

FOUNDATIONAL ETHICS, FEMINISM, AND BUSINESS ETHICS

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A course on Business Ethics became a feature of many universities' Religious Studies or Philosophy Departments in the 1980s. One might be cynical and say that it was an enrolment move but let us see the past as better than it was and view it as progress.

The phrase *seeing the past as better* has an echo for the Lonergan scholar, to whom this effort is primarily addressed, an echo of the dialectic effort.¹ So, it is a reminder of one of Lonergan's main cultural achievements: thematising functional specialization. Then one might envisage Business Ethics as it is taught as one of the fruits of that specialization.² As so envisaged it is not part of the theological process proper but a result of the specialty called Communications: it is an outreach.³ Then the question rises, How might that external reach vary, improve, with the ongoing genesis of a more adequate eighth specialty?

I had the privilege at one stage in my career of directing a doctorate thesis that related to this topic.⁴ One result of the work was the discovery that the prevalent view of Communications was a narrow one, almost as if Communications was a reflective pause before preaching or

¹ The phrase occurs in the treatment of dialectic method, *Method in Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1972), 251.

² *Ibid.*, 353.

³ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁴ Sinead Breathnach, *Lonergan's View of Communications*, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Higher Education, 1990. The thesis is also available at the Toronto Lonergan Centre.

teaching. That view certainly had grounds in the manner in which Lonergan treated the topic in *Method in Theology*. It was not a topic, as far as I know, that Lonergan ever lectured on formally.⁵ In the 1971 course on Method the book was already completed but he did not even present the chapter; I had the doubtful privilege of giving a perspective on the matter. Since then I have sought to envisage, an effort of fantasy, this crown of theology's achievement.⁶ I have renamed it varyingly in order to bring out its reflective, withdrawn, status: *Executive Reflection*, *Communising*.⁷ Perhaps it is no harm to try the name thing again: and here I suggest *Strategics*. That has a nice ring about it, the significance of which will, I hope, gradually begin to emerge.

First of all the name *Strategics* fits in with my most recent effort to give some notion of the new genetic Systematics.⁸ For anyone brought up on the Aristotelian or Newtonian view of System this notion involves a big shift in perspective. It is perhaps easier for one familiar with the old style biology with its interest in the process of development.⁹

⁵ One might make an exception of a lecture he gave, Easter week, 1961, in the Jesuit Milltown Institute, Dublin. He had been asked to speak on Communications. In fact, he did a piece from *De Deo Trino* on early developments of Trinitarian understanding. On the way from the lecture in a taxi to the Leeson St. residence where he was staying during the lectures at University College, he grinned at me and said, 'Well, that took care of communications!' He was referring to a favourite phrase of his, if you understand you can express that understanding in twenty different ways. The discovery of functional specialisation was, of course, still almost five years away.

⁶ I introduced the category *fantasy* in "Instrumental Acts of Meaning and Fourth Level Specialization", chapter four of *The Shaping of the Foundations* (Washington: University Press of America, 1976). The book is available, free of charge, on the Axial Press Website.

<http://www.philipmcshane.ca/foundations.pdf> The category can be related to Aquinas' treatment of deliberation in the *Prima Secundae*.

⁷ See, for example, "Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts", *Lonergan Workshop*, Volume 6 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986); chapter three of *A Brief History of Tongue* (Halifax: Axial Press, 1998).

⁸ See chapter three of Philip McShane, *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2002).

⁹ One might muse over whether Lonergan was reaching towards a genetic systematics of theology in *Insight* (see the index under

We need to pause over this new perspective. My preferred illustration at present is from tennis. Take someone like Martina Hingis. One might envisage her development as a tennis player from little girl to champion and beyond in stages of increasing excellence. At each stage she is, one might say, an incarnate system.¹⁰ But it is more than genetically complex, in a way that parallels dialectic and contrafactual analyses' contribution to any field. Each stage includes flaws: the flaws need to be sublated and, as far as possible, reversed. An over-powered backhand top-spin can be turned to a powerfilled asset. Furthermore, the tennis player is not amnesiac. Strokes dominant in an earlier Martina are still available and may be useful not only when teaching or playing with inferior talent, but in eccentric moments of championship stuff. At all events, I invite you to think this out, add in contrafactual reflection shared with a coach or a physiologist or a friend, etc., and see how far you can carry this glimpse of Lonergan's subtlety. It is useful, too, to lift the hope of *Insight* into this later context by re-reading a relevant passage: "The antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialised auxiliary ever ready to offset any interference...."¹¹ But the main task is to glimpse the power of the new view of Systematiks in their relations to

Development). I do not think so. His focussed struggle emerged in his graduate seminars on History and System in the late fifties. My own shift of discovery came from reading the last parts of *De Intellectu et Methodo*. I return to the topic in an article entitled, "Sunflowers, Speak to Us of Growing." See <http://www.philipmcshane.ca/cantower2.pdf>. The central issue of that essay, however, is the issue of integral consciousness and feminist possibilities. The fragmented consciousness of contemporary science may eventually be identified as a patriarchal mis-take.

¹⁰ Within the new subjectivity it is as well to think of the functional specialties incarnately. This is Lonergan's view of foundations as persons, "ongoing developing realities" (*Method in Theology*, 270). I sometimes find misspelling a convenience. So, a Systematik is someone; likewise, perhaps, a Strategik. The incarnate system, Martina, was comfortably eliminated from the American Open 2001 by Serena Williams. As I type now, September 8th, I await a historic sisters-final. For you it will be history, but also, perhaps, a piece of future system.

¹¹ *Insight* [1957], Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 747.

Strategiks. The first work noted in footnote 7 is a lengthier lead to this, and can hardly be summarised here. But a flexing of the imagination can exploit the parallel with global tennis. Systematiks in theology are normatively a global community incarnating a retrieval of the past; Strategiks are also a global community, mediated in their perspective particularly by the previous four specialties, but also richly informed about local global conditions.¹² The informedness can be considered in normative optimism. What Lonergan says of research can be thought of and applied here with a new twist: “Some day, perhaps, it will give us a complete information-retrieval system”.¹³

The parallel with playing tennis, or any other game, is limited of course, but worth pursuing. Strategics is not playing, nor even coaching: it is more like forming coaches. But let us for the moment return to a simpler aspect of the analogy, in which Martina represents the global community of Systematiks. Martina has to play, say, Serena or Venus Williams at Wimbledon. Strategiks will push for a ‘fix’ on Williams’ game on grass, anywhere, but in particular in Wimbledon during June. What parts of the genetic systematics that is Hingis should be called into play? So, you begin to see what I meant by the relationship between S_{ij} and C_{xyt} in “Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts”? Think of x and y as longitude and latitude, t as the time: it is useful, too, to imagine not a globe but a flat projection, moving forward. To shift the illustration, one may envisage a problem of presenting a divine incarnation to an unsophisticated community in the Andes. Like Hingis with a beginner, one chooses bits from the retrieved (and reversed if necessary) systematic slice of Luke or Irenaeus rather than from John the Evangelist or John Damascene.¹⁴ One advantage of the analogy of tennis is that it

¹² Think of the Club of Rome slogan, “think globally, act locally”, but the acting locally is here an activity of withdrawn discernment.

¹³ *Method in Theology*, 127.

¹⁴ This type of reflection can take such an effort as Neil Ormerod to handle the ‘whole sequence of changing forms of ministry’, “System, History, and a Theology of Ministry”, *Theological Studies* 61 (2000), 433 into the new context. Ormerod writes about carrying forward Doran’s view of “a systematic theology of history”(432). The above perspective depends on a

lifts our perspective to the global level quite easily. Tennis is a global enterprise, and its Systematics – in any of the senses – has to be brought to bear on local conditions. One could also think of soccer or baseball, but I would lose the focus on the incarnate subject.¹⁵ Further, in all contemporary competitive sports there is the sophistication of the mediations of chemistry, physiology, dietetics, and so on. Without parallel sophistication theology is liable to be “always arriving on the scene a little breathless and a little late”.¹⁶

But it is time to pause over our title. What might it mean, actually and normatively? ‘Business Ethics’, actually is what we are familiar with as a course within some academic discipline. Obviously, it is not ‘playing’ but pouring over possibilities and probabilities, regularly in a normative way. What those norms as presented breed in terms of discourse and discussion depends obviously on the teacher and the ethos of the class, but the textbook presentations are mainly of a standard Western view.¹⁷ Since I am writing mainly for an audience familiar with Lonergan’s perspective the question immediately arises: What does this perspective add to business ethics? Again, one must think of the teacher and the particular

clear distinction between history and system. Systems, of course, may have historical identifications, like Maxwell’s electromagnetics or Irenaeus’ Christology, but such identifications are more related to convenience of reference.

¹⁵ The West Dublin Conferences of both 2000 and 2001 concentrated on the topic “Cultivating Categorical Characters”, where the word character, layered with resonances, was taken from *Method in Theology*, ch. 14, section 1. With that short section I like to associate the equally short section in chapter three on “Incarnate Meaning”. The twist is towards that self-taste which makes for incarnate competence.

¹⁶ *Insight*, 755.

¹⁷ I have selected, as a basic text in the field, *Business Ethics in Canada*, edited by Deborah C. Poff and Wilfred J. Waluchow, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1999). I do so simply because it is handy and taught in a local university. It is not properly a text but a collection of readings. That has the advantage for me - unfair, some may well say - of necessitating a compact presentation of *standard* views at the beginning, and also of including brief statements on a range of topics. Since I do not wish to distract you here from my main topic and point, I postpone comments on that text to the second part of this essay, where I weave the reflection round the main point of the article.

group. Then one expects a heightening of subjectivity, a self-identification and the cultivation of self-taste in teacher and class. How far this goes depends on the ethos of the institution, the department, etc.

It is, I think, worthwhile to think out classroom dialogue – my reader may find this a strange jump! – in the context of Lonergan’s later definition of generalized empirical method. “Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of subjects; it does not treat of subjects without taking into account the corresponding objects”.¹⁸ What would this mean for a classroom? Even without adding the further sophistication of a general change in the ethos of word-pointing,¹⁹ one can envisage a change of classroom mood in my slogan: “When teaching children geometry, one is teaching children children”. The slogan emerged from my consideration of the generation of a new ethos of geometry in the context of envisaging a sublation of Husserl’s perspective on geometry.²⁰ It involves a gentle shift of teaching attention. One aims at a concomitance of self-discovery and discovery of geometry, and this in both students and teacher. The slogan, obviously, can be shifted to any zone, to business ethics. It would definitely challenge both the persons and the texts whose mode of presentation is slanted, for example, by Scotist conceptualism. A classroom style to “make conversion a topic and thereby

¹⁸ Lonergan, *A Third Collection*, ed. F.E. Crowe (Mahwah NJ: Paulist Press, 1985), 141.

¹⁹ I am referring to that powerful suggestion in *Method in Theology*, 88, note 34: “At a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feed-back, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective.”

²⁰ The reflection was originally designated as Appendix A of Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic*, ed. Philip McShane, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 18 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). I removed it to satisfy the biased yearning of a publisher’s reader who seemed to consider that it went beyond *haute vulgarization*. It appears as chapter five of McShane, *Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*, Axial Press, Halifax, published February 18, 2002, free of charge, at <http://www.philipmcshane.ca/lackinthebeingstalk.pdf>.

promote it”.²¹

There can, then, be this difference in a business ethics course influenced by the turn to the subject associated with Lonergan. So, business as usual may receive a lift: the insights and adventure of business enterprise can be identified, even cultivated. But what of the ethical dimension? Yes, it too receives a lift: business knows that it has responsibilities, and now it can be more luminous regarding such responsibilities: responsibilities to staff, to customers, to shareholders, to needs of innovation and versatility, to quality, to integral aesthetic needs, to sales management, to environmental conditions etc. And, of course, to regulations of government in regard to taxes and standards.

But is there more to the mediation of Lonergan’s perspective? So we come to the question of the first half of the title. What might I mean by foundational ethics?

It is useful to have a helping diagram, and here the help comes from page 48 of *Method in Theology*. It is I hope a familiar diagram, laying out in a relational structure human capacity and need, present institutions and tasks, and that challenging third line that carries considerations beyond present structures to creative liberty and personal loneliness, institutional possibilities and distant goals. And here we reach the nub of the matter. Challenges of this type may emerge randomly – like Lonergan’s thematic of functional specialization – but they must gradually find operative foundational identity in community. And prior to that effective cultural presence, there must be foundational acknowledgement.

So, I invite you to foundational acknowledgement of a projected and required institution: the institution that would be in place were functional specialization suitably operative.

There are various aspects of this invitation that require pondering and fantasy. In the first place there is a matter of belief. You may well accept Lonergan’s discovery as significant even though you have little idea what its operative cultural presence might be. This certainly was the case in 1965, when Lonergan made the leap for theology, gave hints about it in the following years, wrote it up for the 1969 *Gregorianum*.

²¹ *Method in Theology*, 253.

But since that time, strangely, it has remained as only a vague belief regarding a convenience in thinking personally about theology, not a real assent to a desperate need for an institutional shift in the shabby good of the present order. The heartfelt need that carried Lonergan through the dark decade prior to the discovery is not a shared ethos. I am writing here about “what an existentialist would call an existential category. It is a constitutive component of the group as human. It is an aesthetic apprehension of the group’s origin. The aesthetic apprehension of the group’s origin and story becomes operative whenever the group debates, judges, decides, or acts – and especially in a crisis”.²²

There is no operative apprehension. Further, the crisis is larger than the circumstances of Lonergan’s life allowed him to apprehend. And that larger crisis is a condition of the possibility of the emergence of the missing operative apprehension.

Here is not the place to deal with that larger crisis, with the human group’s need to apprehend its dynamic emergence in these past centuries, the manner in which it strains the present inadequate good of order, the imperatives of a new order. Rather, let us stick with our particular interest as named in the title. What, then, is business ethics?

Business ethics is obviously in the context of business and business studies. And the fundamental, the foundational, crisis of business studies is the generic disorder of those studies.

Later I will focus on some particular disorders of those studies and the concomitant perspective on business practice: the disorder that is grounded in a mythic economic theory; the disorder that has its roots in a failure to grasp the significance of human leisure. But the disorder that I would have us attend to at the moment is the disorder that business studies shares with all other areas of inquiry, a disorder of ordering. It does not take genius to get a sense of this disorder. One has merely to take time around the library journals of business to glimpse unconnectedness, lack of serious orientation, absence of all-

²² Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 10 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 230.

round efficiency and of any overall goal.²³ One might pause in one's library ramble and venture deeper. Are there, as well, "methodological conventions that exclude the heart of the matter"?²⁴ Is there the further flaw that "they labour under the delusion that their inquiry is *voraussetzungslos*"?²⁵ Is there a massive commitment to common sense overlaid with mathematical sophistication? And how does all this affect the entire business department program?

Now my reader may say that this is all very well – indeed all very ill – but what has it got to do with business ethics? And I concede that it may have little to do with business ethics as presently taught, precisely because of some of the flaws listed. A course in business ethics may well be caught up in methodological conventions, indeed the conventions of the current texts.

We are back, then, with the question, What is business ethics? – but now with a normative edge. We are, if you like, on the third line of the diagram of page 48 in *Method*, in the zone of freedom and fantasy. In the zone, even if you don't like [it], of that gloomy section 8 of chapter seven in *Insight*, where the stand against institutionalised dullness and misery centres on freedom and fantasy. "The principle of progress is liberty for the ideas occur to the man on the spot, their only satisfactory expression is their implementation, their only adequate correction is the emergence of further insights; on the other hand, one might as well declare openly that all new ideas are taboo, as require that they be examined, evaluated, and approved by some hierarchy of officials and bureaucrats; for members of this hierarchy possess authority and power in inverse ratio to their familiarity with the concrete situations in which the new ideas emerge; they never know whether or not the new idea will work; much less can they divine how it might be corrected or developed; and since the one thing they dread

²³ I am handing here what I have dealt with at chapter length in other disciplines such as music, linguistics, literary studies, economics. See, for example, *Economics for Everyone: Das Jus Kapital* (Halifax: Axial Press, 1999), chapter five. Perhaps one of my interested readers would venture the same in the present area?

²⁴ *Insight*, 735-6.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 600.

is making a mistake, they devote their energies to paper work and postpone decisions”.²⁶

The lengthy quotation, from the centre of that lengthy gloomy section, seems necessary. It takes massive fantasy to eye, aye, the meaning of decline’s product: “the social situation deteriorates cumulatively”.²⁷ And, to pun terribly, it is not something that the I can behold with an adequacy that is effective, efficient. This, indeed, is the message of that section, which moves forward through the gloom of the major sell-out of the theoretic (7.8.2) to cultures’ entrapment (7.8.5) in “the monster that has stood forth in our day.”²⁸ What is needed is a Cosmopolis (7.8.6) that will sustain the individual effort.

I am not here interested in juggling with religious and non-religious views of Cosmopolis. All I will claim is that a component in Cosmopolis is a shift in method, and that the core of that shift in method is the division of labour talked of by Adam Smith, thematized by Lonergan. This, I would propose, is the foundational business ethic that has emerged in these centuries.

There is a variety of ways of approaching this proposal, but first I suppose it is important to note that it is a proposal, a suggestion, that is an ethical nudge towards implementation. The nudge comes from two directions, and it is worth picking up on the quotation just given to see how the two come together. There is the nudge coming through me from Lonergan, the alternative of adopting a higher viewpoint; there is the nudge of need generated by fragmentation and bias. Business studies in its disorder ferments forward towards partial ordering, but it needs a persuasive confrontation with a potentially full ordering to lift it to an operative higher viewpoint. But notice the broader lift involved. The fresh ethics of order in theology occurred “to the man on the spot” [in theology] “and its only satisfactory expression is its implementation”. Yet there is no sign of that expression within theology, even within theology as an enterprise cultivated by those who claim to respect Lonergan’s perspective. The above

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 259-260.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 254.

²⁸ *Method in Theology*, 40.

lengthy quotation expands on reasons to “postpone decision”. These reasons can be identified as embedded in institutions, roles, tasks, of old ways. So, there emerges a Lonergan tradition that lives lightly within his rediscovery of Aristotelian interiority and meshes its labour with old ways. Lest this be too general and vague, it is worthwhile to pause over the meaning of a single word within Lonergan’s strange new way, the word *Comparison*.²⁹ The new task of dialectics gives the word precise meaning and bids farewell to old style comparisons of Smith and Jones or whatever. Perhaps it might be useful to think of the phlogiston-meaning of the word *combustion* before Lavoisier and then leap to its meaning within the context of Mendeleev. So, in this popular article, I might legitimately compare Keynes’ view of employment with Lonergan’s, but such comparison does not belong in the new context. By illustrations of this type one arrives at a better grasp of “methodological conventions that exclude the heart of the matter”.

This, clearly, is a discomfoting challenge in theology or philosophy. It is part of the task of institutionalising functional specialization in the evil of order that is theology. And here I am focussing on another discomfoting task: a preaching, if you like, of what we as philosophers are not practising. But at least there is a twisted advantage in preaching the division of labour to business: the sermon might begin to echo in our own backyard.

The implementing of my proposal is, then, quite simple: within even an elementary course on business ethics, that large ethic is an essential topic. Bruce Anderson’s work in law illustrates the inclusion. It can be a final topic in a course, pointing to deeper problems and possibilities of present and future business.³⁰ But what of the rest of the course in business ethics? We already considered the lift that the regular course gets from Lonergan’s transcendentals. But a richer course would also drive towards an exposure of present “moral evil”

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 250.

³⁰ Bruce Anderson, *Discovery in Legal Decision-Making* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1996). The final chapter raises the issue of specialization.

and the history of its dialectic genesis. I use the phrase “drive towards” in a loose and popular sense: like the word *Comparison*, *Drive Towards* has a precise meaning in the new context. Perhaps an ambitious course might shift to that precise meaning by beginning the course with the basic ethical issue in business studies: the need for a business-like organisation of that study, identifiable as the eightfold division that Lonergan describes in *Method in Theology*. It is important to pause over my meaning here of *identifiable* and *describe*. Strategically, it might be just as well to avoid introducing the ground of the division: the division is pragmatically suggested by the present mess. Indeed, I would consider arguable that the way to introduce the levels of subjectivity is through the emergence of the fragmentations of study and the divisions that those fragmentations suggest.³¹ Such described divisions would make the consequent drive and exposure more luminous.

My reader is certainly interested in some ideas regarding just what I have in mind when I write of moral evil, “the monster that has stood forth in our day”. But such a venture would be at least book-length, and the book has been available for some time.³² A few pointers in a short article will hardly make a difference. Still, I may have a reader fresh to this perspective, one who might take up that volume of Lonergan and be quite astonished that this man has a following interested in such contemporary agonies as social justice, third world abuse, urban slums, etc., who nonetheless find his solution worth neglecting.

So, a few musings.

I mentioned Keynes and a possible comparison with Lonergan, specifically the comparison of *The General Theory*

³¹ This is in line with my suggestion of pragmatic categories in chapter three of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A New Pragmatism*. I suggest there two categorial grounds: the fact of sensAbility, an undefined bent towards sense acceptable to a range of positions, and the need for division of labour. What I suggest above is merely spelling out one of the effects of this strategy. The division of labour will gradually differentiate the category of sensAbility.

³² I refer to Lonergan’s 1942 *For a New Political Economy*, which is the first third of the book of the same title published by University of Toronto Press, 1999, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 21.

of *Employment* with *For a New Political Economy* of Unemployment. My addition to Lonergan's title no doubt gives you pause. Do I mean that Lonergan tackles the problem of unemployment head-on, to get some new solution that will beat the 'natural rate of unemployment' and give an optimistic twist to the Phillip's Curve? No: I mean that Lonergan has a quite different twist on human life, on the function of production, on progress and profit, on cycles in the economy, on business success, on the rhythms of advertising, on innovation, on subsidiarity, on taxes and government, on export and import, on local autonomies, etc., etc.

How does one arrive at this different twist? There are two ways. One can struggle, somewhat as Lonergan did for fourteen years: "to discover such terms is a lengthy and painful process of trial and error. *Experto crede* [believe me: I've tried and erred!]." ³³ The process may not take that long, since it is a rediscovery through reading Lonergan's work. My own experience – *experto crede* – is that it takes a decade! And when you have had some success, what is the situation? The situation is that there is now Lonergan and you so that instead of *The Silence of the Lambs*, Lonergan putting his work back in his files in 1944, there is the Newfoundland version of the sequel, *Ewes Be Quiet*.

In recent years I have begun to admire increasingly the courage and wisdom of Lonergan in putting his answer to the alchemy of Smith and Ricardo and Keynes back in his files for twenty-four years. ³⁴ He could have wasted his energy trying to

³³ *For a New Political Economy*, 112.

³⁴ Of course he may have thought of it in between. Eric Kierans, who became a minister of finance in a later Canadian government, was given the typescript of *For A New Political Economy* at some later stage with the comment, "this is easier to start on." It seems that what Lonergan passed around originally was the 1944 version, tougher reading but elegantly complete. I recall Kierans admitting to me that he hadn't time then to read that version. The 1942 version from which I did the work of editing, the only one in existence, was in Kierans' possession till 1986, when he passed it on to the Lonergan Research Institute. Scribbled comments on it showed that Kierans had read it but didn't get the point. I mention 24 years above because it was in 1968 that he communicated to me the request to "find an economist" and the '44 typescript: he had been reading Metz and felt that we just couldn't go on like this, with the usual family wage stuff.

break the hold that Keynes' New Deal came to have on the West and now has globally. In the Autumn of 1977, when we worked together to see how he might present his view – basically the 1944 version – in the Spring of 1978, he remarked to me “this is going to take 150 years”.

Well, we are down now to 126 years. It seems that the first way is not going to work; so there is the second way. That is the way on which I have centred attention in this article.³⁵

It seems best to leave it at that, and move to the relevant consideration of my chosen representative text. But a final point is worth noting that brings in the context of Lonergan's reflections in *Phenomenology and Logic* on the role of philosophy. What sort of Queen of sciences and business might philosophy or theology be? The answer lies in a tasting of the meaning of mutual self-mediation, of a new meaning of enlightened self-interest. Business should rule in its own house. But is there some strange sense in which the metaphor of *Queen* might be be sublated into a post-axial reality? Let me place this odd question in a rather prosaic context, the context of the book mentioned already: *Business Ethics in Canada*.³⁶

It seemed to me that a few pointers regarding this text would be helpful towards illustrating the problems to be dealt with in business ethics by those reaching for generalized empirical and hodic method.³⁷ To old hands in the zone, my points may be elementary. But there are also those of you who like what they find in Lonergan, but are not too far into self-tasting. Also I am thinking of those of you who are beginners: either beginning a thesis, or beginning teaching, especially if you have been suddenly landed with the job of teaching business ethics. In either of these scenarios my views, perhaps,

³⁵ In *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism*, chapter five, I add various suggestions regarding strategic implementation of a new context for business and economics, suggestions that need detailed spelling out. So, for instance, there is a much richer ethic of banking and credit waiting in the wings.

³⁶ The title is, of course, the title of the work referred to in note 17.

³⁷ *Hodic* (method) is an adjective I invented to by-pass the clumsiness of the phrase *functional specialist* (method). It has Indo-European roots, but it also echoes a line from the song *Finnegan's Wake*: “to rise in the world he carried a hod.”

are already known. I follow the advice that Lonergan gave me when I was having doctorate doubts in Oxford: give the fellow what he wants and get the union card. This advice applies not only to theses but to teaching. Tenure is, at present, a union card. Corrupt the youth carefully if you wish to survive the hemlock in order to corrupt further. My own experience is that you can teach good stuff from bad texts: you can get the youth to read self-attentively about the massive hold truncated consciousness has on the present academy. But as a beginner, of course – according to both Camus and Zen it takes 10 years to get an idea – you probably have no serious molecular hold on that massive disorientation. Pushing for a better hold is the benefit of teaching according to generalized empirical method. The opposite is to teach from a glibness fostered by chapters two and three of *Method in Theology*: neither teacher nor student gets to grips with the fact that the self-energy of inquiry is much more difficult to investigate than the self-energy of the electron, not at all a first year university topic in physics. This must especially be borne, and slowly born, in mind regarding my *doctrinal* comments to follow.³⁸

My comments are divided into three zones. First, I shall focus on the Introduction by Wilfred Waluchow. Secondly, I turn to the essay by Friedman. Finally, I place the volume in the context of the main challenge of my essay: the move that each of us might make towards promoting the molecular turn to the idea, *die Wendung zur Idee*, that is hodic method. I do not think it is at all necessary to have the book to hand. Each culture or country will have its own version of the text and its own variety of local or continental interests. The zones I focus on are, as you will notice, zones that point towards the problem of international invariants of business progress.

Waluchow's "Introduction: Ethical Theory in Business" runs from page 1 to 37, but my comments are restricted to the first seven general pages and to pages 28-30, where he deals all too briefly with feminist ethics. Why I limit my reflections to

³⁸ This is a huge and hugely important topic. Systematic and Doctrinal understandings are as different as climbing and map-reading. *Insight* is a doctrinal book; *Method in Theology* is doctrinal writing cut back to a level of description.

these ten pages will gradually emerge.

There are all sorts of subtle ways of approaching these ten pages. At its loftiest the task becomes a matter of struggling for a pure formulation of content and context, this task and role, moreover, sublated into the precision of differentiation given by the stumbling institution of hodic procedure. But I mention this only to slide past it into luminous *haute vulgarization*.³⁹

The cultural context is one of a truncatedness which is almost irremedial. Serious thinkers like Piaget, Voegelin, Langer did not escape this truncation, and perhaps the point is to notice that one's own living is in this context. Do not presuppose a post-axial luminous liberation in yourself too easily. Certainly, do not be too unkind to the struggling community of ethicicians represented by Waluchow. This axial period of increasing and crippling truncation could well run another 500 years. But at least we should and even might be wiser, through some descriptive historical consciousness of 'the third time round': Aristotelianism, Thomism, Lonerganism.

There are a host of other -isms, but my focus is on a peculiar bent in and of subjectivity to be found in the originators of these three -isms. Later studies, especially from an integral feminist perspective, will reveal flaws in these founders' searchings, flaws related to fragmented consciousness, but the positive side of their searching is a focussed radicalness that edges towards integrity and integrality. Neither the positive nor the negative aspects of these men are enlarged on here: I wish rather to emphasise context.

I wrote above about the cultural context in its truncatedness, and mentioned an axial period that may cling to that truncatedness for some time to come. So it seems as well to raise now the problem of cultural context in its fullness. What might I mean by that? I do not wish to enter here into my perspective on the Axial Period, a notion that sublates Jaspers' view of the short global period 600 B.C. – 200 B.C. into

³⁹ See pp. 121 and 155 of *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). There is the irony of the volume representing Lonergan's entrapment in patterns of *vulgarization*.

Loneragan's reachings for an understanding of two times of the temporal subject, three stages of meaning, and a long cycle of decline.⁴⁰ And perhaps I might recall here a little book that impressed me in the early seventies, when I was still struggling with Jaspers' narrow view of axiality: Elaine Morgan's *The Descent of Woman*.⁴¹ My larger view of axiality is of a descent into fragmentation that may well be associated with the emergence of written language, and later with patriarchy, but at all events it broadens Jaspers' period to a length of at least five thousand years – the number is symbolic rather than accurate (perhaps 6666 would be better), but I would note that the end of the period is not yet in sight. Could the end be in view, if not in sight, in a deeper radical feminism?

There is spontaneous human subjectivity, inarticulate but integral. One may think of the distant primitive, but there is also the present, if disappearing, bush-tribe. I am not writing of some primitive savage as noble and innocent: but at least the savagery, as well as the nurturing, was integral. The axial period is a period of fragmentation. Regularly I take the emergence of Greek drama as an illustration here: the transition from the relative integrality of Aeschylus and Sophocles to the fragmentation of Euripides, regarded as the paternal parent of Western drama. Obviously such illustrating needs meshing into the concrete weave of decay, the longer cycle of decline: a hodic task. But let me ramble on in vague suggestiveness.

Perhaps a good starting point is a drawing of attention to the non-integral meaning of key words in the writing of Waluchow: words such as *question*, *concept*, *term*, *principle*.

⁴⁰ The relevant texts for the three features mentioned are, respectively, Lonergan, *Quaestio XXI* of *De Deo Trino II: Pars Systematica*, Gregorian University Press, 1964, to appear as volume 9 of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*; *Method in Theology*, section 10 of chapter three; *Insight*, section 8 of chapter seven.

⁴¹ My Bantam edition is dated 1973, but I presume it has been republished many times. I cannot help recalling here the view of another impressive lady, even though fictional. Molly Bloom soliloquizes: "I don't care what anybody says it'd be much better for the world to be governed by the women in it you wouldn't see women going and killing one another and slaughtering..." *Ulysses* (New York: Random House, 1986), 640.

When Waluchow writes “questions concerning the ethics of business – i.e. business ethics – are significant” (p.1: I am avoiding unnecessary footnoting here), does he really *mean* question? What are questions? Are they not human molecular upsurgings? I am reminded of Kurt Goedel’s nickname as a child: *Herr Warum*. Yet *Herr Warum*, for all his searchings of the questions of incompleteness theorems, somehow was absent from his own nickname, from the question as obviously his, deeply his, radically him. And I can wander back in the axial period to the same missed point, mist point, in Arjuna’s *Bhagavad-Gita* question to Krishna, “What is man?” The question is its own answer, a Molly Bloom concluding *Ulysses*’ ramblings with “yes I said yes I will yes”. Then the questions of business ethics are the women who cling to Indian trees, the men with limp ties to pseudo-success, the children school-abused and labour-slaved.

And what does the word *concept* mean in this article, indeed in most of this text? There is a conception and a birth that is part of womanhood as a reality or a possibility. Is there any parallel between this slow integral conception and the conception that relates to the word *concept*, or indeed to the words, *term*, *principle*? Mothers can identify with such phrases as *the term of a pregnancy* or *oneself as principle of the child*. Do these meanings have anything in common with the meanings in the text? Those incarnate meanings seem very remote from a discourse about “clarifying the terms of moral debate” (1) or “examining the fit of moral principles” (1). More broadly, what is this “desire for clarity of thought” (2) that Waluchow writes of? Does it somehow parallel a quest for conception?

On a presently dominant view, an establishment view, concepts result from swift impregnations of sensibility. The job is done, even if there remain problems of clarifying. On a non-establishment view, concepts are the result of an integral nurturing of sensAbility, of the molecules and nerves that are the bones and blood of our images and fantasies. The concept slowly emerges, almost as a second self, a pleasing bloodied presence. It is a self-justifying presence.

This is a world of suffering and meaning that is quite

foreign to the first seven pages of the text we are considering, so superficially. We cannot delay, gestating: I must leap to the end of the seven pages to note the bold super-capitals, **SOME BASIC CONCEPTS**. The text here begins: “before examining the theories of Kant and Mill, and Ross, and Aristotle and the feminists, we should look at some basic terminology”. (7) What in human’s name is going on, going forward,⁴² here? Certainly, one can set up terminology in some way that corresponds to a pre-Linnean classification of flowers, suitable names relating to sufficiently distinguishable realities. But that does not seem to do justice to the implicit claim in the text. In the text we are into the serious business of solid summary familiar to anyone who has suffered through a conventional first-year university textbook.

Earlier in the text Waluchow remarks that “it is a serious mistake to think that morality is exhausted by conventional norms or that moral justification ends with the invocation of a conventional rule. The norms must always be subject to critical moral scrutiny”. (3) Indeed it is, a serious mistake. But what I am getting at here is a long-term gross mis-take that perhaps echoes the mis-take on evolution conveyed by the corrective title *The Descent of Woman*. There are conventional norms about thinking about norms that are grossly inadequate and inefficient. There are conventions of critical scrutiny that are scholarly in the worst sense, an established patriarchal inheritance. But if there has been a mis-take of such proportion, summary is not a solution. Still, I can quote Waluchow meaningfully, with a new reach for the heart of the matter, the heart of the *mater*. “Most feminists are opposed to the search for the abstract, universalizable principles and rules with which to answer everyone’s moral questions.” (29) There is something deeply wrong with this search and with its conventional findings. Can the opposition breath and breed life into the search?

I find it useful here, anticipating my next zone of discussion of this text, to quote a lady who lived in an

⁴² There is here of course the full question of hodic history; but one can also smell with common knows the brutal nominalism of standard first-year university texts in many fields.

ambiguity of loyal opposition. In a short text, which was certainly not promoted by the establishment,⁴³ she took a courageous stand regarding economic theory, “It is time to go back to the beginning and start again”.⁴⁴ But the sad fact is, and this is key, that she did not begin again. She began with father Ricardo. “Far more than Quesnay, he deserves the title of the father of modern economics, for he devised the method of analysis which we know as setting up a model”.⁴⁵ And so her critical perspective on Keynes was warped, doomed.

What is my point? Perhaps Susan Sherman can give an ambivalent lead. “Most women experience the world as a complex web of interdependent relations, where responsible caring for others is implicit in their moral lives. The abstract reasoning of morality that centres on the rights and duties of independent agents is inadequate for the moral reality in which they live. Most women find that a different model for ethics is necessary; the traditional ones are not persuasive”.⁴⁶ The *complex web* brings us back and forward to the issue and importance of context. What I am trying to do here is to raise the questing to its fullest molecularity of context. What is it “to go back to the beginning and start again” either in economics or in ethics? It is almost to try the impossible and it is no wonder that Susan Sherman trips. Joan Robinson tripped in respecting Ricardo’s bent towards model-building. Susan Sherman writes of the need for a new model. No: we do not

⁴³ An account of Robinson’s problems is given in Marjorie S. Turner, *Joan Robinson and the Americans* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990).

⁴⁴ Joan Robinson and John Eatwell, *An Introduction to Modern Economics* (London: McGraw Hill, 1973), 52.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 11. In a lengthier treatment I would certainly give space to a contemporary mother of economics, Jane Jacobs, to whom Lonergan referred as “Mrs Insight.” In a letter to me of some years ago she acknowledged that she had not delved into Lonergan’s view but remarked “I’ve just been pondering your explanation of the difference between operative and redistributive events, an understanding which is so much needed. Our business papers typically treat redistributive activity of many kinds as if it were the Big and Important News.” Stock trading, in spite of idiot media coverage, is not at all at the heart of business.

⁴⁶ Susan Sherman, “Ethics, ‘Feminine Ethics’, and Feminist Ethics”, in Debra Shogan, ed., *A Reader in Feminist Ethics* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 1993), 10.

need a new model either in ethics or in economics. We need to go back, beyond, forward, to some radical newness.

Let me begin – that dangerous word – with the issue of ethics. The radical newness is in the future and the task for the feminine is to “Remember the Future” in a way that cuts to the nerves and neurons within women that could redeem words and phrases, full stops and question marks. It must employ an new grammar of descent, a descent of woman that is an assent to the complex web that is the life-weave of women. I borrow the phrase “Remembering the Future” from an essay on J.M. Synge, but these are double-edged words, calling in also a Proustian remembrance of times past.⁴⁷ The essay on Synge focuses on the challenge of de-colonising language, a topic that I have been implicitly raising all through this section. We have, at the centre of this decolonisation challenge, the task of rescuing the real parts of speech from the eight parts that ground abstractive abuse. How are we to do that? I would look with hope to a new radical feminism, a femininity that searches the hearts of speech.⁴⁸

I cannot emphasise enough how novel the findings and language might be. I wrote of it twenty years ago in terms of Joyce’s *Ulysses* episode “Oxen of the Sun”, an episode in a maternity hospital dealing in tandem with the evolution of language and the birth of a child. What I wrote then has taken on enormously more significance for me in the past decade. I can, perhaps, point forward a little by asking you, Do you feel a new skin tone in the achievement of a serious conception? What words might we use for that instead of that dead word *concept*? Again, I think of Gabriel’s failure in “The Dead”: the

⁴⁷ “Remembering the Future” is the title of the chapter on Synge in Declan Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland: The Literature of the Modern Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). The abundant references in the index to *colonization* are well worth following up in relation to the present topic.

⁴⁸ Even without the reach of fantasy that the next paragraph seeks to stir, there are evident points of attack on present staleness, for example, in battling towards a fresh meaning of *attention*. Female attention has quite a different molecularity and neurology than its male counterpart. Attention to this attention would shift massively the slim descriptions given by Lonergan in chapter three of *Method in Theology*.

meaning of his wife escapes him. Perhaps we need to redeem words like *concept*, *term*, *judgment*, *question*, *desire*, *interest*, *planning*,⁴⁹ *love*? Or perhaps we need a new Babel, beyond *Finnegans Wake*, a new breeding? In mentioning Babel I am recalling the central character, Isaac Babel, of my little book, *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism*. The frontispiece, perhaps, gives the mood of the new search, the new beginning: "Gorky called me into his office, and what he said to me there decided my fate. 'There are small nails,' he said, 'and there are nails as large as my finger,' and he brought his long powerful, delicate chiselled finger up to my eyes. 'A writer's path, dear dreamer, is strewn with nails, mostly of the larger sort. You will have to walk upon them barefoot and they'll make you bleed. And with each year the blood will flow more freely. If you are a weak man they'll buy and sell you, harass you and lull you to sleep, and you will wilt while pretending to be a tree in bloom. But for an honest man, an honest writer and revolutionary, to travel this path is a great honour; and it is for this arduous journey, my friend, that I give you my blessing.'"⁵⁰

⁴⁹ The transposition of the meaning of *planning* is a central task of the new economics. The new meaning will be almost a non-planning, a heuristics of collaboration altogether closer to jazz grouping than to pre-programmed symphonic performance. It was such a heuristics that Lonergan had in mind sixty years ago when he wrote of democratic economics, but perhaps his sad little appeal of 1953 is worth quoting from: the quotation centres on the heading "Planned Society". "Obviously, if men are just aggregates of small knobs, then experts are needed to do their thinking for them, popularisers are needed to tell them what has been thought for them, social engineers are needed to condition them to like it, planners are needed to tell them what to do, and organizers are needed to get them to do it in the right way... Education ceases to transmit a culture that passes judgment on society and becomes an ever more efficiently organized department of bureaucratic government. One is assured that in due time the world will be a paradise of prosperity, security and peace. But, while men wait for the utopia promised by universal organization, there are wars, transplanted populations, refugees, displaced persons, unemployment, outrageous inequalities in living standards, the legalized robbery of devalued currencies, and the vast but somewhat hidden numbers of the destitute." Lonergan, "Respect for Human Dignity", *The Canadian Messenger of the Sacred Heart*, Toronto, July, 1953, 415-6.

⁵⁰ Isaac Babel, *The Beginning*, quoted in James E. Falen, *Isaac Babel*,

There is a sense, then, in which I am asking for a Donna Quixote to face an arduous journey, to reach into a pre-axial depth, a memory of compact consciousness, and begin to virgin-birth a decolonisation of language that would be a fresh feminist anthropology.⁵¹ I am asking, perhaps for a new and dedicated loneliness reminiscent and sublational of Hermione's molecular yearnings: "Ah Harry, we have to stumble through so much dirt and humbug before we reach home. And we have no one to guide us. Our only guide is our homesickness".⁵²

The guidance of our homesickness and the imaging of our destiny are perhaps not too remote from each other, but I expect that my reader, even if she be a Christian feminist, may be surprised that I would risk a paragraph here on trinitarian theology. Clearly, however, what I have been saying has relevance there. The divine first person was historically thought of as Father, but the agony and the ecstasy of the eternal conception-birth of a second person – not eternally male – is best imaged by the homesickness of the woman. A glib processional analysis needs to be sublated into a glorious umbilicality. Might I add too that Thomas, for all his odd views on women, has some startlingly open things to say about divine incarnation?⁵³ Any grouping of divine persons might become human any number of times. Further, I like to throw my hat among the papal pigeon by reflecting on the curious possibility of the second coming of the second person being female. But would this be the same Person that suffered under Pontius Pilate? Yes. The second Person of the divinity suffered under Pontius Pilate. Food for thought. More prosaically and generally, it seems to me that Thomas' regular reflections on *convenientia*, convenience, have to be recontextualised by

Russian Master of the Short Story (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1974), 19.

⁵¹ I recall the tone of the works of women like Ruth Benedict and Margaret Meade in the last century, but this is a deeper and larger venture. Also it should reach into all the sciences to change the meaning of *science*, to make science a pursuit and achievement of integral consciousness. Perhaps the tone is intimated a little by the suggestiveness of the title of the botanical study, "Sunflower, Speak to Us of Growing." See note 9, above.

⁵² Hermann Hesse, *Steppenwolf* (London: Penguin, 1965), 179.

⁵³ *Summa Theologica* III, question 3.

axial considerations, so that the convenience of a single-Person male incarnation within the axial period of history resonates with our gendered and sexual homesickness.⁵⁴

And what of economics? There is here no room for the type of abstractive thinking that mistakenly leaves out what it (he?) calls the inessential. A future metaeconomics, like a future metaphysics, cannot dodge the complex web. Metaeconomics and economics, like the metatennis of the Williams sisters, must strive to be a mesh of concrete anticipations.

If it seems to me that Aristotle, at his concrete best in his ethics, and Lonergan, in his core achievement on both economics and metaphysics, were on the right track, still, both wrote from limited contexts and in a style that allowed partially legitimate doctrine to foster what I call the *doctrinaire disease*. Theirs is a language that allows post-systematic meaning to pose as wisdom, that allows a control of words that parallels the control a London taxi-driver has over London: she or he can get around the streets while missing the heart of the city. One can follow Leopold Bloom round the Dublin of *Ulysses* with a standard map; one can struggle to keep track of Molly's molecule-speech that, at the end, falls on Leopold's sleeping ears; but only a mad circulatorix can follow Anna Livia round the globe of *Finnegans Wake*.⁵⁵ But how do we follow through

⁵⁴ "The sexual extravagance of man, unparalleled in the animals, has its ultimate ground in St. Augustine's 'Thou hast made us for thyself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee.'" Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," *Collection*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 49. Unfortunately, as Lonergan remarks in the same article, "theologians, let alone parents, rarely think of the historical process" (47). Not thinking of oneself biohistorically is, however, a massive categorial defect.

⁵⁵ The Irish novelist Edna O'Brien remarked that no woman novelist has emerged that could deal with male consciousness as Joyce does with female consciousness in Molly's soliloquy. Jung's view was that perhaps the devil's grandmother might do what Joyce did. Where will our search lead us? Humanity is not at an end but at a beginning. Northrop Frye wrote, "The forms we have been isolating in fiction, and which depend for their existence on the commonsense dichotomies of the daylight consciousness, vanish in *Finnegans Wake* into a fifth and quintessential form." *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 314.

from *Finnegans Wake*?

I leave that question in your molecules and turn now to the short, and perhaps already familiar, essay by Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits” (43-7) Here I wish only to home in on a single point: the meaning of *social*. Does that meaning include also, in some way, a meaning that is economic? Friedman remarks that “the discussions of the ‘social responsibilities of business’ are notable for their analytic looseness and lack of rigour.” In pursuing this flaw Friedman concentrates on the acceptable notion that only persons have responsibilities: one can follow down that track, as Friedman does, without raising the issue that is my concern. So, one nurses a convenient analytic looseness of the meaning of ‘social responsibility’. And that analytic looseness – or could it be three-card trickery? – allows Friedman to home in on profit-making as a central reason for doing business.

I would insist that we are in deep water here. To do business is to belong to an exchange economy, even if what is exchanged is only a shell: and I might add that in such a primitive situation Friedman’s principle would seem to add up to the notion that the point of doing business is the accumulation of shells. Wittgenstein could perhaps go to town on this: is business a game, like playing marbles? Did Friedman go into the business of economics in order to gain rather than loose marbles, or is there more to it? Why did Friedman write this essay? To gain more marbles? We must assume that Friedman means more than gaining rather than losing his marbles.

And why do we read Friedman’s article, or put it up-front in such a volume as this? Is it not because Friedman is considered to have the right to an informed opinion on economics? His name is ‘out there’ not merely for his suggestions about monetary expansion. Perhaps he writes, and we read, because we suspect that there is such a reality as economic science?

And is not this the reason why Friedman writes about profit maximisation? If profit maximisation is not somehow an economic good, then we are back to playing marbles within some Darwinian daftness.

What, then, has profit maximisation to do with economic process and progress? One can leap immediately to the possibility of growth, of expansion, of investment, of invention and innovation. But the leap, if scrutinised slowly and carefully, plunges us right into the problem of the analytic looseness that is my central concern. And that, far from being a walk in the park, is the issue that has haunted two centuries of relatively loose economic thinking. Profit maximisation is certainly one reason to engage in business within an exchange economy, and it is one of many. There is, for instance, the reason of avoiding starvation. The accumulation of such reasons ground in practice the success or the horror of the coincidence of decisions to exchange.

“What causes the coincidence of decisions to exchange? Undoubtedly there are causes, but the causes are infinite. There is the whole realm of truth and the far larger realm of possible error. There is the stimulus of desire and of fear, of ambition and of passion, of temperament and of sentiment. At any given time or place any of these may be more prominent: desire plays a large role in free countries, and fear plays a large role in others; ambition presses forward the new citizens of new lands, and a sullen hopelessness presses further down the depressed classes of senile states; nationalist sentiment dominates with protection, and phlegmatic individualism with free trade. But neither the folklore of popular beliefs, the mythologies of antiquated science, nor the psychology of national and ethnic groups is of concern to any economic science, and least of all to an economic generalisation. Accordingly we dismiss the causes of decisions to exchange, with one exception. That exception is obvious. Economic science itself has to exert an influence on decisions to exchange.”⁵⁶

Economic science would, presumably, involve an understanding of economic process. Alas, the presumption is at present wrong, massively and disastrously wrong. And that was and is the point of Lonergan’s struggle, to get it right. Friedman does not understand the economic process, nor does any inheritor of the mantle of Keynes.

This is an audacious and provocative statement. It echoes

⁵⁶ *For a New Political Economy*, 30.

the title of the book, *Beyond Establishment Economics: No Thank You, Mankiw*.⁵⁷ Like the book against Mankiw (which, of course, rhymes with ‘thank you’) it is meant to annoy, to provoke. But the statement cannot be backed up here. However, at least I can note that the statement represents the perspective of some respectable dissenters. Neither Drucker nor Heilbroner think that Keynes had the economic process figured out: they prefer Schumpeter’s work of a century ago.⁵⁸ And Schumpeter’s view of Keynes’ efforts is just as audacious as mine.⁵⁹ But I prefer Lonergan to Schumpeter, however magnificent Schumpeter’s effort: we are back at the question of analytic looseness.

Lonergan escapes the analytic looseness by tackling the problem of understanding economic process in an integral manner that, I would hope, will gain respect through the efforts of a feminism that disdains the abstractness of economic modelling, whether that of Keynes’ manipulation of interest rates or that of World Bank manipulations of pseudo-growth or that of Friedman’s manipulation of money supply. All are just silly solutions to an aggregate of concrete problems of local innovations and global exchanges. It is a silliness that grounds global disarray: my central image of the destructive arrogance comes from a television vision last year of the two men, George Bush and Alan Greenspan, shoulder to shoulder in their ignorance of economic process, juggling with ungrounded centralist policies.

But there is the consequent smaller analytic looseness that was the initial focus. If the word *social* does not include *economic* in the phrase ‘the social responsibility of business’ then Friedman has no more authority than a non-economist in the matter. Business ethics is then just ethics *in* business, and

⁵⁷ Bruce Anderson and Philip McShane, (Halifax: Axial Press, 2002).

⁵⁸ Peter Drucker, “Schumpeter and Keynes,” *Forbes*, May 23, 1983, 124-28; Robert Heilbroner, “Was Schumpeter Right After All?,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (1993), 87-96.

⁵⁹ Schumpeter wrote a biting critical review of Keynes’ *General Theory* on its appearance in *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, December, 1936, 791-95. It is reproduced in Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Essays*, ed. Richard V. Clemence (London: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 160-64. The review is well worth a visit.

that ethics is bred by the non-economic virtues of business persons.

Does Friedman not, then, have a sort of three-card trick? The social responsibility of business persons is evidently no different from that of persons in other roles, task, institutions. The responsibility that Friedman identifies is one that springs from his economic perspective. He lays it on us like a Sinai tablet, to be swallowed as bible. Profit maximisation is an ungrounded maxim of a muddle of economic thinking that goes back to way before Adam Smith.

Might I add hints of the better view that lurks in Schumpeter's early work and in Loneragan's sustained effort of the 1930s? Any business person knows that a business must yield not just a living – for those at the top a very good living – but a surplus that covers maintenance.

That is a necessary surplus. It is necessary in a non-expanding business or economy. What of an expanding economy? In such an economy there has to be another type of surplus, an innovation surplus. Non-abstractive analysis of real business reveals that this surplus is associated with ideas that mediate the expansive production of non-consumer goods that, with a lag, ground the provision of consumer goods. Non-abstractive analysis reveals, further, that the mediation and the lag give rise to oscillations in the innovative surplus so that there are rhythmic recurrences of the shrinkage of innovative surplus income. That revealing analysis would expose Friedman's maxim as just a gross unthinking, unanalytic, mistake, one that costs dearly in terms of the growth of the supply of consumer goods, the growth of global well-being.

The key word here is *would*. Schumpeter and Loneragan in the first half of the last century invited the tough thinking that *would reveal*. Omerod can now write, expressing the mood of many, of *The Death of Economics*. But his suggestions for reform just do not cut it. However, he makes a valid point that is important in the present context. "It may be said in passing that, in the market for strategic advice, the revealed preference of companies is to use management consultants and business school academics rather than economic theorists. The former group tend to have few, if any, theoretical preconceptions, and

draw instead on a wide range of practical experience.”⁶⁰ Businesses, I suspect, are not enamoured by contemporary macro- and micro-economics. The mention of such stuff may merely bring back memories of memory work in compulsory economics courses. Businesses certainly have to keep an eye on interest rates, the more so in businesses with long turnover periods. Curiously, or not so curiously, turnover analysis is not at all central to economic analysis.⁶¹ Indeed, the economic analysis of the standard textbook is quite a comic abstraction.⁶²

But from such comic and monstrous abstraction there comes hope. It is the hope for a business ethics that could emerge to displace the death-hold of establishment economics.

Business ethics *qua* business centres on the social responsibilities that are purely economic, that relate to making the whole business, the whole of business, work in a way that does credit to it, in a way that gives *credit* an old richness. But how is such a business ethics to emerge, to emerge moreover as democratic? Certainly, there is the hope that the analysis of business, suggested by Schumpeter and Lonergan, would be undertaken and slowly implemented. Not a very pragmatic hope at present: witness the last century of narrow mindlessness. So I return to my serious hope that business

⁶⁰ Paul Omerod, *The Death of Economics* (London: Faber and Faber, 1994), 57.

⁶¹ Check the indices of texts. Mark Blaug asks, “Why is the quantity theory of money the oldest surviving problem in economics?” *The Quantity Theory of Money from Locke to Keynes and Friedman* (Brookfield VT: Edward Edgar Publishers, 1995), chapter 2. I would claim that it can only be solved by precise turnover analysis. For Lonergan’s solution see the Appendix to either McShane, *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2002), or Anderson and McShane, *Beyond Establishment Economics: No Thank You, Mankiw* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2002).

⁶² Recently, while lecturing in Austin, Texas on economics, I took the opportunity to check locally-used textbooks. There was little or nothing about the large economic area, Texas, in the texts. See chapter five of *Pastkeynes* for pointers towards restructuring of economic thinking. There is, for example, a clear need for the development of a study I would call *meso-economics*. It would investigate local rhythms of economic behaviour in a way that would transpose various efforts of Jane Jacobs and throw light on the movements described in Michael Barratt Brown, *Africa’s Choice: After Thirty Years of the World Bank*, New York, Penguin Press, 1995.

studies would expand and differentiate its scope and methods. For instance, to Schumpeter's massive history of economy theory there must be added the history – contra-factual as well as factual – of economic practice. That history will generate eventually a dialectics of practice that will be rich in detailed and local suggestions, quite unlike silly 3% abstractions of the Friedman style, silly fractional percentages of Greenspan. Eventually? In this century? "Is my proposal utopian? It asks merely for creativity, for an interdisciplinary theory that at first will be denounced as absurd, then will be admitted to be true but obvious and insignificant, and perhaps finally be regarded as so important that its adversaries will claim that they themselves discovered it".⁶³

It is time to bring my weaving reflections to a compact conclusion. Oddly, I recalled this morning, as I faced this task of ending, being asked by Fred Lawrence about twenty five years ago – it was the Boston Workshop in which I presented the weaving spiralling paper "Instrumental Acts of Meaning and Fourth-Level Specialization"⁶⁴ – about the weave of my style. I am closer now to a clear answer, one that is clear to me, one that might be obscurely clear to an integral subject with a sense of "the complex web". Clarity on the difference between doctrine and system was still twenty years away from me then; clarity on the nature of *vulgarization*, both *haute* and in various layers of *culture*, still eludes me: I shall struggle with it and intimate directions of clarity when I bring together *Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*. But perhaps you can see the connection my obscurity has to the problem of integral feminism? "Women's enterprise in patriarchal culture might be the excavation and confrontation of the Uncanny".⁶⁵ Elsewhere I put that problem of feminist criticism in the fuller context of functional specialization, the context of my present

⁶³ Lonergan, *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 15 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 106.

⁶⁴ Later published as the fourth chapter of *The Shaping of the Foundations* (Washington: University Press of America, 1976).

⁶⁵ Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, "The Mirror and the Vamp: Reflections on Feminist Criticism," in Ralph Cohen, ed. of *The Future of Literary Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 144-66, at 158.

considerations.⁶⁶ But it is no harm to give here a sense of the detailed struggle demanded by that criticism. So I recall a favourite instance of mine. “To investigate women and the piano nocturne in the nineteenth century is to uncover stories of devaluation and sometimes outright exclusion – but also to discover intimations of individual voices questioning the patriarchal tradition”.⁶⁷ So, one must meet with one’s mind and muscles and molecules Clara Weick (Clara Schumann) in her *Notturmo*, *op.6, no. 2*, or Fanny (Mendelson) Hensel in her *G-minor Notturmo*.⁶⁸

However, I must return to my general – yet totally concrete – pointing. For me the Uncanny is to be associated with the Unappreciated. I use the word *Unappreciated* – or any word you prefer – rather than the word *Unknown* (is this a patriarchally-possessed word?) – because I am thinking (another dangerous word) of our molecular yearnings, our molecules reaching for the music, all music. Perhaps you, like I, are lucky in having been *con-fronted* with the integral uncanny at some stage in your life? My luck was to be enthralled by the music of Frederick Chopin through my early teen years, with hours of struggle especially with his *Ballades*.⁶⁹ Have you been so blessed? Do you read, with enthralled resonance, as I did very recently, the following passage from George Steiner: “A solo voice, out of sight, arching from the dark or from the quiet of morning, can transmute the space, the density, the perceived tenor of the world ... [music] that breaks the heart ... a Monteverdi lament, the oboes in a Bach cantata, a Chopin ballade”.⁷⁰ And do you re-cognize the larger music he intimates: “Certain masters of exact hearing and of linguistic phrasing – of those tonal,

⁶⁶ See *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2002), 65.

⁶⁷ Jeffrey Kahlberg, *Chopin at the Boundries. Sex, History and Musical Genre* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 60.

⁶⁸ See Kahlberg, 30-61.

⁶⁹ My early meeting with Chopin was followed much later by my meeting of George Sand. The two great Georges of the nineteenth century are, for me, not British Monarchs but Sand and Evans (George Eliot).

⁷⁰ George Steiner, *Errata: An Examined Life* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), 73.

rhythmic, harmonic lineaments in spoken and written speech which imply some kinship to music – are able to evoke, with tantalising proximity, the actual effects of music on consciousness. Proust, for example, on ‘Vinteuil’s sonata’; Joyce throughout *Ulysses*; Thomas Mann in his *Faustus*.⁷¹ And are we not close to the bone, indeed the bone of my contention, with the brief claim, “Our poetry is haunted by the music it has left behind.”⁷² Does this line, within this magnificent essay on music, not capture the integral yearning that we have been focussed on? But how, and for whom?

I spoke yesterday of this essay with a former leader of a symphony orchestra: yes, he had lived with this essay as an echo of his meaning. And I have no doubt that that great lady of music, Nadia Boulanger, would find in it her home.⁷³ But I would contend that such excellence is not adequate to our times. For some cultured few, such a wink is certainly as good as a nod, but good only in a limited and restricted sense. This is a difficult point, in need of patient pondering. One might contextualise the pondering with the diagram from page 48 of *Method in Theology*: then one can identify such writing as part of the present insufficient good of order. Some will be shocked by my associating with such writing the critical writing of my two favourite contemporary Irish poets: Seamus Heaney and Brendan Kennelly. Much of their writing is spot on, and I have quoted it as such.⁷⁴ So, Kennelly writes of the *Journey into Joy* of some of our Irish writers in a manner “that breaks the heart”. For instance, he sums up journey beautifully with four lines from Patrick Kavanagh, which I quote here *by heart*:

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 66. In the text mentioned, note 66 above, I raise the issue of a full *hauntology* that would sublate the work of Derrida: it would merge with the transposition that is pointed to in these concluding remarks.

⁷³ Nadia was central to my writing of *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young Christian Minders*, Mt. St. Vincent University, 1989, available in 2002 on the Axial Website, www.philipmcshane.ca free of charge.

⁷⁴ But also I have tried to bring out a contrast, perhaps most substantially in the contrast between Heaney’s efforts in the nineteen nineties and my own, captured in the difference of our two titles, Heaney’s *The Redress of Poetry* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995) and my own *The Redress of Poise*, 1996, available free, 2002, on the Axial Press Website.

All true poets laugh inwardly
 Out of grief-born intensity
 Suffering soars on summer air
 The millstone has become a star.⁷⁵

What, then, can I mean by saying that it is not good enough, enough good? What I have been saying here of integral consciousness is said so *magnificently* in the line, “our poetry is haunted by the music it has left behind”.

But if one is to be radical one has to go further. “Study of an organism begins from the thing-for-us, from the organism as exhibited to our senses”.⁷⁶ So too, self-study of the organism that is the yearning musey-self⁷⁷ begins also in poetic intensity, perhaps an echo of primitive first words. But if the community, local or global, is to reach adequately beyond present fragmented and botched good, some, called anciently wise, which I might now designate as Ken Missteries, must move beyond, down that decade-long page in *Insight*, in “grief-born intensity” to discover the music left behind in our best poetry. Without that inward kenning laughter our best poetry will generate conventions, and our conventions and gatherings will become slums.⁷⁸

I am writing about, appealing for,⁷⁹ the struggle towards a slice of the terminal value, the first word of metaphysics, uttering utterly molecular yearnings in a transposition of Rilke’s “first word” that springs from lived integral memories. “For the memories are not important. Only when they have changed into our very blood, into glance and gesture, and are

⁷⁵ Brendan Kennelly, *Journey into Joy*, ed. Ake Persson (Newcastle: Bloodaxe Books, 1994), 209, quoting Patrick Kavanagh’s *Prelude*.

⁷⁶ *Insight*, 489.

⁷⁷ “This is the way to the musey room.” Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* (New York: Penguin, 1976), 8.

⁷⁸ The reader familiar with the conclusion of chapter three of *Method in Theology* will recognise here an echo of those pages that reflect on the decay of the Greek aesthetic into the conventions of Roman verse and slowly on into the slums of the West.

⁷⁹ I am merely repeating the neglected appeal of Lonergan, in the central paragraph of p. 287 of *Method in Theology*, not to leave the early chapters of that book trapped in description, but rather to reach into the molecular self for a larger and vital self-taste.

nameless, no longer to be distinguished from ourselves – only then can it happen that in some very rare hour the first word of a poem arises in their midst and goes forth from them”.⁸⁰

And for the metaphysician, the Ken Misstery, the central birth-issues are the Strategiks and the *implementators* that would reveal the millstone and our molecules as star-glazed.

We are back to the heart of the matter. Only the hodic enterprise can shift seriously the statistics of implementation, of rescuing globally the melody in the heart. And in the long run, that enterprise will spiral forth with higher probabilities if we luminously accept the hodic way as the global heart of our reaching. Can that long run be shortened? It seems to me that there is a shift of statistics to be associated with a radical feminism, a brand of Ken Misstery that cannot be patient with the researching, interpretation and history that would ferment forward a fuller foundations of sensAbility, that would cultivate not models but molecules. I recall the theologian Harnack remarking that men have been dressed in work-clothes for centuries. Suits and uniforms hold our hearts hostage, warp brutally our exchanges, lay waste our buying and selling. Might it not be possible for a radical feminism to sense deeply past the recent millennia, perhaps with random dialectic, to find in their molecular hearts what we have shrunk out of our words, our poems, our production processes? The finding could, mustard-wise, leave business walking, or waltzing, on quite different streets.

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⁸⁰ *The Selected Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke*, ed. and trans. Stephen Mitchell (New York: Vintage, 1982), 93. I have discussed this problem more fully in “Thoughts, Tongues and Times: The Drive of Foundations”, chapter four of *A Brief History of Tongue*.