Ludwig Landgrebe’s Phenomenology of Moods

Ignacio Quepons


In a letter dated February 5, 1933, Husserl shares his disagreements over an
attempt to connect the notion of the horizon with the Heideggerian philosophy of
moods with Landgrebe. Husserl claims that for him, moods are founded in a
more elementary dimension of life-consciousness that is the dimension
conferring objectivity to the phenomena of experience:
According to what I’m hearing, you are still always trying to transform my
theory of horizons in a Heideggerian way, and thus to establish a
connection between us. I am quite certain that this is not possible and that
mood is not an elementary phenomenon, but lies at a higher level that only
comes later in the systematic analysis of founding-founded relationships.
Yet you shall and must find your own way and come to your own clarity
step by step.
The origin of the controversy was Landgrebe’s project for a Habilitationsschrift
entitled The Concept of Experiencing, where we may find one of the first  attempts in the phenomenological tradition at a genetic-phenomenological description of affective life.

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