The Subversion of German Idealism in Schelling’s Revival of Augustine’s Doctrine of Original Sin

Abstract

This essay aims to develop a systematic comparison between Augustine’s and Schelling’s conceptions of the origin of evil. The main similarity in the intentions of both thinkers lies in the fact that the late Augustine and the author of the Freedom Essay recognize the positivity of evil, which they seek to reconcile with the omnipotence, all-goodness, and personality of God. While Augustine considers true human freedom—understood as the free capacity to choose between good and evil—forfeited for all human beings subsequent to the fall of Adam, Schelling regards this same capacity as the eternal, transcendental, and in this sense, indestructible principle of human individuality. In this way, he seems to have mastered the Augustinian challenge in the Freedom Essay. Augustine’s position is generally challenging, even and especially for today’s readers, because he considers all humans to be evil after Adam’s fall into sin, so that there is no possibility that anyone can do good of their own accord.
Whereas according to Augustine, freedom is an endowment that God only conceded to Adam, at first glance, it looks as if Schelling rescues human freedom as an original self-beginning open to every individual.

Keywords: Schelling, Augustine, human freedom, evil, God, original sin, intelligible deed, ethics, theology, pantheism