

ISSN 1918-7351
Volume 5 (2013)

Scott Campbell, *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012). 288 pages.

Scott Campbell's text arrives at an opportune time, as nearly all of Heidegger's early Freiburg and Marburg lectures are now available in English translation, including, as of early 2013, Campbell's own translation of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (GA 58). Throughout *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life*, Campbell argues that, even early on as a lecturer, Heidegger is deeply concerned with the relationship between facticity (life as it is lived and experienced), language, and Being. As a lecturer Heidegger worked against the misrepresentation of human experience as it is violently subjected to theoretical categories. Campbell's book traces the path of Heidegger's thinking of facticity through his 1919 War Emergency Semester lectures to his 1924 Marburg course on Plato's *Sophist*. Though, as Campbell admits, there are three main studies that focus on the early Heidegger—Kisiel's *Genesis of Being and Time*, Van Buren's *Young Heidegger*, and Crowe's *Heidegger's Religious Origins*—he claims his own book is unique because it pays exclusive attention to the early Heidegger's thinking of the relation between life, Being, and language. In order to complete this project, Campbell divides his book into four sections that are both chronologically and thematically related.

The first section, "Philosophical Vitality" (1919-21), deals with the way Heidegger grounds worldview philosophy, science, and religion in life experience. Philosophy, as the articulation and construction of worldviews, distorts the experience of life as life through its tendency to crystallize experience into objective and universal categories. Such universal constructions fail to accurately disclose historical life, that is, life as it is lived and not life as it is conceptualized. Similarly, the sciences, as theoretical endeavours, arise out of the more original, pre-theoretical lived experience. Since philosophy deals with the most original or primordial domain—the realm of lived experience—the theoretical sciences are subordinate to philosophical research. With respect to religious experience, Heidegger shows the early Christian experience to be firmly rooted in the immersion in temporality. The early Christians were united in their having-become Christians, their awaiting of the second coming, and an overall sense of urgency. Those who want to 'secure' the Christian life by systematizing the order and time of future events violate and want to marginalize the facticity of life.

In the second section, "Factual Life" (1921-22), Campbell turns to Heidegger's lectures course (GA 61) *Phenomenological Interpretations of*

Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research where Heidegger points to an ambiguity inherent in life's situation between birth, death, and immersion in the world. Heidegger isolates *ruinance* as the way life conceals its own temporality though being caught up with the world. In its immersion in the world, life tends to *incline* towards the world, *distance* itself from realizing it is caught up in worldly affairs, *block itself off* from being aware of itself, and *make its course* as easy as possible, avoiding obstacles that will reveal itself as a temporal being. Furthermore, as Campbell clarifies, Heidegger identifies *relucence* and *prestructuring* as two key characteristics of factual life. Whereas *relucence* points to the way life lights up the world for itself and makes it available to itself, *prestructuring* refers to life's tendency to organize the world it lives within. The theoretical sciences are an outcome of the prestructuring process inherent in life, but this process is made possible by the life's *relucence*, that is, the way it makes the world available to be prestructured. The tension between these two revealing/concealing elements of facticity contribute to life's ambiguity.

The "Hermeneutics of Facticity" (1922-23) examines the introduction to Heidegger's proposed book on Aristotle. Here, Campbell highlights Heidegger's attempt to simultaneously retrieve and criticize Aristotelean philosophy. As such, the text offers us one of Heidegger's early deconstructive/destructive readings. Of special interest is the contrast Heidegger makes between *sophia* and *phronesis*. Though Heidegger deals at length with *sophia*—no doubt because Aristotle does the same—he is critical of the detached and atemporal observation that the concept implies. Philosophy, if it hopes to study temporal life, should not resort to techniques that ignore temporality; rather philosophy must acknowledge the temporal-historical character of life. This is done best, Heidegger explains, through *phronesis* or temporal-practical wisdom. Further on, Campbell highlights Heidegger's discussion of *Existenz*, a mode of facticity whereby life becomes aware of itself as a living being in the world. Through its fallenness (by this point, it seems that Heidegger has replaced *ruinance* with fallenness), factual life *can* become aware of its own temporal and lived character; it can become aware of its immersion in the world. Nevertheless, as Campbell makes clear, *existenz* is not entirely opposed to fallenness. Though life tends towards always being fallen, this fallenness can lead to *existenz* which, in turn, resists though is not absolutely antagonistic towards fallenness.

In *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (GA 63), Heidegger examines the meaning of hermeneutics and offers it to us as a way to better understand Dasein (Campbell states that this lecture course marks the place where Heidegger reaches a stable understanding of Dasein). Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutic examines Dasein's being by carefully thinking through Dasein's pre-understanding of being. We find that objective articulations of being rest upon the more basic pre-understanding of the same. The objective and thematic is subordinate to the factual. Facticity, moreover, as it undergirds the theoretical, marks the convergence of Dasein and being: far from being static, Dasein's being is temporal. Consequently, Dasein is misrepresented when it is originally defined theoretically. Its being cannot be fully captured with such

phrases as “rational animal” or “creature made in the image of God.” At the end of this chapter, Campbell argues that, for Heidegger, Dasein’s usual way of living in the world—its average and everyday comportment—is not a lesser way of living; rather, through average everydayness, Dasein’s world is opened up to it. Objectivity arises through fallenness or the attitude Dasein has towards the world which tends towards theoretical or propositional characterizations. Campbell argues that this mode of facticity is not morally inferior; rather, Heidegger points it out as a way to explain how objectivity arises. Following his examination of *The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Campbell goes on to note that after 1923, Heidegger turns from the study of facticity to an examination of the works of Plato and Aristotle.

The final part of Campbell’s text, “The Language of Life” (1923-25), follows Heidegger’s turn from facticity to language and concerns itself primarily with Heidegger’s initial Marburg lectures. In the first chapter, Campbell examines Heidegger’s *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* (GA 17). Here, Heidegger shows that *logos*, for Aristotle, is not about speaking or language, but about discussion and, more specifically, discussion in the world with others. Aristotle’s articulation of *logos* stands in contrast with the scientific understanding of *logos* or language. Whereas the former originally reveals aspects about the world and only subsequently can be deemed true or false, the scientific understanding of *logos* posits truth and falsity on an equivalent level: theoretical science does not recognize the necessity of an original revealing. But speaking, even as it reveals, also conceals insofar as speaking differs from what is being spoken about. That is, speaking represents something and brings it to light in a way that it originally is not. Hence, Campbell goes on, for Heidegger, Dasein is a fundamentally deceptive being insofar as, through language, it represents the world as it is not.

In the following chapter on rhetoric, Campbell shows that, for early Heidegger, Aristotle’s concern with rhetoric was driven by his concern for authentic speech. Over time, the language human beings use tends to lose its originality and becomes ‘worn-out.’ But through its being worn-out and inauthenticity, language does not become useless or something to be avoided; on the contrary, inauthentic, common, and average language characterizes Dasein. Dasein’s facticity cannot be studied if inauthentic language is ignored. Nevertheless, Heidegger, following Aristotle, points to rhetoric as a contrasting and authentic way of using language. This mode of language-use arises when the speaker uses language to move along with the listener. This mutual movement arises though an awareness of anxiety in the face of Dasein’s own lack or nothingness such that the speaker is driven to communicate with a listener about this nothingness. Hence, inauthentic speech characterizes the way Dasein usually uses language to communicate with others; but authentic speech or rhetoric, by contrast, concerns the ways Dasein communicates in the anxious awareness of its own nothingness.

After examining Heidegger’s theory of authentic speech, Campbell turns to Heidegger’s lectures on Plato’s *Sophist* (GA 19). In these lectures, he examines

Plato's attitude towards dialectic and rhetoric. Whereas Plato employed his dialectic/dialogic method in order to see the ideas as fixed and present perfections of concretely existing things, his attitude towards rhetoric is more ambiguous. In his *Gorgias*, Plato castigates rhetoric as a way to deceive others. It is idle talk, composed of opinion. However, in the *Phaedrus*, Plato views rhetoric as a dialogic pursuit of Being. This second form of rhetoric has to do with acquiring a clear and more accurate understanding of the topics under discussion. By contrast, idle talk and superficial communication is not interested in the truth of what is being discussed. It is, rather, more interested in convincing and spreading unexamined opinions. So whereas rhetoric in the *Gorgias* refers to the persuasive spreading of opinions, rhetoric as Plato presents it in his *Phaedrus* concerns the pursuit of the truth that grounds opinions.

In the conclusion, Campbell discusses the ambiguity that pervades Heidegger's thinking of authenticity. Unlike more existential interpretations of Heidegger, Campbell does not take authenticity as forming the ground for a moral imperative to be authentic. Rather, Heidegger names authenticity and fallenness as two inherent modes of facticity. One mode is not to be pursued to the exclusion of the other. If fallenness has more to do with the concealment of Being, we must, Campbell argues, realize that this concealing character of facticity is not something that can be discarded. Rather, concealment, like fallenness, is an intrinsic element in any search for truth.

Though Campbell's exposition becomes a bit repetitive over time, this is because Heidegger's own lectures revisit and expand on themes covered earlier on. Campbell himself should not be to blame for chronologically and thematically covering Heidegger's thinking of facticity with extreme care. The book could have profited from a chapter on contemporary German or even European accounts of life in order to situate Heidegger's thought within its historical context and in order to show the novelty or unoriginality of his ideas. Notes for such a chapter are provided in the end-notes which, themselves, are very informative for those who take the time to read them. Following the endnotes, Campbell provides a glossary of Greek terms and their rough English equivalents. His bibliography also cites most of the relevant research and the index is also very helpful since it includes both English and Greek terms. One nagging question that Campbell does not answer is why the book skips GA 62 of Heidegger's collected works, *Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik*. Perhaps this is due to the size of the volume. Nevertheless, throughout, Scott Campbell's text is very well researched, written, and organized. I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in early Heidegger, facticity, the philosophy of life, and early twentieth-century German philosophy.

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