

Editors' Introduction

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There is a significant correlation between the development of Lonergan's theory of ethics and the emergence of functional specialization. In the often-cited article, "An Expansion of Lonergan's Notion of Value,"¹ Frederick Crowe noticed a shift in Lonergan's notion of value between the writing of *Insight* and *Method in Theology*, which, in his view, grounded the differentiation of decision as a distinct fourth level of intentional consciousness. That differentiation was not, of course, wholly without precedent in Lonergan's prior thinking. A seed of that development goes back to Lonergan's enthusiastic and even passionate reading of John Henry Newman's *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* in the 1920s. Newman articulated for Lonergan a criterion of mind "far higher, wider, more certain, subtler, than logical inference."² Lonergan's efforts to articulate more precisely the implications of this 'criterion of mind' in the making of history would become a *leitmotif* for his life's work.

We note, however, that the tone and emphasis of his efforts changed significantly. Initially, Lonergan's explicit appeal to the data of human consciousness was minimal. In his student essays, *The Blandyke Papers*, he uses a series of diagrams to draw out the non-visual component of a solution that is the 'insight.' In his early and original account of the dialectic of history in the 1930s, Lonergan exploits Aquinas' account of the intellectual and appetitive faculties in their relation to free will, as they appear in the first part of the *Summa Theologica*, to ground his dialectic account of history. In his doctoral study of operative grace in Aquinas he continues in the same vein. While there are significant developments in his grasp of the operations of interiority between his

¹ Frederick E. Crowe, "An Expansion of Lonergan's Notion of Value," in *Lonergan Workshop 7* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 35-57.

² Bernard Lonergan, "True Judgment and Science," in *Shorter Papers*, ed. Robert Croken, Robert Doran, and H. Daniel Monsour, vol. 20, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 34-44, at 41.

introduction to Newman and his study of Aquinas, the style of presentation does not yet make thematic the process as a personal appropriation of the operations of intentional consciousness; his account lacks the luminous appropriation of the data of our operating consciousness that is the hallmark of *Method in Theology*. Indeed, it is only with the *Verbum* articles that Lonergan begins a systematic study of the intellectual component of human interiority.

The *Verbum* articles establish with convincing detail the implicit cognitional position grounding Aquinas' account of reason and will, which is foundational to Lonergan's own account of the dialectic of history. Those articles represent a crucial step towards the explicit appeal to cognitional process that later would form the backbone of *Insight*. The first ten chapters of *Insight* itself, of course, can be understood as a series of five-finger exercises in the personal self-appropriation of understanding and judgment. Yet the account in *Insight* is at a tipping point, at least linguistically, and probably also genetically. In a number of places in that work, Lonergan tends to deploy the scholastic language of faculty psychology, even though he had already moved well beyond it in his articulation of a generalized empirical method oriented towards the scientific investigation and identification of the data of consciousness.³ Still, whatever the expressive ambiguities at that stage of his thought, Lonergan's self-understanding of intellect and reason was deeply and extensively developed in *Insight*. The same is not true of the elements of deliberation so central to moral self-appropriation and so central also to any third-stage effort to implement generalized empirical method.

The differentiation of decision-making as a distinct fourth level of intentional consciousness—together with the concomitant shift to the language of intentionality—were without question important in his discovery and explication of functional specialization. But Lonergan never fully articulated the elements of deliberation even in *Method in Theology*, at least not in the detail that characterized his account of cognitional structure in *Insight*. For example, while he discusses a fourth level of intentional consciousness at some length in *Method*, he tends not

³ Lonergan's own later gloss on this transitional stage is revealing. "Although in *Insight* I am still talking as if it were faculty psychology, what I am doing is not faculty psychology. ... I still talked about intellect and will. I don't anymore. Potencies are not data of consciousness; operations and dynamisms are." Bernard Lonergan, in *Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan* (interviews), ed. Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey, and Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers, 1982), 43. On the recurrent gap between significant innovations in human thought and existing settled or conventional modes of expression, see Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran, vol. 3, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 595 (CWL 3) (noting that "the great difficulties of interpretation arise when the new wine of literary, scientific, and philosophic leaders cannot but be poured into the old bottles of established modes of expression.")

to distinguish systematically and thematically between the *what question* of understanding at the second cognitional level and the *what-to-do question* at the fourth level of deliberation. Instead, Lonergan directs his efforts in chapters 1 and 2 of *Method in Theology* towards establishing the reality of a distinct notion of value grounding a good decision.

Yet it is already clear from his 1961 Dublin lectures⁴ that the thematization of what-to-do questions is fundamental to understanding the process of deliberation, a thematization that (with the benefit of hindsight) we may say was crucial to the discovery of functional specialization. If we hark back to the chapter on “The Possibility of Ethics” in *Insight*, we notice that both the level of understanding *and* the level of judgment are repeated in deliberation.⁵ We notice, too, a surprisingly explicit recognition of the modal difference between the possibilities grasped in response to the what-question on the second level of human consciousness and the possibilities grasped in response to the what-to-do question on the fourth. As Lonergan notes in that chapter of *Insight*, while “factual insights are concerned to lead to knowledge of being, practical insights are concerned to lead to the making of being.”⁶ It is a remarkable phrase—“the making of being”—but it has a fascinating and earlier echo in *Insight*’s chapter 7. There, in a programmatic passage almost unparalleled in the body of his writings, Lonergan writes of the deep and almost desperate need for “the attainment of a higher viewpoint in man’s understanding and making of man.”⁷

This is not without significance for the very meaning and project of functional collaboration. The distinction between the what-question on the level of direct understanding and the what-to-do-question on the level of deliberation provides a forward-leaning mood for the functional specialty Systematics. Indeed, since the what-to-do question lurks in the what-question, it lends a future leaning even to the specialty Interpretation as well as to the other three early specialties. That lurking, of course, adds richness to Lonergan’s future-bent expression on *Method*, 53. The significance of that distinction is one of the central points intimated in Philip McShane’s essay in this volume, “What-To-Do: The Heart of Lonergan’s Ethics.” Consequently, just as we can trace a four-decades long development from implicit to explicit expression in Lonergan’s account of intellect, so we can envisage future developments

⁴ See *Phenomenology and Logic: The Boston College Lectures on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism*, ed. Philip McShane, vol. 18, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 319-323 (Appendix A).

⁵ One can track, for example, the role of “the grasp of a possible course of action” through the successive sections in *Insight*’s chapter 18 on “practical insight,” “practical reflection,” and “the decision.” *CWL* 3, 632-639.

⁶ *CWL* 3, 633.

⁷ *CWL* 3, 258.

of our understanding of deliberation, the seeds of which are contained in Lonergan's account of deliberation and the notion of value. And thanks to Lonergan's 'lone ranger work,' as Robert Henman puts it in "An Ethics of Philosophic Work," we have the long-term advantage of the framework that is functional collaboration, Lonergan's finest achievement.

This issue is dedicated to an exploration of ethics and functional specialization. The articles are either explorations of particular zones of ethical reflection, or they are efforts to articulate the significance of functional specialization in ethics.

The issue begins with Jean Ponder Soto's brave article, "Sexuality: The Mysticism and Ethics of a Mediated Return to Immediacy." Dr. Soto takes advantage of Lonergan's own advances in interiority to offer us a refreshed and enlivened discussion of the profoundly positive function of human sexuality in both its natural and supernatural contexts. The article reminds us in some ways of Lonergan's own ultimately balked effort, in 1943, to open up Catholic discourse on marriage and sexuality.⁸ Perhaps Dr. Soto's reflections provide some hope for a more empirical, candid, and dialectical dialogue in the future.

In "Lonergan's Ethics and Feminist Ethics: Exploring the Meaning of *Care*," Alessandra Gillis explores the significance of a fuller appropriation of deliberation, implicit in *Method in Theology*, for a feminist ethics of care. That fuller appropriation emphasizes the differentiation of the what-question from the what-to-do question, the appropriation of the act of consent, and links both to the fundamentally collaborative character of ethics.

In his "The Ethics of Philosophic Work," Robert Henman argues that solo performance in philosophy is passé. To be up-to-date now means to collaborate: the lone ranger becomes a posse.

Bruce Anderson continues his work in economics, this time sketching the implications for business ethics of Lonergan's discovery of macrodynamic economics. Anderson's article, "Is There Anything Special About Business Ethics?," makes a clear case for the importance of understanding Lonergan's economic theory for doing business ethics.

In "What-To-Do: The Heart of Lonergan's Ethics," Philip McShane explores the implications of Lonergan's own compacted account of 'what questions' and 'what-to-do questions.' The essay provides a fascinating and instructive glimpse into McShane's own long-continued struggle and dialogue with Lonergan's achievement.

While all the essays in this volume feed, to a greater or lesser extent, on the collaborative reality of doing ethics, the final two essays make functional collaboration in ethics the main course. Terry Quinn's

⁸ Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage," in *Collection*, ed. Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran, vol. 4, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 17-52; see also the editorial notes, note x, 263-64.

“Invitation to Functional Collaboration: Dynamics of Progress in the Sciences, Technologies, and Arts” takes up the issue of collaboration as a scientist thinking about progress—surely a core ethical concern—in all fields. Finally, in a remarkably fresh, enlightening, and in some ways path-breaking essay, James Duffy tackles a similar concern from the viewpoint of a teacher of philosophy. His essay is an excellent and engaging introduction to the central problem of the issue and seems a fine way to end the volume.

We finish, appropriately, on a forward-leaning note. Our next issue will be a book-length essay by Philip McShane on Functional Research to be followed by an issue devoted to the Functional Specialties of Interpretation and History.