

## Functional Collaboration: A Novel Challenge

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### First Objectification

#### *Field and Subject Specializations*

##### A. Needs Emerging from Specialization

The academic disciplines are largely results of developments in the late 19th and early 20th century, when those working in the disciplines increasingly decided themselves what to teach, what qualified as good research through journals managed by disciplinary associations, and who to hire and promote.<sup>1</sup> In 1910, Abbott Lawrence Lowell, president of Harvard University, introduced the academic major system. Since then majors have come and gone.<sup>2</sup>

As an undergraduate at Loyola Marymount University (1979–1983), I needed to declare a major, and within the major, I needed to choose courses, with the exception of those courses that were required. Another need I had some years later (1996), one that is all-too familiar to graduate students, was to land a job before or after defending my dissertation.<sup>3</sup> In the area of philosophy, this task typically requires identifying an area of specialization (AOS) and one or two areas of competency (AOC) and, depending on the hiring institution, a couple of publications. The practice of specializing is part of the academic culture, and positioning oneself can help to land a job, get published, get tenure, and eventually get promoted. We all must find a niche, a groove or two.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Allen F. Repko, Rick Szostak, and Michelle Phillips Buchberger, "The Rise of the Modern Disciplines and Interdisciplinarity," in *Introduction to Interdisciplinary Studies*, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2019), 32–33.

<sup>2</sup> Information systems is a discipline that emerged in the 1970s. Earth System sciences emerged in 1970s and became a "new science" in the 1980s. On the other hand, the number of history majors has declined sharply since 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Thanks to a recommendation by Patrick Byrne at Boston College, I was offered a tenure track position at St. Mary's University of Minnesota.

<sup>4</sup> When I was a graduate student at Fordham, a colleague recommended that I pick up a course on business ethics to have it on my CV as one of my grooves.

## B. Other Experiences

Since declaring a major in philosophy and two minors (theology and mathematics) at Loyola Marymount University (LMU) in the spring of 1981, I have had myriad first-hand experiences taking, designing, and teaching courses in one department or another. Undergraduate courses included a few roughly focused on divisions of the field of data (Pre-Socratic and Platonic Tradition, History of Philosophy I, History of Christianity I), as well as courses that could be roughly classified as subject courses (ethics, empiricism). Graduate courses I took at Boston College (1983–85) and Fordham University (1988–1990) could likewise be classified as courses roughly focusing on a field (medieval humanism, contemporary German) or on a subject (philosophy of science, theology as hermeneutics).<sup>5</sup> As an undergraduate, graduate student, and professor, I have also taken and taught courses focusing on individual thinkers.

My teaching career in both the US and Mexico also presents evidence of departmental specialization. In the early 1990s, I taught epistemology to undergraduates at Fordham. Later I taught undergraduates pursuing philosophy or theology majors, as well as students of all majors taking core interdisciplinary courses, at Saint Mary's University of Minnesota (SMU). From 2007 until 2015 I taught core ethics courses to undergraduates studying engineering or business at the *Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey* (ITESM). During that same period, I collaborated with colleagues in different parts of Mexico on designing a humanities and social sciences

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<sup>5</sup> The words *rough* and *roughly* are significant. Courses such as “Medieval Philosophy,” or “Medieval Masonry” might be found in a university catalogue, but no courses simply titled “Medieval.” Nor do we find subject courses without a field. For example, a seminar on “Transcendental Thomism” is a slice of Thomist studies focusing on “transcendental,” whatever that might mean to the one designing the seminar. Lonergan did not consider Otto Muck's notion of transcendental method pertinent to what he describes in the first chapter of *Method in Theology*. See CWL 14, 17, n. 11.

major,<sup>6</sup> and I taught most of the sequence of philosophy courses within that major.<sup>7</sup>

### *Functional Specialization*

#### A. Emerging Needs

##### 1. “New Theology” Crisis

In the late 1980s and early 90s, I learned about a need to reconfigure theology while doing graduate work at Fordham University. I was not alive in the 1950s and far too young in the 1960s to appreciate the “new theology” crisis that was in the air. I did, however, pick up on the crisis while studying at Fordham in the 1990s, in particular while taking classes from Gerald McCool SJ and Norrie Clarke SJ. McCool wrote about an “internal evolution of Thomism” and an “explosion of pluralism,”<sup>8</sup> while Clarke wrote about the end of “Thomistic Triumphalism.”<sup>9</sup>

Towards the end of the defense of my dissertation, McCool, one of my readers, asked me “What is Lonergan up to in *Method in Theology*?”<sup>10</sup> The exchange lasted a total of two or three minutes at most—I mentioned

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<sup>6</sup> The *Licenciatura en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales* (LHCS) major was initially offered at four of the 33 ITESM campuses. The course description is available online in both Spanish and English:

<https://samp.itesm.mx/Programas/VistaPrograma?clave=LHCS07&modoVista=Default&idioma=ES&cols=0>

<sup>7</sup> The sequence includes logic, epistemology, social philosophy, philosophy of culture, and “Modernity and Postmodernity.”

<sup>8</sup> *From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989), 200–233. For McCool, the “new theology debate” culminated during and after the Second Vatican Council, when Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Rahner, and Bernard Lonergan became leading voices of the next generation of theologians. *Ibid.*, 225.

<sup>9</sup> Clarke uses the expression “Thomistic Triumphalism” to describe his M.A. training at Fordham and Ph.D. training at Louvain in “Thomism and Contemporary Philosophical Pluralism,” in *The Future of Thomism*, Deal Hudson and Dennis Moran (eds.), (University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 91–92.

<sup>10</sup> Even though my dissertation focused on Lonergan’s two studies of Aquinas (1938–1949), Joseph Koterski SJ, my third and final mentor, had insisted I include a final set of comments on the significance of Lonergan’s post-1949 writings for the meaning of “existential ethics,” a phrase that occurs in the 1976 “Questionnaire on Philosophy” (see CWL 17, 357–358) and that I referred to in the thesis.

something about the two ways of development,<sup>11</sup> which was the best I could do at the time. I did find it quite admirable that a respected scholar of nineteenth and twentieth century Thomism was comfortable enough to confess publicly his befuddlement about *Method in Theology*.

## 2. Cosmopolis

I find another expression of a need for a reconfiguration expressed in chapter 7 of *Insight*, a chapter I read twice as an undergraduate,<sup>12</sup> again as a graduate student, and again and again in the years to follow. The need in this chapter of *Insight* is to somehow figure out what to do with, about, and in the longer cycle of decline in which we live and move, and which results from group bias combining with general bias. The latter is general because we are all ladies and gentlemen of common sense, and commonly our legitimate concern for making it through the day, or the semester, is detached from concerns about long-term results. In addition, those of us in academics who have specialized in order to survive have “run the risk of turning his [or her] specialty into a bias by failing to recognize and appreciate the significance of other fields.”<sup>13</sup>

I do not find in *Insight* a solution for how to break from the talking-head Babel of our day.<sup>14</sup> The solution is identified in chapter 20 as something that “will consist in a new and higher collaboration of men [and women] in the

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<sup>11</sup> The two ways correspond to the proposed two phases of collaboration—“from below upwards” in indirect discourse and “from above downwards” in direct discourse.

<sup>12</sup> In an undergraduate seminar in 1981, Mark Morelli asked me to read *Insight* by journaling my way through the book. At the time, I knew next to nothing about Aquinas, Kant, Wittgenstein, or Lonergan, but I learned from Mark that philosophy has much to do with self-appropriation. After years of trying to read *Insight* this way and various efforts to teach sections to undergraduates, I have come to appreciate that the book is quite an achievement, one that falls into the category of a classic—a work that is well beyond my horizon. “Lots of people look at *Insight* with some interest, but almost no one reads it as its author intended it to be read. This is not surprising, since it would probably cost years of one’s life to do so.” Fred Lawrence, “Lonergan: A Tribute,” *Boston College Biweekly*, vol. 5, no. 9 (January 1985), 8. See also note 36 below.

<sup>13</sup> CWL 3, 251.

<sup>14</sup> “Cosmopolis is not Babel, yet how can we break from Babel? This is the problem. So far from solving it in this chapter, we do not hope to reach a full solution in this volume.” CWL 3, 267.

pursuit of truth.”<sup>15</sup> In the ten-page “Resumption of the Heuristic Structure of the Solution,” the word *collaboration* occurs 34 times and *collaborate* twice.

### 3. Interdisciplinary Core Courses

From 1996 to 2001 I taught philosophy, theology, and interdisciplinary studies at SMU. The core interdisciplinary courses were intended to provide a broad, liberal arts and science formation. These courses included “Perspectives on the Good Human Life from Greek Antiquity to the Middle Ages (Perspectives), “Our Modern Heritage” (OMH),<sup>16</sup> “Great Ideas in Math and Science,” and “Stories of God and the Human Condition.” As was typical at the time, and perhaps still is, the core courses were divvied up along departmental divisions, for better or worse.<sup>17</sup>

After a few days of meetings, the five of us involved in designing the courses that had been assigned to the philosophy department (Perspectives and OMH) finally got around to agreeing on texts to read. Although there was a general sense in the group that we were doing the best we could, we knew there were unresolved issues regarding the integrity of the courses and, more generally, of the interdisciplinary program. In a paper I wrote for WCMI (1999) about my experience collaborating on the design of OMH, I raised a question about possible meanings of *modernity* and began to wonder if the concern about the fragmentation of teaching and learning was at root an unsettling, whatever-that-might-mean crisis.<sup>18</sup> Ten years later I revisited

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<sup>15</sup> CWL 3, 740.

<sup>16</sup> OMH was organized around six historical periods—the Reformation, the rise of modern science, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the late nineteenth/early twentieth century.

<sup>17</sup> “Surely, one of the most baneful effects of modernity on the university as far as liberal and liberating education is concerned is the stranglehold of departments even over undergraduate education.” Frederick Lawrence, ed., “Dangerous Memory and the Pedagogy of the Oppressed,” in *Communicating a Dangerous Memory: Soundings in Political Theology*, by Frederick Lawrence (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 26.

<sup>18</sup> There are reasons for identifying a movement out of premodern, classicist culture (“earlier modernity”) into the modern era (“later modernity”), for example, if what one means by *modernity* are developments such as acceptance of the Copernican revolution, teaching and writing in modern languages, distinguishing feudal from national and centralized governments, and utilizing modern technologies. Likewise, there are reasons for distinguishing “modernity” from “postmodernity,” for example, if what one means by *postmodernity* is the crisis ushered into our inexorably pluralistic world by the end of the metanarratives of

this query when I taught the course “Modernity and Postmodernity,”<sup>19</sup> the capstone philosophy course in an undergraduate humanities and social sciences major.<sup>20</sup>

## B. Other Experiences

### 1. Writing on Probability

In 2013, Francisco “Paco” Galán asked me to elucidate this sentence from *Insight*: “It follows that, when the prior conditions for the functioning of a scheme of recurrence are satisfied, then the probability of the combinations of events constitutive of the scheme leaps from a product of fractions to a sum of fractions.”<sup>21</sup> It took me three months to write “*El azar, la probabilidad emergente y la cosmópolis*.”<sup>22</sup> During those three months, I took my eyes off the page (CWL 3, 144) time and again in order to do some ‘apparently trifling problems,’ e.g., flipping a coin ten times, then ten times again, then ten times again.<sup>23</sup>

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unlimited, speculative knowledge and unlimited emancipatory *praxis* together with the “legitimation crisis” in the university institution which in the past relied on metaphysics. See further, Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). Still, if what one means by *modernity* are the emergence of “linguistic, literary, systematic, scientific, scholarly, and introspective differentiations of consciousness” as well as the transformation of meanings and transvaluation of values that these differentiations make possible, then things are not so clear. See Bernard Lonergan, “Dialectic of Authority,” *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 16 (University of Toronto Press, 2017), 5, and the conclusion of “Dimensions of Meaning,” CWL 4, 244–45. Charles Jencks provides a diagram chronicling the use of “Seventy Posts,” i.e., seventy words or phrases beginning with post, Post, post-, or Post-, dating back to the 1870s, in *What Is Post-Modernism?* (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 1996), 14–15. The phrase “post-Vatican II” could be added to the list.

<sup>19</sup> There were some philosophers on the list of assigned readings—Nietzsche, Lyotard, Foucault, Habermas—but the course was a pastiche. We read Jane Jacob’s *The Life and Death of Great American Cities* as well as Jorge Borges’ “The Library of Babel” and “The Circular Ruins.” In addition, we watched *Blade Runner* and *Wings of Desire*.

<sup>20</sup> See footnotes 6 and 7.

<sup>21</sup> CWL 3, 144.

<sup>22</sup> [Randomness, Emergent Probability, and Cosmopolis], *Revista de Filosofía (Universidad Iberoamericana)*, vol. 135 (2013), 313–337.

<sup>23</sup> I comment on the lengthy, technical definition of *probability* on page 81 of *Insight* (CWL 3) in James Duffy, Cecilia Moloney, and Terrance Quinn,

## 2. *Seeding Global Collaboration*

The Sixth International Lonergan Conference, “Functional Collaboration in the Academy: Advancing Bernard Lonergan’s Central Achievement,” took place at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, in July of 2014. *Seeding Global Collaboration*<sup>24</sup> is a collection of papers that were presented at the conference. I was one of the twelve contributing authors who explored different topics and attempted to collaborate by implementing an agreed upon a four-part format for the essays.<sup>25</sup>

## 3. Writing on *Fratelli Tutti*

In March 2021, Banzelão Teixeira, co-editor of *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education*, asked me for an article on *Fratelli tutti*<sup>26</sup> to be published in a special issue of the journal addressing different aspects of the encyclical.<sup>27</sup> I discovered that while those advising Francis say many things that might sound good, for example the promotion of “inclusive capitalism,” I question the effectiveness of the encyclical. As far as I can make out, the advisors have no appreciation of two-flow economics,<sup>28</sup> and so no appreciation of getting

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“Assembling the Meaning of Probability,” *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 13 (2020), 84–118.

<sup>24</sup> Meghan Allerton et al., *Seeding Global Collaboration*, ed. Patrick Brown and James Duffy (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2016).

<sup>25</sup> The four parts: (1) identify a context; (2) specify a “content,” something that, if cycled forward, might contribute to the collaborative effort and indeed transform a concrete situation; (3) attempt to hand on efficiently the relevant content to an audience; (4) reflect critically on what was learned in the prior two attempts to think and write functionally.

<sup>26</sup> Pope Francis, *Fratelli Tutti* [Encyclical Letter on Fraternity and Social Friendship], available online at:

[https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco\\_20201003\\_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html](https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html).

<sup>27</sup> James Duffy, “*Fratelli Tutti* and Colorful Fruit to Be Borne,” *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy & Education* 32, no. 2–3 (2021), 203–22.

<sup>28</sup> The two firms can be symbolized by  $DA'$  — the aggregate of primary rhythms, which are routines which yield both *ordinary* products (food, clothing, entertainment) and *overhead* products (books, tablets, schools, bridges) — and  $DA''$ , the aggregate of rhythms that accelerate  $DA'$ . See Bernard Lonergan, *For a New Political Economy*, ed. Philip McShane, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 21 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 17–19. See also note 33 below and James Duffy, “Minding the Economy of *Campo Real*,” *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 1 (2018), 15–16, n. 54.

the basic insights to flow historically, i.e. in textbooks and teachers.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the need to communicate begs the question of method: How might various tasks be divided up in such a way that the conversion towards two-flow economics is “translated”<sup>30</sup> efficiently and beautifully, thus bearing fruit in street markets in Rome and Mexico City?

## Second Objectification

*“Doing a big thing”*<sup>31</sup>

One of the little insights I had while writing on *Fratelli tutti*, is that its redaction and reception is also part of a whatever-that-might-mean crisis, “a crisis not of faith but of culture.”<sup>32</sup> If the basics are not understood and not taught, all the good intentions will not lead to increments of progress.<sup>33</sup> One of the things that results from my position is that this weakness will be

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<sup>29</sup> See also note 34 below.

<sup>30</sup> *Fratelli tutti* is now available in twelve languages, and I am very grateful to Armando Bravo SJ for his perseverant and dedicated translation of CWL into Spanish (available online, <https://bellarmine.lmu.edu/lonergan/centerresources/spanishtranslationsondisk>). The efficient ‘translations’ of *For a New Political Economy* (CWL 21) and *The Incarnate Word* (CWL 8) for “the almost endlessly varied sensitivities, mentalities, interests, and tastes of [hum]mankind” (CWL 14, 135) will be methodological. See also Philip McShane, HOW 8, “The Making of Jesus of Present.”

<sup>31</sup> “And you can have teamwork insofar, first of all, as the fact of reciprocal dependence is understood and appreciated. Not only is that understanding required; one has to be familiar with what is called the *acquis*, what has been settled, what no one has any doubt of in the present time. You’re doing a big thing when you can upset that, but you have to know where things stand at the present time, what has already been achieved, to be able to see what is new in its novelty as a consequence.” Bernard Lonergan, *Early Works on Theological Method 1*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 22 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 464.

<sup>32</sup> CWL 4, 244. It is fair to say that the “not numerous center” described in the last paragraph of “Dimensions of Meaning” are multiply differentiated folks slowly “shifting towards system.” See also notes 18 and 42.

<sup>33</sup> The well-known economist Jeffrey Sachs, one of the many advising Pope Francis, insists on policy planning based on “real data.” I agree, nominally, with his position. The expression “real data,” however, begs the question of real (economic) analysis.



addressed in the next 50 years, perhaps even in philosophy or theology courses.<sup>34</sup>

A second result of my position is that the possibility of a dynamic unity of functionally interdependent collaborators yielding cumulative and progressive elicits a reconfiguration of philosophy, theology, and interdisciplinary studies as I experienced them, both as a student and as a professor. My sense is that philosophy, theology, “interdisciplinary studies” and “integrative studies” could benefit from exercises done in twofold attention and the implementation of basic heuristic structures. How might high school, undergraduate, and graduate programs be reconfigured to promote integral growth so that a creative minority of graduate students resonate with the claim: “Theoretical understanding, then, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view.”<sup>35</sup> How might lower education be transformed so that 18-year-olds are at home with canons and heuristics of empirical science and a creative minority of them live the question “What might the X cosmopolis be?”<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> “There is needed up-to-date technical knowledge of economic and political theory and their respective histories; perhaps the greatest weakness of Catholic social thought is its apparent lack of awareness and the need for technical knowledge.” Bernard Lonergan, “Questionnaire on Philosophy,” CWL 17, 370, responding to the question: *Is a thorough presentation permitting an understanding of Marxism an essential element of priests today?* 366. In the footnote (†) Lonergan cites Christian Duquoc, *Ambiguité de théologies de la sécularisation* (Gembloux: Duculot, 1972), 103–128. On April 2, 2021 (Good Friday), I wrote a letter in Spanish to Pope Francis with a recommendation to address the concern Lonergan articulated in the Questionnaire. The reply from his advisor reads: “*Por lo que se refiere a las cuestiones manifestadas en su escrito, puede dirigirse a las autoridades competentes.*” (“With regard to the concerns raised in your letter, you may contact the competent authorities.”)

<sup>35</sup> CWL 3, 442. Is this line somehow a foundational statement, an orientation of all healthy human inquiry and living? The orientation requires constructing diagrams: “If we want to have a comprehensive grasp of everything in a unified whole, then we shall have to construct a diagram in which are symbolically represented all the various elements of the question along with all the connections between them.” Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, ed. Michael Shields, Frederick Crowe, and Robert Doran, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 7* (University of Toronto, 2002), 151.

<sup>36</sup> On different occasions, I have tried teaching chapters 6 and 7 of *Insight* while skipping the previous chapters on heuristic structures and canons of empirical method, the complimentary of statistical and classical knowings and knowns, and space and time. Former students—one of whom did an MA in Public Policy at University of Oxford, another one who is studying at the University of Chicago

*“What has been settled”*

An important thing that ‘has been settled’ is the role of diagrams and heuristics to guide inquiry and protect inquirers against commonsense overreach.<sup>37</sup> An example is the spread of 18 terms and their relations in the “Structure of the Human Good.”<sup>38</sup> The challenge in both reading and teaching the structure is to move beyond a descriptive appreciation of the spread of terms, to envision, for example, safe and friendly neighborhoods and to keep horizons of urban planning “genuinely open. Insofar as the heuristic structure of the good is understood, appropriated and practiced, it would restrain any one set of analyses from rising to totalitarian pretensions.”<sup>39</sup> Within the “less successful subjects”<sup>40</sup> there is resistance to creating and implementing convenient symbols that would otherwise protect students

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Harris School of Public Policy—still joke around about cosmopolis. But they do not live the question, “What is this not easy, not busy, timely and fruitful, not pushy dream team called cosmopolis?” How well, then, did I succeed in sowing the question, “What is the X cosmopolis?”?

<sup>37</sup> “Within method, the use of heuristic devices is fundamental. They consist in defining and naming the intended unknown, in setting down at once all that can be affirmed about it, and I using this explicit knowledge as a guide, a criterion, and/or a premise in the effort to arrive at a fuller knowledge. Such is the function in algebra of the unknown  $x$  in the solution of problems.” CWL 14, 24. In “Words, Diagrams, Heuristics” (2016), I comment at length on my experience implementing heuristics in undergraduate philosophy courses. James Duffy, “Lonergan Gatherings 7: Words, Diagrams, Heuristics,” 4–19, <http://www.philipmcshane.org/lonergan-gatherings>.

<sup>38</sup> CWL 14, 47. In undergraduate ethics courses, students would ask me how to read the spread of terms. I added colors to the diagram to form groups of terms (see CWL 14, 48–51), and we did our best to read terms both horizontally and vertically. It does, however, require a good deal of patience to appropriate the terms and relations time and again instead of just memorizing the diagram. “A basic set of analogous terms whose meaning develops with the development of the person indicates the fruit of self-appropriation, the basis that makes the difference between the plaster cast of man and the philosopher.” Bernard Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, ed. Elizabeth A Morelli and Mark D. Morelli, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 48.

<sup>39</sup> Patrick Byrne and Richard Carroll Keely, “LeCorbusier’s Finger and Jane Jacob’s Thought: The Loss and Recovery of the Subject in the City,” in *Communicating a Dangerous Memory: Soundings in Political Theology*, ed. Frederick Lawrence (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), at pages 90–95.

<sup>40</sup> CWL 14, 8.

and professors alike against totalitarian pretensions and the subtle “arrogance of omnicompetent common sense.”<sup>41</sup>

*“What is new”*

With regard to functional collaboration, I do not expect the displacement towards system<sup>42</sup> to occur overnight. The preliminary work of solving great problems by breaking them down into little apparently trifling ones in twofold attention takes time, patience, and some luck. I was fortunate to discover philosophy as a form of praxis by journaling before learning about philosophical schools and -isms. I was also fortunate to have learned enough math and physics to appreciate the role of convenient symbolisms in guiding inquiry.

My hope is that those involved also plan for follow-up reflections and evaluations—friendly reversals of performance in the classroom or at a conference or workshop.<sup>43</sup> My assessment of those of us who published in *Seeding Global Collaboration* is that we did not measure up to performing different tasks and “distinguishing eight different sets of methodical precepts” very well. We pretended as best we could to be ‘at the level of the times,’ knowing that we were not.<sup>44</sup>

Progress in doing dialectic, which is at the heart of discerning authenticity and inauthenticity, will be slow and messy, as it requires those of us who are willing to attempt dialectic to ask basic questions about ourselves and encounter one another. Eventually such an “objectification of subjectivity in the style of the crucial experiment”<sup>45</sup> will, I believe, win the day over silent refusals to reveal one’s notions of authenticity and

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<sup>41</sup> CWL 17, 370.

<sup>42</sup> Lonergan translates Simmel’s *die Wendung zur Idee* “shift towards system” (CWL 14, 133) and “displacement towards system.” *De Deo Trino I. Pars Dogmatica*, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964, 10, n. 10; CWL 11, 19, n. 11.

<sup>43</sup> I provide an example of what I mean by a “friendly reversal” in note 11 of “Effective Dialectical Analysis,” *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis*, 13 (2020), 24.

<sup>44</sup> In the epilogue to *Seeding Global Collaboration*, McShane describes the results of our well-intentioned efforts in these words: “[O]ur efforts were scattered, dippings into various disciplines, expressions of ‘certain points’ that were regularly not original, not fresh lifts to the cycling of our non-existent science, not related in any obvious way to one another.” (235)

<sup>45</sup> CWL 14, 237.

inauthenticity. In the long run, the number of latent, hardline dogmatists avoiding the “projective test” will diminish.<sup>46</sup>

Finally, as the task of teaching and preaching justice cries out for a global group of collaborators who are “at home,”<sup>47</sup> I anticipate, in a kind of hope beyond hope, the slow emergence of collaboration yielding cumulative homecomings. The emergence of collaboration will coincide with a growing interest in questions such as “What specialty might I be doing?” and “Who is my audience?”<sup>48</sup> Eventually, in good time, the labor of a growing team of collaborators who are at home will bear fruit, not just listening but also speaking to the hundreds of thousands of youths in the corner losing their

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<sup>46</sup> “Investigators are urged both to expand what they consider authentic in the followers of a religion they are studying and, as well, to reverse what they consider unauthentic. The result will be a projective test in which interpreters reveal their own notions of authenticity and unauthenticity both to others and to themselves. In the short run both the more authentic will discover what they have in common, and so too will the less authentic. In the long run the authentic should be able to reveal the strength of their position by the penetration of their investigations, by the growing number in the scientific community attracted to their assumptions and procedures, and eventually by the reduction of the opposition to the hard-line dogmatists that defend an inadequate method no matter what its deficiencies.” Bernard Lonergan, “Philosophy of God and the Functional Specialty ‘Systematics,’” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965-1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, vol. 17, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 403.

<sup>47</sup> Various contexts come to mind: at home in two-flow economic analysis well enough to teach it to high school students; at home in the world of theory, convenient symbolisms, diagrams, and heuristics; “at home in transcendental method” (CWL 14, 18); at home discovering the dynamics of teamwork by doing (*praxis*); at home believing that “to advance the less successful subjects, ... some third way, then, must be found even though it is difficult and laborious.” CWL 14, 8.

<sup>48</sup> While writing “A Special Relation” and doing my best to “foundationalize” a statement in a dense paragraph from *The Triune God: Systematics* (“The secondary act of existence of the incarnation is a created participation of paternity and so has a special relation to the Son.” CWL 12, 473) for the Sixth International Lonergan Conference, I learned firsthand that collaboration in the form of receiving and handing on is quite demanding. See “Hand-on” and “Further contexts” in Allerton et al., *Seeding Global Collaboration*, 98–101.

religions because they are unsatisfied with a childish apprehension of religious truths and feeling frustrated or desperate.<sup>49</sup>

### Third Objectification

#### A. Some Points of Convergence Worth Developing

In the seven essays, there is a consensus that, as Coelho writes at the end of his second objectification, we are “doing what we can” in a period of transition. Orji writes of a transition from a non-contextual, classicist dogmatic theology towards historically-minded Christian theology. McNelis expresses doubts about functional collaboration emerging in housing in the next 50 years, while Anderson expresses similar doubts with respect to legal studies.

Both the novelty and difficulty of implementing functionally specialized work is acknowledged as well. McNelis writes about a “fundamental transformation ... making demands upon both my self-understanding and upon decisions I made as to whom I will become both as a housing researcher and as a person,”<sup>50</sup> and had the nerve to “propose something completely different,”<sup>51</sup> while St. Amour notes that the “functional specialization introduces a new way of doing things”<sup>52</sup> and that “grounding of functionally specialized inquirers in self-appropriation and transcendental method would shift probabilities.”<sup>53</sup> Coelho acknowledges that academic disciplines provide very little guidance, especially for doing dialectics, foundations, and doctrines. Quinn writes of “training wheel”<sup>54</sup> attempts at functional collaboration.

Another point of convergence is the relevance of philosophical praxis—doing “apparently trifling problems”<sup>55</sup> in twofold attention. St. Amour writes that “philosophy **would** become *internally relevant* to theology and other

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<sup>49</sup> R.E.M., *Losing My Religion*, Out of Time, 1991. The phrase “losing my religion” is an expression from the southern region of the United States that means “feeling frustrated and desperate.” Robert Sloane, “Tensions Between Popular Music: R.E.M. as Artists-Intellectuals,” in *A Companion to Media Studies*, ed. Angharad N. Valdivia (Blackwell, 2003).

<sup>50</sup> McNelis, 81.

<sup>51</sup> McNelis, 84.

<sup>52</sup> St. Amour, 138.

<sup>53</sup> St. Amour, 143.

<sup>54</sup> Quinn, 114 and 116.

<sup>55</sup> CWL 3, 27.

disciplines in a manner that is far from the case currently.”<sup>56</sup> Quinn writes about an uncommon, exercise-based way of reading *Insight*<sup>57</sup>—drawing upon his experience “in instances and in detail”—enabling a new control of meaning, one that “is in accord with the achievements of modern science”<sup>58</sup> and that is not innocent.<sup>59</sup> Anderson cites a proposal to “move interdisciplinary research beyond simple notions of people from different departments working on the same topic using the same old methods”<sup>60</sup> and “make explicit a strategy that would help towards an organized collaboration of disciplines in the field of human studies.”<sup>61</sup> On a similar note, I wrote of disciplinary and interdisciplinary meetings at Saint Mary’s University of Minnesota in the 1990s that were focused on designing and teaching disciplinary and core courses.<sup>62</sup> While we were able to reach a consensus about books, topics, and periods, there were unresolved issues that, I know better now, could only be resolved by doing ‘apparently trifling’ exercises in twofold attention.

### B. Comprehensive Symbolism: A Central Challenge

Central to my experience was a symbolic apprehension of the possibility (or perhaps the impossibility) of wisdom. ... Was there ever

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<sup>56</sup> St. Amour, 142. I added the bolded emphasis, as I believe “would” is the correct verb, not “has.” On the problem of getting *Insight* into *Method in Theology*, see Philip McShane, “‘What-To-Do?’: The Heart of Lonergan’s Ethics,” *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 7 (2012), 69–93.

<sup>57</sup> “I was wired, or rather Why’d, as it were, to attempt exercises that Lonergan posed. The first, of course, was on Archimedes’ principle. For me, reading in that way was ‘standard procedure.’” Quinn, 111.

<sup>58</sup> Lonergan, “Philosophy of God and Systematics,” 191. The notion of philosophy and theology as personal development is in Bernard Lonergan, “Theology and Praxis,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Didosky, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 177–93.

<sup>59</sup> “[P]raxis acknowledges the end of the age of innocence. It starts from the assumption that authenticity cannot be taken for granted.” “The Ongoing Genesis of Methods,” *A Third Collection*, (New York, Paulist Press, 1985), at page 160; CWL 16, 154. See also “Dialectic of Authority” in *ibid.*, 5–12; CWL 14, 3–9. Regarding authenticity and inauthenticity, see the penultimate paragraph of my second objectification on page 66 above.

<sup>60</sup> Anderson, 27–27.

<sup>61</sup> Anderson, 27.

<sup>62</sup> Duffy, 60–61.

someone or something that symbolically made present to your consciousness the possibility of wisdom? Do you recall a felt reaction in response to that image, person, or occasion?<sup>63</sup>

Thank you, Paul, for the marvelous questions. And thank you for positioning yourself autobiographically in spite of your reluctance to do so. Your description of feeling overwhelmed by so many books in O'Neill Library at Boston College reminded of a passage from Borges' "The Library of Babel":

When it was announced that the Library contained all books, the first reaction was unbounded joy. All men felt themselves the possessors of an intact and secret treasure. There was no personal problem, no world problem, whose eloquent solution did not exist somewhere in some hexagon. The universe was justified; the universe suddenly became congruent with the unlimited width and breadth of humankind's hope.

....

That unbridled hopefulness was succeeded, naturally enough, by a similarly disproportionate depression. The certainty that some bookshelf in some hexagon contained precious books, yet that those precious books were forever out of reach, was almost unbearable.<sup>64</sup>

Of course, all the books in all the libraries in all parts of the world are just billions of marks on paper. The fundamental challenge is not the sheer quantity of words, although, yes, in all areas, all disciplines, "big data just keep getting bigger."<sup>65</sup> The fundamental challenge is educating a creative minority of researchers capable of detecting positive and negative anomalies;<sup>66</sup> another minority interpreting, others storying, and others evaluating the stories; and four other minority groups somehow converting the best story into direct speech, providing solid food for the youth 'losing their religion' that I referred to at the end of my second objectification. A sub-challenge for educating a creative minority is to encourage them to do what

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<sup>63</sup> St. Amour, 135.

<sup>64</sup> Jorge Luis Borges, "The Library of Babel," in *Collected Fictions*, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Penguin, 1999), 115–16.

<sup>65</sup> Julia Adeney Thomas, Mark Williams, and Jan Zalasiewicz, *The Anthropocene: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020), 7.

<sup>66</sup> "An anomaly might or might not be significant or relevant to the legal studies community. In order to judge its significance, the researcher must have an up-to-date knowledge of legal theory" (Anderson, 30). See also what Lonergan writes about "teamwork" in note 31 above.

most of us were not encouraged to do: reach for an up-to-date genetic understanding of an object.<sup>67</sup>

The  $C_{ij}$  matrix Quinn references conveniently reminds me that collaborative teamwork consists of conversations among and between specialists. The metagram is convenient in the sense that it allows me to hold together in thought a manifold of conversations. It leads me to reflect upon the nature of my conversations, exchanges with colleagues in print or in person. The double subscripts symbolize psychic and intellectual adaptation, each person giving “some indication of his awareness of what is to be added to his statements in the light of the evidence available to other, distinct specialties.”<sup>68</sup>

Communicators face the “problem of the creative use of the available media,” which now includes social media, and “the task of finding the appropriate approach and procedure to convey the message to people of different classes and cultures.”<sup>69</sup> The symbol  $C_{89}$  represents this tremendous challenge. Ideally communicators have backup, for “without the first seven stages there is no fruit to be borne.”<sup>70</sup> The symbol  $C_{78}$  represents the immediate input (backup) from systematisers. Nowadays there is not much backup; the conversations symbolized  $C_{i,i}$  and  $C_{i,i+1}$  ( $i = 1$  to  $7$ )<sup>71</sup> have certainly

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<sup>67</sup> Quinn mentions that a disorientation of education reaches down into primary and secondary education (Quinn, 114). This is potentially disturbing and, implicitly, raises possibly uncomfortable existential questions: How was the what-that-I-am nurtured, encouraged, embraced when I was a tiny tot? What was my experience in high school of reading with “eyes off the page,” doing ‘apparently trifling problems’? From the fall of 2016 to the fall of 2020, I had a part-time job editing kindergarten and primary school lesson plans. The well-intentioned authors of the plans focused on defining learning objectives, identifying measurable skills and competencies, and determining student evidence used by the teacher (“coach” is the popular term) to measure the development of specific skills and competencies. So much for meeting and greeting the incessant what’s? and why? of wonder-boned five-year-olds.

<sup>68</sup> CWL 14, 131. See also note 44 above.

<sup>69</sup> CWL 14, 135. The symbol  $C_9$  compactly includes every brand of common sense, the colorful, multi-tongued concrete plurality of approximately 7.8 billion humans, “the almost endlessly varied sensibilities, mentalities, interests, and tastes of [hu]mankind.” (CWL 14, 135)

<sup>70</sup> CWL 14, 327.

<sup>71</sup> There might be *per accidens* functional conversations as well, for example, policy-makers in conversation with researchers ( $C_{16}$ ), or dialecticians in conversation with systems planners ( $C_{47}$ ). I borrow the language of *per accidens*



not been carried out by persons “with a clear and distinct idea of what they are doing.”<sup>72</sup> For me, that was a significant takeaway from the Sixth International Lonergan Conference, “Functional Collaboration in the Academy: Advancing Bernard Lonergan’s Central Achievement.”<sup>73</sup>

Both the “Keyhole diagram” and the “Slopings metagram” are suggestive images for thinking concretely, historically about the good. The second of the two, possibly the least known of the four diagrams that Quinn includes, suggests a convergence that would solve the puzzle of disciplinary silos that McNelis alludes to.<sup>74</sup> The metagram suggests that the characters doing dialectic and foundations are “big men [and women],”<sup>75</sup> elders whose center of gravity has been shifted by an integral education.<sup>76</sup> Since the current disciplinary setup does not promote this kind of growth, it is left to individuals to lead a kind of double life—taking classes within one major or department or another, writing defensible theses, publishing to get tenure, collaborating as best we can, blind-spotted<sup>77</sup> and crack-potted<sup>78</sup> as we are—while, perhaps, privately growing, studying language(s), art, literature, history, maybe even a bit of mathematics and/or economics, perhaps

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functional conversations from Philip McShane, “Communications: On Track,” chapter 26, *Method in Theology: Revisions and Implementations*, at page 124, <http://www.philipmcshane.org/method-in-theology-revisions-and-implementations>.

<sup>72</sup> CWL 14, 131. Ideally, “the use of the general categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties” (CWL 14, 273). See also what I wrote about a “friendly reversal” in note 43 and my comments about being ‘at home’ in note 47.

<sup>73</sup> See note 24 above.

<sup>74</sup> McNelis, 84.

<sup>75</sup> The phrase occurs in chapter 8 of *Topics in Education*: “The big men today are not specialists; they move about.” CWL 10, 206. At the end of the preceding paragraph, Lonergan writes about “becoming a crackpot by premature specialization.” What he calls “the human touch” (CWL 10, 206–207) is the result of “a general development of assimilative powers.” See also chapter 8, “Critical Paws” in Philip McShane, *Futurology Express* (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2013), 54–59.

<sup>76</sup> See *Topics in Education*, CWL 10, 116.

<sup>77</sup> “Despite my earliest striving for breadth and aversion to specialization, the pressures of scholarship and the necessity of discrimination placed me at risk of becoming ‘the man with the blind-spot... [who] is fond of concluding that his specialty is to be pursued because of its excellence and the other[s] are to be derided...’” (St. Amour, 135, citing CWL 14, 122.)

<sup>78</sup> See note 75.

becoming comfortable implementing convenient diagrams in our teaching and writing.<sup>79</sup>

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There is nothing a priori about functionally specialized praxis; understanding the dynamics of teamwork requires doing. So, here we are, “objectifying subjectivity in the style of the crucial experiment,”<sup>80</sup> doing our best to be methodical “in a very, very delicate area, namely that of value judgments.”<sup>81</sup> Coelho concurs: “Lonergan’s brilliance lies in offering a methodical way of handling dialectical differences, where method is not some simple recipe but necessarily involves subjects, the concrete realities of the investigators involved.”<sup>82</sup> Anderson notes that dialectic is needed to deal with gridlock in legal studies.<sup>83</sup>

One obviously not obvious instance of general bias rolling down the ages and perpetuating the longer cycle of decline is the aversion to and disavowal of implementing convenient symbols that protect us from arrogance. Convenient symbols do not “cover” whatever my topic of interest might be, but “oncover,”<sup>84</sup> protect me against mistaking post-systematic love-of-God-talk<sup>85</sup> that lacks a minimal appreciation of the need to develop a genetic

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<sup>79</sup> See further the essay cited at the end of note 37 above.

<sup>80</sup> CWL 14, 237.

<sup>81</sup> CWL 14, 22, n. 2. See also Philip McShane, “On the Stile of a Crucial Experiment,” *Dioyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education* 31, no. 3 (2020), 327–44.

<sup>82</sup> Coelho, 48.

<sup>83</sup> Anderson, 33.

<sup>84</sup> “Oncovering is the challenge of heuristics: a protection of humanity’s **what** and **Om** and **home** in each and all from stupidity and evil.” (Philip McShane, “*Æconomics 3: A Common Quest Manifesto*,” (2019), 8, n. 42 (<http://www.philipmcshane.org/ecconomics>). Think of  $x$  and  $y$  of algebra or the trio of questions “What is fire?” “What is the nature of fire?” and “What might the  $z$  we call *fire* be?” (see CWL 18, 113–114), which are versions of an open-ended question-constant through which Aristotle, Becher, Stahl, Lavoisier, you, or I might interpret the successive explanations of fire. In Lonergan’s reply to a question about the content of a heuristic structure, which was put to him in one of the discussions of the 1958 Halifax lectures on *Insight*, he noted that “the heuristic structure in itself is a content” (CWL 5, 341).

<sup>85</sup> Post-systematic talk refers to the use of technical terms, e.g., “capital,” “things,” or “human development,” without any systematics, without heuristics for understanding or performing these same terms. See the “Fifthly” paragraph on CWL 14, 283–284. On performance, either in the classroom or at a conference, see

method<sup>86</sup> for studying *Hibiscus syriacus* (rose of Sharon) and the Rose of Sharon.<sup>87</sup> The neglect of genetic (and dialectic) method simply and subtly leads to self-justifying, decadent “conventions of a clique” generating “the unauthenticity of a tradition.”<sup>88</sup> “Might we not make a beginning in this century, to take seriously the need for a neurorapping genetics of explanation, not just in Jesus-searching but in all human searchings?”<sup>89</sup>

What is misleading and in need of reversal is sophisticated, erudite talk about “the primacy of love” or “being-in-love with God” that is unprotected by convenient symbols that safeguard comprehensiveness.<sup>90</sup> “Within

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the “Secondly” paragraph on CWL 3, 582 as well as the LOL section 3.1 “The Problem” of interpretation (585–87), where Lonergan conveniently uses letters (A–F), primes, and double primes to express the problem.

In the chapter on Systematics in *Method in Theology*, he distinguishes static system (Euclid, Newton, Aquinas) from probable systematics “at home in modern science, modern scholarship, and modern philosophy” (CWL 14, 323). He does not, however, remind the reader that genetic systematizers create “appropriate symbolic images of the relevant chemical and physical processes (CWL 3, 489; see also the text at notes 86 and 87 below.) This is one instance of the problem of “struggling with some such book as *Insight*” (CWL 14, 11, n. 4) that St. Amour rightly claims is “internally relevant” to efficient collaboration.

<sup>86</sup> Coelho comes clean about skipping chapter 5 “Space and Time”: “I don’t think I went beyond chapter 10 or 11 at the time, almost certainly skipping over chapter 5 on space and time.” (42) I came clean about my reading of chapter 5 in James Duffy, Robert Henman, and Terrance Quinn, “The Heuristic Notions of Space and Time,” *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 14 (2020), 65–94. If senior faculty who claim to be disciples of Lonergan could muster up the honesty to come clean about skipping “the heuristic significance of the notion of development” in preparation for “our statement of the integral heuristic structure that we have named metaphysics” (CWL 3, 484), that would help young theologians fantasize about possible goings-on at Vatican III. The same thing can be said about skipping over the three canons of methodical hermeneutics, CWL 3, 608–616. See also note 99 below.

<sup>87</sup> Song of Songs 2:1.

<sup>88</sup> CWL 14, 78.

<sup>89</sup> Philip McShane, *HOW* 8, *The Making of Jesus Present*, 8, <http://www.philipmcshane.org/how>.

<sup>90</sup> In “Lonergan’s Hermeneutics” (*The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics* [New York: Routledge, 2015], 160–78), Frederick Lawrence asserts that comprehensive reflection “can only be comprehensive if grounded in being in love with God” (173). He does not acknowledge the fundamental role of convenient symbols for reflecting comprehensively nor how they protect *God* talk from what

method, the use of heuristic devices is fundamental."<sup>91</sup> Unprotected *God* talk, *love* talk, and *feeling* talk are vulnerable to general bias and misleading. In the absence of senior faculty humbly identifying their horizons while showing and telling their heuristics, the next generation of students master the trade of erudite scholarship and are effectively "tied down to this or that provincial routine of familiar ideas."<sup>92</sup>

Obviously, Aquinas was not in a position to be "pulled neatly and effectively out of the compromising orbit of Aristotle's physics"<sup>93</sup> by modern physics. Less obviously, "some third way must be found"<sup>94</sup> to think both concretely and historically about, for example, effective intervention vis-à-vis viruses and research for their cures, soil erosion due to fertilizer overuse, rates of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and climate change, reforms in education, and the possibility of papal encyclicals hitting the streets and leading to an increment of progress.<sup>95</sup> The view that 'some third way'—call it "the ontological structure of the hermeneutical circle"<sup>96</sup> if you wish—has already been found and is operative, yielding cumulative progress, is sadly mistaken and needs to be reversed. Both Orji and Coelho quote a passage from chapter 5 regarding "Christianity having nothing to lose from a purging of unsound reason."<sup>97</sup>

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Lonergan calls "the arrogance of omniscient commonsense" in "Questionnaire on Philosophy: Response," CWL 17, 370. Lawrence is aware of the cost of being psychologically present in the twentieth century. See note 12 above.

<sup>91</sup> See note 37 above.

<sup>92</sup> CWL 21, 20–21. "The blind will be leading the blind and both will head for a ditch." CWL 3, 265. These are harsh words, a severe criticism of subtle and, perhaps, well-intentioned deception. "Such devaluation, distortion, corruption may occur only in scattered individuals. But it may occur on a more massive scale, and then the words are repeated but the meaning is gone." CWL 14, 78.

<sup>93</sup> CWL 3, 547.

<sup>94</sup> CWL 14, 8.

<sup>95</sup> See note 27 above.

<sup>96</sup> See further Clayton Shoppa and William Zanardi, "The Ontological Structure of the Hermeneutic Circle," *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis* 14 (2020), 110–32.

<sup>97</sup> Coelho, 75, and Orji, 108, citing CWL 14, 125. "It just won't do to stick with the image of a friendly Jesus on the Mount chatting out the beatitudes. 'There are windows to be opened and fresh air to be let in' to give 'a securer base and enrich it with a fuller content.'" Philip McShane, *The Allure of the Compelling Genius of History: Teaching Young Humans Humanity and Hope* (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2015), 191. The inner citation is to Bernard Lonergan, "Christology Today," in *A*

Honesty about ‘doing what we can’ in ‘training-wheel attempts’<sup>98</sup> at collaborating will increasingly temper enthusiasm regarding advances in theology after Vatican II.<sup>99</sup> The difficult foundational task is one of phantasy, which challenges our battered molecular selves. How will self-embracing, self-digesting praxis become relevant in the next three decades, or three centuries? What might uncanny performances of Zen mistresses reverently minding grade school incarnate quests look like?<sup>100</sup> How do we, will we, little humans slowly, painfully, repentantly leave behind childish apprehensions?

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*Third Collection*, ed. Robert M. Doran and John D. Dadosky, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* 16 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 85.

<sup>98</sup> In my second objectification, I assessed the essays published in *Seeding Global Collaboration* as basically ‘training wheel’ attempts without using that expression. See also note 48 above.

<sup>99</sup> After? One of the dialectic tasks is to spell out my ‘resulting view’ of progress in the last 57 or 570 years and fantasize about progress in the decades and centuries after Vatican II. In 2015, I articulated my ‘resulting view’ of 50 years of Lonergan studies (1965–2015) in a collection of essays honoring Brendan Lovett. My evaluation was not very cheery, as I wondered “if the trajectory of theological thought among many Lonergan enthusiasts stretching from the close of Vatican II (December 8, 1965) right through the visit of the Pope to New York and Philadelphia (September 22–27, 2015) has been rooted in the option to develop realist views about doing theology in which theology means whatever happens to be done.” James Gerard Duffy, “The Joy of Believing,” *Himig Ugnayan: A Theological Journal of the Institute of Formation and Religious Studies* XVI (2016 2015), 221. See also note 86 above.

<sup>100</sup> I am not suggesting youngsters read Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, or Lonergan. I am suggesting that children incarnate quests, while well-intentioned teachers can be blocked from meeting and greeting their exuberant questions. (See note 67 above.) In the Afterword to *Seeding the Positive Anthropocene* (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2022), I wrote about the possibility of “Rewilding Educating Rita to Get the Rhyme Wrong and Rita Right” (147–150). See also references to “what, whatting,” and “what’s what” in the index.

