A Phenomenological Argument for Realism

Denis Seron


Metaphysical concerns occupy a central place in Ludwig Landgrebe’s thought.1
To a large extent, it is a contribution to metaphysics that he read and appropriated
Husserl’s work. Already in 1933’s “The method of Edmund Husserl’s
phenomenology,” one of his very first publications, he claims that the most
central aim of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is to pave the route for a
“universal philosophical science.” Later, Landgrebe conceived the project of a
metaphysics of his own, based on Husserl’s method of phenomenological
reduction. This project as well as his metaphysical reading of Husserl seem
paradoxical, because the term “phenomenological reduction” usually denotes
some sort of emancipation from metaphysics. The present paper aims to outline
some aspects of Landgrebe’s phenomenological metaphysics and thereby to
explain why, in his view, this paradox is only apparent.

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