Ethnicity, Regime Type and the Tendency for Violence

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Abstract. Within the study of ethnicity and violence, there is a compelling puzzle: the number of ethnic groups in the world exceeds the number of violent ethnic conflicts. This puzzle alludes to an important question: what explains the tendency for violence among ethnic groups in multiethnic states? This essay argues that the tendency for violent ethnic conflict in multiethnic states depends on the regime type of the state. Using data from the Democracy Index developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2017) to classify regimes, this paper will argue that ‘anocratic’ regimes have a higher tendency for ethnic violence than states classified as ‘full democracies’ or ‘authoritarian regimes’. This essay contributes to the literature on ethnic violence and how regime type is an important and overlooked variable for explaining its onset.

Introduction

Within the study of ethnicity and violence, there is a compelling puzzle: the number of ethnic groups in the world exceeds the number of violent ethnic conflicts. This puzzle alludes to an important question: what explains the tendency for violence among ethnic groups in multiethnic states? This essay will argue that the tendency for violent ethnic conflict in multiethnic states depends on the regime type of the state. Using data from the Democracy Index developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2017) to classify regimes, and building off a theoretical explanation from Fearon and Laitin (2003) regarding regime type, this paper will argue that ‘anocratic’ regimes have a higher tendency for ethnic violence than states classified as ‘full democracies’ or ‘authoritarian regimes’. In full democracies, such as Canada, the freedom to engage in collective action and the presence of institutions to accommodate ethnic groups make violence less appealing. In authoritarian regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, the state has the capacity to use coercion and fear to repress ethnic groups, making ethnic violence less likely to occur. In anocracies, such as Iraq, the state does not have the capacity to accommodate ethnic groups nor repress them, providing the conditions in which there is a higher tendency for violent ethnic conflict. One key variable plays a role in this argument: state capacity. Regardless of whether a state is accommodating or repressing an ethnic group, it requires the capacity to do so.

Given that ethnicity is a broad concept, it is important to establish a definition. This essay will adopt the definition of ethnicity posed by Anthony Smith, “Individuals that share i) a common trait such as language, race, or religion; ii) a belief in common descent and destiny; and iii) an

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association with a common piece of territory” (1986: 22-31; Toft, 2012: 583-84). The goal of this essay is not to claim that violent ethnic conflict does not occur in full democracies or authoritarian regimes, but to analyze the conditions in which violence is most likely to occur.

In order to develop this argument, a literature review of three hypotheses will be conducted to explore current theoretical explanations of ethnicity in relation to violence. The first hypothesis claims: if one or more ethnic groups accumulate grievances toward the state and have the opportunity to create an insurgency, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. According to this hypothesis, accumulated grievances (Keen, 2012) and an opportunity for collective action (Bara, 2014) best explain the tendency for ethnic violence. The second hypothesis claims: if opposing ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. According to this hypothesis, geographic concentration and increased competition between ethnic groups best explain the tendency for ethnic violence (e.g. Toft, 2003; Weidmann, 2009; Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010). The third hypothesis claims: if the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress an ethnic group, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. According to this hypothesis, anocratic regimes have a high tendency for violence because of their low state capacity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Each hypothesis was formed based on the reading of various theoretical explanations pertaining to ethnicity and violence and will be tested to develop the initial argument regarding regime type.

After the literature review is conducted, there will be three brief case studies that show the significance of regime type in relation to violent ethnic conflict. Each case was chosen based on its regime type: Canada, a full democracy that has allowed collective action and accommodated ethnic diversity to decrease the tendency for violent ethnic conflict; Saudi Arabia, an authoritarian regime that has prevented the minority Shi’a population from effectively mobilizing and engaging in violence; and Iraq, an anocracy that has endured widespread ethnic conflict and civil war, yet does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress the groups engaging in violence. Using the Democracy Index, Appendix 1 provides an overview of why each country is coded as a specific regime type, considering the variables of electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). The argument posited in this essay is important for two reasons: First, it identifies a condition in which there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. Second, while the argument being posed in this essay is used to explain civil war onset, there are scarce explanations that relate regime type with ethnic violence. Within the scholarly debate of the relationship between ethnicity and violence, regime type is not a common explanation, but this essay will demonstrate that it is a salient variable.

Literature Review

There are various theoretical explanations that attempt to explain the conditions under which ethnic violence is likely to occur. Toft has identified 283 ethnic groups since 1945 at risk of political discrimination and repression, claiming that approximately half of these groups have engaged in violence (2012: 582). The frequency of violent ethnic conflict demonstrates why scholars have interest in understanding the conditions for when it occurs. During the research phase of this essay, there were three identified schools of thought involved in the debate on which conditions cater to violent ethnic conflict. These schools include greed (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), grievance and opportunity (Bara, 2014), and geographic concentration (Toft, 2003).
However, an explanation that is comparably absent is the role of regime type, and the state’s capacity to accommodate or repress ethnic groups.

This literature review will demonstrate the importance of regime type in the relation to ethnicity and violence and will test three hypotheses focusing on grievance and opportunity, geographic concentration, and regime type. Greed explanations are not included in this analysis; despite economic resources being necessary to sustain or repress a rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 563-564), greed explanations assume that the accumulation of material resources is the most salient variable for explaining the onset of violence (Toft, 2012: 586). Violence assumes a high risk of battle-related death, and greed explanations fail to show why combatants are willing to sacrifice their lives for material gains that they may not benefit from. Therefore, greed alone has limited explanatory power for the tendency of violent ethnic conflict to occur. However, other schools of thought require further analysis, the first being grievance and opportunity.

Grievance and Opportunity

Grievances are significant in all accounts of ethnic violence; it is obvious that an ethnic group would not engage in violence if they did not possess grievances. Grievance is frustration derived from a difference between the life conditions people expect (e.g. civil liberties), and the conditions that they actually receive (Gurr, 1970: 24). Another key aspect of grievance is opportunity; without the opportunity to act upon grievance, successful collective action is improbable (Bara, 2014: 696). It is difficult to find any instance of violent or non-violent collective action where grievance did not play a role, making this an important theoretical explanation to further analyze.

Grievances are present amongst all ethnic groups engaging in violence. Tackling the greed vs. grievance debate to explain the onset of violence, Keen argues that the grievance explanation is best suited to explain the tendency for violent conflict (2012: 757). Building on the concept of ‘horizontal inequalities’ that accumulate social and economic grievances between groups, it is shown that grievances built over time cause violence (Keen, 2012: 757). Keen (2012) poses a compelling argument, showing how accumulated grievances lead to a higher tendency for violence between ethnic groups. However, there are two limitations to this explanation: First, Keen fails to explain why grievances cause violence between ethnic groups at a particular time. Assuming a linear relationship between grievance and violence, Keen shows that more grievances lead to a higher tendency for violence (2012: 777). Not only is the ‘level’ of grievance difficult to measure, but if accumulated grievances alone explain the onset of violence, then there is a gap failing to explain why violence occurs at one point in time instead of another. Second, and perhaps most significant, Keen ignores the salience of the state in the onset of violence. Grievances, while showing why groups wish to engage in violence, do not explain why groups are able to mobilize in some cases but not in others.

Bara (2014) effectively mitigates the gap in Keen (2012) through combining grievance with opportunity. Bara argues that both grievances and opportunity explain the onset of violent conflict between ethnic groups (2014: 707). For example, in countries with an oil ‘resource curse’, ethnic groups that do not profit from oil accumulate grievances, and when the state weakens because of low oil prices, it provides opportunity for an insurgency (2014: 705). Opportunity is important for determining when ethnic groups are able to engage in collective action and violence. Also, state capacity plays a significant role in opportunity; state capacity determines whether the opportunity for ethnic groups to mobilize is available. In the Rwandan genocide, for example, the
absence of a state-based or international military power provided an opportunity for ethnic violence to occur. Therefore, in full democracies and authoritarian regimes, the opportunity to engage in violence is absent compared to anocratic regimes where ethnic groups cannot be accommodated or repressed (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 88). However, focusing on opportunity does not explicitly signify the importance of regime type in determining state capacity or the tendency for violence to occur. While opportunity is important, having the opportunity for violence is contingent on the top-down capacity of the state to accommodate or repress ethnic groups.

Taken together, Keen (2012) and Bara (2014) formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: If one or more ethnic groups accumulate grievances toward the state and have the opportunity to create an insurgency, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

However, the above literature review demonstrates that grievances alone do not explain the tendency for violent ethnic conflict. While grievances play a role in all instances of violent and non-violent collective action, they do not explain why violence occurs at a particular point in time, or why violence occurs in some cases but not in others. Despite this, the idea of opportunity is salient; in order for a group to act upon their grievances, they must have the opportunity to do so. This hypothesis recognizes the importance of opportunity but fails to show how this opportunity is both created and constrained by the state. Therefore, grievance and opportunity alone do not explain the tendency for violent ethnic conflict to occur.

**Geographic Concentration**

The next school of thought that attempts to relate ethnicity and violence is geographic concentration. According to this school of thought, how an ethnic group is organized within a particular territory determines the opportunity to mobilize, the level of competition between groups, and the tendency for violent ethnic conflict to occur (e.g. Toft, 2003; Weidmann, 2009; Toft, 2012). Each of these explanations will be reviewed for their accuracy in demonstrating the tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

Toft (2003) provides an in-depth analysis of the relationship between ethnicity and violence. In her book, Toft argues that the indivisibility of territory, and ethnic groups viewing it as crucial for their survival explains why ethnic conflict turns violent. If an ethnic group is a majority within a region of the state, and view its territory as indivisible, it will be more willing to engage in violence against other ethnic groups and the state to achieve independence. If this scenario does not exist, then a negotiated settlement between competing ethnic groups is more probable (2003: 14). Focusing on groups seeking independence from the state, Toft conflates ethnic group and nation, which are two distinct political concepts. Discounting this conflation, there are multiple cases, such as the Catalan’s in Spain, where large-scale violence does not occur between national or ethnic groups. Applying Catalonia to Toft’s argument, Catalan’s are the majority population within Catalonian territory in Spain and view their territory as indivisible with over 90% of people voting for independence in the most recent referendum (CNN, 2017). However, large-scale violence has not occurred between the Catalan’s and Spanish. While geographic concentration does not explain this outcome, Spain has allowed collective action in Catalonia to express grievances, making violence less desirable. Other prominent nationalist conflicts, such as those within the former Yugoslavia, highlight the significance of geographic
concentration in exacerbating nationalist tensions. Despite this, geographic concentration alone discounts the role of the state and its inability to repress tension.

Weidmann (2009) and Toft (2012) further develop the relationship between geographic concentration and ethnic violence. Weidmann argues that there is a higher tendency for violence amongst geographically concentrated ethnic groups (2009). This argument is supported by two claims: First, when a group inhabits a clearly defined territory, they will be more willing to fight and protect it from nearby groups. Second, close geographic concentration of an ethnic group provides an opportunity to mobilize for collective action (Weidmann, 2009: 526). Toft poses a similar argument, claiming that ethnic groups inhabiting their own territory are more likely to engage in violence (2012). Also, violence is most likely to occur in ‘peripheral’ regions outside of state capitals and urban centers, especially along borders where rebels can find sanctuary in neighbouring states (Toft, 2012: 590). These arguments are compelling; geography is salient in determining the opportunity for mobilization and collective action. However, both Weidmann (2009) and Toft (2012) discount the importance of state capacity. Although Weidmann (2009) successfully demonstrates how concentration enhances the opportunity for ethnic mobilization, the ability to mobilize and engage in violence is contingent on not facing repression from the state. While the desire to engage in violence may be present, the ability to mobilize is not guaranteed. Toft (2012) experiences similar limitations: geographic peripheries are less significant if the state has the capacity to exercise authority over its entire territory. Also, it is debatable whether a neighbouring state would assist a rebellion if its neighbour has high state capacity that translates into a powerful military. Both explanations fail to acknowledge the salience of the state in accommodating or repressing ethnic groups, which are significant limitations for understanding the relationship between ethnicity and violence.

Taken together, geographic concentration explanations form the following hypothesis:

H2: If opposing ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

However, this explanation is not well-suited to demonstrate the conditions under which there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. Geographic concentration is vital for ethnic mobilization in a specific territory, and the political relationships within said territory determine whether grievances are present. Despite this, geographic concentration alone does not guarantee a successful mobilization, and there are several cases where geographic concentration combined with grievances do not lead to violence. This outcome is explained by the capacity of the state to accommodate or repress certain ethnic groups. Therefore, the optimal explanation for demonstrating the tendency for ethnic violence requires a further analysis of regime type.

Regime Type

Compared to grievance and geographic concentration, regime type explanations are scarce for considering the tendency of ethnic violence. This is surprising given the importance of the state in accommodating or repressing ethnic groups. While explanations explicitly focusing on regime type are scarce, it does play a role in other schools of thought. For example, grievance explanations highlight the salience of opportunity (e.g. Bara, 2014), and this opportunity is often provided or constrained by the state. Similarly, the ability for geographically concentrated ethnic groups to engage in violence is contingent on them not being repressed by the state. Although grievance and
geographic concentration are important, regime type either precludes or increases the salience of these variables for inciting violence. This section of the literature review will show the significance of regime type in relation to the tendency for ethnic violence.

Elkins and Sides demonstrate how democracies and dictatorships mitigate the tendency for ethnic violence. They argue that the institutional design in a multiethnic state, particularly states with democracy, proportional representation, and federalism will unify groups and mitigate the tendency of violent conflict (Elkins and Sides, 2007: 693). Elkins and Sides observe the institutional structure of 51 multiethnic states, placing a particular emphasis on Iraq (2007). They claim that while authoritarian governments use fear and coercion to repress conflict, democracies must have certain institutions in place (Elkins and Sides, 2007: 693). Iraq, according to this perspective, will strengthen its democracy through proportional representation and federalism. While making a compelling argument about how regime type influences the tendency for violence, this explanation is limited by only coding regimes as ‘democracies’ or ‘dictatorships’. This binary does not consider regimes that fit between these two types (i.e. anocracies). To code Iraq as a democracy is flawed, and does not consider the low state capacity, oppression of individual rights, and violent conflict occurring in Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Therefore, studies on regime type and the tendency for ethnic violence require an acknowledgement that not all regimes are full democracies or authoritarian.

Vreeland disputes the salience of regime type in precluding or influencing the onset of violence, arguing that there is a direct relationship between prolonged political tensions and escalation to civil war. Despite this, regime type does not influence when violence is likely to occur (2007: 401, 419). This explanation counters the central argument of this essay, claiming that states which transition into anocratic status through prolonged political conflict do not have a higher tendency for violence (Vreeland, 2007: 419). Ultimately, it is prolonged political conflict that translates into violence. Vreeland makes a significant contribution, highlighting that regime type is multivariate, and that even states coded as full democracies or authoritarian can become anocratic and lead to violence (2007: 403, 418). However, this also reveals a limitation: Vreeland focuses on cases that ‘became’ anocratic during prolonged political conflict, instead of observing political regimes that were established for a long period of time. Also, Vreeland implicitly lends support to the central argument of this essay; Vreeland claims that prolonged political conflict eventually causes violence (2007: 419), but political conflict is only prolonged because the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress politically mobilized groups. For example, Saudi Arabia swiftly quashed Shi’a uprisings during the Arab Spring (Matthiesen, 2012: 628), but in Iraq the government has been unable to accommodate or repress mobilized groups. This difference is attributed to regime type and the state’s capacity to accommodate or repress ethnic groups.

Therefore, the theoretical explanation that best explains the tendency for violent ethnic conflict is Fearon and Laitin (2003). This explanation argues that regime type, not ethnic or religious diversity, determines a countries susceptibility to civil war. Particularly, anocracies, countries which are militarily, bureaucratically, and financially weak, favour insurgencies within

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1 One of the case studies for this essay, Iraq, became anocratic after the United States intervention. This does not change the argument presented in this essay; Vreeland (2007) focuses on the duration of political conflict, but this essay focuses on state capacity to accommodate or repress ethnic groups.
the state. Furthermore, a large population, poverty, and instability are better determinants of civil war onset than grievances or ethnic diversity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 88). In full democracies, peaceful collective action is normal and a better alternative to violence, while in authoritarian regimes, the state uses coercion and fear to repress collective action. However, in anocracies, the state does not have the capacity to repress or accommodate collective action, making violence a more probable outcome (Vreeland, 2007: 401-402). Ultimately, it is state capacity that influences or precludes the tendency for ethnic violence. While Fearon and Laitin (2003) make a compelling argument, it has not yet been applied to explaining the tendency for ethnic violence in multiethnic states. While grievance and geographic concentration explanations are robust in the literature, regime type is comparably absent despite its salience.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) aids to form the following hypothesis:

H3: If the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress an ethnic group, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

This hypothesis finds support in the literature: grievances and geographic concentration are less significant in a regime with high state capacity. In full democracies, for example, grievances can be expressed, and sometimes accommodated through non-violent means—making violence less desirable. In authoritarian regimes, the state has the ability to repress the violent mobilization of geographically concentrated ethnic groups. It is when the state does not have the capacity accommodate or repress ethnic groups when there is a tendency for violence to occur.

To demonstrate this empirically, three brief case studies will be conducted: A full democracy—Canada; an authoritarian regime—Saudi Arabia; and an anocracy—Iraq. Each case study will explain why each country codes as a certain regime type, and provide an example of how state capacity within these cases encourages or precludes the tendency for ethnic violence. Although these case studies are brief, they are meant to lend support to the initial argument, and show why regime type transcends grievances and geographic concentration for explaining the tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

Case Studies

Full Democracy: Canada

There is a low tendency for ethnic violence in full democracies, despite several of them being multiethnic (e.g. Canada and Switzerland). Within these regimes, most people give affinity to the nation instead of an ethnic group. Full democracies are generally open to collective action, and allow grievances to be expressed and accommodated through non-violent means (Vreeland, 2007: 401). Canada is a prime example of this regime type, a country that is exceptionally high in civil liberties, political participation, and functioning of government (see Appendix 1). However, whether it be ‘non-separatist nationalism’ in Newfoundland (Vézina and Basta, 2014: 67), or long-standing nationalist tensions with Quebec, Canada has experienced a certain degree of ethnic and national conflict. Despite this, there is an absence of large-scale violent conflict in Canada. One explanation for this is Canada’s democratic institutions, fostering an environment of ethnic and national accommodation. An example of this is Canada recognizing French as an official language, and allowing the preservation of French culture. This has occurred for various reasons, including brokerage politics and embracing multiculturalism (Forbes, 1993: 69-72).
Neither grievance nor geographic concentration explanations show why violence has not occurred in Canada. Prolonged grievances are present within Quebec; almost 50% of Québécois voters in the 1995 independence referendum voted to leave Canada, yet still remain in Canada today (CBC News, 2015). Geographic concentration is also relevant; there are over eight million people in Quebec, most of them being ethnically French (Statistics Canada, 2017). To understand why these variables have not resulted in violence, it requires analyzing Canada’s regime type. Aside from having the state capacity to accommodate multiple nations and ethnic groups, there are two reasons why Canada’s regime type mitigates the tendency for violence: First, it is difficult for proponents of violence to convince people that violence is necessary when there are non-violent methods to express grievances. Given the possibility of battle-related death and the significant resources needed to sustain an insurgency, violence is significantly costlier than non-violent collective action (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 136). Second, given the civil liberties granted to people in Canada, engaging in violence with unpredictable outcomes is less desirable. Therefore, it is full democracy, not factors relating to grievances and geographic concentration that decrease the tendency for ethnic violence.

Authoritarian Regime: Saudi Arabia

Contrasting full democracies, authoritarian regimes use coercion and fear to repress violent mobilization. Authoritarian regimes are generally repressive of collective action, and are usually not open to accommodating grievances. Saudi Arabia is an example of this, a country with no electoral process, and mass oppression of civil liberties (see Appendix 1). While oppressing individual liberties, Saudi Arabia possesses a strong military that had an expenditure of 9.6% GDP in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). Combining authoritarianism with a strong military provides a condition where ethnic mobilization and violence is difficult to achieve. In authoritarian regimes, people require creative and hidden ways to express grievances, but this usually does not result in violence because the state can repress any mass mobilization (Johnston, 2012: 55).

An example of this was Shi’a protests in the Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province during the Arab Spring. Facing a history of state oppression, a portion of Saudi Arabia’s Shi’a population rapidly mobilized to challenge authoritarianism in 2011. While these demonstrations resulted in one of the longest protests in Saudi Arabia’s history, the protests did not spread to other parts of the country, were quashed by the state, and achieved little success (Matthiesen, 2012: 628). This example illustrates two important points relevant to this essay. First, prolonged grievances and opportunity during the Arab Spring did not result in a successful violent mobilization against the state. Second, 2.5 million Shi’a people are geographically concentrated in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province (Matthiesen, 2012: 630), and while this made it easier to mobilize, the state maintained its control over the territory and eventually quashed protests. Therefore, while grievance and opportunity along with geographic concentration provided a medium for mobilization, it was ultimately Saudi Arabia’s regime and state capacity that precluded violence.

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3 This section of the essay is meant to demonstrate how institutions within full democracies foster accommodation and decrease the tendency for ethnic violence. While Quebec is a nation instead of an ethnic group, it is still an appropriate example to show how regime type transcends both grievance and geographic concentration in determining the tendency for violence to occur. However, more research is needed to determine whether the central argument being posited is applicable to nationalist conflict across all regime types.
Anocracy: Iraq

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iraq has been unable to end violence or mitigate the tendency for ethnic mobilization and collective action. This is attributed to Iraq’s regime type, an anocracy that is militarily and bureaucratically weak with low state capacity. Iraq has a moderate degree of pluralism, and an electoral process combined with political participation, but it has exceptionally low functioning of government (see Appendix 1). While there are several proponents of the United States intervention of Iraq, the subsequent process of democratization has created an anocratic regime incapable of accommodation or repression. This is alluded to by Wimmer, who claimed that the democratization of Iraq would fail if the state did not have the institutions or capacity to accommodate all citizens (2004: 111).

Over the last decade, Iraq has been plagued by ethno-religious conflict, terrorist organizations, and civil war. Between 2004 and 2016, the Iraqi government has been a part of six dyads, totaling 52,178 casualties in state-based violence (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017). Grievances and geographic concentration are important variables in Iraq; the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress grievances, while the failure to exercise its authority over the entire territory facilitates easier mobilization. However, these variables are salient because of Iraq’s anocratic regime, which enhances the tendency for ethnic violence. Ultimately, it is regime type, not grievance or geographic concentration that precludes or enables ethnic violence.

Conclusion

This essay has found support for the following hypothesis: if the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress an ethnic group, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. Through the literature review and case studies, there were two main findings: First, anocratic regimes have a higher tendency for violence than full democracies and authoritarian regimes. Second, while grievances and geographic concentration are important variables for determining the tendency for ethnic violence, their importance depends on the state’s regime type. These findings are supported theoretically and empirically, but there are two limitations that require acknowledgement: First, there are significant differences between the cases studied in this essay, one of which is the salience of ethnicity. For example, in Canada it is difficult to find ethnic tensions that could translate into violence because most people give their affinity to the nation. However, in Iraq, ethnic connections are significant. Second, the findings of this essay are only applicable to ethnic violence with a degree of state involvement. Given the focus on regime type, it would be difficult to apply these findings to non-state ethnic conflicts.

Despite these limitations, this essay poses two important contributions. First, it highlights a scope condition for when ethnic violence is more likely to occur. Second, it integrates regime type, a variable that is scarce in the literature, into the debate on when there is a tendency for ethnic violence. Building on these contributions, there are two fruitful avenues for future research that are worthwhile: First, whether regime type influences the tendency for nationalist conflict as it does for ethnic conflict. Second, under which conditions is there a tendency for violence in full democracies and authoritarian regimes? This essay provides a useful starting point for answering these questions, and more importantly, adds further discourse into the relationship between ethnicity and violence.
References


### Appendix 1: Democracy Index

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<th>Country</th>
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