

Method in Theology, chapter 5, "Functional Specialties"

Terrance Quinn

First objectification

Growth in my awareness of the problem to which, according to my present view, functional collaboration will be the solution

Beginnings in my awareness of there being "a problem" were emerging in grades 12 (1978–1979) and 13 (1979–1980). (In those days, high school in Ontario, Canada, went to grade 13, for students planning to go to university.) I was making student-level beginnings in mathematics and sciences. I was also learning about some of the emerging crises in global economics and world ecologies. With the help of one of our teachers, a few of my fellow students and I were, in naïve fashion, wondering about cultural decline, increasing global poverty, concentrated wealth, social justice, governments, and 'What could be done?' to make things better. I wasn't attracted by activist groups. Partly that was because it seemed to me that, even if somehow successful in communicating a message that current practice needed reform of some kind, the activist approach was not going to find a way forward. At the time, my thinking was that in order to find a way forward, we would need new understanding; and new understanding would need new thinking.

In May of 1979, our high school economics teacher invited three intrepid graduate students from York University, Toronto, to give lectures to the grade 12 economics class, over two days. In hindsight, I see it as amazing good luck that their main topic was Lonergan's economics. The book on global corporations,¹ by Barnett and Muller, also was discussed. I can't say that I understood much. But I did have the following "takeaway": According to the graduate student lecturers, Lonergan's work in economics would be important on two main fronts: (1) A concern for taking care the world; and (2) In order to do that, we would need to understand how economies work, and that Lonergan had made a breakthrough in his economic theory. In a broad way – that is, in my extremely vague heuristics at the time – these points made sense to me. But I could not follow up, yet. I made the decision to study Lonergan's economics, later, as soon as circumstances allowed.

¹ Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976).

After high school, I went to St. Michael's College at the University of Toronto. My major was mathematics. I was becoming increasingly aware of the fact that there are many disciplines (e.g., mathematics, history, etc.), interest groups, governments, and more, and progress, or not, in explaining or attempting to account for, or influence, or control "aspects" of the world; that each of these was only providing part of the story; and that there was the practical problem of how all of this could work together better, with the help of an improved economics, in ways that would help rather than undermine education, cultures and ecologies of the world. In philosophy courses, however, the speculative models to which I was exposed seemed contrived and remote to real life, and actual circumstances in all areas and fields. For example, speaking about 'understanding,' 'wisdom,' 'feelings' and such, in general terms, but not being able to account, in detail, for 'this' and 'that' instance, in experience, seemed strange to me, and not worth paying much attention to.

But it also was evident to me that all of this was well beyond me. So, I was content to bide my time and learn more. Bide my time? Being optimistic, I was thinking in terms of decades. So far, that optimism has paid off. I took the problem and problems to heart, to live for, and work toward, in the decades ahead. For the time being, my commitment was to pursue a life of learning with mathematics as a centerpiece. I went on to do a PhD in mathematics and had a career in the field. But over the years, I kept my ear to the ground, among other things, read work on Lonergan's economics, as it became available. About thirty-one years after my decision, in August of 2010, circumstances allowed me to begin studying Lonergan's work in economics in a focused way. Over the last twelve years, I have been working on various fronts, but economics has been of growing concern.

I need to say something, then, about my present "horizon." In the summer prior to grade 13, I was introduced to Lonergan's book *Insight*. It was too soon for me to be able to work with it. But it was helpful to know that it was there, calling, waiting. In the summers that followed, I returned to it, for a few weeks at a time, as circumstances allowed. I was wired, or rather Why'd, as it were, to attempt exercises that Lonergan posed. The first, of course, was on Archimedes' principle. For me, reading in that way was "standard procedure." I don't mean that "reading self-attentively" was standard procedure for me. But it never occurred to me to skip exercises, to focus on learning Lonergan's words or be satisfied with general impressions. Of course, I had to defer the more advanced exercises, but not without a "note to self" that I would need to return to them, later, when I had more data. I was predisposed to trust Lonergan, the author of the book, that he meant

what he said, that the book was written from a “moving viewpoint.” Indeed, I assumed that that would be case. I was accustomed to that sort of thing, having climbed through advanced and eventually graduate-level textbooks in mathematics and physics. It was obvious to me that one can’t jump to later chapters, let alone “the next chapter,” without working through exercises and making at least some of the content partly one’s own.

Before long, however, it became evident to me that *Insight* was something that I would not be able to “master.” But I was learning that I *could* hope to gain modest footholds, here and there, over time. More than once, I read *Insight* cover to cover, not with the idea that I was reading to understand but rather in order to get a grip on the arc or storyline. To actually gain traction, however, I worked in a different way. As I still do today, I would home in on one (or more) of Lonergan’s (dense doctrinal) paragraphs, and take weeks or a year, or three years, as needed, to go into some field (e.g., a science). These detours were not to become a front-line expert in different fields, but to acquire data, experience, to learn some of what I needed, “self-attentively,” to then return to try to get a hold of something of what Lonergan was talking about, in the selected text. In my undergraduate summers, McShane’s deceptively short book, *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations*² was a great help; as was, in my post-doctoral years, one of his other early books, the published PhD thesis, *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence (RSE)*³. As with *Insight*, I did my best to read and work through examples in *RSE*, in the way the author requested, that is, with “self-attention,” with a balanced attention on object and subject. Among other things, McShane’s book, *RSE*, helped me make beginnings in “self-illuminative bridging” into contexts of modern philosophy of science.

Thanks to ongoing similar efforts, it became evident to me that noticing and describing the occurrence in oneself of various acts of, for example, insight, judgement, as well as feelings, and so on, while a legitimate beginning, is no more *explanatory* than describing plants is explanatory in botany. I think here, for instance, of ongoing scholarship that includes talk of ‘levels of consciousness,’ and such, and claims of “intellectual conversion,” as though such a thing could be a *fait accompli*. In my heuristics, intellectual

² Philip McShane, *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations. Self-Axis of the Great Ascent* (Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1975).

³ Philip McShane, *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd, 1970). A second edition of the book is now available, Philip McShane, *Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence*, 2nd edition, eds. James Duffy and Terrance Quinn (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2021).

conversion is not a discrete achievement but a name for a horizon shift which can begin, and also admits endless growth and differentiations. From what I can tell, breaking into that horizon is a rare achievement and not constituted merely by being able to describe acts of meaning in one's experience. Taking Lonergan's suggestions, exercises in self-attention, in instances, in elementary geometry, provided significant beginnings for me, in a new control of meaning that I do not see being possible without some such examples. It is also part of my present position that philosophy of physics (or any other science or field) needs to begin with reflection "on-in" one's experience in physics, in instances, in detail. For me, this is merely a normative feature of (adequate) empirical method (which, by Lonergan, was originally named "generalized empirical method"). Publications in the literature to the contrary, so far, I see no evidence, yet, of (implemented) generalized empirical method. If the 'object' part of the balanced empirical method is lacking the (poorly named) "generalization" is not possible. By recalling Lonergan's definition of "generalized empirical method" in a *Third Collection*, I am confident that I am not saying anything controversial. In my view, then, implemented generalized empirical method is a remote future possibility, in history. And so, the demands of attempting to work within adequate empirical method steepen enormously, when attempting to move from lower sciences into philosophy and theology. I think, then, of the challenge for (not the laity but) the contemporary front-line theologian of "putting on the mind of Christ" thus calling for experientially grounded modern heuristics of our minds and hearts which, already *inwithto* the Holy Trinity, are aggreformic achievements of chemical history that is the body of Christ.

From my post-doctoral years onward (1992ff), I became increasingly aware of the dominance of various disorientations in method that have, for centuries, been sustaining philosophical traditions, and schools of thought. I am referring to semi-random conjunctions of (a) systematic exclusion of attention to one's own mind, in instances, (b) merely speculative modeling, and (c) emphasis on the "spinnings" of linguistic competence. Results are remote to concrete circumstances, to experience, to instances-here-now, me-here-now, you-here-now, we-here-now.

Please know that I am not claiming advanced control of meaning. But I have been witnessing aspects of the historical problem, through empirical studies in, for instance, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, mathematics education, ecological economics, and economics. In modern contexts, adverting to and drawing on one's experience, in instances and in detail is, for the most part, inadmissible. For me, this became poignantly

evident in the contemporary field of scholarship called “mathematics education.” More often implicit than explicit, a dominant view, or rather, model, is that concepts precede understanding, and that understanding is a matter of *connecting concepts*. A premise held by many is that the syntax of computer programming provides a suitable model of mathematical understanding. This is no mere philosophical game. Young minds are blocked and locked down with these views and their consequences, through pedagogies that reduce empirical probabilities of what otherwise can be enjoyable and accessible mathematical insights, to near zero. Mathematicians and mathematics majors can, to a large degree, ignore such nonsense. But for primary and secondary education, and now also for some freshman and sophomore level courses, the well-intentioned but destructive folly goes on. Not without social impact, ongoing “reforms” in how to teach school-level mathematics are thus contributing to and supporting horrific notions of “systems theory humanity.” That is just one range of examples. More generally, topic-specific, discipline specific, and method-specific literatures expand, merge and spread, year by year, with ongoing scholarly debate. There are clusterings and convergences of “engagement” and well-expressed opinion, but with no discernible progress. It also seems to me that street-value is not an issue. Meanwhile, however, (speaking in descriptive terms) global cultural, social, ecological, and economic crises continue to deepen at alarming rates.

Functional specialties

In the early 2000s, my growing awareness of the problem of history began to intertwine with my gradually increasing, and initially very thin, appreciation of Lonergan’s solution to the problem. I had been reading chapter 5 of *Method in Theology*. By digging into examples given by Lonergan, the cycle of eight specialties was seeming plausible. But I also was aware of the fact that I was skimming the surface. In 2003, Philip McShane suggested that I explore the literatures of the global mathematics community, to see if I could make some headway in discerning eight tasks, described by Lonergan. It was my first effort at such empirical work, vis à vis functional tasks. At the time, my findings and reflections on the four “forward tasks” were weak. Since then, I have taken “deeper dives” into various fields including, for example, physics, ecological economics, and economics. I have also participated in a few “training wheel” attempts at working functionally, that is, working in a mode wherein one attempts to keep the focus of one’s article within one functional task. These were not hugely successful, but they were enlightening and, for me, in those contexts, nicely brought Aristotle’s observation to life, namely,

that “[f]or the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them.”⁴

What I have been able to discern, then, in gradually increasing detail, in various areas, and in my own work, is the operative presence of eight distinct tasks. For me, this is an empirical result, in the mode of “generalized empirical method,” and is not a deduction from knowledge of “levels of consciousness.” I am not suggesting that “levels of consciousness” are not “grounds” of the methodology. But what is to be meant by “grounds”? In any case, it is also evident to me that, at this stage of history, that operative presence is mainly inadvertent, confused, fragmentary and, in many respects, occurs in combinations that are counterproductive. How can I say that, with confidence? When circumstances allow or there is need for such, I do my best to enter into a scholar’s “mindset,” phrase by phrase and line by line, with an eye-and-mind for “functional modes” (not yet “luminously functional”). And so, for example, recalling some of my forays into the philosophy of physics, as well the literature in ecological economics, I might find an author talking about foundational issues, inadvertently doing so in doctrinal mode; or working historically and for a sentence or three sliding into dialectical reflection, or constructing a speculative model that, by definition, is not verifiable; and so on.

Ubiquitous in contemporary scholarship is the tacit assumption that organizing an author’s words is acceptable for interpretation and comparison. Among other problems, this grounds versions of dialectic that go nowhere, and historical works that attempt to telescope what in fact are massively complex problems into superficial summaries and comparisons. For my part, *Insight*, CWL 3, 609–10 provides a high-bar heuristics for interpretation. I should point out that, while “mindsets” in contemporary sciences remain self-screened and non-functional, for some tasks, “function-hopping” is infrequent. This can be seen in, for example, basic physics, chemistry, and botany, and in modern engineering science. The major problem of “self-screening” aside, there is relatively efficient collaboration between investigators who focus on experimental work, those who advance theoretical understanding of results obtained from experimental work, and the work of creative engineering science, all of this, thus, in limited fashion, implicitly revealing the (so far non-luminous and self-screened but nonetheless) operative presence of three of eight functional modes.

⁴ David Ross and Lesley Brown, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Oxford World’s Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), II.1.

Because of “layerings” of horizon gaps, and “self-screening” that are centuries deep, it seems to me that the possibility of the academy working functionally remains a remote future possibility. Nevertheless, from my empirical forays, it is also evident to me that the main “modes” of the eight functional specialties are, de facto, burgeoning in history; and that adverting to and increasingly taking advantage of implicit structurings—our implicit grouping-structurings—will be a key methodological part of the solution to the problem of history.

Without calling for “reductionism,” it seems to me that one of the fundamental horizon gaps in contemporary human studies is the lack of experience in basic science. Among other things, also lacking, therefore, is an up-to-date heuristics of our aggregative selves. But perhaps that isn’t the most pressing issue. For that need will become increasingly obvious, and the problem will be soon resolved, once “training wheels” come off and the Functional Wheel begins to turn. And so, this, I think, is also partly why our Duffy Exercises are so important, that is, to start bringing needed types of growth into view. Note, however, that the previous four sentences are me edging into, and therefore providing a segue to, my second objectification, to which I turn next.

There is one more thing that I should mention. My narrative here moves along the surface. I do not attempt to describe data. But I have made the effort to be concrete, in my referents. I will gladly get into details, and data. Part of the challenge, however, is that, in empirical method, getting into details includes attention on both subject and object.


Second Objectification

I need to be brief. The topic is history. I have written on this extensively, and I continue to make progress. For present purposes, then, I briefly draw attention first to long-term, and then to short-term, outcomes that will follow from us adverting to, attempting to implement, and growing in heuristics of “the functional specialties.”

Long-term


I represent long-term implications diagrammatically with (a) the communications matrix, C_{ij} (with the surround of the “plane of common meaning”); (b) the “keyhole diagram” that will include a layering for the new (Loneragan’s discovery) science of economics; (c) the slopings metagram; and for me personally, but not needed for all traditions, (d) W3, which includes the Trinitarian and Christian realities of human history.

a) C_{ij} ($i, j = 1$ to 8)⁵




⁵ Philip McShane, *A Brief History of Tongue* (1998), 108; *The Allure of the Compelling Genius of History*, (2015), 188; *Interpretation from A to Z* (2020), 104.

b) "Keyhole diagram"⁶




⁶ Philip McShane, *A Brief History of Tongue* (1998), 110; *The Allure of the Compelling Genius of History* (2015), 188; *Economics for Everyone*, 3rd edition (2017), 115.

c) Slopings⁷

⁷ Prehumous 2, "Metagrams and Metaphysics," <http://www.philipmcshane.org/prehumous>. See also Cantower VIII, "Slopes: An Encounter," <http://www.philipmcshane.org/cantowers>.

d) W3⁸



⁸ Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, *Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas* (2013, second printing), 161; Philip McShane, *A Brief History of Tongue* (1998), 124; *The Allure of the Compelling Genius of History*, (2015), 95; *The Future: Core Precepts in Supermolecular Method and Nanochemistry* (2019), 20; *Interpretation from A to Z* (2020), iv. McShane created this diagram at a conference on Lonergan's Hermeneutics in November 1986. "It occurred during the Montreal Concordia Conference on interpretation that gave rise to the volume *Lonergan's Hermeneutics: Its Development and Application* (edited by Sean E. McEvenue and Ben F. Meyer, The Catholic University of America, 1989). The morning that I was to reply to a paper by Fr. Bob Doran, I had a leap of imagination which gave me what is now a centerpiece of my grip on future effective intervention in human progress." *Interpretation from A to Z* (2020), iii.

Short-term

For short-term outcomes, I quote from a recent paper of mine, three paragraphs that I added, in response to a welcome request from the reviewer(s), for more detail on the usefulness of the C_{ij} matrix.

The [C_{ij}] diagram can immediately help us make beginnings in a new control. For instance, it provides a heuristics by which, and in which to read works (including one's own) in a new way. Reading phrase by phrase, and line by line, [self-attentively] and (provisionally) symbolically identifying the various " C_{ij} leans" present, can be remarkably revealing. On the one hand, methodological problems can be more easily identified. On the other hand, reading a work with " C_{ij} matrix-eyes" can reveal clusterings of communication modes, thus allowing for a work's positive contributions to the field to be more easily ascertained.

Adverting to communication modes is, of course, not yet part of the current ethos in economics, or any other field. Progress in identification, and control of meaning in all sixty-four modes of communication will be future work.⁹ But then, is the communications matrix really needed, at this time?

On this matter, we might remember Mendeleev, who worked out a periodic table for chemical elements. In communicating his results, he also indicated gaps in the table, and successfully anticipated the eventual discovery of elements that, at the time, were not yet known. In a similar way, but where the focus now is method, [the C_{ij} matrix] provides us with a "global cyclic table" for "communication modes" in all areas. ... [D]escriptively, some of its elements are already known.¹⁰ But the diagram also alerts us to new possibilities. It points to and invites the emergence of differentiations of consciousness that, at this time, remain largely unknown.¹¹ In particular, "the more the specialties

⁹ Concretely, if we think more of conversations than of individuals submitting communications, the count is "symmetrized." Therefore, there will be something like $1 + 2 + 3 + \dots + 8 = \frac{(8)(9)}{(2)} = 36$ classes of (functional) conversation. Both ways of counting, however, are but preliminary and open heuristics, within which endless differentiations may emerge.

¹⁰ See also, for example, my comments above regarding physics, chemistry, botany and engineering.

¹¹ These will be normalized through the eventual emergence of the "third stage of meaning" in history. See, for instance, Lonergan, *Method*, ch. 3. See, e.g., the last point of first objectification, the problem of commonsense and common-sense bias,

develop, the more their techniques are refined, the more delicate the operations they perform,"¹² the more there will be works wherein, phrase by phrase and line by line, individual authors will luminously hold, each to their functional task. But getting to that stage in history will be a long climb, akin to, but far greater than, the climb from Mendeleev's elementary periodic table to the marvels of modern biochemistry and its applications in, for instance, modern medicine.¹³

Postscript

To share something of my view, and the basis of my view, I began by briefly pointing to some aspects of my growth in awareness of a problem. This included efforts and modest progress in basic issues. However, once functional specialization has become the standard for front-line collaboration, basic issues will have been sorted out. Relatively luminous frontline collaboration will be on advanced refinements and increments, whether minor or major.

Third Objectification

Introduction

For each paper, I draw attention to just a few aspects that I found to be on track, or positional; what I think might be added; as well as what seemed to be, in some way, off-track, positionally, or methodologically. I also provide some indication of what I think can result from (my view of) some of the best elements of your view.

No doubt, I got some things wrong, and in some cases quite wrong. I do my share of off-trackings. My apologies for the terse and partial treatment which, mainly, was in order to meet word-count limits.¹⁴

In section Us together, I highlight a few aspects of our work about which we might move toward consensus. If there is no such effort in follow-up, what will have been produced will merely be another set of contributions to the "coincidental aggregate,"¹⁵ without making progress as a group, let alone for the academy.

in philosophy and Lonergan Studies and modern theology, feeling, aggreformism, etc.

¹² Lonergan, CWL 14, 135.

¹³ "On the Operative Presence of Eight Tasks in Economics," *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies*, to appear.

¹⁴ My unabridged third objectification ran to more than 13,000 words.

¹⁵ Coelho, 45.

A. Anderson

Your observations about Research draw attention to a crucial point, namely, that, for progress, there is the task of “bringing [potentially] novel relevant data to the notice of legal scholars”¹⁶; and that “the primary aim of Researchers in this new scheme is to notice anomalies and omissions, to collect them, organize them, and bring them to the attention of other scholars.”¹⁷

I am not seeing pointings that would distinguish eight tasks as currently (implicitly, inadvertently, or confusedly) present in contemporary contexts versus their eight future *functional* (and so luminous) differentiations. Although, such pointings are nascent in your second objectification, where you ask the question “What if ...?” You list various aspects of what you envision for functional dialectic.¹⁸ A note to readers would be helpful, that these are preliminary descriptions of but a few aspects of a not-yet operative largely unknown future science.

Once beginnings are made in implementing the new standard model, many of the examples to which you point (of basic confusion and counterpositional influence in law, legal studies, and art theory) will, before long, be sorted out. Within that same control of meaning, potentially significant errors, confusions, counterpositional influences, positional differences, etc., will occur in *all* of the functional specialties, although they will be handled in different ways. I think that several of your observations regarding confusion and such, will find their first home, operatively, not in dialectic but in the mode of functional research. For, taking Lonergan’s words as my own, (functional) dialectic “meets persons.”¹⁹

B. Coelho

I get the impression that, in your readings of *Insight*, you made beginnings in self-attention, *in instances*, thus obtaining “empirical”²⁰ results that “could be verified in oneself.”²¹ In ‘The fantasy,’²² I am right with you, in your interest in making progress in “applying the method.”²³ You are one of the few

¹⁶ Anderson, 29.

¹⁷ Anderson, 30.

¹⁸ Anderson, 34–36.

¹⁹ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 236. See also, Lonergan, *Method*, 2017, 381, 388.

²⁰ Coelho, 42.

²¹ Coelho, 42.

²² Coelho, 48–53.

²³ Coelho, 43.

scholars, so far, who have made an effort in this regard. I also see that you have identified what I think is a key aspect of dialectic, namely that it is an “encounter with ... persons.”²⁴

You refer to scholars “doing research, interpretation, ..., though not always with a clear understanding of what they are doing and often mixing up the specializations.”²⁵ Consider, however, your observation that functional specialization will be “something radically new.”²⁶ As your own efforts to “apply the method” have revealed, functional specialization per se is not yet operative in the academy. You are making a key point but what you are touching on, then, are not functional specializations but rather tasks, and modes of thought and action that, currently, only implicitly are present in the “merely coincidental aggregate.”²⁷ In my experience, progress in discerning and distinguishing the already operative and *presuppositionless* presence of eight tasks in fields is challenging empirical work. Experience-grounded fantasy is a further task. At this time, functional specialization per se remains a (remote) future possibility.

You write that “everyone can do research, interpretation and history, as in fact any other specialization.”²⁸ In any modern science, there are minimal standards of competence, contexts of which are utterly, and indeed, increasingly, remote to the plane of common meanings. In functional specialization, in all areas there will be ongoing progress in *new* standards of competence that subsume and exceed already demanding standards. Functional specialization, then, will *not* be for everyone. Although, the *fruit* of functional specialization will be for everyone, globally.

I think that your thought on “dialectic, foundations, and doctrines” would find more traction by keeping your focus concrete. For instance, your speculative model restricts “tak[ing] a stand”²⁹ to foundations. But as experience reveals, taking a stand can occur in and between all modes³⁰, not to mention, in this Exercise. And of course, Jesus, too, gave us examples of “taking a stand.” I think, for example, of his vigorous stand taken against the money changers in the temple.³¹

²⁴ Coelho, 46.

²⁵ Coelho, 45.

²⁶ Coelho, 45.

²⁷ Coelho, 45.

²⁸ Coelho, 48.

²⁹ Coelho, 47.

³⁰ See, for instance, note 4 of my second objectification.

³¹ John 2: 14–15, Matthew 21: 12–13.

You point out that your model for dialectic “obviously is somewhat different from the structure suggested to us by James Duffy.”³² You also describe possible protocols for generic, as well as specific, types of group encounter. For instance: “The setting could be a retreat house or *ashram*.”³³ You might notice, however, that the structure suggested by Duffy is not intended to be either that of dialectic (functional, or otherwise) or of any specific or generic type of encounter. It is, rather, a *heuristic* structure for an *Exercise* that is intended to help us make beginnings in merely one aspect of not-yet-operative *functional dialectic*, that was compactly described by Lonergan in fourteen lines of text.³⁴

One of your first observations is fundamental and will be of relatively permanent significance: “Here was a philosophy that was empirical, something that could be verified in oneself, and I found it exciting.”³⁵ In that way, we will start breaking free of conventional modes of philosophic speculation and instead, make progress in our efforts to attend to and identify, in instances, dynamics and modes of an otherwise “merely coincidental aggregate.”³⁶

C. Duffy

I find that the biographical focus in *Field and Subject Specializations* is on point, regarding the assembled text for this Exercise. You draw attention to various aspects of your experience, and of modern history, which help reveal that humanity has a major problem to solve.

You make an important and positional observation: “I do not find in *Insight* a solution for how to break from the talking-head Babel of our day.”³⁷ I draw attention to the fact that you speak, here, in the first person, *I*, thus breaking from flawed traditions of nominal comparison.

Your approach to preparing yourself to write on emergent probability was positional.

I find that your observations regarding *Frutelli tutti* (and its various related projects) also are positional, scientifically correct, and timely. I am referring, in particular, to your comments regarding (a) the absence of

³² Coelho, 53.

³³ Coelho, 52.

³⁴ Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 235, lines 14–27, or Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 250, lines 18–33.

³⁵ Coelho, 42.

³⁶ Coelho, 45.

³⁷ Duffy, 59.

understanding of real economic process; and (b) the lack of attention given to how “various tasks [might] be divided up in such a way that the conversion towards two-flow economics is ‘translated’ efficiently and beautifully, thus bearing fruit in street markets in Rome and Mexico City.”³⁸ What I am seeing in your objectifications is evidence of a heartfelt concern in which, positionally, you are reaching into “the level of the times,” and calling for feasible solutions.

I think that your observations regarding the need of appropriate symbolisms touch on crucial issues. Also important are your observations regarding the need for “us [scholars] to ask basic questions about ourselves and encounter one another.”³⁹ For my part, I see no other way for current and future impasses to be resolved, at least in ways that will be statistically effective.

It seems to me that you are on the cusp of being able to obtain new results in foundations, in probability. Among other things, in twofold attention, there would be the possibility of obtaining new detailed results regarding symbolism and diagrams.

For those whose academic formation has mainly been through conventional scholarship, it will be difficult to appreciate the need of symbolism. But homely, and therefore effective, beginnings will be possible by implementing the method that you employed, in preparing to write about emergent probability.

D. Sean McNelis

Your story tells of a wonderful orientation to the concrete, and to being practical. It is also evident that you have been growing in awareness of problems involved in subdividing academic work by disciplines. I think that you reached an important insight, that ‘progress’ is key. Your approach has included an empirical focus, raising “questions about what we were doing as housing researchers and asking them to distinguish between different types of questions and different types of research.”⁴⁰

You refer to “the powerful technique of scientific collaboration.”⁴¹ In reference to a list of eight questions that you provide, you write that “[t]hese eight questions are a complete ordered set of inter-related questions. There are no other questions. They are an explanatory definition of science locating

³⁸ Duffy, 63.

³⁹ Duffy, 66.

⁴⁰ McNelis, 84.

⁴¹ McNelis, 80.

an understanding of science in 'the questioning procedures or praxis of communities of inquirers.'"⁴²

You might notice, however, that questions arise. For instance, to what (in your experience, verified in instances) do you refer with the words 'scientific collaboration,' ..., 'functional specialties,' and so on? Is your "explanatory definition of science" verified in, for example, your experience in modern progress in understanding the buttercup, say, or in other actual contexts? In your experience, do you find that there are no other ("types"⁴³ of) question than the eight you list? Alas, what you are describing is a speculative model rather than what occurs, in actual contexts. You may well disagree. What to do? Our differences could be partially resolved in follow-up dialogue, by deliberating over details, in instances, in our shared experience. That could be enormously fruitful and would, I conjecture, also reveal in a positive and entertaining way that neither of us know very much about modern scientific collaboration.

You refer to "understanding each of the functional specialties, how they related to one another and how together they formed a unity-identity-whole."⁴⁴ It is, I think, part of your good tracking that you are beginning to see that there is a unity of some kind. However, what is the nature of that 'unity'? In the book *Insight*, Lonergan provides a heuristics for "the notion of the thing," and thus introduces the terminology "unity-identity-whole." Unfortunately, you have introduced a different meaning for the triple. Or, in your experience, is the vast historically emergent aggregate of acts and operations of communities of collaborating human things a thing? It is an empirical problem.

You write of functional specialties as though they are already present, even if in "a confused and erratic manner."⁴⁵ But there is not yet data on functional specialization per se, nor on the functioning of a *not-confused* and *non-erratic* global academic family serving the global human family.

We will do well to follow up on your initial orientation to the concrete.⁴⁶ There would, however, be the challenge of making progress in making such inquiry consistently empirical, focused on details of our respective experience.

⁴² McNelis, 87.

⁴³ McNelis, 84–88.

⁴⁴ McNelis, 81.

⁴⁵ McNelis, 81.

⁴⁶ McNelis, 82–84.

E. Cyril Orji

There was a wonderful “Eureka moment. ... Theology all of a sudden became delightful. ... the beginning of my own self-discovery.”⁴⁷ You call this “intellectual conversion.” The name is not important, in itself. But there are, in fact, further shifts that emerge from the kind of “self-discovery” of which you speak, but in *theoretic* contexts. “Intellectual conversion” is not to be confused with description of one’s acts and operations. I do not see references to data on intellectual conversion per se.

A proportion of your paper appeals to what Lonergan wrote. Notice, however, that our present task is neither interpretation nor history. In any case, in as much as Lonergan’s words have meaning for you, to reveal something of that meaning and of your current foundations, it would be important to refer to, or describe sources in your experience.

Again, a name is not in itself fundamental. But you seem to be equating “rote learning” with “second stage of meaning.”⁴⁸ In *Method in Theology*, *second stage of meaning* is a name for a prolonged and, so far, ongoing stage in human history.⁴⁹ In addition to rote learning, it includes, for example, continuing advances in mathematics, sciences, technologies, arts, society, and all manner of human development, through an ongoing plenitude of gifts of the Holy Spirit.

You mention that “theological propositions and church documents and papal encyclicals are, for me, ‘the materials of dialectic.’” I would like to broaden the context here. There is the de facto open and full range of materials of dialectic. There were, for instance, various clashes of leaders in 20th century mathematics, and physics (which eventually will also contribute to advances in theology). Is there any way to prescribe what will or will not be materials of dialectic? Might not results in this exercise potentially be materials of dialectic?

Implicit in your achievement is an invitation for each of us to build on “the beginning of my own self-discovery.”⁵⁰ But the source of examples needs to be enlarged to include examples that (depending on one’s background) might, at first, not seem to be “theological.” I am referring to beginnings in modern science. Informed by such experience, we could make progress in envisaging the possibility of *ongoing* “heightening[s] of consciousness” that

⁴⁷ Orji, 104.

⁴⁸ Orji, 103.

⁴⁹ Lonergan, CWL 14, 90–93.

⁵⁰ Orji, 104.

will be constituted, in history, by ongoing progress in “objectification of the [aggreformic] subjects” and that way make progress in anticipating non-terminating series of genera and species of being “intelligent, reasonable, responsible, and being in love,”⁵¹ in this life, and the next.

F. Quinn

My first objectification traces aspects of my development that eventually related to modest beginnings in heuristics of functional specialties. It seems to me that my first and second objectification minimally serve our present Duffy Exercise.

My discussion of the C_{ij} ⁵² matrix would have benefitted by me referring to a few examples. Within that same discussion, I included a footnote and referred to “36 classes of (functional) conversation.”⁵³ Again, a few details would have been helpful. Here, I give a preliminary indication of my rationale.

Operatively, communications between C_{ij} and C_{ji} aim for shared understanding. In a broad heuristics, then, there will be classes of functional conversation, the number of which is determined by pairing each C_{ij} with C_{ji} . The number of distinct pairings *internal* to functional collaboration, therefore, will be $8 + 7 + 6 + 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 36$. The full context, however, emerges from and includes the plane of common meanings, a massive class of emergent communications, C_9 , say. This brings the total count to 37.

Certainly there will be no rule against communications C_{i9} and C_{9i} , with $i = 1, 2, \dots, 8$. But there will be special roles for communications C_{91}, C_{19}, C_{89} , and C_{98} .⁵⁴ The entire functional enterprise will thus be attending to, and be working to bear fruit in, for example, villages, towns, neighborhoods, schools, universities, churches, family life, governments,

⁵¹ Orji, 107.

⁵² In my second objectification, temporarily keeping symbolism simple, I used the notation $C11, C12, \dots$. That soon leads to various problems. I resort now to the more refined symbolism that uses subscripts.

⁵³ See Quinn, note 4.

⁵⁴ As in any contemporary field, we can anticipate “lanes” of competence. See W5 in, Philip McShane, “Prehumous 2. Metagrams and Metaphysics,” n.d., http://www.philipmcshane.org/wp-content/themes/philip/online_publications/series/prehumous/prehumous-02.pdf. See also John Benton, “Lonergan and the Meaning of ‘Word,’” *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 4, (2004), <https://journals.library.mun.ca/ojs/index.php/jmda/article/view/140>.

landscaping, architecture, engineering, business, industry, applied economics, and ecology.

G. St. Amour

From your auto-biographical narrative it seems that, in your youth, you were experiencing aspects of the problem for which functional specialization will be the solution. Evident in your question regarding reading and coursework, you had a practical concern: "What could be done about it?"⁵⁵ Your context of concern has grown: "Last, but not least, there remains a concern pertaining to the practical and ethical relevance of functional specialization,"⁵⁶ and for "meeting the practical and ethical challenges of human living in an increasingly complex global context."⁵⁷

It seems that you are drawing on experience, when you write that "[t]here is an umbilical cord stretching from chapter 5 to its mother, which is chapter 1. ... [which] offers merely a terse sketch of self-appropriation."⁵⁸ You are touching on key issues that are either ignored or inadequately treated in the current literature. However, foundational issues here are massively complex. For beginnings, it would be important to describe, in specific terms, that to which you refer, in your experience.

You write that "functional specialization is an application of transcendental method."⁵⁹ Since functional specialization per se, is not yet operative, I wonder what you mean here, by 'application.' Again, what will be important will be to describe details, in your experience.

You write that "[s]elf-appropriation requires evocation of the relevant operations in one's own consciousness and a discovery, in one's own experience, of the dynamic relationships by which these operations are connected."⁶⁰ You also write of that "(which cannot be fathomed in the absence of self-appropriation on the part of that person to whom I am responding) ... that the authority ... is ... that which is personally-verifiable in the structure of conscious intentionality itself. Verification is to occur within the theologian's own data of consciousness."⁶¹ Well said, as doctrinal

⁵⁵ St. Amour, 135.

⁵⁶ St. Amour, 143.

⁵⁷ St. Amour, 145.

⁵⁸ St. Amour, 140.

⁵⁹ St. Amour, 138, 139, 142.

⁶⁰ St. Amour, 140.

⁶¹ St. Amour, 141.

statements. However, you do not seem to provide, or refer to, details of your experience that would instantiate and thus reveal your current heuristics.

A similar methodological difficulty is in your attempt to deduce the need and possibility of functional specialization, by arguing in general and philosophic terms, without adverting to, or drawing on experience in, actual contexts. There is not yet data on functional specialization, per se. I would like to think that each of us in this Duffy Exercise, in our own way, share somewhat in Lonergan's Dream.⁶² But even a dream is experience and therefore, in your searchings, and for each of us, calls for detailed identification of sources, in experience.

As you indicate, there is the practical problem of "living in an increasingly complex global context."⁶³ Going forward, with a shared practical concern but turning our attention self-attentively to actual contexts, there will be the possibility of beginnings in identifying already-operative tasks, as well as inadvertent "cross-talk" between tasks, all of which will provide data on the possibility of progress in (luminous) $C_{ij}, i, j = 1, 2, \dots, 8, 9$.⁶⁴ Our present challenge is somewhat analogous to that of chemistry, in the years following Mendeleev's discovery of the Periodic Table. Now, though, we are tasked with identification and implementation of elements of a Global Table.

H. Us together

Our contributions reveal a concern for humanity; consent to the need and possibility of human progress; and beginnings in: self-attention, in instances; in discerning the historical emergence of eight distinct tasks in the academy, and their potential influence in cultures.

However, our positive results in this Duffy Exercise are amateur; and are undermined by philosophic argument in general terms and speculative modeling, contents of which mainly are remote to actual contexts. Good intentions notwithstanding, our current views and methods provide little concrete direction and little or no basis for bridging academic work and the needs of humanity in these times. Each of us speaks of "functional specialties" but at this time it can only be a name for the thinnest of heuristics. For since a functional division of labor is not yet operative, in history, we do not yet have data on "functional specialties" per se.

⁶² Lambert and McShane, *Bernard Lonergan. His Life and Leading Ideas*, 163.

⁶³ St. Amour, 145.

⁶⁴ See my second objectification.

It seems to me that the most important results of this Duffy Exercise do not concern the assembled text, but concern, rather, what is being revealed, namely, that fundamental shifts are needed, in method. Progress is needed in our effort to understand experience. Developing consistency in attending to experience will, in particular, reveal the need for self-attention and growth, in scientific contexts. A focus on experience in tasks will further reveal that Our Emergent Human Body is, de facto, eight-plus-one-fold, in our gatherings and growings, in our sufferings and joys.

