Embodiment and Subjectivity in Ludwig Landgrebe’s Interpretation of Husserl

Karel Novotný


At first glance, it seems that in his published works, Husserl addresses the
appearing of phenomena out of a counterintuitive conviction that may be called a
subjectivist conviction: namely, that appearing depends on an “act” of
consciousness. Why is this counterintuitive? It is because what appears to us
always seems to be already given—otherwise, it simply would not appear. It
appears because it is and is given. In his “genetic” phenomenology, Husserl
himself admits to the pregivenness of what appears. Even there, however, the
following question remains for him: how are such phenomena constituted for
thematic consciousness in the lived experience of their being and givenness, and
how are being and givenness accomplished in concrete terms?

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