question [of a complete account of whatever else is] is independent of the precise manner in which metaphysics happens to be conceived. But I would contend that the conception of metaphysics that has been implemented in the present work yields unique results. For potency, form, and act have been defined, not solely by their relations to one another, but also by their relations to human knowing. The argument is that (1) if a man is in the intellectual pattern of experience, and (2) if he is knowing an object within the domain of proportionate being, then his knowing will consist in experiencing, understanding, and judging, and the known will be a compound of potency, form, and act, where potency, form, and act are related as the experienced, the understood, and the affirmed, and where they possess no meaning other than what has to be presupposed if there is inquiry, what is known inasmuch as there is understanding, and what is known inasmuch as judgment results from a grasp of the virtually unconditioned. The only manner in which this basic theorem could be modified would be to modify its factual supposition that knowing consists in experiencing, understanding, and judging; and it has been argued that that fact is not open to revision in any concrete meaning of the term 'revision.' For any human reviser would appeal to experience, understanding, and judgment; and there is no use arguing that men might be other than they are, because it is equally true that the universe might be other than it is, and the issue lies, not in the possibility of a different metaphysics in a different universe, but in the possibility of a different metaphysics in this universe (757-58).

B. Understanding and Being

1. CWL 5, 11

Lecture 1, Section 1.2.2 In Philosophy

Our first point was that seeking knowledge is seeking an unknown, and this implies an ideal, a set of tendencies. But this ideal is not explicit; it becomes explicit in the process of seeking knowledge. That becoming explicit involves a change in the ideal. In Newton science achieves law
and system, and that ideal is pursued up to Einstein. But there follows a phase in which what is sought is not law and system but states and probabilities. Similarly and concomitantly, science starts off with an ideal in terms of things and causes, and moves to a practice that is a matter of analysis and synthesis.

The question arises, What is going to happen next? Scientists have moved from law and system to states and probabilities. Is there going to be another change, and if so what will it be? They have moved from things and causes to analysis and synthesis. Will there be another change, and if so what will that be? Above all, what on earth can the philosopher be aiming at? If he is seeking knowledge, he is seeking the implementation of some ideal. What can that ideal be?

2. CWL 5, 195

Context: Lecture 8, Section 6 Explicit Metaphysics

Metaphysics becomes explicit insofar as the implications of the pure desire to know and its unfolding are worked out with regard to the structure of reality and the unification of knowledge. So we come to our definition: explicit metaphysics is the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being. What does this mean?

3. CWL 5, 198

Context: Lecture 8, Section 7 Metaphysics and Explanatory Knowledge

Now in Insight the various properties of metaphysics are worked out in some detail. I will mention just one which is of fundamental moment for scholastics. If your metaphysics is an implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being, then you are concerned with anticipating the structure of your knowledge when it is at the stage of completion.

4. CWL 5, 218

Context Lecture 9, Section 2.2 Mystery and Myth

The image has a logic of its own. It is not subject to any law of univocity. Words have to have one meaning or a limited series of meanings; if it is not sufficiently clear which meaning one is employing, words become useless. But the image is not tied down to one meaning. It can have a different meaning today from its meaning yesterday. It can have different meanings for different people. It can become enriched in meaning as a person develops. The significance of the religious image, the death and resurrection of Christ, is a significance that can develop with the whole religious development of the person; it can be
apprehended by the child, and it can be enriched in meaning with the
developed and cultured adult understanding of human life. The image
can carry all levels of understanding, from the most incomplete to the
highest and most complete. Again, because of that multiplicity of
interpretations, the image is not under the law of contradiction. It can
mean different things at different times. It is an implement of developing
understanding, rationality, and virtue. On the other hand, the image can
also be a block; it can also function as myth. Living on the level of the
image can be a closing off against the development of intelligence and
rationality and virtue. Considered from this viewpoint, it is significant
that Platonism involves a critique of the gods, a critique of common
notions, a critique of Homer (217-18).

5. CWL 5, 236

Context: Lecture 10, Section 7.7 The Course of Human History

That first approximation [to the course of human history] provides, as it
were, a first differential equation on development. How does
development occur? Situations give rise to insights, policies, consent,
and courses of action, and consent can be implemented in a variety of
ways: people may form a small group, an association for a specific end,
or a state, or the United Nations.

6. CWL 5, 380

Context: Discussion 5

There is a third level, the level of choice. People write a Utopia. They
desire things to be ordered in an entirely different way. And if you try to
implement a Utopia at once, well, you would be destroying the whole
good of order that exists, and it would be a long time before you would
have another. But there is always the question, Is the order we have
disrupting? And it is always disrupting to some extent. Can it be
improved? It always can be improved to some extent. And there, there
arises the question of value. The whole order as it exists is a value, that
is, something that can meet with rational approbation, something on the
level of judgment. And the effective approbation is the act of will. Just
as on the side of knowing you have experience, understanding, and
judging, so with regard to the good you have the multiple good through
objects of desire, you have the good of order in which these emerge, and
you have good in the sense of value, which is the object of the practical
judgment 'This is worthwhile' and the subsequent choice.

Note: While the term ‘implementation’ does not occur, we would add
that pages 188 to 199 of the text are particularly relevant to a discussion
of Lonergan’s developing understanding of the meaning of
implementation in metaphysics.
C. Method in Theology, 251

1.2 Context: Chapter 10: Dialectic, Section 4 Dialectic: The Problem

Accordingly, let us see what happens, first, when the dialectic is implemented by a person that has undergone intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and, secondly, when it is implemented by a person that has not yet undergone intellectual or moral or religious conversion.

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