LonerGAN AND THE MEaning OF 'WorD'

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PART 1 – PERSONAL CONTEXT

The editor’s suggestion to put my attempt at functional interpretation into three sections is helpful. It would seem to parallel Lonergan’s thinking in Insight: one should seek to get beyond voraussetzunglos (CWL 3, 600). We are all, of course, with presuppositions: the challenge is to make them explicit to oneself and others. Professor Shute draws attention, in this context, to page 250 of Method in Theology. Because the task of becoming explicit about one’s presuppositions would seem to belong per se to the functional specialty “Dialectic,” this section will then appear to be more of an informal venture into that zone, a matter of positioning “being brought out into the open” (Method 250) in a casual manner. But clearly the editor’s suggestion is far from casual: he wishes to fulfill a function of dialectic. Therefore, the intention in the first section is to “provide the open-minded, the serious, the sincere with the occasion to ask themselves some basic questions, first, about others, but eventually, about themselves. It will make conversion a topic” (Method 253). So, to begin, I find myself informally in the centre of that demanding page 250 of Method in Theology.

Am I converted in any of the senses that Lonergan writes about? I think I can claim a level of aesthetic conversion, one that is being constantly refined but goes back to my days of being engrossed both in literary studies and in a brief career as an actor drawn to the rich language of Shakespeare. Likewise, there is a touch of scholarly conversion, a displacement I
would characterize as a solitary contemplative journey that has somehow meshed with my otherwise pretty-ordinary moral conversion. Religious conversion? I am convinced of the “friendly universe,” and despite my “quasi-Catholic sentiment,” I am suspicious about where Christianity went after the Ascension. Nevertheless, specifics of the preceding conversions are not immediately central to my present task. What seem key to my task are three mountainous conversions, “Butterfield,” “Hodic,” and “Intellectual.”

First, “Butterfield conversion” is my own quaint name for what might properly be called “theoretic conversion.” For me, it means taking the “what-question” seriously in the manner of a personal scientific revolution. This is a shocking displacement, especially for me, having been brought up in a literary tradition that dodges scientific thinking. I have struggled towards it for decades, particularly in the context of Lonergan’s economics, coupled with elementary ventures into the areas of mathematics and physics.

Secondly, “Hodic conversion,” named by McShane, is a conversion to functional specialization. Like the other zones of displacement, I have no doubt that, at an elementary level, the

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1 On reflection, and in the context of my own random existential journey, the pattern of my life has been dominated by a bent for contemplation, the focus of which has been slow to evolve, the process of which has coincided with the Chestertonian precept: “If it’s worth doing, it’s worth doing badly.” It began in 1973 with an introduction to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and Plato’s *Dialogues*. From there I was driven by the “what” question: “What is wisdom?” and existentially, “What is it TO BE wise?” With the introduction to Butterfield and Lonergan in 1977, my appreciation of the “what-question” evolved to taking it seriously enough to adopt the role of Socratic “devil’s advocate,” in a way that also meshed with a sense of the need for a shift in focus in language studies to procedure. Later, the struggle to get beyond the pejorative meaning of “introspection” brought me to within an elementary range of fantasizing on language, bringing about the move towards a two-pronged thesis in 2001. See footnote 7.

2 My religious sentiment has always been grounded by Julian of Norwich’s epigram, “All thing is well. All manner of thing is well.”

3 This allusion to Butterfield’s research on the discovery and significance of theoretical understanding, as well as to his criticism of “extra-scientific” opinion, reinforces the need to take a Socratic stand in language studies. See Herbert Butterfield, *The Origin of Modern Science* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1968).
need for this conversion must be acknowledged in the branch of language study known as English literature, if one is to be serious as an undergraduate. The study by Wellek and Warren cries out for the development of an adequate investigative structure. Unfortunately, the field of literary study, however refined and sophisticated it may appear to be on the surface, seems to have muddled along from one fashionable movement to another, only to end up with a movement that would end all movements, namely, “post-modernism.” But, if it is to have any identity, must it not be a movement?  

Thirdly, there is “intellectual conversion,” and it has been, to say the least, a more-than-formidable challenge. I have imagined myself pacing the stage in Macbeth’s skin uttering, “Is this a dagger which I see before me?” But the struggle with Lonergan’s “startling strangeness” continues to be a shattering, disconcerting, presence in performance. The end of that first page of chapter 14 of *Insight* puts it well. Whereas I might sit and ponder “the already-out-there-now,” it is quite another reality to find the stage and one’s fellow actors disappear behind my eyes! But at least when I sit and wonder I can hold on to the shocking unreality of the imagined dagger and the seen cast, the “props of truth.” At any rate, despite random

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5 The meaning of movement I have in mind here comes from an image in a Patrick Kavanagh poem: “…Gather / no moss you rolling stones / Nothing thought out atones / for no flight / in the light …” “To Hell With Commonsense,” *The Complete Poems of Patrick Kavanagh* (New York: Hand P, 1972), 288. For me, there is beauty in this image that draws attention to the need for cycling tasks of discernment in the field of language studies: *to continue to discover as best we can how language works and how we should roll with it.* Is this not Lonergan’s strategy for a practical view of history – an adequate investigative structure, a genetic division of labour relevant to any cultural endeavour? My other point is that a pragmatic principle has been forced upon us by the specializations and fragmentations and discoveries of these past centuries; moreover, the need for a division of labour is suggested, NOT by some arbitrarily imposed group of tasks, but rather by the fermentation of centuries, even in post-modern expressions that would scorn categories and canons.

6 “[N]o man is born in that pattern; no one reaches it easily; no one remains in it permanently…” (*CWL* 3, 411).
attempts over the years of teaching English to nudge students in that direction, I have pretty much failed to facilitate a parallel shock in them. Needless to say, it is absent everywhere in reflection on English and its philosophy or method. That its startling strangeness will become the dominant tone of English classes in the short term is, to my mind, a matter for long-term optimism; which leads me to my topic.

I am in the process of refining my doctorate thesis objective, having battled through a Master’s degree in the Philosophy of Language. Those who have attempted a “Lonergan-type” thesis in a non-Lonergan environment will know what I mean by “battle.” Notwithstanding, my focus in the doctorate is to follow up on the aforementioned research in the philosophy of language. The doctoral issue, of course, has many facets: political, academic, locational, and financial. But the topic relevant to this paper is the issue of “interpretation” raised by Lonergan in the third section of chapter 17 of *Insight*. The challenge of this paper (and this volume) is to lift that

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8 I found, however, that working in the “groves of academe” offered no shortage of opportunity to exercise and refine my sense of humour and satire. For example, my thesis proposal on procedure in language studies noted a parallel between Joseph H. Greenberg’s concern over the lack of coherence and progress in the field of linguistics and Welleck and Warren’s investigation into the structure of inquiry in literary studies. See Greenberg, *Universals of Human Language* Volumes I-IV (Stanford UP, 1978). In an effort to set me straight, a professor of linguistics at Harvard University wrote me a letter declaring on the one hand, “progress” was “orthogonal” to the study of linguistics, while on the other hand, Greenberg’s legitimate call for progress in the field was passé and bypassing him would be a step toward progress!

9 I have, at this point, arrived at a half-way station to a full heuristics of basic linguistics and basic grammar with a two-pronged thesis that cut down the elements of restructuring in language studies to its two key components: the focal shift in grammatology and the functional relating of sub-fields of linguistics. The full reach of the doctoral thesis will seek to penetrate more fully the entire scope of grammar studies both in the re-cataloguing of linguistic families and in the re-defining of the standard parts of speech, the topic of section 3.
section into the context of hodic conversion.\(^{10}\)

As I struggled with this problem of division of labour, I slowly began to sense that I would be able to merge it with the problem of writing a doctorate thesis in a way that, I think, could be extremely helpful to us as we attempt to move as a community into the cyclic collaboration that is functional specialization. And so, in section 2, I attempt a functional interpretation of a single paragraph of *Insight* quoted at the beginning of that section below. Now, if the community of linguistic scholars agreed with me on the meaning of that paragraph,\(^{11}\) I could get on with the task of pushing forward the meaning of this single paragraph so as to arrive at a view of grammar quite significantly beyond grammarians from Pannini up to the present time. This, of course, is quite unrealistic. Instead, I had to focus on the presuppositions of the paragraph. And yet, here came a fortuitous leap in the personal context of my effort to come to grips with functional interpretation. For me, the key lies in *The Sketch* (CWL 3, 602-603), and, specifically, Lonergan’s fourth point in that section: the ideal interpretation would be a “hypothetical expression” of a “hypothetical pure formulation.”\(^{12}\) Now that would be possible if there was a shared sophistication of “the universal viewpoint” (587-591) and my work “was addressed to an audience that similarly grasped the universal viewpoint” (602). With that in mind, I linked up with McShane’s timely description of the collaborative enterprise. His effort has

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\(^{10}\) I would recall that Lonergan points to this challenge in a note on *Method* 153: “One of the advantages of the notion of functional specialty is precisely this possibility of separate treatment of issues that otherwise become enormously complex. … See my own discussion of the truth of interpretation in *Insight* and observe how ideas presented there recur here in quite different functional specialties. For instance, what there is termed a universal viewpoint, here is realized by advocating a distinct functional specialty named dialectic.” The last sentence in particular will occupy me at the end of this first section.

\(^{11}\) As will appear in section 3, it is the meaning of the paragraph within the context of the later view of Lonergan, on functional collaboration, that I have in mind here.

\(^{12}\) “From his immanent sources of meaning *P* will work out a hypothetical pure formulation of *Q*’s context and of the content of *Q*’s message” (602).
inched my personal context forward.

McShane is slowly tackling the problem of transposing *The Sketch*. For me, one of his inspiring images is that of collaborative bands, where *band* could mean both *group* in the usual sense – tribe or musical – and *spectral*. He comes up with the image of a spectral band complete with standard running track and a band of lanes. A diagram is helpful here:

![Diagram of spectral bands]

The lanes go up in parallel from the first to the fourth specialty, then turn and come down parallel to the end of the eighth specialty. McShane arranges the colours in a very useful and suggestive way. His outside lane is “violet,” and the lanes run across to “red,” the short inner circuit. He considers the outside “violet” lane to be the lane in which one must both *hold to*, and *develop*, the universal viewpoint. At the opposite end of the band, the “red” inner lane, which scarcely attempts the cycle, is the danger lane, dominated by commonsense eclecticism and general bias. For me, the key was to grasp his insistence on the
“violet” lane *holding to itself*. What does this mean? It means that functional interpretation, if it is to be efficient, does not attempt to communicate with, or persuade, other schools of interpretation. Other schools of thought enter into consideration – or dialogue – in the two specialties “dialectic” and “communications.” Furthermore, McShane reinforces the idea of an audience sharing the interpreter’s viewpoint. Certainly, Lonergan makes this point clear: “The use of the general … categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialities” (*Method* 292). This idea has its parallel in the presuppositions of those who are collaborating in contemporary physics: one does research or history or theory or teaching *in the context of the best contemporary horizon*. The function of any specialty is to *open up new twists* in the cyclic collaboration, such as I wish to illustrate in this section.

Now I return to my double problem: a pedagogical handling of both doctorate work and the challenge of trying functional specialization. Its possibility took shape for me by exploiting the image of the spectrum. There is the standard list of seven colours which some of us memorized in school: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet. Now, how might I talk to the other tracks of interest in language? At the same time, how might I bring my audience into my context? So, I came to envisage the work as a series of interpretative steps: *I* have, to some limited degree, the idea *A* of the text below, or of the thesis-presuppositions. I need to move to a complex practical insight *F* (or *F*' or *F*") to get my audience to my idea.

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13 In a developed specialist collaboration, shared and sophisticated general categories would control the level of specialist work and interspecialist communication so that “cumulative and progressive results” would occur with a *per se* accuracy and efficiency that would give a new unity to the enterprise of metaphysics. One must think, then, of a community sharing, *in a manner quite beyond public discourse*, a full genetic systematic control of the ongoing genesis of meaning. In contrast, truncated perspective systematically fails to sense the spontaneous and shadowy seeds of progress from which the quest of a Greenberg, or of a Welleck and Warren, could be transposed.

14 Perhaps here I am being helpful towards a conception of the operation of the functional specialty, communications, towards an appreciation of *per se* accuracy and efficiency that involves sharing in a manner quite beyond public discourse.
My practical idea takes the shape of a seven-step effort, starting with the “red” track and moving to the “violet” track. The audience in the “violet” track is, supposedly, my community of collaborators. My thesis, in that better world, would be the advance. My thesis, in the real academic situation, is more likely to be a “mangled” seven-step effort followed by an eighth step; the mangling is, of course, the result of the usual academic compromising, politics, and despair.

Obviously, then, this is not the place for a plunge into the eighth step, towards a new view of grammar, though I shall venture some suggestive pointers in the third section. Rather it seems to me to be, realistically, the place for the previous seven. Certainly, the eighth step is the key one, the one that comes closest to the ideal of functional interpretation: of opening up new twists. What is functional interpretation about? It is about someone who is up with the community’s categorial effort at finding clues to progress in some author so far neglected, in those particular clues, by the community. But it’s not just a matter of recovery. Whereas the interpreter, as interpreter, is retrieving creatively, seeking the best of an author’s clues to progress, s/he may, in actuality, also have original clues: then there is the need for conversations with other specialties.\(^\text{15}\)

Finally, I would note that my audience \textit{per se} is the community of historians. “This is something that should get picked up and woven into the flow of progress, something that you folks should notice as neglected with a neglect that is now part of the surds of history.”\(^\text{16}\) At the same time, obviously, my audience is you, living your story. In so far you are tracking along in the “red” lane, but open in some minimal way to functional specialization, my functional interpretation begins immediately after the quoted text (“red”? \(\rightarrow I\)). Now what does each subsequent colour or lane in the spectral image represent? Each level represents an \textit{unknown complexity}, the content of

\(^{15}\) However, that is another and quite complex topic beyond the scope of our immediate interest.

\(^{16}\) A remark of McShane made at the West Dublin Conference on “Functional Specialization,” August 2003.
which is *presupposed* at each level – the topic of Part Two. When you reach a subsequent unknown colour, then you are back with the task of “interpretation” (“orange”? → I; “yellow”? → I; “green”? → I), and so on. In so far as you are “up with me” in any subsequent colour or lane, then that subsection is simply a clue as to how we might differ in teaching or presenting that sub-sectional interpretation. Insofar as you or I are “heading together to violet,” then we move beyond the *per se* task of functional interpretation to creative work in some other area.

**Part 2 – Content**

The Text:

Were words related only to other words, their meaning would never be more than verbal. But the mere fact that a word can occur in a sentence that is affirmed endows it with a basic reference to the objective of intelligent and rational consciousness, to being. Moreover, this basic reference, which is the core of all meaning, admits differentiation and specialization. There are many words: some are substantival because they refer to intelligible and concrete unities; some are verbal because they refer to conjugate acts; some are adjectival or adverbial because they refer to the regularity or frequency of the occurrence of acts or to potentialities for such regularities or frequencies. Finally, since the development of language fuses with the development of knowledge, the meaning of words not only depends upon the metaphysical matrix of terms of meaning but also on the experiential sources of meaning. Prior to the explanatory conjugates, defined by their relations to one another, there are the experiential conjugates, that involve a triple correlation of classified experiences, classified contents of experience, and corresponding names. The being to be known as an intelligible unity differentiated by verifiable regularities and frequencies begins by being conceived heuristically, and then its unknown nature
is differentiated by experiential conjugates. (CWL 3, 578)

There is a basic flaw in what follows that I must bring to your attention. It may be considered by you to be, perhaps not a flaw, but simply a deviation from the editor’s request. Lonergan writes: “Suppose P to be interpreting Q. From his immanent sources of meaning P will work out a hypothetical pure formulation of Q’s context and of the content of Q’s message” (CWL 3, 602). Lonergan would not seem to ask for a separation: but then, the editor can have another meaning for the separation, which I must come to in the third section. At any rate, I seem to need to merge content and context in what follows.

2.1 Red: Helen Keller

What do I mean here? Well, think of the context, semi-purely formulated as the absence of the thematic of meaning pointed to by Lonergan when he refers to Helen Keller’s discovery (Method 70). He points to the same missing thematic elsewhere. “[Meaning] seems to be a relation between sign and signified” (CWL 3, 5). At greater length, and important when we arrive at section 2.4, is his statement of the point in considering “the first element in the general notion of an inner word”:

[It] is had from a contrast from outer words - spoken, written, imagined, or meant. Spoken words are sounds with meaning: as sounds, they are produced in the respiratory tract; as possessing a meaning, they are due to imagination according to Aristotle, or, as Aquinas seems to have preferred, to soul; it is meaning that differentiates spoken words from other sounds, such as coughing, which also are produced in the respiratory tract. (CWL 2, 14)

Clearly, we are into the question of context, the context in particular of Aristotle and Aquinas, and I suspect that the pure formulation of this context has to come, eventually, from within a genetic systematics17 that would order such

17 What is needed is some suggestive imagery of system, indeed
positioning regarding the core of meaning (CWL 3, 381-83). And within that ordering would be the sequential reversal of the massive historical confusion of viewpoints on meaning, the proximate versions of which dominate reflection on language. The point here, I think, is that we are just not up to pure formulations at present. For instance, one may think of mistaken views mentioned in passing by Lonergan that surface in the reflections of Pinker or Foder.

At any rate, under red I am dealing with a necessary piece of an interpretation to almost all the present academic community. Indeed, there may well be members of the Lonergan community who have not done the serious exercises involved in identifying the data for the insight into the grounding insight of language. Yet without this insight, the passage, and the entire book, is being systematically under-read.

So, it is of no little importance to ask, what would a hypothetical expression of Lonergan’s position on the insight into the equivalent of Helen Keller’s insight be? The question raises all the problems of adequacy. My suspicion is that the short statements within Lonergan’s writing are inadequate as expression. What seems to be needed is a hypothetical expression that would be the equivalent of Lonergan teaching a class on those few lines of Method that deal with Helen Keller.

2.2 Orange: Elements of Meaning

The previous section touched on a problem that spanned the entire text: without a universal viewpoint meaning of word incarnate system, on the move.

18 See, for example, CWL 3, 383: Lonergan discusses “the prevalence of empiricist theories” in the context of instrumental and ostensive acts of meaning. “[T]he empiricist identifies the valid field of full terms of meaning (i.e., the universe of being) with the range of sensible presentations.”


20 This is discussed in TSLS, Chapter 4.
the paragraph is seriously under-read. Let us focus our attention now on the end part of the text: terms of meaning, conjugates, triple correlating, etc.: “there are the experiential conjugates that involve a triple correlation of classified experiences, classified contents of experience, and corresponding names. The being to be known as an intelligible unity differentiated by verifiable regularities and frequencies begins by being conceived heuristically, and then its unknown nature is differentiated by experiential conjugation.” For the people in the violet band, these would not be topics in a pure formulation, which is after all addressed to those in the ballpark of the universal viewpoint, who have then digested the first sixteen chapters of *Insight* – within context: the topic of section 3.

What begins to emerge here for me, and possibly for you, is the high standard of achievement and collaboration that Lonergan was writing about in his reflections in *Insight* on interpretation. And with that emergence comes the suspicion that there is a great deal of preliminary work to be done before a “violet” band emerges to cycle achievements of the past into a scientific community in the control of pure formulations. To get there we need the accumulation of a tradition of simple interpretations of Lonergan’s *compact* doctrinal pointers: for example, an essay on the problem of introspecting triple correlations.21

2.3 Yellow: Hierarchies of Meant

In the previous two sections I have been drawing attention to the difficulty of reaching – or teaching – the control of meaning that pivots on grasping the grounding insight of language and the differentiating of the grounding insight over the elements and terms of meaning. Without that control one is not in the scientific community that Lonergan writes of in terms of pure formulations: one is not in the equivalent of the world of physics that shares the control of meaning given by

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21 Relevant to this preliminary work, I think, is the need to re-catalogue words that I touch on in Part Three. It focuses on data in Lonergan’s work that would contribute to a sweeping reclassification of adjectival, pronominal and nominal expression
theoretic achievement. Yet the next step, the next band of our reflections, takes us into a quite solitary zone of Lonergan’s work. The paragraph that we are reading was written by a thinker who had sorted out, over at least ten years, the hierarchic aggregative structure that was essential to his meaning of words like *molecule* or *mouse*. “A concrete plurality of lower entities may be the material cause from which a higher form is educed” (*CWL* 4, 20). We are back in the first half of our paragraph. Most of the words that occur in our sentences are endowed with reference to such hierarchic entities or quiddities. And so is not one missing Lonergan’s meaning if one is not tuned into that component of Lonergan’s context?

Once again, we are in the area of contexts. I shall return to the problem of the content of a hypothetical expression in the present question in concluding this section, but I think two points are relevant here to our reflections. First, this content – a hierarchic perspective – is needed in foundational linguistics. One has only to survey the efforts of Greenberg to see how the search for a hierarchic perspective is lurking as a problem. 22 Language reaches towards an objective that is intrinsically aggregormic: A heuristics of linguistics, of words, cannot dodge that issue. But my second point is addressed to both linguists and my co-workers in Lonergan studies. The present issue, however difficult, cannot be left out of one’s perspective without warping the conceptualization that is metaphysics. On this it is worth attending to an earlier, recently published, writing of Lonergan. “The conceptualization of understanding is, when fully developed, a system, and one must advert to the implication of systematic knowledge in the Aristotelian and Thomist *quod quid est* if one would grasp the precise nature of the concept; the concept emerges from understanding, not an isolated atom detached from all context, but precisely as part of a context, loaded with the relations that belong to it in virtue of

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a source which is equally the source of other concepts.’” This is very far from the simpler view of the reference of words that runs through most traditions. But does that simpler view not hold down Lonergan interpreters? Think, for instance, of the word *phantasm* that occurs in the frontispiece of *Insight*: do we regularly read it hierarchically?

2.4 *Green: Word-beings and Beings*

Two sections have reflected on elementary meaning and on the generic meant of human knowing. But words also fall under the class of generic means: we speak of words; Lonergan writes here of words. So, we arrive at a twist to the question that concluded the previous section.

Do we regularly read the word *word* hierarchically, as a word, in its referencing? We are back with the problem of a word as produced in the respiratory tract or chemically on paper or electronically on screen. The difficulty is brought out by McShane’s effort to symbolize this problem of meaning and expression. “You come to the complexity of a heuristics of speaking… Now what does its symbolization look like? There is generically a need for a reduplicative symbolization of the form $V\{ W(p; c; b_k; z_i; u_m; q_n) \} > HSf (p; c; b_k; z_i; u_m; q_n)$. The symbolization is strange but the content is part of the content of the Lonergan paragraph with which we are dealing. And some such symbolization is necessary to the control of meaning made possible by Lonergan’s shift of metaphysics into the zone of generalized empirical method. This is a large

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23 CWL 2, 238. I am quoting from the Appendix, which contains previously unpublished fragments.

24 See footnote 19 referring to Pinker and Foder. There is the problem of general bias, a sort of global flattening of meaning. History has multiplied words, externalized them.


26 A metaphysics of words, of language, sublating the elementary pointers of CWL 2, 1, relates an aggreformic function $W(p, c, b_k, z_i)$ to functions $F(p, c, b_k, z_i; u_m, r_n)$ within the integral perspective of $Sf(p, c, b_k, z_i; u_m, r_n)$. That relating meshes into the reality of “the finality of intellect” (CWL 3, 16), that “all we know is somehow with us” (ibid. 303), that “every consistent choice, at least implicitly, is a choice of universal order” (ibid. 629).
and rich topic that forces us to think of the meaning subject in a new way, in a way that is adverted to explicitly when we face Lonergan’s invitation to think of the harmonious development of the subject as incarnate.\textsuperscript{27} That invitation is part of the content of a previous chapter\textsuperscript{28}: it is obviously part of the meaning of our selected text.

But let me turn aside here, in a type of reflective interpretation that can share a fault common to both the present writer and perhaps most of my readers. Let us suppose that indeed we are green, green and beginners in the effort to cultivate the universal viewpoint, or to cultivate functional interpretation. Still, we have some suspicion of the missing viewpoint. So there is a sense in which we can do a type of immature, imperfect, functional interpretation. Even here, as we communicate, might we not say that, in so far as I may be a little ahead of some of you in the heuristics of words, I could enter into a hypothetical expression of Lonergan’s view of aggreformic signs referring to aggreformic quiddities?\textsuperscript{29} That would identify me as an interpreter speaking to you as a “his or her story,” who would then view the story and the history of what goes on in metaphysics and linguistics, and indeed in Lonergan studies.

No doubt some of you will sense that the problem of interpreting Lonergan’s paragraph is becoming far too complex. I would make three points here. First, when one enters into a new science it is good to have, up-front, the spread of that science: a school class in chemistry is handed the periodic table. The second point is really only this point with a twist given it by Lonergan. His text on the point is quite lengthy, but briefly he is saying that, even at an immature stage in a science it is “inconvenient” – damaging then – to tarry with description when one can lift the investigation into an explanatory heuristic.\textsuperscript{30} Thirdly, convenient or not, what I write

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Method}, ch.3 section 6 and ch.14, section 1. Also, see notes 34 and 35 below.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{CWL} 3, ch.15, §§ 6 and 7.

\textsuperscript{29} On the process of ingesting the aggreformic perspective, see McShane, Cantower 29. [www.philipmcshane.ca]

\textsuperscript{30} Lonergan, \textit{De Deo Trino II, Pars Systematica} (Rome: Gregorian
of here is part of the meaning of the paragraph of our interest.

2.5 Blue: A Hodic Perspective

By hodic I mean functional specialist. You may immediately think that, no, this could not be part of a functional interpretation of the paragraph. The discovery was eleven and a half years away at the time of writing. And I must obviously agree that the hodic perspective was not part of the original content. But I am led to this larger, and perhaps strange, view, the need for efficiency in functional interpretation. It would seem that we are committed to recycling the best, the neglected best. We look to the past for neglected riches of the heuristics of progress. That riches may be found early in an author’s reachings and have sufficient autonomy to warrant what one might call a restricted – and certainly precise – interpretation. Indeed, such autonomous interpretations belong to the full task of functional interpretation. But I would say that they belong as context.

The illustration that comes to mind is that given by Lonergan’s doctorate work published in Grace and Freedom (CWL 1). What is relevant to the core of a functional interpretation as lifting the systematics of future theology is Aquinas’ “endview,” in so far as that endview was the result of a genetic achievement, not an elderly lapse. What is seen to be relevant for handing on then is, so to speak, a neglected “best stab” at a topic. Such achievement is to be selectively imported into the pure formulation of context. Selecting and trimming is important. The beauty and efficiency of the collaboration requires that a participant not inflect irrelevant searchings and blind alleys. This relates to Lonergan’s demand that one know the object, one is up-to-date, one has reached adequate control of the author’s meaning, shifting words, etc., etc. In this

UP, 1964), 308-309. This is, of course, also the message of chapters 15-17 of Insight.

31 Nonetheless, what I am pointing towards is the transposition of the later explicit writings into that full explanatory heuristic context. That transposition is the topic of those key pages, Method 287-288. What emerges then is a vast enlargement of the task envisaged by the canons of hermeneutics of Insight.

32 The central pointing of chapter 7 of Method.
context it is worthwhile recalling the first principle of criticism of the third canon of hermeneutics: how would one shuffle and trim the work in order to bring it closer to a functional interpretation?33

But the point in this section is that the hodic reading, a hodic consciousness, is key to attempting functional interpretation at all. Further, from my own struggles, I would suggest that at its best it involves a new and precise set of differentiations of consciousness. But in its early stages it is no more differentiated than is the periodic table for a pupil. Lonergan writes of the exegete “expressing his interpretation to his colleagues” (Method 170), speaking to his pupils, “to the theological community, to exegetes in other fields and to those engaged principally in other functional specialties” (171). Lonergan goes on to give suggestions from Bishop Descamps about communication that are “eminently relevant, sane and solid” (172) but I think that it would be a mistake to let this sanity of Lonergan’s superficial treatment in Method warp our perspective on the distant achievements intended by his project. There is certainly a matrix of specialized conversations to be envisaged and cultivated in this new context. But the per se function of interpretation is a conversation of interpreter with historian about a clue to progress present as a past expression but missed as a “going-on.” That specification should be luminously present in the interpretative effort of the cycling of mutual self-mediation.

2.6 Indigo: Linguistic Feedback

When we come to the indigo band and to the topic of linguistic feedback it seems that we are still closer to the ideal of purely-formulated functional interpretation. Linguistic feedback, as envisaged by Lonergan in Method in Theology, seems like an ongoing reaching for an impossible adequacy of expression. “At a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feedback, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective” (Method 88, n. 34). In the text, Lonergan is writing of projection, of the increasingly refined transfer of the

33“A contributor fails to present his results …” CWL 3, 611.
meaning of moral defect so that it is felt as personal guilt before God. What I am envisaging here is not moral defect but moral success, the blossoming of linguistic mores in a sort of Wordsworthian tonality of metaphysics. Then one is speaking about “the earth and every common sight tak[ing] on the glory and the freshness” (CWL 3, 556) of the inner reach of hodic metaphysics.

Then the triple correlation that is the concluding topic of the paragraph of our attention is lifted into the context of another triple correlation, the defining relations of a mature methodology discussed by my colleague, Darlene O’Leary, in section 2.1 of her contribution. Her reflections relieve me of the task of venturing further into that area.

But there are less complex aspects of the methodological presence of linguistic feedback, aspects that were not present in Insight but begin to be suggested in Lonergan’s lectures on Existentialism, lectures given the year of Insight’s first publication.34 There is a focus there on the task of expressing the subject-as-subject, expressing the subject’s exigent reaching for the unknown field.35 Yet that topic, without the linguistic sophistication, was the topic of the beginning of the chapter in Insight from which our paragraph is taken. The meaning has not been lost, forgotten, by the author in the intervening week. Mystery and the reach for the unknown is meshed into the meaning of the paragraph with which we began. It would seem to be part of the task of adequate interpretation to make that meaning present: as I do now, with massive inadequacy of expression.

2.7 Violet: At home in the text

Still, there is a sense in which I can certainly claim some success: for part of functional interpretation is “understanding oneself.”36 I am only at the edge of a beginner’s possession of a

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34 See the Introduction to CWL 18, and McShane’s missing Appendix A to the volume, which appears as chapter 5 of Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway (Axial P, Halifax, 2005). See also the following note.
35 See CWL 18, the index under “exigence,” “field,” “subject-as-subject.”
36 Method 161. It is the title and topic of section 5 of the chapter on Interpretation.
universal viewpoint, of a viewpoint that would place me in a position to address “an audience that similarly grasps the universal viewpoint” (CWL 3, 602). But I have succeeded in lifting the paragraph of our attention out of “common sight” much more than when I began this essay. At my best moments, the paragraph is no longer “already out there.” Indeed, there can be something of the reversal of what Lonergan writes of at the beginning of his chapter on “The Method of Metaphysics,” worth quoting here fully as an aid to a glimpse of his full existential context. “The intellectual pattern of experience is supposed and expressed by our account of self-affirmation, of being, and of objectivity. But no man is born in that pattern; no one reaches it easily; no one remains in it permanently; and when some other pattern is dominant, then the self of our self-affirmation seems quite different from one’s actual self, the universe of being seems as unreal as Plato’s noetic heaven, and objectivity spontaneously becomes a matter of meeting persons and dealing with things that are ‘really out there’” (CWL 3, 411). Might one not suspect that Lonergan was neither “out there” nor “in here” but in being, somehow focused on the context and content of a quite new metaphysics of words and of grammar?

So I come back, or forward, to my initial problem of facing the writing of a thesis on a new metaphysics of grammar. Were my audience at home in the violet band, comfortable about the benefits and the deficiencies of the other bands, then I could proceed to what I could genuinely call a functional interpretation of the class envisaged by Lonergan when he wrote chapter 17 of Insight. Why would I claim that? Because it seems to me that, however original my work would sound or read, it would only be an interpretation – a mix of simple and reflective interpretations as described in Insight (585-587) - of what Lonergan meant by the middle sentences of the paragraph with which I began this second section. So, placed in the context of functional specialization, my work would qualify as a functional interpretation. For it would be addressed to the community of Lonergan students – and hopefully beyond it – to draw attention to the ongoing defective storytelling that flows from Panini and the
mediaevals right through our psyches in our talk of words as parts of speech. Only slowly, humbly, patiently, can we face the problem of the alienating patterns of axial grammar. But that raises a further question of interpretation, which, fortunately, I can leave to my colleague Alessandra Drage-Gillis.

Part 3 – Context

Towards the Restructuring of Language Studies placed grammatology in the context of functional specialization that the Greenberg School was looking for and grasping at, reaching quite beyond previous efforts such as that of Chomsky. Yet the context was not hinted at adequately within the field of linguistics itself. The context emerged as a sort of “half-way house,” in the form of a two-pronged strategy to cut down the elements of restructuring to its two key components: the focal shift in grammatology and the functional relating of sub-fields of linguistics. The full reach adequately expressed and expanded would seek to penetrate the entire scope of grammar studies both in the re-cataloguing of linguistic families and in the redefining of the standard parts of speech. The full reach freshens up the question, “what is metaphysics?” by focusing on the isomorphism of “question” and “questioner”: “metaphysics rests on the major premise of the isomorphism of the structures of knowing and of proportionate being” (CWL 3, 599). Lonergan, envisioning the full reach, was neither “out there” nor “in here” but in being,37 “some how” focused on a quite new metaphysics of words and of grammar, on the structured concrete “whats” and “ises” that are all humans in history. In Chapter 17 of Insight, Lonergan puts the challenge into context for a metaphysics of words and of grammar: “A scientific interpretation is concerned to formulate the relevant insights and judgments, and to do so in a manner that is consonant with scientific collaboration and

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37 I would note how helpful for me here is the analogy of the Möbius-strip to the extent that a Möbius-strip theory of consciousness, one-sidedly excludes any two-sidedness in the appreciation of the meaning of the word “is.” The anomaly of confrontational two-sidedness is the central warp in both logic and phenomenology.
scientific control.” 38 Hodic science, then, Lonergan’s great achievement, gave structure to the Hegelian insight:

As the labor of introspection proceeds, one stumbles upon Hegel’s insight that the full objectification of the human spirit is the history of the human race. It is in the sum of the products of common sense and common nonsense, of the sciences and the philosophies, of moralities and religions, of social orders and cultural achievements, that there is mediated, set before us the mirror in which we can behold, the originating principle of human aspiration and human attainment and failure. Still, if that vast panorama is to be explored methodically, there is the prior need of method. 39

Lonergan’s focus on the question about the question in the concrete takes in all occurrences of questers and questions. His reflection on Hegel envisages the dialectical reach of the whole of humanity in its minding, from which to shape its future minding. So here we are situated at the foothills of Lonergan’s perspective on the future of language in general. 40 Over the long haul, the task of working toward elevating language to an explanatory perspective is to fantasize foundationally, as did Lonergan, toward a perspective on a fuller explanatory heuristic of words. 41 “It takes as its starting

38 CWL 3, 608. The context of this statement is Section 3.8 “Some Canons for a Methodical Hermeneutics.”
40 In a sketch, dating from February 1965, of a first chapter of Method in Theology in the archive file labeled Batch V. 7 (which contains the discovery pages of functional specialization), Lonergan scribbles of “Second level mediation: based on tools of meaning … Third level mediation: based on operations.” The second-level mediation requires “study of language, Ar. Logic [norms are incorporated in linguistic, grammatic, structures]. Study of maths, Modern logic [norms are incorporated in math. struct + procedure].” The file is reproduced in Darlene O’Leary, Lonergan’s Practical View of History (Halifax: Axial P, 2004) Ch. 2. I would note the connection of second-level mediation to the discussion here.
41 In the new hodic context, postmodern philosophy is to be identified
point and clue the discovery of some precise issue on which undoubtedly one was mistaken”\( (\text{CWL 3, 736}) \), the issue being the massive historical confusion of viewpoints on meaning, the proximate versions of which dominate reflection on language, the alienating grammatical structures of Panini, the mediaevals and the moderns in their talk of words as parts of speech.

Where does a responsible reach for a new view of grammar go from here? I suspect it involves a long-range plan with a realistic attitude. It seems to me, then, a plan that seeks to rise to the level of a scientific determination of classes should move towards strategic description meshed with crucial experimenting from which to arrive at the beginning of explanation.\(^4^2\) I am pushing for the metaphysical equivalents of the parts of speech \( (\text{CWL 3, 16.3.3 and 16.3.4}) \). That push, realistically, will be the long haul. And so this short section anticipates the much-needed expansion and detail. I point, briefly and densely, to specific struggles and to the massive complexity of the work.

A preliminary involves the employment of a simple phenomenological procedure. The strategy behind this procedure is to notice the obvious, and evident problems in the obvious from which to make a determination.

As the notion of the universal viewpoint, so also some account of levels and sequences of expression is, we believe, a necessary preliminary to a treatment of the problem of scientific interpretation. The immediate task will be to classify modes of expression, not in terms of language or of style, but in terms of

\(^{42}\) Here I recall Lonergan in \textit{Insight}, in a way that includes the necessary twist toward the questioner: “[Self-]study of [language] begins from the thing-for-us, from the [linguistic data] as exhibited to our senses. A first step is a descriptive differentiation of different parts …” \( (\text{CWL 3, 489}) \). The long haul, of course, is to discover the metaphysical equivalents of the eight parts of speech. Lonergan later observes, “Since metaphysical analysis has a quite different basis from grammatical or logical analysis, one must not expect any one-to-one correspondence between metaphysical elements and grammatical or logical elements” \( (526) \).
meanings… Sources of meaning lie in the experiential, intellectual, and rational levels of knowing [and doing]. (CWL 3, 592)

So my attention is focused on surface aspects of writing that express invariant sources of meaning, the data of which is available with the text of any familiar language. To illustrate, I take the data of a passage from Derrida’s large work, *Of Grammatology*. Derrida writes:

The science of writing should therefore look for its object at the roots of scientifcicity. The history of writing should turn back to the origin of historicity. A science of the possibility of science? A science of science which would no longer have the form of logic but that of grammatics? A history of the possibility of history which would no longer be an archeology, a philosophy of history or a history of philosophy?43

First, I observe that invariant surface structures are detectable in the linguistic data. Secondly, these invariant surface structures reflect a “search.” Thirdly, the search is evident by recurring patterns that involve the mark “?”. Fourthly, the problem I sense in Derrida’s use of language, far from being the legitimate questions that he raises, is that, for all their sophistication in his sincere search for solutions, he seems to overlook the obvious, which in this case is the invariant surface structures in his own data.

Now, curiously, Derrida’s expression contains two full stops and three question marks: five blocks of meaning, then. And so some descriptive classification of writing structures can be noticed: large-scale statements (about judgments of value) and small-scale punctuations. I also observe that the small-scale punctuations have a central role in the large-scale classifications. I’ll come to that presently. I notice that the three question marks in the quotation connect to future possibilities. I note further that this connection reflects a spontaneous need for a rational restructuring of inquiry; a

restructuring that anticipates a determination of normative classifications warranted by hodic science.

It is illuminating to follow such patterns from which to verify the existence of invariant patterns of meaning. The mark “?” is a symbol for what Lonergan refers to in *Insight* as the “effective emergence of wonder, of the desire to understand” (*CWL* 3, 34). It has a central role in the data related to the deeper core of meaning objectified as the “dynamics of knowing” (“What is it?”→“Is it so?”), and as the “dynamics of doing” (“What is to be done?”→“Is it to be done?”). That core of meaning is a basic logic of language the images of which appear in Appendix “A” of *Phenomenology and Logic* (*CWL* 21, 322-323).

This brings into focus the middle sentences of our passage in Section 2 from *Insight*:

There are many words: some are substantival because they refer to intelligible and concrete unities; some are verbal because they refer to conjugate acts; some are adjectival or adverbial because they refer to the regularity or frequency of the occurrence of acts or to potentialities for such regularities or frequencies. Finally, since the development of language fuses with the development of knowledge, the meaning of words not only depends upon the metaphysical matrix of terms of meaning but also on the experiential sources of meaning. (*CWL* 3, 578)

The strategy is to follow up on the foregoing paragraph by assembling phyla of words that range over all levels of the two categories by sifting through the texts, *Insight* and *Verbum*. Again, the context is the push for the metaphysical equivalents of the parts of speech, the struggle of which relates to *Insight* 16.3.3 and 16.3.4. “The significance of metaphysical equivalence is twofold. On the one hand, it provides a critical technique for the precise control of meaning. On the other hand, it is an implement for the development of metaphysics” (*CWL* 3, 530). I am dealing roughly and sketchily with the data

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44 The reach for the deeper structures of speech and their objectification is the focus of pp. 126-7, 130.
in a manner that would somehow bear on, “the rule of concreteness [for] a solution to the problem of individuation” (527), “[the] rule of explanatory formulation…that takes its stand on the present existence and functioning of the dynamic structure of explanatory knowledge” (528-529), the rule of structural transposition between logical and metaphysical analysis with which to yield a grounding metaphysical equivalent (529). I begin by noting that the small-scale punctuations have a central role in the large-scale classifications from which to re-catalogue words:

1. Adjectival “When,” “Where,” space-time locational questions,
2. Adverbial “How” and “Why” questions seeking “causes:” material, formal, efficient, exemplary, and final,
3. Substantive classifications associated with the copula “is.” (“Is” questions that fall into a new series of classifications, the assonant descriptions of which I cannot resist borrowing from McShane: pod\(^45\) questions, quod questions, nod questions, hod\(^46\) questions, even God questions),
4. Conjunctival “if” and Adverbial “then,” expressing inference. Lonergan writes, “Any language has a number of syntactical forms that are peculiarly inferential. Most obvious is the causal sentence, because A, therefore B, where A and B each stand for one or more propositions. Next comes the concessive sentence, although A, still not B, which is the natural instrument of anyone ready to admit the propositions, A, but wishing to deny that A implies B. To meet such denial, to give separate expression to the implication of B in A, there is the host of conditional sentences, if A, then B,

\(^{45}\) Pod or seed questions are questions of initial meanings, aesthetic meanings, which is a focus close to conventional phenomenological interest.

\(^{46}\) Hod questions are questions of “met’hod” with tones of both Indo-European roots and of the first verse of the Joycean song “Finnegan’s Wake”: “to rise in the world he carried a hod.”
which may be past or present, proximate or remote future, particular or general, actually verified or what the pure interconnection grammarians call contrary-to-fact. It is not hard to see that these three syntactical forms are particularly inferential. Just as ‘so that’ and ‘in order that’ express the relations of efficient and final causality, so also ‘because,’ ‘although,’ and ‘if’ are the special tools of reasoning man” (CWL 4, 4);

5. Noun classifications (Nominal and Pronominal) in terms of hierarchic entities or quiddities bringing to light varieties of unity: real-thing unity, planned unity, metaphysical unity, aesthetic unity, abstractive unities, and so on.

6. A transposition of the classification of Indefinite Articles, Definite Articles, Prepositions.

Obviously, this drive for metaphysical equivalents and the re-definition of the eight parts of speech has massive implications, one of which would expose and transpose flawed language usage. In other words, a new grammatology has the potential to give the phrase “linguistic analysis” quite a new turn. For example, painfully evident is the usage of the word “concept,” particularly in academic English. Its warpedness is rooted in the colonization of the language of inquiry. Colonization of language has its reflective origin in Scotus’ view of mind and has proliferated a language replete with dead metaphors that dominate the language employed in most

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47 I have, to some extent, undertaken this type of inquiry in TRLS. See Chapter 7 for a dialectical discussion of flawed language usage in Pinker, Derrida, Chomsky, et al.

48 I borrow the expression of colonization from Declan Kibberd, *Inventing Ireland. The Literature of the Modern Nation*, Harvard UP, 1993. The index under “colonization” gives abundant references to the problems of colonized expression. However, I refer here to the deeper problem of the disorientation of Scotus’ view of mind in almost all brands of educated English, evident by the recurrence of phrases like “understanding the concept of,” “teaching the concept of,” “clarifying the concept of.” Such orientations murder the educational process: neither child nor adult mind fits this linguistic mold.

49 This basic issue is described in CWL 2, 38-39. See Chapter One, Part 4, “Insight into Phantasm.”
fields of inquiry today. What might it mean then, from a developed grammatology, to analyze a concept? If a concept is descriptive, what needs analysis is data; if a concept is fully theoretic, it does not need analysis: it can be applied or taught, in both cases through a return to data. Furthermore, there are extended investigations of a greater complexity that could reveal unwarranted deviations from normative discourse: tainted aesthetic discourse, flawed theoretic discourse, and – anticipating hodic science – there are deviations to be expected in initial efforts to conduct discourse within any of the eight differentiations of consciousness warranted by functional specialization.\textsuperscript{50}

I leave that struggle for now and turn to a related struggle associated with Lonergan’s challenge to conceive the existential and phenomenological human in heuristically adequate terms. According to Lonergan, even in the early stages of the development of a science, it is a serious handicap not to reach methodologically for serious relational understanding.\textsuperscript{51} Properly done, this requires the mediation of textbooks in biopsychology. This mediation relates to the reach for a controlling heuristic language of \textit{word}. I take as a brief illustration the word “image.” In what sense can we be in heuristic control of our efforts to talk metaphysically about the word “image” that lifts us out of spontaneous, illusory speech of “image” as “already out there now”? In what way can we get beyond speaking glibly about “insight into image?” How do we face the question: what does the named word “image” convey about its referents? For me, then, there is the struggle to put the image in the imager and the primary referent of any word in the speaker. The imager, the speaker, to be attended to is:

\textsuperscript{50} TRLS, chapter 8 discusses the emergence of “shadow zones” of the eight functional specialities in linguistics and literature.

\textsuperscript{51} On this point I am indebted to McShane for both the translation and references from the following works of Lonergan: \textit{Divinarum Personarum Conceptio Analogica} (Rome: Gregorian UP, 1957), 290; the same passage occurs on pages 308 and 315 of the slightly modified version of the same book, \textit{De Deo Trino II: Pars Systematica}. 
Again, let’s say there is the complex that is the image, and there is the word image that is used to refer to it. Let’s say the two complexes resonate, intermesh, and enrich each other. Then there is the struggle to come up with illustrations of referents of multiple complexities for which further heuristic clarity is required regarding language and its referents: so a science of grammatology would be faced with symbolizations of functional form:

\[
V \{ p_1 \cup c_j \cup b_k \cup z_i \cup u_m \cup q_n \} > HS \{ f(p_1 \cup c_j \cup b_k \cup z_i \cup u_m \cup q_n ) \}
\]

An adequate metaphysics, as Lonergan observes, pulls in “optic nerve and cerebrum ... [and] the matter is far from fully explored” (CWL 3, 213); hence we are at the very edge of Insight, 6.2, especially 6.2.7.1 to 6.2.7.3 somehow meshing with Insight 16.3.3 and 16.3.4 and grasping the manifold complexity of the speaker, the imager, on the neurochemical level of mind mapping. An adequate heuristics of the word “image” and its referents will be viewed as a function of aggregates of aggregates etc. of biochemical acts. The remote meaning “of subjective experience in words and as subjective” (Method 88, n. 34) will neither be confused with, nor expressed by, the language of “the already out there now.” It will transpose Carter’s observation that “reflects a real truth: there is no definitive picture of ‘out there,’ only a construction in our heads triggered by the external elements we are best equipped to register” (109), to reveal the blossoming of linguistic mores in a sort of Wordsworthian tonality of metaphysics. Then one is the speaking about “the earth and every common sight tak[ing] on the glory and the freshness” (CWL 3, 556) of the inner reach of hodic metaphysics. The fantasy that is the science of language will come to fruition by the hodic searching of the human group into neurochemical rhythms. Hodic cycling will, in Lonergan’s words, embarrass (Method 299) and curtail “the substitution of a pseudo-metaphysical

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52 My introduction to this strange world has begun with Rita Carter Mapping the Mind (Berkeley: U of California P, 1999).
myth-making for scientific inquiry” (CWL 3, 528). Appropriately, then, I close this sketch with an image of the heuristic patterns of collaboration below,\(^{53}\) and its necessary complexity, by drawing attention to the reference to Lonergan from *De Constitutione Christi* near the top left corner. On that page, Lonergan notes that unless you have a diagram you will not have a controlling understanding (CWL 7, 150-151).


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\(^{53}\) McShane, *A Brief History of Tongue*, 124.