The Determinants of Differing Legislative Responses in Similar States
A Nordic Case Study

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Abstract. This article examines the domestic legislative responses of three of the five social-democratic Nordic states: Norway, Sweden, and Finland. This exploratory study attempts to answer the question: Why do the social-democratic Nordic states differ in their legislative responses to terrorism? It analyzes state membership in supranational bodies (NATO, EU), [domestic] political climate, the number of ‘high-profile’ terrorist attacks on [domestic] soil, and the perceived level of threat. The field lacks significant comparison between states, specifically the Nordic states. The main differences between these Nordic states are their counter-terrorism policy responses towards law enforcement, immigrants, gun-control, and their levels of Europeanization.

Introduction

The five Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have enduring political, economic, and social commonalities since the start of the twentieth century. During the Cold War, these countries were collectively known as the ‘Nordic balance’ as they strived for neutrality between the two competing superpowers (Rieker, 2005; Pontusson, 2011). But soon the Cold War would slowly wane and the collective idea of ‘Nordic Balance’ would also wane as these states started to integrate into the global market individually and at different paces. Soon, the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were all created. These supranational bodies were signs of global integration and security as a global time of relative peace would begin.

Although the phenomenon of globalization started to increase, the Nordic states have managed to stay vastly connected. The idea of ‘Nordic balance’ may have waned, but the Nordic states remain socially and economically intermingled because they share one common identity: social-democracy. Still today, these states are collectively known as the ‘Nordic model’ which refers to their commonalities: comprehensive welfare states, state-level collective bargaining, protectionist measures, and free-market capitalism (McWhinney, 2013). Although these states have significant commonalities, they remain vastly different in their legislative responses to a particular phenomenon: terrorism. These differences include police powers (interrogation methods, funding, allocation of resources), immigration laws, gun-control, criminal codes (number

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of years in prison) and their levels of Europeanization (see Moller and Bjereld, 2010; Rieker, 2004; Council of Europe, 2014; Appleton, 2014; Husabo, 2013; Jakobsson and Blom, 2014).

Terrorism has been around for decades, but research in the field of political terrorism did not garnish much attention until the 9/11 Twin Tower attacks in the United States. Political terrorism research has been limited to states that have experienced domestic attacks or are involved in the global fight against terrorism. The Nordic states have been under-researched as they have remained relatively isolated from terrorist-related activity until recently. As terrorist-related activity has grown in connection with these Nordic states, so has field research (see Appleton, 2014; Perliger, 2012; Rieker, 2004; Peers, 2003). Since interest in the Nordic states has grown, a number of studies have researched why the Nordic states have adopted certain policy responses towards terrorism (see Malkki, 2016; Rainne, 2008; Rieker, 2005). It is here, where the theoretical weakness within the field of political terrorism lies. There is a lack of a comprehensive and systematic list of variables that can explain why these similarly structured Nordic states differ in their legislative responses towards terrorism. In other words, why do these similarly structured states legislate a particular phenomenon differently?

This study introduces a comprehensive and systematic list of variables, based on ideational and institutional theory to empirically investigate if these variables can account for the counter-terrorism legislative differences between three of the five social-democratic Nordic states by attempting to answer the question: Why do the social-democratic Nordic states differ in their legislative responses to terrorism? The variables presented in this study include: (1) state membership in supranational bodies (NATO, EU); (2) domestic political climate; (3) the number of ‘high-profile’ terrorist attacks on domestic soil; and (4) the perceived level of threat. These prominent variables allow or constrain certain types of legislative responses to occur. It is important to highlight that these variables are not mutually exclusive, they can work in succession with each other. The central argument in this study is that state membership in a supranational body, such as NATO or the EU plays the most significant role in allowing or constraining certain legislative responses to occur in a state. States that operate in a more autonomous matter are able to construct certain types of legislative responses in accordance with its own agenda. Membership in a supranational body hinders a state’s ability to act without a conflict-of-interest. Thus, this study illustrates that the Nordic states’ legislative responses differ from each other in large part because of their individual participation in different supranational bodies. Although this study is exploratory in its nature, these variables showcase that the Nordic states’ counter-terrorism policies do not form in a vacuum.

There are three main reasons why this research is warranted and thus, important in the field of political terrorism. The field of political terrorism lacks significant comparative analysis between similarly structured states explaining why they differ on certain matters. Developing explanations may in turn help predict future legislative responses to terrorism in non-Nordic regimes. Studying the differences between states’ responses to terrorism is considerably important to supranational bodies and how they can move forward on institutional matters-- i.e. the European Union and NATO. And furthermore, domestic legislative responses may conflict with international law and international norms, or hinder bilateral relationships (Perliger, 2012: 492).

The next section outlines the key scholars, debates, theoretical approaches, and variables used within the field of political terrorism. This section includes peer-reviewed scholarly work as primary-sourced data is utilized in the later sections of this study. This section will illuminate the shortcomings of prior research and explanations to further illustrate the current research gap that this study seeks to fill.
Literature Review: Key Scholars and Debates

Although political terrorism-related research on the Nordic states has increased, studies have not deeply investigated what factors take place “behind the scenes” that influence policy creation. This is where the theoretical weakness within the field can be found. This weakness is that there has been little attention given to the political processes that shape counter-terrorism policies (Perliger, 2014: 491). However, it is important to note that the field of literature contains some significant insights into the politics that take place behind enacted counter-terrorism policies and the common theme amongst these studies is the use of a constructivist framework (see Omelicheva, 2007; Katzenstein, 2007). These studies have researched how political culture and institutions play a role in developing counter-terrorism policies and highlight that there exists some agreement around the role that specific variables play in developing counter-terrorism policies.

Given that this study draws on counter-terrorism policy literature, regime characteristics, state security identities, and terrorist-related events it is significantly important that this section highlights the variation of my approach. The current literature gathered can be grouped into one of two groups: structuralist-comparative or institutional-policy formation. These specific camps are indicative of the theoretical perspectives and approaches that scholars have taken towards their research. Steve Peers (2003) focused on the European Union’s responses to terrorism. This study mainly focused on the structural-measures enacted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Peers stated that it is generally agreed upon in the scholastic community that the EU has been extremely active in implementing new counter-terrorism measures relating to cross-border policing and criminal law (2003: 227). One of the most important enactments by the EU is the supranational agreement amongst its members on the definition of terrorism. The EU defines terrorism under Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism (2002) as a criminal offence against persons and/or property: “… seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country of an international organization” (Peers 2003).

Peers’ (2003) study takes a structuralist approach that highlights the different types of enactments and agreed upon laws that seek to combat terrorism in the continent. The study investigates the legislative responses from the major players that make up the EU, mainly the domestic courts and parliaments of member states. The exploratory purpose of this study is to highlight the framework of the EU and the associated issues that arise between upholding liberal democratic values and protecting citizens in member-states (Peers, 2003: 243). Peers’ (2003) work has uncovered important variables that have played a role in allowing or constraining certain EU legislative responses to occur in order to combat terrorism. By utilizing a structural-comparative approach Peers (2003) has shown how state-membership in the EU has changed member-states’ policy discourse in response to terrorism as the structural body can influence domestic regimes. This article showcases a wide variety of variables and associated issues with counter-terrorism measures that may affect the Nordic states differently. This affirms the value of utilizing a constructivist theoretical underpinning.

Included in the camp of institutionalism is Catherine Appleton’s article, “Lone wolf terrorism in Norway” (2014), which investigates the 2011 Andres Behring Breivik massacre of seventy-seven people in Norway. This project investigates the responses of Norwegian authorities, courts, and government. This work is of great importance to this study since it investigates how a new domestic terrorist attack played a major role in developing subsequent policy responses. The
attack heightened the perceived level of threat in Norway and neighbouring democracies and in turn, this has had a direct influence on the domestic institutions to enact a response due to immense societal pressure (Appleton, 2014: 127-128). This source was crucial in the development of this study since it was able to illustrate that local law enforcement can play a substantive role in guiding a state’s response(s) to terrorism (Appleton, 2014: 127). In sum, this work is similar in its institutional approach to that of Peers’ (2003) study in the avenue that it examines how institutions can allow or constrain a state’s response(s) to terrorism.

Pernille Rieker’s (2004) work is a key piece of literature in the field of political terrorism since it specifically examines the Nordic states that have traditionally been ignored in this academic field. Rieker argues that the Nordic states’ security policies have been idiosyncratically shaped due to their differing rates of greater European integration (2004: 369). According to Rieker (2004), the Nordic states have integrated into specific European-wide institutions for self-interested purposes—mainly security (Rieker, 2004: 373). This work highlights the different responses undertaken by the Nordic states towards counter-terrorism and the framework needed to undertake a comparative analysis and reconfirms the notion that the Nordic states have differing policy discourses towards terrorism. However, this work has a substantial gap as it does not offer evidence as to why these Nordic states differ and what variables cause these differences. Again, this reconfirms the ‘research gap’ within existing literature.

Lastly, Arie Perliger’s “How Democracies Respond to Terrorism” (2014) study is the most extensive piece of literature in structural-comparative political terrorism. Perliger (2014) argues that the field lacks a comprehensive theory explaining why states construct different counter-terrorism policies. To this point, Perliger suggests that the democratic foundations of the state, whether the state is strong or weak, and the symbolic effect of terrorism are the main factors that shape security responses (2014: 490). The importance of this study is the combination of ideationalism and structural-comparative perspectives that allowed for the investigation into the domestic ‘ideas’ of terrorism and perceived threats. This work ultimately allowed for the construction of the ‘perceived threat’ variable used in this study. In addition, Perliger’s (2014) work was of immense importance to this study through its examination of the structural components of eighty-three democracies and how this, in turn, can affect policy discourse on terrorism. Although Perilger’s (2014) work highlights several important variables, it does not investigate a wide-range of variables or the social-democratic Nordic states and again, this further exemplifies the gap within political terrorism literature.

Although I have only highlighted some of the examined literature, these works have confirmed prior assumptions and highlight important comparative and theoretical perspectives. All four of these studies have incorporated overarching constructivist frameworks that have allowed the scholars to uncover hidden variables that shape policy discourse. These works confirm the prior assumption that supranational bodies such as the EU and NATO have played intrusive roles in shaping security policy in the Nordic states.

The next section outlines the theoretical approach adopted in this study. The theoretical approach adopted is the use of a constructivist framework as policy discourse on counter-terrorism tends to be historically and socially constructed because of one’s experience with the phenomenon. Thus, this theoretical perspective lends itself to qualitative methodology. Examined below are the chosen methodologies and the limitations of this study.
Methodology: Underpinnings and Limitations

The last decade has seen a rise in comparative studies between states that explain different typologies and normative assessments in regard to counter-terrorism policy responses (Perliger, 2012; Foley 2009; Reinares, 2000). As aforementioned, the theoretical weakness in the field of political terrorism is the lack of a comprehensive and systematic list of variables that can help explain why states enact different counter-terrorism legislative measures when they share similar characteristics. However, political terrorism literature does provide an agreed upon constructivist framework that is adopted in this study (see Bélard, 2009; Rieker, 2004).

The investigation in this study is undertaken by adopting an ideational-institutionalist framework (Bélard, 2009). This framework combines the core concepts of ideationalism with historical institutionalism which allows for the investigation and exploration into how the proposed variables in this study can influence the creation of counter-terrorism policy to occur and how institutions operate. This framework also allows for the investigation into the changing evolution of government institutions within these Nordic states in response to these variables. Ideational-institutionalism can help investigate three specific gaps: why policy-makers choose to address certain issues, what the policy addresses, and the construction of policy (Bélard, 2009). This framework lends itself to qualitative methodology as it seeks to explain what variables can account for the different policy outcomes in these Nordic states. To fully investigate and explain why these Nordic states differ in their counter-terrorism policy outcomes it was critical to use process-tracing, triangulation, and discourse analysis as additional qualitative tactics. In addition, the definition of terrorism used in this study is adopted from the European Union as defined above in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002).

Exploring why specific states adopt certain policy responses, specifically counter-terrorism policies requires the use of qualitative methodology as this study is investigating what is allowing or constraining policy discourse. Exploring these causes did not require the finding of causal relations as the purpose of this study is the investigation of hidden factors, not specific explanations. Comparatively, quantitative methodology lends itself towards statistical analysis in which finding causal mechanisms is the goal (John, 2010). The proposed research question did not infer causal relationships, rather it inferred the investigation of possible explanations of why a particular phenomenon occurs. The undertaking of a three-state case study allows for greater generalizability which is commonly a limitation of qualitative methodology (Vromen, 2010). Specifically, a limitation of this study is that Iceland and Denmark were not included because of time constraints and lack of sufficient data. Qualitative methodology allows for greater in-depth analysis of both the historical context and long-term dynamics that can help explain the reasons why there are differing counter-terrorism policy outcomes between these Nordic states. For this reason, qualitative methodology was the appropriate choice for this study.

Furthermore, in an attempt to investigate whether these variables could account for different policy outcomes the method of process-tracing was used. Process-tracing is a qualitative tool used for drawing descriptive inferences from examining a wide amount of relevant literature and/or evidence (Collier, 2011; Rieker, 2004). Process-tracing was vital to this study because it allowed for the investigation of whether these proposed variables have had any impact on subsequent counter-terrorism policy responses and whether these variables could help explain any differences between these Nordic states. This method was combined with the method of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is the interpretation of relevant documents and texts through certain political, social, and cultural lenses that can deepen the understanding of policy discourse.
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(Vromen, 2010). In addition, triangulation was used; this is the use of various sources as a method to establish a theory (Rudestan and Newton, 2007). Triangulation was used to provide greater empirical evidence to address the research question as it allowed for the examination of a wide variety of related literature to develop a concrete theoretical basis to help guide the construction of the four variables that were ultimately used in this study.

This study is primarily source-based as it relied on a multitude of texts and oral speeches. Due to time constraints fieldwork was not a viable option. This is unfortunate as it would have provided first-hand experience that could provide vital information relevant to political institutions and political climates. Rather, this study explored the chronological order of changes in these Nordic states by interpreting official speeches, documents, texts, policy and peer-reviewed scholastic work. Scholastic work was investigated in order to provide a theoretical lens that could answer the research question. Primary source-based tools and associated political rhetoric were used in order to provide an empirical lens that could address the research question as well. Although this qualitative approach may not be able to generalize why states’ counter-terrorism policies differ, this study can hopefully contribute towards a greater understanding of the policy dynamics that take place within these three Nordic states.

The next section will examine the four variables proposed in this study in an attempt to observe whether they can help explain the differences in the Nordic states’ counter-terrorism policy outcomes. Through the use of different methodologies and an examination of the literature, these variables have been put together to address the observed ‘gap’ in political terrorism literature as mentioned above.

Key Findings

Political Climate

Although the Nordic states are vastly similar in their governmental systems and social and economic policies, one characteristic that remains slightly different is their domestic political climates. The political climate of a state can be described as the aggregate, or the current opinions and moods of the populous in accordance to their shared experiences and/or perceptions. The political climate of a state can create path dependency or change rapidly during a critical juncture. For example, a domestic terrorist attack may shift the political climate and new criminal punishments may be enacted creating a path of harsher punishment.

Conditions created after the end of the Cold War saw a rapid rise in the levels of Europeanization. Europeanization gradually consolidated parts of Europe which created the vast interconnectedness of European nations culturally, socially, and economically (Rieker, 2004: 369-370). The Nordic states’ security approaches have changed in sequence with the European integration process. However, the security approaches of the Nordic states took different paths as their political climates allowed or constrained different levels of integration based on their views of post-Cold War conditions. Norway’s political climate has viewed the United States in a more positive light than both Finland and Sweden. This is evident since Norway is the only Nordic state that participates in NATO. Norway’s political doctrine of territorial defense was accepted by the United States during the Cold War and thus, the practice of Atlanticism became entrenched in Norway’s political climate (Rieker, 2004: 375). Atlanticism is the practice of being militarily aligned with the United States, including regional interests. Norway’s reluctance towards the European integration process was driven by its security policy consideration of Atlanticism as they feared that a common European identity would weaken NATO which, in turn, would affect its
position in European security policy (Rieker, 2004: 373). Thus, Norway’s political climate of traditional security discourse has remained and by this, the state has not adopted any European-wide political or economic consensus on terrorist-related matters in addition to NATO. The political climate of Norway can explain why its counter-terrorism and security policy discourse has been largely self-driven.

Sweden was initially skeptical of greater European integration due to its long-lasting doctrine of neutrality. However, greater integration became widely accepted within Sweden as its Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ulf Dinkelspiel, convinced the nation that it should not hinder the movement of a greater political force (Rieker, 2004: 374). The statements made by the minister proved to be a political ‘critical juncture’ within the state (Malkki, 2016: 344). This critical juncture effectively changed Sweden’s traditional policy (neutrality) discourse and its security approach began to reflect greater European influence. Sweden’s political climate has traditionally viewed both superpowers in a negative light, especially the U.S. This is another guiding reason why Sweden opted for greater European integration: to protect itself from both superpowers. Soon, explicit changes to Sweden’s constitution would be enacted. For example, constitutional references to a European comprehensive security approach began to replace the traditional references to the doctrine of neutrality (Rieker, 2004: 384-85; Malkki, 2016: 345).

Change in traditional security-policy discourse is most evident in Finland. Finland has always been in a unique position because of its proximity to Russia. But, due to the fall of the Soviet Union, Finland’s political climate finally allowed for open discussion on European integration (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 377). The reason for open discussion was because the residents of Finland viewed the end of the Cold War as a critical juncture where Finland would have the chance to protect itself from being politically colonized by the Soviet Union (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 376). Greater acceptance of European integration influenced Finland to allocate more monetary resources and to enact structural measures to parts of its military. These measures enacted by Finland were much more conservative in nature than seen in Norway and Sweden (Loik et al., 2016; Husebo, 2013; Rainne, 2008; Riker, 2005: 395-95). The political climates of these Nordic states illustrate different levels of openness to European integration after the Cold War. In other words, different critical junctures have influenced domestic policy discourse. Security policy does not operate in a vacuum, rather the security policies of these nations have been enacted due to the immense number of factors that have influenced each state differently and individually (see Council of Europe, 2014: Sweden, Finland, and Norway).

**Domestic Terrorist-related Event(s)**

Collectively, the Nordic region has experienced relatively few terrorist-related activities. The region is amongst the safest areas from terrorism around the globe. However, post-WWII, terrorist-related activities have been slowly increasing in the region, especially since the 9/11 Twin Tower attacks in the United States. This variable only includes the most “influential” terrorist-related attacks where explicit policy responses could be observed. On July 22, 2011, Norway was struck by two lone wolf terror-attacks of unparalleled magnitude that destroyed several government buildings (including the prime minister’s building) and thus, claiming seventy-seven lives (Appleton, 2014: 127). This marked the first time that Norway would be in the international spotlight in regard to terrorism. Soon after these attacks strong counter-terrorism rhetoric not only permeated within Norwegian parliament but would also come from various political leaders.

Norway’s traditional policy response to issues of national security has been more democracy, more openness, and greater political participation. However, the 2011 lone wolf terror-attacks combined as the largest modern terror-related mass-killing to take place in Norway (Appleton, 2014: 132). These two terror events led to 31 enacted legislative policy responses from the Norwegian government, all conservative in their nature. Amongst these enactments were greater controls on weapons and chemicals, police and military reforms, and the amendments to the criminal code—for example, the maximum sentence for a terror-related incident increased from 21 years to 30 years (Appleton, 2014: 135; Jakobsson and Blom, 2014: 483; Norwegian Criminal Code, 2014; Wall Street Journal, 2013; Risk Daily Report, 2011). Norway’s counter-terrorism legislation became much more conservative in nature in large part due to its domestic terrorist experience that led to increased public support for harsher legislation and an increased [domestic] perceived threat level. Ultimately, this attack led Norway to increase proactive police powers, including covert and coercive interrogation and surveillance methods to a much greater extent than its Nordic neighbours (Husabo, 2013: 3).

As for Sweden, the threat of terrorism has been relatively insignificant. The most significant terror-related activity to take place on Swedish soil has been a suicide bombing outside a shopping mall in 2010 in which no one died but several were injured. Since the damage and casualty count from the attack was much less than what Norway experienced in 2011, it comes as no surprise that the policy discourse to follow was also less extensive. There were no explicit changes to the criminal code or enacted conservative legislative policies. Rather, the associated policy responses that did occur were changes to the language in Sweden’s existing criminal codes and legislature. These associated policy responses changed traditional Swedish counter-terrorism strategies from mitigation to prevention (Strandh and Eklund, 2015: 359; Swedish Criminal Code, 2014). The most noteworthy change was the construction of the Swedish Counter-terrorism Cooperative Council designed to specifically investigate and monitor terrorist activity. Other small changes included increased funding and resources to the Swedish Security Service and parts of the Swedish police (Council of Europe, 2014). Compared to Norway, Sweden did not increase its maximum sentence for terrorism (18 years). In sum, this terrorist-related event on Swedish soil did not register a perception of threat within the nation due to its small scale of damage and casualty count and thus, the policy discourse arising from it was not extensive nor conservative in nature.

Finland, on the other hand, has had zero official terror-related events on domestic soil. In fact, Finland is ranked as one of the world’s safest countries. Although Finland has experienced zero official terror-related events since WWII, the country remains in a unique position geographically. This unique position is its shared border with Russia. There has been outspoken public discontent about NATO’s expansion and future Finnish membership from the Kremlin (Russia) that could threaten the “peaceful” relationship between the two states as it currently stands (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 378). Future terror-related threats from Russia remain an important topic for Finnish counter-terrorism policy discourse. However, since Finland has experienced zero official terror-related events there have been no associated policy responses that could account for a difference in counter-terrorism policy discourse. Therefore, this variable does not apply strongly to Finland as it currently stands. Overall, Norway has experienced the harshest terrorist event of these three nations and because of this Norway’s policy discourse has become more conservative in nature, comparatively speaking.
Perceived Level of Threat

This variable is based upon the attitudes and associated rhetoric of governments and citizens alike. Collectively, the Nordic countries have a low perception of threat as compared to the United States, United Kingdom, and France as comparatives. The previous variable is vastly connected to this variable as domestic terror-related experience can vastly alter a state’s perception of threat. In other words, how individuals perceive their own risk of being a victim of a terrorist attack and the motive behind a terrorist attack can play an influential role in determining how people will respond to an attack (Jakobsson and Blom, 2014: 483). The 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway directly led to heightened perceptions of threat not only in Norway but in Finland and Sweden as well. Notable government officials of both the Swedish and Finnish governments have commented that the likelihood of something similar happening in their nations has increased (Appleton, 2014: 128-130). Both Interpol and the United States publically announced that this attack symbolized a great threat to the Nordic countries (Appleton, 2014: 128). The domestic terror-events and associated rhetoric in Norway are largely responsible for the heightened perception of threat in the nation that led to the aforementioned conservative legislative responses. In addition, the perception of threat in Norway is also heightened due to its participation in NATO, unlike Finland and Sweden. By participating in this supranational body terrorist groups such as IS (Islamic State) and Al-Qaeda have directly threatened any nation that participates in this international organization (Dahlburg, 2016).

The threat perception in Sweden is relatively low compared to Norway. The 2010 terrorist attack in Sweden has had no significant impact on Swedish threat perceptions. However, threat perception in Sweden has increased slightly due to the 2011 terror-attacks in Norway primarily because it is a neighbouring country with similar values. Although several highly-ranked government officials have publically stated that a similar event could take place on Swedish soil, the public perception of threat is low as the old doctrine of neutrality is still immensely embedded in the nation’s political culture. This doctrine is vitally important in Sweden as public opinion still vastly supports military non-alignment due to the perception that future membership in NATO would increase terror-related threats (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 371). In other words, public opinion on the notion of military non-alignment is in turn connected with perception of threat since the populous of Sweden believes military non-alignment with NATO lowers the risk of terror-related threats. And because of this public belief, there have been no conservative legislative measures in response to this variable.

The perception of threat is most unique in Finland. As previously mentioned, Finland shares a border with Russia and its perceived level of threat is much different than Norway and Sweden due to its fear of Russia. Finland has experienced zero domestic terrorist attacks since WWII, but its perception of threat is higher due to its close proximity to Russia. The fear of Russia has led the Finnish government to express good bilateral relations with the United States in order to seek greater protection (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 372). The fear of Russian terrorism had led Finland to adopt various counter-terrorism policies that place a stronger emphasize on national defense rather than military alignment as seen in Norway (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 366).

In addition, since Finland has taken on a greater and more influential role within the European Union, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (FSIS) has started to provide in-depth assessments of terrorism threats to the Finnish government. The increased workload of the FSIS has led to an increase in arrests of individuals who have ties with terrorist organizations (Malkki, 2016: 350). As the FSIS develops into a more experienced institution, the more terrorist activity...
that it reveals will cause potential increases in threat levels (perceptions). The increased level of threat has influenced Finland to adopt one of the four pillars of the EU’s international counter-terrorism strategy (prevention) into its own domestic legislation (Malkki, 2016: 351). In sum, Norway has the highest level of risk perception due to its participation in NATO and domestic terrorism experiences which have led to more conservative legislative measures. Sweden has altered its domestic legislation to reflect ‘prevention’ rather than ‘mitigation’ due to its isolated and small-scale terrorist attack in 2010. As for Finland, it remains in a unique position because of its proximity to Russia and thus, its few counter-terrorism legislative responses have reflected the threat of Russian terrorism.

**Supranational Membership**

A state’s membership in a supranational body, particularly NATO or the EU can influence the state’s counter-terrorism policies most significantly. Norway’s legislative responses have been more conservative and more draconian in nature because of its participation in NATO and close relationship with the United States. Membership in NATO has drastically changed Norway’s counter-terrorism policy responses to reflect the greater interests of the membership and particularly the largest member-- the United States. This membership dynamic has influenced and thus changed Norway’s traditional security approach to reflect a more comprehensive security outlook (Rieker, 2004: 385). Norway’s counter-terrorism legislation closely resembles U.S. security policy in the ‘Age of International Terrorism.’ This is particularly observable in the expansion of proactive police powers after the 2011 terror-attacks (Husabo, 2013; Rieker, 2005: 395).

Sweden as a member of the EU has been greatly influenced in the avenue that it is the only Nordic country to undergo explicit constitutional change in state identity (domestic security policy). Although the doctrine of neutrality has been eliminated in many instances, it remains a reason as to why Sweden will not join NATO. The EU offered Sweden a chance to integrate politically but due to the EU’s increasing involvement with security, Sweden has been socialized differently because of this phenomenon without the initial intent of changing its national security policies (Rieker, 2004: 374). The impact of the EU on Sweden is evident through a set of regional, institutional, and ideational forces affecting domestic counter-terrorism policies, practices, and politics (see Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 365).

Finland is also a member of the EU, but its membership has been significantly different than that of Sweden. Finland assumed the EU presidency in 2006 and as a result of this appointment the nation undertook several institutional and structural changes in regard to terrorism policy. In addition, due to the EU presidency, the workload of the FSIS gained increased confidence and thus, it has taken on a greater international role. Finland’s counter-terrorism policies have been “broadening” to incorporate cross-national terrorism issues, for example: incitement, recruitment, and financing (Malkki, 2016: 342). Finland’s membership in the EU has dramatically increased counter-terrorism policy debate in parliament. Prior to Finland’s EU presidency, terrorism was only mentioned four-times in the previous decade; post-2006, this has increased to nineteen-times in a single year (Malkki, 2016: 347). In sum, this variable has shown that counter-terrorism policy development does not occur in a vacuum. These similarly structured Nordic states have been pressured internationally to varying degrees which, in turn, has influenced their domestic responses to terrorism in varying fashions.
This variable is the most significant in influencing different legislative responses for two main reasons. First, international agreements, especially membership bodies can infringe on state sovereignty as they may require domestic legislation to be altered to match the goals and objectives of the membership. This requirement ultimately requires the explicit change of a state’s constitution and in the context of this study, the security approach of the state—implicit and explicit changes due to supranational membership have been observed in all three states examined. And secondly, the democratic make-up of supranational bodies may influence a state’s domestic institutions, policies, and political culture through socialization, adaptation, and coercion. Even if a state has not experienced domestic terrorism (Finland for example), membership in a supranational body may nonetheless influence policy responses based on the experiences of neighbouring countries. The biggest distinction between this [supranational membership] variable and the three other variables examined above is that a domestic experience does not have to be present for a security policy change to occur within a state.

Conclusion

Through the use of various methodological approaches, mainly literature reviews and process-tracing this paper shows that the field of political terrorism suffered from a theoretical weakness. This theoretical weakness is that little attention had been given to explaining how or why certain policy responses occur in response to terrorism. Specifically, this study investigated the similarly structured Nordic states and provided a systematic and comprehensive list of four variables that can help explain why these states differ in their counter-terrorism legislation despite similar political structures and institutions. These variables have highlighted that counter-terrorism policy does not occur in a vacuum, but rather counter-terrorism policy develops and is influenced by a states’ individual experiences, political climate, and notable international forces. The main limitation of this study is that the findings and use of these four variables may not be generalizable to non-Nordic states and this is precisely where greater research is needed. However, the findings of this study suggest that state membership in a supranational body or group of supranational bodies through socialization, adaptation, and coercion is the most impactful variable in explaining why these Nordic states differ in their counter-terrorism legislative policies. Ultimately, by attempting to answer the question: Why do the social-democratic Nordic states differ in their legislative responses to terrorism? this study has sought to fill the gap within political terrorism literature which lacks comprehensive explanations for differing legislative responses between similarly structured states.

References

"Criminal Code. 2014. Norway; Finland; Sweden."


