
John Haugeland passed away suddenly in 2010 leaving behind an unfinished book manuscript on Heidegger. He was an analytic philosopher who specialized in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science; however, he had an “extensive engagement” with Heidegger’s philosophy. Editor Joseph Rouse has compiled Haugeland’s previously published and unpublished writings (including the incomplete manuscript) on Heidegger in order to produce this book, which is divided into four parts: “Early Papers on Heidegger;” “Dasein Disclosed;” “Late Papers on Heidegger;” and “Papers on Heideggerian Themes” (xxxvi-xxxviii). Haugeland’s goal was to discuss Heidegger’s work in such a way as to make it more accessible for those who practice Anglo-American or “analytic” philosophy (48). This review intends to elucidate each part with particular emphasis on part two, “Dasein Disclosed,” which is the incomplete manuscript of this posthumously published book.

Part one, Haugeland’s well-known and most influential papers on Heidegger, “Heidegger on Being a Person” (1982) and “Dasein’s Disclosedness” (1989), comprise part one (xxxvi). Haugeland describes his 1982 article as “a nonstandard and rather freewheeling interpretation of *Being and Time*” (3). That is precisely what it is. He proposes for Dasein to be construed not as a synonym for person, but rather as *conformist* behaviours that are handed down from generation to generation. Through censorship and norms, members of a community will acquire dispositions enabling them to behave in a normalized manner. Haugeland frequently uses very accessible examples such as a herd of animals. A herd is an “emergent entity” that is composed of new animals being born and replacing the old, yet the herd is able to remain or “outlast many generations” (4-5). Although certain aspects of a herd can exemplify the idea that Haugeland is trying to convey, he maintains that animals do not have the same being as human beings and therefore the normalized behaviours of human beings should be seen as distinct from herd behaviour.

The game of chess and the specific *roles* that the pieces play is an example that Haugeland utilizes throughout the book. The interweaving roles of chess construct and shape the game and the individual roles that each piece will play in the game. The “socially acceptable” role of a chess player or chess teacher along with the specific roles codified within the game itself is an example of norms in relation to equipment. In the same style as Heidegger, Haugeland
describes the game as each piece relating to the other pieces and to the game as a whole in a “referral nexus of significance” (7). The role that the king piece plays in chess is different and yet intrinsically related to the role that the other pieces play and to the game as a whole. The notion of equipment “belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper” is Heidegger’s description of a multitude of assignments. The role that the king piece plays in chess is different and yet intrinsically related to the role that the other pieces play and to the game as a whole. The notion of equipment “belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper” is Heidegger’s description of a multitude of assignments.

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The game of chess along with other games, professions, cultural products and virtually everything that humans cope with in their everyday world, except for other human beings, is all established by “the norms of the conformists,” namely, human beings. Haugeland wishes to summarize Being and Time as “all constitution is institution” (8). Therefore, Haugeland believes that when Heidegger says, “we ourselves are Dasein” he does not mean that Dasein is simply a new “term for ‘person’ (or ‘ego’ or ‘mind’)” (9). On the contrary, a person is what Haugeland calls a “case” of Dasein. Dasein is not a thing, it is not something real such as a person or an idea, but rather Dasein exists. Haugeland goes into a discussion of accountability in which each conformist is a “unit of accountability” (13). It is in this discussion that Haugeland is able to describe Heidegger’s notions of resolution, authenticity and being self-owned (14-6).

“Dasein’s Disclosedness” (1989) is where Haugeland discusses how the being of entities are disclosed. It is the condition of the possibility of making discoveries, such as scientific discoveries in which certain “evidence” has to be disclosed (18). Haugeland, although making a reference to science, does stay close to the traditional interpretation by insisting that disclosedness is primordial truth, i.e., “the condition of the possibility of the truth of assertions” (17). Disclosedness is a prerequisite for making assertions about the being of entities. In order to illustrate the structure, Haugeland goes back to the chess example: the game of chess is “the ‘world’ within which chess discoveries are made” (19). In other words, no chess discoveries can be made if there was no game (world) in which said discoveries can be made in the first place. The sheer possibility of making moves within the game and playing the game at all depends on there being a game (world). Furthermore, the game would not be possible if it were not for the players. This is a crucial point. Haugeland notes that in order for disclosedness to take place, not only is evidence and proof and a world (in which evidence and proof can occur) required, but a discoverer is necessary (18). The game of chess could not be if there were no players to play it. This brings the reader back to the discussion of equipmentality and the social norms and standards that Haugeland described in his paper “Heidegger on Being a Person.” Dasein, as opposed to equipment, is disclosed as “a living,” in other words, Dasein is in the process of living (31). Haugeland gives many ontic examples of Dasein as a “way of life:” the “Polynesian Dasein . . . modern Western Dasein, swashbuckling-fighter-pilot Dasein, and so on” (31). He then contrasts these with a way of life that has died out, such as the Aztec Dasein and even that of dead

2 Heidegger, Being and Time, 97.
3 Haugeland, Dasein Disclosed, 7.
languages. He refers to the multitude of ways of life as cases of Dasein; however, it is important to note that he does deal with Heidegger’s crucial notions of findingness, thrownness, and fallingness. In everydayness, Dasein finds itself in certain situations into which it was originally thrown. Once in a certain situation, various possibilities are open and Dasein, in selecting one possibility, is then thrown into and finds itself in a new situation. Haugeland is able to explain these complex ideas by relating them back to the game of chess and social norms. He maintains that we are “falling in with” public norms, which determine what is right and what is wrong (36). Therefore, in Haugeland’s explanation, in order to navigate in the world, Dasein has to have a “socially transmitted skillful mastery,” which is culturally relative (37). This notion of socially transmitted norms is all tied in with his discussion of understand and projection, as well as fore-having and for-sight.

Part two, “Dasein Disclosed,” begins with his brief “Proposal for a Guggenheim Fellowship.” It is in this section that Haugeland attempts a “philosophical account of Being and Time” as well as “a tentative projection of what might have occurred in part I, division III” (49). Unfortunately, the manuscript ends leaving “substantial parts” of chapter 7 and his tentative projection of part I, division III unwritten. Haugeland’s “Proposal for a Guggenheim Fellowship” is an overview that describes his interpretation of Heidegger’s Being and Time as “distinctive (controversial [and] “original”)” (43). He introduces the basic topics that will be covered in his book including a brief description of temporality and timesiness, which was never finished. He concludes his proposal by stating that his book may “contribute to the ongoing dismantling of the old analytic/continental split” (47).

Chapter 1, “The Being Question,” is where Haugeland discusses what it means for entities to be, noting that there is an important ontological difference. His explanation of the distinction between ontic and ontological remains Heideggerian while at the same time branches out to provide further clarity to readers unfamiliar with such terminology. Haugeland explains this difference by stating that ontic deals with entities, such as dogs, ballgames, numbers, etc., whereas ontological deals with Being. Entities are all that there is, “everything that there is at all is an entity” (52-53). Being, on the contrary, “is” not an entity at all and cannot be discussed in the same manner as entities, viz., one cannot say that being is (53). Haugeland then poses the predictable question: “does it mean that being “is” nothing (53.).

4 Haugeland uses shudder quotes for “is” when talking about being in order to highlight the linguistic difficulties.

5 The question of nothing, although not explicitly discussed here by Haugeland, is one that Heidegger dealt with in his later work “What is Metaphysics,” a work that no doubt exasperated many in the Anglo-American tradition. This could be something that Haugeland was aware of and hinted at in this brief section. 
that lives, i.e., “for it to be alive, at a given time” (52). To be a ballgame, on the other hand, means for it to be while it is being played. Haugeland notes that this idea of regions is similar to what Carnap calls “Frameworks of entities” or “worlds,” which includes “the world of things, the language of sense data, the system of numbers,” etc. (56). He then breaks Being and Time down into various regions: the region of Dasein, region of equipment, region of intraworldly entities, and regional the ontology of life. Haugeland notes that Heidegger’s main point is to show the ontological priority of the being question, i.e., before any regional ontology is possible, one must first understand fundamental ontology (63).

Chapter 2, “Philosophical Method,” delineates the method that Heidegger utilizes in order to understand being. This section is a close reading of the method and remains very Heideggerian, i.e., unlike elsewhere in the book, Haugeland does not stray from the terminology in order to make it more accessible. In fact, he covers the method as follows: “Phenomenology: Phenomenon and Logos” (mainly the etymology of the word according to Heidegger); “Phenomenology as Method” (the ways in which a thing is disclosed and to point it out as it “shows itself in and of itself”) (70); “Phenomenology as Ontology” (the problem of sound common sense, which has taken the question of the meaning of being for granted); “Hermeneutic Phenomenology” (how to interpret phenomena—by “re-expressing more accessibly what something already means in the context of some way of life”) (71); and “Formal Indication” (the pointing out that does not specifically stipulate or describe what is being pointed at) (73). This section clearly elucidates Heidegger’s method, “All viable philosophical concepts must remain directly grounded in the phenomena themselves—as opposed to those comfortable public accommodations. And that, seen from this first side, is why they must remain formally indicative” (75). It is not by conceptualizing—not the “what,” but the “how to be Dasein” (75).

Chapter 3, “Dasein,” is where Haugeland notes that the main topics dealt with in Being and Time are being, time and Dasein; however, Dasein is missing from the title and yet is the topic that figures most prominently in the book (76). Haugeland insists that Dasein can be emphasized in two ways: first, each person has a separate and individual Dasein and, second, many people partake in one collective Dasein. He defends the view that Dasein is intended to comprise both ideas. Science and language are in the region of Dasein—sciences and languages exist so long as they are being practiced and spoken (80). Thus, Dasein is only insofar as it is lived. Chemists are chemistry (the discipline), Italian speakers are Italian (the language), and Dasein exists—is a living “way of life” (82). Haugeland notes the distinction between existential and existentiell in which existential is ontological understanding and existentiell is ontical understanding. It is here that Haugeland discusses regional ontology yet again, but with a more focused account of the “burden of being” and the decision to own or unown one’s ownmost being (86). Haugeland translates eigentlich as owned as opposed to authentic and maintains that the notion of owned and unowned better depict the idea that Heidegger is trying to put forth (90). To “own up to” or “take over” ones
burden of being is the decision that Dasein is faced with—to unown means to simply dwell in the “most common condition” (90).

Chapter 4, “Being-in-the-World,” discusses Dasein’s basic constitution. Haugeland covers the three aspects of this unitary structure: the “world”; the “who”; and “being-in” (92). The “world” is the things around us, the “who” is us (the people), and “being-in” is the relation between them. Haugeland fascinatingly compares this structure with that of an insurance company selling and servicing insurance:

There can be no such things as an insurance business that does not sell and service insurance policies, nor an insurance policy that is not sold and serviced by an insurance firm. . . . The insurance firm and its policies each presuppose not only the other but also . . . the specific relation between them—the selling and servicing (93).

Basically, Haugeland describes the three aspects of being-in-the-world as follows: “being-in” is the living; “the “world” is the where-in of that living; and the “who” is the by-whom of that living” (95). The next three chapters are divided into these three sections: “world,” “who,” and “being-in.”

Chapter 5, “The World of Everyday Dasein,” is where Haugeland explains the world in which Dasein lives. There are four different senses of world, two ontic and two ontological: the first ontic world is “totality” (as in the totality of all that exists in the universe); the counterpart to totality is the first ontological world of “regions” (the region or world of physics, mathematics or chess). The second ontic world is the “everyday worlds” (specific to humans such as the world of equipment or the “world of sports”); the counterpart to the everyday worlds is the third ontological world of “worldishness” (the being of all the lived-in worlds, Dasein) (100-1). Haugeland discusses the world of equipment with which we go about our business in our everyday dealings. There is an important distinction between equipment and occurrent entities, i.e., equipment is not occurrent. To be occurrent means to be an objective thing that does not require any other thing to be what it is—it “stands on its own” (102). Equipment, on the contrary, is available and has properly assigned roles in relation to other equipment—think of the chess example discussed above. Equipment that is mistaken as occurrent—a hammer that is taken out of “being-available” and has become an object of inquiry—is actually a hindrance to getting things done (103). Basically, Haugeland notes that the being of equipment is its availability and it is what it is when it is being used in the appropriate manner. Equipment that does not function properly or that is not being used for its intended purposes is conspicuous, obtrusive or obstinate (108). Thus, it prevents jobs from getting done and becomes an obstruction; this is known as the phenomena of interruption and unavailability. Haugeland therefore describes the being of equipment as a “holistic interdependence” or “wholeness,” which essentially means that a hammer is what it is due to its relation to nails and wood and, of course, Dasein (108-10).
Chapter 6, “The Who of Everyday Dasein,” focuses on the social aspect of Dasein, i.e., Haugeland uses the term “social holism” (124). Haugeland observes that, like equipment, Dasein is interdependent with each other and also with equipment, projects, ideas, etc. This idea of the interdependence of Dasein is called co-Dasein or Mitdasein and is a “way of being” as opposed to an entity (122-5). “To be a person at all is to be a coparticipant in a way of life that embodies an understanding of being—in other words, a fellow member of a community whose way of life that is” (125). This co-Dasein is responsible for determining the social norms and conformists behaviours that embody our everyday world. It is the publicness, the “anyone” (das Man) that causes the “leveling down” of Dasein in which Dasein becomes relieved “from the burden of thinking for oneself” (136). The everyday, public way of being is unowned due to this leveling down (Heidegger expresses this as a fleeing from ones ownmost being). It is not that unowned Dasein is false or negative in anyway, it is, rather, that unowned Dasein is the common, standardized, conformist way of being (everydayness).

Chapter 7, “Being-in as Such.” is living ways of life, which includes the important concepts of there, findingness, thrownness, disclosedness, clearing, and understanding, projection. Haugeland discusses each concept as it relates to Dasein’s basic constitution, being-in-the-world. The there is where Dasein finds itself. Dasein exists, meaning it is (in the ontological sense) “there” living, being; however, it is also living (in the ontic sense) in a particular place and time and, furthermore, in a particular situation. “Findingness” is not just the there and thus where Dasein finds itself, but the fact that Dasein is always finding itself—so long as it is, it is finding itself. This finding is ontological, however, it is ontically disclosed to Dasein as mood (144). It is not by accident that Dasein finds itself in a particular there (mood), it was in fact thrown (note the passive connotation of the word thrown) (143). To be “thrown” means to be “delivered over,” i.e., to find oneself in a there that “is and has to be this [particular] there, here and now” (144). The there, findingness and thrownness is disclosed to Dasein both ontically and ontologically. To disclose means to “lay open”—to bring something into view or uncceal something (141). This was discussed in chapter 2 describing the philosophical method, however, in this section, Haugeland connects it to Heidegger’s concept of the clearing. It is in the clearing that things can be disclosed—to actually clear things “out of the way” and make room for something to show itself (141). Haugeland notes the “finitude” of the clearing—like a clearing in the forest, it does not last or go on forever (141). Understanding is practical “know-how,” namely, the ways in which Dasein uses equipment to take up projects (148). One could not do something without the understanding of how to do it, e.g., how to use a hammer in the ontic sense. It is possibility and the capability to do something—the “ability-to-be” and to project forward into the future in the ontological sense (148-9). Projecting is when Dasein treks forward into possibilities that are not-yet (note the active connotation of the word project). Haugeland notes the passive and active elements in Heidegger’s terms thrown and project. To be thrown is passive and past whereas to project forward is active
and futural. Unfortunately, the chapter ends abruptly and Haugeland does not get to the important discussion of temporality.

Part three is titled, “Later Papers on Heidegger,” and is divided into five chapters: “Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger” (2005); “Letting Be” (2007); “Death and Dasein” (2007); “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism: (2000); and “Temporality” (2002). The following will be a brief review of each paper as many of the topics discussed in these papers are dealt with in parts one and two (and also in this review). The first paper, “Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger,” is a discussion of Robert Brandom’s essay on Heidegger reprinted in Tales of the Mighty Dead: “Dasein, the Being That Thematizes” (157). Brandom asserts, not unlike Haugeland, that Being and Time can be thought of as a “normative pragmatism,” i.e., that the idea of norms can be used to understand some aspects of Heidegger’s thought (157). This is obviously what Haugeland discussed and defended in part one of this book; however, Haugeland notes that it does not perfectly capture what Heidegger is really doing in Being and Time. Haugeland thus discusses many of the same arguments and examples that he made in “Dasein Disclosed” in order to show what Heidegger is “really up to” (158). He explains the notions of talk, idle talk, language, and assertions in order demonstrate how problematic some of Brandom’s assertions are about Heidegger (161-6).

“Letting be” is the second paper and in it Haugeland reveals the process of letting things be or “setting-free” (172). He provides an analogy of a potter who produces a pot; the pot does not yet exist (except in the mind of the potter), but once the pot is made or produced, it is up to the potter to set it free by way of making it available for use. If the potter decides to smash it into pieces, then the potter is not letting it be. Allowing the pot to be is allowing it to be used and to make it available—as a pot. The remainder of the paper discusses a more scientific side of letting be by way of allowing or enabling things to reveal or show themselves to us (174). “There is truth only so far and so long as Dasein is. Only then are entities discovered, and they are disclosed only so long as Dasein is at all” (174). This is then discussed in relation to understanding and projection.

“Death and Dasein” is mainly an account of life and death according to Heidegger. As was discussed earlier, Dasein is a living way of life that harbours an understating of being and, as a result, Dasein is the only entity that dies. Haugeland goes back to the examples of science and language that can die out when they are no longer practiced or spoken. Death in this sense, as is discussed in more detail in the next paper, is bound up with Heidegger’s notions of projection, ownedness and resoluteness. Haugeland then contrasts death with perishing and demise noting that to perish means the “cessation of organic functioning,” which is an inevitable outcome of life (180). To demise is more related to people (plural), “the cessation of that ability to participate” in the community of others (180.).

“Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism” is where Haugeland focuses more on death, especially near the end of the paper. For
the most part, in this paper Haugeland attempts to show that Heidegger’s notion of disclosedness is *transcendental* and he actually relates it to Kant’s notion of *apperception*. “The reason that I nevertheless want to emphasize their kinship is that disclosedness has the same sort of interdependent duality in what it is “of” that apperception has” (190). It is noted, however, that one significant difference between the two is that, unlike apperception, disclosedness discloses the *being* of entities and not just the entities themselves. Kant would not have known about this ontological difference, which has been explained as the difference between ontic and ontological (or between entities and *being*) (191). The disclosedness of entities as the entities that they are (as in a specific scientific discipline), to find and “double-check” the possibilities/impossibilities of such entities, is to uncover ontical truths (218). On the other hand, “resolute being toward death is the condition of the possibility of ontological truth,” i.e., to go back to the discussion of owned/unowned Dasein, only owned Dasein as able to disclose ontological truths. Of course this is all tied in with Heidegger’s notion of death and finitude and the necessary anxiety that accompanies it. For it is only when one takes responsibility and chooses to be resolute in the face of one’s ownmost possibility (the possibility of impossibility), can any sort of ontological truth be disclosed (215-20).

“Temporality,” the last paper in this section, was actually a keynote address given in July 2002. It is Haugeland reiterates his interpretation of Dasein in order to move on to a discussion of *timeishness* and *temporality*. Disclosing what is possible and impossible for the sake of acquiring truth (ontical or ontological) is revisited. Haugeland then discusses the “ekstases of timeishness:” Dasein’s *coming-toward* itself; its enpresenting of entities; and its *coming-back-to* itself (232). These moments mark the past present and future aspect of Dasein’s being, which allows Haugeland to elaborate more on Heidegger’s notion of finitude and death. Death individualizes and “is the finitude of Dasein’s coming-toward itself” (239). Time, being and Dasein, according to Haugeland, “come as a package” (one cannot be understood separate of the other two) and they are all *finite* (221). Haugeland’s important closing remarks deserve to be displayed, “Well, first, of course: if (by any chance) I have said one or two things tonight that are not actually in the text as we have it, they would certainly have been made fully explicit in division III” (240).

Part four, “Papers on Heideggerian Themes,” is quite different from the rest of the book. Heidegger is not the focus by any means and is only ever mentioned a handful of times. The papers revolve around analytic philosophical problems/discussions, which are, to be honest, slightly foreign to me. Haugeland does manage to tie Heidegger into the discussion nevertheless; in fact, it appears to be where Haugeland attempts to bridge the gap between analytic and continental philosophy. “Social Cartesianism” is the first paper and in it Haugeland discusses the philosophical conceptions of Nelson Goodman, W. V. O. Quine and Saul Kripke. He finds that ideas such as “inductive inference” (Goodman), “apparatus of objective reference” (Quine), and “the sceptical paradox” and “the sceptical conclusion” (Kripke) are missing a vital component
That component, according to Haugeland, is the consideration of the world in which we actually live. Before one can discuss such philosophical problems and ideas, “the everyday world”—“as an integrated whole”—has to be considered (259). The section closes with a quote from Heidegger in order to demonstrate the point that Haugeland himself has made and in which Heidegger rejects the “scandal of Philosophy” (259).

“Authentic Intentionality” is the final paper in this book and, interestingly, Heidegger’s name never actually appears. The various topics discussed—authentic intentionality, original intentionality, responsibility etc.—would lead one to think that Heidegger would figure prominently. On the other hand, this section deals primarily with scientific intentionality and is particularly critical of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. The critique is not in the fact that such disciplines should not be, but rather, in that such disciplines may not be authentically responsible and lack self-criticism (274). A scientific discipline (or any discipline for that matter) has to be able to make “first-order,” “second-order” and “third-order self-criticism” (265-70). The ability to notice inconsistencies and problems within the discipline itself is very similar to the discussion of disclosedness of entities and the possibilities/impossibilities that one notes. Authentic intentionality is when one notes that the supposed facts (or possibilities) fail and the discipline as a whole comes into question. Authentic responsibility is when one chooses (decides) to end the discipline; to admit that the discipline is too problematic to continue and should die out and be replaced with something new (271). This is very similar and perhaps even analogous to Heidegger’s notions of being responsible and choosing to answer the call to conscience leading to ownedness—the realization that one will eventually die out, just like alchemy.

John Haugeland has a unique interpretation of and engagement with Heidegger’s Being and Time. This book does explain Heidegger’s complex ideas in a more accessible fashion, while not straying too far from what Heidegger originally interned. Haugeland does not so much reinvent Heidegger as reinvent the explication of Heidegger. Having said that, it should also be noted that people who are eager to understand Heidegger should consider beginning with the primary texts themselves. This book (and all secondary literature), in my opinion, should be referred to only after one has already dealt with the primary sources. It would be easy to misconstrue what Heidegger does by beginning with a text such as Dasein Disclosed. However, for those who are already familiar with Heidegger, this book is quite insightful and provocative.

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