

Assembling the Science of Interpretation

Philip McShane and William Zanardi

Introduction (Philip McShane)

"Interpretation is to be scientific."¹ Those five words of Lonergan weave beautifully into my proposed sublation of Chapter 17 of *Insight* in the context of an effective engineering of progress that would gently blossom into the strange leap to eschatological neuromolecular reality.² But here we are not pushing for a grasp of such a millennial-long global venture. We are, rather, trying to get the community around Bernard Lonergan to begin to take his project and his optimism seriously. Our effort is in continuity with two previous *Assembly* ventures but is quite independent of them: these introductory remarks settle that independence by indicating the basic strategy.

That strategy is simply taking Lonergan seriously when he outlines compactly the way he wishes us to go about the part of functional cycling that is the fourth special task. Our strategy is neatly strategic in a number of ways. First of all, the dynamics of the task, despite it being a task for elders, are quite easily identified for beginners by splitting it in two. There is the first part of the task which involves a complex process of testing some suggested advance in the cycled content of current theology against its present content. That present content can be named—borrowing from physics—the *Standard Model*. We are not getting into that difficult part here, so let there be no anxiety about it throughout these initial efforts.³ It is the

¹ *Insight*, CWL 3, at 587.

² There is a massive problem in theology, adverted to by Rahner in his final lecture, relating to the state of eschatology, undeveloped and unincorporated in an existential heuristics of hope. For a push towards a remedy see my article "*Insight and the Trivialization of History*," *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy & Education*, vol. 28, no. 1 (2017), 125–28.

³ These *Assembly* essays aim to work slowly towards a glimpse of the full view. The peculiar place of the present essay is stated briefly in note 34. There is

second part of the task that is the direction of the present exercise. That second part I have called *Lonergan's 1833 Overture*. The 1833 comes from the lines of the first edition of *Method in Theology* where the exercise is identified. Perhaps it is as well to present them here for reference.

horizons.

The results, accordingly, will not be uniform. But the source of this lack of uniformity will be brought out into the open when each investigator proceeds to distinguish between positions, which are compatible with intellectual, moral, and religious conversion and, on the other hand, counterpositions, which are incompatible either with intellectual, or with moral, or with religious conversion.

A further objectification of horizon is obtained when each investigator operates on the materials by indicating the view that would result from developing what he regarded as positions and be reversing what he has regarded as counterpositions.

There is a final objectification of horizon when the results of the foregoing process are themselves regarded as material, when they are assembled, completed, compared, reduced, classified, selected, when positions and counterpositions are distinguished, when positions are developed and counterpositions are reversed.⁴

Even if you are reading these indications only for the first time, you surely get a sense of their cunning. A shift has been suggested in the

the further challenge for later essays of dealing with the top half of *Method* 250 or, equivalently, the meaning—in a distant mature dialectic—of the words, *Assembly, Completion, Comparison, Reduction, Classification, Selection*. I would note, however, that the standard model is the point of the first exercise: its cycling is the strategy of its ongoing implementation. The present exercise gets us towards the heart of the matter: the astonishing absence of a heuristic logic of development in the culture of any venture. So, at the bottom level, Kneale and Kneale's classic, *The Development of Logic*, has no reflexive luminous nudges regarding the logic of development.

⁴ *Method in Theology*, 250. I would note that I have considered this text in a number of contexts. For example, there is the context of Chapter 12, "Dialectic and the Notion of Being" in *The Allure of the Compelling Genius of History* (Vancouver: Axial Publishing, 2015), where the text is reproduced on pages 145–46. My most recent, more comprehensive treatment of the meaning of the text is the five articles in "Religious Faith Seeding the Positive Anthropocene Age," *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy & Education*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2019).

Standard Model. Perhaps it might help to think of such shifts in normal science, but I leave that to the footnote.⁵ The exercise which you are invited to try yourself is to work out your reaction to the shift—a first objectification—and figure out what its acceptance or rejection would entail—a second objectification. The trouble for you with this working out is that you need to back up your acceptance or rejection from your own grip on the present standard model. This is a tough challenge for a beginner, but the exercise only asks you to do the best you can, and for many it is a fruitful venture in recollecting and thematizing for yourself your climb to your present position. The two previous assembly exercises illustrate the procedure. The challenge is, in the mature science, that of a group enterprise of dialecticians, on which I comment further in various footnotes.⁶ In the two previous exercises there were, respectively, five and three participants. You could then think of yourself as having your own shot at acceptance or rejection, giving your reasons, and then seeing how you might fare if you slip into the third objectification.

In the present exercise there is just one participant, William Zanardi, who has been in the ballpark of the Assembled Improvement for some time, as you will see.⁷ He expresses his acceptance of the Assembled Improvement within the context of his developing *Weltanschauung*. Normally each participant works this out on their own, but here we cheat a little in letting you savor Zanardi's view before you try your own. I would

⁵ One might think of the shifts induced in physics by, e.g., Feynman's diagrams or Maxwell's equations, then move up through familiar shifts in chemistry, biology, etc. But getting beyond *haute vulgarization* is a massive Kuhnian task. The present venture is getting people to an effective shift regarding the shocking shift invited by Lonergan's various heuristic clues to growth-analysis, shift-analysis.

⁶ See notes below: 34, 37, 44, 45, 49, 51, 56.

⁷ Part 2 comes from the massive undertaking represented by William Zanardi, *The New Comparative Interpretation: A Primer*, Revised 2nd edition (Austin: Forty Acres Press, 2014); Clayton Shoppa and William Zanardi, *Cracking the Case: Exercises in the New Comparative Interpretation* (Austin: Forty Acres Press, 2014); Clayton Shoppa and William Zanardi, *What Is an Environment? A Study in the New Comparative Interpretation* (Austin: Forty Acres Press, 2015); William Zanardi, *The Education of Liberty: Fantasies about the Future* (Austin: Forty Acres Press, 2016); R.G. Aaron Mundine, Clayton Shoppa, and William Zanardi, *Comparing Philosophical Methods: A Way Forward* (Austin: Forty Acres Press, 2017); William Zanardi, *Rescuing Ethics from Philosophers* (Austin: Forty Acres Press, 2018).

prefer you not to cheat further by reading the final section—the third objectification—before expressing your own position, but that bit of cheating is up to you. The advantage of not cheating regarding the third objectification is that you get a better chance of an honest self-assessment in scribbling out your view first. Obviously, you could avoid any cheating and tackle the task prior to reading Zanardi: another level of self-revelation. Pause and think of the value of doing the self-revelation three ways.

Further, I would note your advantage, one not shared by the group of dialecticians. You can do this exercise privately, and tell no one: so you do not face the discomforts that Lonergan had in mind when he pushes the dialecticians to “lay their cards on the table.”⁸

That being said, we now face the two assembled texts from Lonergan. Your question is, “What do I think of building them into the problem of interpretation in theology?”

What problem? you may ask. Then you might settle down to read the third section of Chapter 17 of *Insight*. But that is not necessary: you may leap into the present task immediately after reading the two texts, and scribble your self-revealing view. Here we go, texts [a] and [b]:⁹

[a] The explanatory differentiation of the protean notion of being involves three elements. First, there is the genetic sequence in which insights gradually are accumulated by man. Secondly, there are the dialectical alternatives in which accumulated insights are formulated, with positions inviting further development and counterpositions shifting their ground to avoid the reversal they demand. Thirdly, with the advance of culture and of effective education, there arises the possibility of the differentiation and specialization of modes of expression; and since this development conditions not only the exact communication of insights but also the discoverer’s own grasp of his discovery, since such grasp and its exact communication intimately are connected with the advance of positions and the reversal of counterpositions, the three elements in the explanatory differentiation of the protean notion of being fuse into a single explanation.¹⁰

⁸ *Method in Theology*, 193; CWL 14, 180.

⁹ The texts were first presented thus in *Æcornomics 3: “A Common Quest Manifesto,”* at notes 77 and 78. The challenge of that essay is the heart of the present venture.

¹⁰ *Insight*, CWL 3, 609–10.

[b] One may expect the diligent authors of highly specialized monographs to be somewhat bewildered and dismayed when they find that instead of singly following the bent of their genius, their aptitudes, and their acquired skills, they are to collaborate in the light of common but abstruse principles and to have their individual results checked by general requirements that envisage simultaneously the totality of results. Still, this is the minor resistance, and it should cause no greater difficulty in the field of interpretation than its analogue does in physics.¹¹

Your first option in this exercise is to settle in yourself, privately or indeed by forming a group who are willing to try it, to give it a week of musing and writing their first and second objectifications, then after that week—or month, or season—each to take time to view the various productions and come up with “a final objectification of horizon”¹² that would lead the group to move towards a consensus about what should be spun forward into an emended standard model. Suit yourself. Here, obviously, we are handing on the assembly to Bill Zanardi, who will take his stand alone on the first two objectifications, though in fact he is not alone but laced into a group of like-minded strugglers tilting towards swinging the proposals of Lonergan into foundations, and thus into the ongoing cycles of future theology, sharing Lonergan’s outlandish conviction that “interpretation is to be scientific,”¹³ that is, to effectively, with statistical success over millennia,¹⁴ enter the human conflict and pick up the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 604.

¹² *Method in Theology*, 250, line 28.

¹³ *Insight*, CWL 3, at 587.

¹⁴ The point was first made by Lonergan in 1934 in “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” *Lonergan’s Early Economic Research*, edited by Michael Shute, University of Toronto Press, 2010, 16–44.

Archimedean lever,¹⁵ form the Archimedean screw up of human thought and human culture.¹⁶

The conflict is not between two schools of thought but between human reality and human thought about human reality. It is human thought about human reality that produces the technical, social, and cultural situation. And it is the revolt of human reality (as distinct from human thought about human reality) against these evils in the situation that provides the lever for correcting the defects in the human thinking about man.¹⁷

The First Two Objectifications (William Zanardi)

The three objectifications comprising the final steps in Lonergan's fourth functional specialty of dialectic (hereafter FS4) are crucial to the recycling of interpretative materials among specialists. Without that recycling the criticism and refinement of viewpoints will be less probable and so progress in diagnosing and solving problems will be less probable. Lonergan's hope for a "statistically effective way of intervening in history" will owe its fulfillment to meeting such prerequisites for progress. Thus, the following exercise is a small contribution to meeting one of those prerequisites, namely, composing examples of the first two objectifications and so supplying materials for a collaborative effort in recycling.

The first text selected for this exercise is appropriate since it briefly formulates what Lonergan thought were three conditions for the development of a science of interpretation. In Part 3 a case study in comparative interpretation supplies materials for the two objectifications in Parts 4 and 5. Notations there suggest how the three conditions ("elements") can guide specialists in composing those objectifications.

The Selected Text

¹⁵ "Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum on which to place it and I shall move the world." I write this claim of Archimedes in the pre-dawn of Pentecost Sunday, the day that celebrates the Lever of God. The context of musing here might be section 5 of Chapter 20 of *Insight*. Note 16 refers you to another context, and the quotation there refers to another lever, represented by the paper mentioned in the next note about a conference in Helsinki on "Peaceful Coexistence" which is a small "revolt of human reality."

¹⁶ The metaphor is developed in my Helsinki paper of June 2019, available as *Æconomics 5: "Structuring the Reach towards the Future."*

¹⁷ *Phenomenology and Logic*, CWL 18, 308.

The explanatory differentiation of the protean notion of being involves three elements. First, there is the genetic sequence in which insights gradually are accumulated by man. Secondly, there are the dialectical alternatives in which accumulated insights are formulated, with positions inviting further developments and counterpositions shifting their ground to avoid the reversal they demand. Thirdly, with the advance of culture and effective education, there arises the possibility of the differentiation and specialization of modes of expression; and since this development conditions not only the exact communication of insights but also the discoverer's own grasp of his discovery, since such grasp and its exact communication intimately are connected with the advance of positions and the reversal of counterpositions, the three elements in the explanatory differentiation of the protean notion of being fuse into a single explanation. *Insight*, CWL 3, at 609–610.

My Interpretation of the Text

The “protean notion of being” is a second-order definition that fixes the meaning of the term “being” in relation to the intentional operations of actual and potential knowers. It is thereby a “heuristic notion” that includes whatsoever is intelligently conceivable and rationally affirmable. Raising and answering both questions for intelligence and questions for reflection is the general way to accumulate limited knowledge of being.

When those questions are responding to a demand for explanatory understanding, the “differentiation” of “three elements” becomes a guide to how specialists can meet that demand. Assuming that multiple research efforts have identified the “surviving” historical views of a selected topic, functional specialists face the first elementary task of ordering those views in a “genetic” or developmental sequence, ranging from the least adequate to the most comprehensive view to date. With their orientation toward the future, they are seeking to pass along to other specialties what is most promising for improving situations to which the selected topic is relevant.

Since specialists prior to those doing FS4 assemble different views and even alternate sequences of views, some of which are incompatible with one another, those doing dialectic face a second elementary task, namely, evaluating major differences after identifying their origins. Here the basic measure of evaluation is the universal viewpoint as dialecticians performing this second task understand it. On the basis of their grasp of the meanings of reality, knowing, and objectivity and of the implications of all three for intellectual, moral, and spiritual development, they proceed to distinguish between advances and regressions in interpreting the selected

topic. Following the mantra of “develop positions and reverse counterpositions,” they refine any received developmental sequences and formulate what they think are the most advanced views to date. In doing so, they are moving toward the formulation of a further measure of and control over new or newly re-discovered interpretations of the selected topic. They will measure such interpretations against the refined sequence of views before giving them serious consideration; they thereby will avoid needless debates over obsolete views.

The third “element” presupposes the historical emergence of distinct ways of intending being. Two mappings of these appear in Lonergan’s references to multiple patterns of experience and to four horizons of meaning: common sense, theory, interiority, and religious consciousness. In order to move among those patterns and horizons with some effective control over intentional operations, it helps enormously to have control over the distinct “modes of expression” appropriate to them. Absent this control over possible expressions-in-use, confusion is inevitable. But cultural advances and “effective education” provide specialized modes of expression that permit more exact formulation and more precise communication of intended meanings. Now, if those seeking an explanatory understanding of some issue are familiar with the variety and historical development of such modes of expression, they are more likely to have greater control both over how they formulate their own insights and over how they try to communicate what they have understood to diverse audiences. Modes of expression appropriate to explanatory understanding ideally escape the relativity to audience so common in everyday language and literary expression. They are, thus, of significance to those pursuing a science of interpretation.

So how are the three “elements” conditions for the development of such a science? To assemble the surviving interpretations of some issue requires basic research. To arrange them in a genetic or developmental sequence is a task for historians; however, they are likely to produce different and, in some cases, incompatible sequences. As a result, dialecticians take on the second task of evaluating differences among those sequences in terms of the universal viewpoint. That explanatory viewpoint fixes the meanings of “reality” and “objectivity” in relation to the intentional operations of possible knowers; it defines the meanings of those operations in relation to one another. The pattern of relations among those operations is an instance of systematic thinking achieving the scientific ideal of invariant correlations among basic categories.

Since the aim is an explanatory interpretation of a selected issue, dialecticians rely on modes of discourse appropriate to the horizon of theory. But, as in the case of historians, they are likely to arrive at different conclusions. If the differences are major, the first two objectifications provide clues as to the origins of those differences. When multiple specialists formulate and circulate their objectifications among their group and invite all the members to formulate and share a third objectification that states their reasons for agreeing with or dissenting from portions of the circulating views, they are engaging in a methodical way of revealing and criticizing the sources of basic differences.

To my reading of the selected text, I have obviously added features of FS4 that Lonergan discovered a decade after he wrote that text. To me these additions represent further insights into how his quest for a science of interpretation was progressing during that period. As well, I found the additions helpful in understanding how the “three elements” could “fuse into a single explanation.” My current understanding of this concluding phrase is the following. The refinement of views through the methodical recycling of them promises to be “statistically effective” in (1) improving the historical understanding of those views and their modes of expression, (2) ordering them developmentally, first, in relation to the universal viewpoint and, second, in relation to a possible front-line view, and (3) achieving some agreement on explanatory formulations that, at least temporarily, best express the critical insights that ground both a front-line view and the rejection of other candidates.

A Case Study

Applying my interpretation of claims about elements of a science of interpretation to a concrete problem seems a practical way of testing its plausibility. In this application do the “three elements” play significant roles in diagnosing and resolving some issues? Note a further purpose for the case study: different interpretations of the problem provide the “materials” useful in composing the two objectifications.

I begin not with the problem but with Lonergan’s sketch of what a developed science of interpretation would take for granted.

[Let] us suppose some such science to be so highly developed that it has ascertained the classical laws that hold at relevant stages of human development, the genetic operators that relate successive stages, the dialectical analysis that envisages different sets of consequences following respectively on reasonable and unreasonable human

choices, and the statistical laws that indicate the probable frequencies of both types of choice. *Insight*, CWL 3, at 766–67.

These characteristics of a “highly developed” science stipulate one way of proceeding toward an explanatory interpretation of some concrete human problem.

Now for the problem: What are the origins of human aggression? Research to date can supply a long list of diverse answers. In a recent work (*Rescuing Ethics from Philosophers*, 2018), I summarized some of that extensive research and concluded that a pluralistic view of its origins is currently the front-line position. A descriptive overview follows.

Humans share with animals an “alert system” that routinely produces physiological and reflex responses both to perceived opportunities for food and mates and to perceived threats and dangers. Human development ordinarily passes through various stages in the expression and control of responses to the alert system. For example, most persons learn the importance of discriminating between perceived threats and actual threats and so mature in exercising some reflective control over their actual responses. However, not every adult develops sufficient reflective control.

Bio-medical conditions can interfere with transitioning through stages of development. The violent responses of autistic teenagers to frustrated demands reflect such interference. Social conditions are common barriers to acquiring reflective control over responses to perceived threats. Parental abuse at key junctures in a child’s transitioning between stages can, in popular language, make the child distrustful and withdrawn for years. In more technical terms, the child’s alert system can become hypersensitive and rarely modulated by reflective deliberation. Children and adult civilians repeatedly exposed to wartime violence may exhibit the symptoms associated with PTSD in combat veterans. Aggressive reaction to any perceived threat becomes a default poise in their psyches.

Then there are personal failures to exercise reflective control over responses to the alert system when adults are able to do so. For example, spreading harmful gossip, fantasizing about disasters befalling others, preferring to think a simple gesture or casual remark must be an intended insult—all are avoidable behaviors, but adults engage in them all the same. The old complaint applies: “They know better than to do that.” Many adults will admit as much and apologize; some will follow up the apology with a standard rationalization blaming their failures on a bad mood or on stress at work or on the fact that they are simply being human.

The preceding remarks are a preliminary way of classifying multiple sources of aggression. To begin shifting the analysis into an explanatory context, let's return to the text cited at the opening of this third section.

Characteristics of a highly developed science of interpretation can serve as guides to making that shift. Thus, classical laws are appropriate in neurophysiological research into correlations among sensory stimuli, the activation of neurotransmitters having axial links to particular brain locales and neural events at those locales. To speak of an alert system and its reflex responses is to talk summarily of a complex series of regularly interacting types of sensory experiences, neurochemical releases, and physiological events.

To speak of stages in the development of reflective control over those events is to rely on genetic laws. Imagine researchers seeking to trace some regular pattern of development within a selected population of children. They consult the cases child psychologists label instances of normal, age-specific responses to designed "cues" that, depending of the purposes of the experiments, either should or should not elicit aggressive responses. The data from those experiments will suggest a range of standard or "normal" responses. Of course, some of the cases will exhibit responses falling outside this range. Then the research can go in two directions.

Those interested in the frequency with which responses fall within the known range can also inquire about the frequency of deviations or outliers. In both instances they will be seeking to formulate general probabilities. Ready-to-hand will be over a century's worth of bio-medical and social-psychological research into the origins of aberrant behaviors. Among the numerous studies they will find data to support the current pluralistic view and to formulate probability statements about distinct types of cases of aggression.

What are they to make of cases of supposedly mature adults whose choices do not seem to fit the prior groupings of disorders? Presumably they will find no shortage of evidence of human malice that is inexplicable in terms of physiological or psychosocial interferences. Much earlier views relied on stories of jealous gods, demon possession, a fallen human nature, an aggression instinct, or even an aggression gene to make sense of such cases. Too often researchers reveal deficits in their self-understanding when they categorize these stories. The deficits show up when they dismiss such stories as pre-scientific and either think science has already explained such cases or hope that it one day will. What they overlook is that persons ask questions, especially about what troubles them; but to ask questions is to

expect answers, and those expecting them will resist the claim that no explanation or reason is possible for unreasonable choices.

Statisticians may someday be able to reliably differentiate morally defective acts of aggression from those due to underlying bio-medical or psychosocial disorders. Then they will be able to determine the frequency of the first type. But will the counting and the setting of ranges be all they try to achieve? Here a reminder about what the explanatory notion of being implies is appropriate. What is not intelligible and rationally affirmable is not being, is nothing. This reminder is not the beginning of a traditional argument for evil as the absence of the good. Instead, I mention it as a reminder of how much we have yet to learn. That is, we are largely ignorant in regard to how much “responsibility” persons actually have for their choices. Judgments about personal responsibility are quite fallible—despite the need to make them in legal proceedings. A study of the history of jurisprudence should alert audiences to how slow societies have been to recognize their own fallibility in judging outliers. The legal judgments and practices of our predecessors that today we label arbitrary and indefensible should warn us that future generations may think the same of our legal judgments and practices.

The First Objectification (with notations of elements 1 and 2)

Is the pluralistic account of the origins of human aggression an advance in understanding? (Element 1) I think it superior to the alternatives mentioned. The latter were either stories substituting imaginary figures for explanations of human aggression or accounts purporting to be empirical but positing unintelligibility as part of being. The former belong to the picture world of the first horizon; the latter are at odds with the universal viewpoint. (Element 2)

I think it is an advance since it can make use of the four types of laws in differentiating sources of aggression. In doing so, it allows for flexible ranges in how persons express aggression. Alert systems are potentially able to evoke responses of fight, flee, or freeze. Which possibilities become actual will be dependent on ranges of antecedent conditions. Among those conditions are human capacities to raise and answer questions and to learn how to control spontaneous responses to perceived threats. The development of those capacities will also vary in relation to ranges of antecedent conditions. Bio-medical and psychosocial barriers to development are instances of unfavorable antecedent conditions. In the absence of such barriers, the inexplicable cases are those in which reasonable people act aggressively for “no good reason.” My view, if I am not to tell a story, is

that such cases are instances of deliberate refusals to develop. The fault lies not in our stars, our genes, our parents, or our societies. The fault lies in us.

The Second Objectification (with a notation of element 3)

My current understanding of the second objectification is that it either suggests how the interpretation defended in the preceding steps of dialectical analysis might undergo further development or how some part of an otherwise defective interpretation might be worth preserving.

In this section I pursue the first option by expanding upon the closing remark, "The fault lies in us." I said that what was inexplicable was a deliberate refusal to develop. Let me shift these comments into a mode of expression appropriate for talking about acts of willing and refusing, deliberating and deciding. (Element 3)

The pattern of distinct but related intentional acts heads toward completion. There is the intermediate term of acts of questioning about matters-of-fact. Their proper end is an act of assent to something as true. There is a further completion intended when the questions include those for deliberating and deciding. Then the object of inquiry is a possibility, e.g. some good thing to achieve or some unwanted event to prevent. When the goal is uncomplicated, deliberating over possible courses of action and judging the merits of each finds its intermediate term in a judgment about what is best to do under the circumstances. Once a person has made this judgment, answering the question for decision becomes seemingly straightforward. "If my best judgments are that this end is worth pursuing and this option is superior to all the others I've considered, then this is what I should choose to do." An act of consent to doing what I have affirmed as the right choice completes the process. When I deliberately withhold that act of consent, I have failed to complete the spontaneous, self-assembling process. As a result, I have left incomplete what otherwise would have been my further development in both knowing and doing what is good. Thus, cases belonging to the third type of aggression are, along with the other two types, instances of failures to develop.

The Third and "Final Objectification of Horizon" (Philip McShane)

Perhaps it is no harm to leap to a heuristic view, a blast from the future, a present end-lining of *Method in Theology* 250, a baton handed on to foundational fantasy, a push towards a flight forward in genetically

“understanding the object”¹⁸ that is distant history,¹⁹ “when positions are developed and counterpositions are reversed,”²⁰ by graceful effective thought about human reality. We are back with, or forward from, the quotation from Lonergan that ended my Introduction: about the “existential gap.”²¹ We are with him now, are we not, brooding effectively over the slow but triumphant overcoming, by a new culture of caring for situations, of “the evils in the technical, social, and cultural situation.”²²

I would like to think that you are with me and Bill, as we brood further over situations that pushed us forward in our objectifications. And was not that brooding previously and continuously over all situations, since we were and are envisaging the good, and “what is good, always is concrete.”²³

I invite you to pause over one of my own *Assembly* efforts, which drove me to a spectrum of creative leaps that Bill and I follow through on in this third objectification. My *Assembly* effort focused on the first two sections of the last chapter of *Method in Theology*.²⁴ How are they to be weaved into a full future cycle?

¹⁸ *Method in Theology*, 153. It is crucially important to weave this topic into a full genetic heuristics, especially when the object is genetic.

¹⁹ How far should the genetics reach? In a heuristics of the sunflower we surely would not cut off its mature smile? What then of the heuristics of the Sunflower? On the heuristics of the Eschaton see Philip McShane, “Insight and the Trivialization of History,” *Divoyadaan: Journal of Philosophy & Education*, vol. 28, no. 1 (2017), section 20.

²⁰ The conclusion to section 5, “Dialectic: The Structure,” *Method in Theology*, 250.

²¹ *Phenomenology and Logic*, CWL 18, treats of the existential gap in the final two chapters, dealing respectively with the ontic and phyletic challenge of closing the gap. In my suggested reflections—the baton handing problem of the third objectification—my focus is on pushing you to sniff the challenge, within, of a full “law of effect” (see notes 30 and 37 below).

²² *Phenomenology and Logic*, CWL 18, 308. A few lines later: the revolt against “those evils in the situation.”

²³ The beginning of Chapter 2 of *Method in Theology*.

²⁴ A context here is my essay of the mid-1980s, “Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts,” conveniently available as Chapter 7 of the website book *ChrISt in History*. Broadly, I thought and think of the first section of *Method* 14 as a compact indication of the “character” (*Method*, 356, line 12) of Tower people and the second section as pointing to the challenge of reaching the plane, the plain, people on the globe. More in note 26.

The conversation between Bill and me started decades ago, but a year ago²⁵ Bill took his stand on the text that was key to my being nudged forward in situation-analysis. I give the text in full. It comes at the end of the second section of Lonergan's chapter on "Communications," a chapter as challenging to him as was the first chapter of the book.²⁶ He is musing, in hopeless compactness, on the dialectic challenge to be met, not now by the heuristic precisions of the third specialty, but by the inclusiveness of global reach.

Now, however, our interest is not in dialectic as affecting theological opinions but in dialectic as affecting community, action, **situation**. It affects community for, just as common meaning is constitutive of community, so dialectic divides community into radically opposed groups. It affects action for, just as conversion leads to intelligent, reasonable, responsible action, so dialectic adds division, conflict, oppression. It affects the **situation**, for **situations** are the cumulative product of previous actions and, when previous actions have been guided by the light and darkness of dialectic, the resulting **situation** is not some intelligible whole but rather a set of misshapen, poorly proportioned, and incoherent fragments. [Lonergan's footnote 4 at this point adds: "On this topic see *Insight*, pp. 191–206, 218–232, 619–633, 687–730."]

Finally, the divided community, their conflicting actions, and the messy **situation** are headed for disaster. For the messy **situation** is

²⁵ At the West Coast Methods Institute at Loyola Marymount University, April 19–21, 2018, Bill Zanardi was the fourth member of a panel that exercised us in assembling four texts in *Method in Theology*. Our challenge as to give pointers with regard to the text, quoted shortly, from page 358. The challenge is presented in reasonable detail in my article "[A Paradigmatic Panel for \(Advanced\) Students \(of Religion\).](#)"

²⁶ Chapter one and its problems was a topic of my conversations with Lonergan in the summer of 1966: the central problem was how to presuppose *Insight*: a complex topic that really is the source of these *Assembly* essays, very obviously the previous one. The last chapter of *Method* revealed itself to me as a problem in the summer of 1971, when Lonergan presented a brief version of the book that was in fact finished by then. He cut his presentation short and left me to present some musings on the topic—hopefully [LOL] not recorded, since I knew little about that eighth specialty. I have since then worked continuously on the challenge of the "fruit to be borne" (*Method*, 355) and have weaved into the footnotes here (see note 6 above) some helpful pointers to the successful meeting of the challenge in this millennium and beyond.

diagnosed differently by the divided community; action is ever more at cross-purposes; and the **situation** becomes still messier to provoke still sharper differences in diagnosis and policy, more radical criticism of one another's actions, and an ever deeper crisis in the **situation**.²⁷

I do not want us to get into the **situation** of this piece of Lonergan's reach in *Method of Theology* for the moment. I wish rather for us to focus on a "messy situation diagnosed differently by a divided community." The messy situation is the situation of pages 490 and 491 of *Insight* between pages 489 and 492. The messy situation involves networks of situations and situation rooms: think of the offices of students of Lonergan and of professors of botany, think of classrooms of biochemistry and exam halls, think of wheat fields and rose gardens, seaweed and arctic plants. But now think of your situation as, yes, you open that book to those two pages that begin with the word "fold" and end with a line about being "clarified by an illustration." The question of the two pages is "what is the operator?" of, say, the growing sunflower.²⁸ The messy situation is that both little flowers

²⁷ *Method in Theology*, 358. As noted, the square brackets above contain Lonergan's footnote to the text, with pagination given to the pre-*Collected Works* version of *Insight*. This text has been the focus of my attention in the past decade. For me, it represents Lonergan's frustration as he battled towards ending *Method*. (An anecdote here: when he finished the chapter Lonergan went down the corridor of the sixth floor of the old Bayview Regis and mixed his delight with a groaning about having to face writing an Introduction. Sean McEvenue remarked, "Well, Bernie, why not just write a page?" He went back to the task and wrote the 2 pages xi-xii). I cannot go into the details of the emergence of that last chapter of *Method*; I would hope that Patrick Brown—the master of the area—would provide them gradually. But note a clue: my boldfacing of **situation** in the text. Brown eventually will relate it back to previous occurrences of the word, all the way to the early 1930s. My own work of the last decade has led me to conceive of a massive effective topology of "situation rooms" that would "be a resolute and effective intervention in this historical process." *Phenomenology and Logic*, CWL 18, 306. I was pushed towards that view by thinking of the—providential—8 occurrences of **situation** in the text typed by Lonergan—was there not frustration in his neuromolecules? I move on in the text to muse over one messy situation that can help see my answer to his frustration, but the help towards distant visioning is best left to the footnote hints, notes indicated above in footnote 6.

²⁸ The question was at the origin of my 150-essay *Cantower* series, and thus located as *Cantower 2*, "Sunflowers, Speak to us of Growing." The drive of the series came from Ezra Pound's 117 Cantos.

and the big Field²⁹ suffer because almost the entire readership of those pages “fold” —might I pun saying “many fold” —on the turn of the page from 489. If you turn now the page 491 to 492, you find immediately the “general principle of development that is named the law of effect.”

For our convenience I quote here an identification.

The law of effect is a psychological principle advanced by Edward Thorndike in 1898 on the matter of behavioral conditioning (not then formulated as such) which states that “responses that produce a satisfying effect in a particular situation become more likely to occur again in that situation, and responses that produce a discomforting effect become less likely to occur again in that situation.”³⁰

I am not going into the story of the law, nor the manner in which I wish to modify it: I wish you to take note of the identifications of three “situations” and the possibility of “a discomforting effect” in the present situation. Might I suggest that, perhaps, you comfortably read Bill Zanardi’s overview to his two objectifications in the comfortable manner in which you first read those two pages of *Insight*? That comfortable reading keeps you, so to speak, living planar, not like the weekly displacers of rosebushes in my garden, or wow, my dazzling climbing Virginia creeper.³¹ And there is perhaps little doubt about how botanists at present read the roses and creepers of the garden.³² Nor—I announce it boldly—do any of

²⁹ The third chapter, “*Haute Vulgarization*” of my *Lack in the Beingstalk* ventures into such topics as 3.1 “The Little Flower,” 3.4 “The Field and the Garden,” and 3.5 “The Field, Foreign and Friendly.” The context is “The field is the universe but my horizon defines my universe.” *Phenomenology and Logic*, CWL 18, 199. The deeper issue, I see now, is the mediation of common meaning by Towering apokataphatic contemplation in the positive Anthropocene age.

³⁰ Peter Gray, *Psychology*, Worth, N.Y., sixth edition, 108–9.

³¹ I planted the Virginia creeper two years ago as a twig: what sort of law of effect can explain it now being perhaps a hundred meters long *in toto*?

³² A little first objectification here. My serious interest in biology goes back to 1962, when, in the back seat of theology lectures, I delved into the few biologists with a serious interest in the patterns involved in developmental dynamics. I spent most of my last year in theology writing “*Insight and the Strategy of Biology*” for the 1964 volume *Spirit as Inquiry*. My second option for doctorate work in Oxford was tackling the broad problem of development but I took the easier route that emerged as *Randomness, Statistics, and Emergence*. I return occasionally to the messy goings-on in later years: there is the obvious *Cantower 2*, “Sunflowers, Speak to us of Growing”; contextualizing efforts were *Cantowers*

these operators pose the question “what is the operator?” with regard to themselves.³³

I am here pitching the larger situation of the emergence of the book *Insight* and of its fundamental drive, which was a drive towards a self-luminous genetic control of history. The two pages I point to in this side-exercise are the final arrival of Lonergan at his solitary beginning of that luminous control, the positive bridge between the negative Anthropocene and the positive Anthropocene. Is that not quite clear from the beginning of his section on “Genetic Method”? “To prepare our statement of the integral heuristic structure that we have named metaphysics, attention must now be directed to genetic method.” Is that not lurking in Lonergan’s ingestion of his attention when he wrote the puzzling statement of success to Fred Crowe in the summer of 1954?³⁴

15 and 16 on Gould and Kuhn and “Theology and Botany,” Part One of the website book, *Method in Theology: Revisions and Implementations*. On the issue of the negentropic goings-on, biological studies have not improved but, yes, reached elegant refinements of genomics. See below, note 52, on my initial daft intention to attempt a rescue in line with *Insight* 490–91. Perhaps a brief quotation gives a sufficient impression of the state of shrunken play with biodynamics programs. “DNA thus becomes the repository of genetic information, and development is described in terms of the execution of a program. An influential embryologist like Lewis Wolpert can ask himself if, with more detailed knowledge of the genetic program inscribed in the nucleus of the egg cell, it might not be possible to ‘calculate’ an embryo, in other words to foresee the sequence and unfolding of these processes that will lead to its transformation into an adult.” Alessandro Minelli, *Forms of Becoming. The Evolutionary Biology of Development*, Princeton University Press, 2009, 80. Minelli has his doubts: see note 35.

³³ Read thus, in a self-enlarging fashion, the word *operator* in the first two paragraphs of “Dialectic: The Structure.” The reading of the last paragraph is towards recycling further self-enlargements into gown and town, plains and tower.

³⁴ The letter is discussed in interpretative detail by Patrick Brown in “Interpreting Lonergan’s view of Method in May 1954,” *Seeding Global Collaboration*, edited by Patrick Brown and James Duffy, Axial Publishing, 2016, 45–79. Later I put it in a fuller heuristic context in “Method in Theology: From $[1 + 1/n]^{nx}$ to $\{M(W_3)^{\theta\Phi T}\}^4$,” *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis*, vol. 10, 105–35. Here I am enlarging on aspects of that context, and perhaps now is the time to come clean on the present enterprise.

This is a peculiar type of *Assembly* in that I slip myself into the third objectification without any apparent contribution to the first or second. I could

The Method of Theology is coming into perspective. For the Trinity: Imago Dei in homine and proceed to the limit as in evaluating $[1 + 1/n]^{nx}$ as n approaches infinity. For the rest: ordo universi. From the viewpoint of theology, it is a manifold of unities developing in relation to one another and in relation to God, i.e., metaphysics as I conceive it but plus transcendent knowledge. From the viewpoint of religious experience, it is the same relations as lived in a development from elementary intersubjectivity (cf. Sullivan's basic concept of interpersonal relations) to intersubjectivity in Christ (cf. the endless Pauline [suv- or] sun- compounds) on the sensitive (external Church, sacraments, sacrifice, liturgy) and intellectual levels (faith, hope, charity). Religious experience : Theology : Dogma :: Potency : Form : Act.

What is this $[1 + 1/n]^{nx}$ as n approaches infinity, and how do we evaluate it? Might we not start with the sunflower's molecularity as it climbs from seed to smile, and thus bring the method of botany into perspective? But what, alas, is happening in botany?³⁵ Might we not repeat, with shock but a smile, the message labeled [b] above?

well have added such by picking one of the many pleas I have made over the past decade for a taking serious of Lonergan's challenge of *Insight* Chapter 17, section 3. Add one such in if you like: I do, in note 46 below. I very deliberately ended the *Æcornomics* series with *Æcornomics 17*, "Engineering as Dialectic," an essay that points to a massive shift in the meaning of that chapter and its third section. At some stage that essay, and perhaps the sixty years' ascent behind it, will be recycled through a mature form of this dialectic exercise. When it is I won't be around: let this little ramble be resurrected then to nudge forward the Standard Model of cosmic engineering and care.

³⁵ Stuart Pivar, *On the Origin of Form, Evolution by Self-Organization*, North Atlantic Books, 2009, provides a context. In particular I draw attention to Kathy Hall, Richard Milner, and Stuart Pivar, "Self-Organization vs. Gene Regulation," pp. 81–106. See *id.* at 81 ("the complete decoding of the human genome announced in December 2000 augured a crisis.") LOL: just not decent enough numbers to plot the journey to us adults! Page 87 has a goodly paragraph on Minelli (*The Development of Animal Form*, 2003) and his revamping of questions from Gabriel Dover (*Dear Mr. Darwin: Letters on the Evolution of Life and Human Nature*, Phoenix Press, London, 2000). The paragraph concludes with Dover's bluntness. "There is a naiveté about genetic determinism in both evolution and development that signifies intellectual laziness at best and shameless ignorance at worst when confronted with issues of massive complexity."

[b] One may expect the diligent authors of highly specialized monographs to be somewhat bewildered and dismayed when they find that instead of singly following the bent of their genius, their aptitudes, and their acquired skills, they are to collaborate in the light of common but abstruse principles and to have their individual results checked by general requirements that envisage simultaneously the totality of results. Still, this is the minor resistance, and it should cause no greater difficulty in the field of interpretation than its analogue does in physics.³⁶

Neither the authors in botany nor the authors in theology are dismayed. The two groups, in the main, “fold” into a reduced law of effect, like Pavlov’s dogs.³⁷ And, alas, there are the groups between that are the topic of Lonergan’s climb to the end of Chapter 15 of *Insight*. And yes, there are the groups below, and the surround of commonsense philosophies.³⁸

³⁶ *Insight*, CWL 3, at 604.

³⁷ “Pavlov explored the physiology of association—and the distinction between conditioned reflexes and cortical associations—by tying Narbutovich and Podkopaev’s trials to the classical puzzle-box experiments of American psychologist Robert Thorndyke.” Daniel P. Todes, *Ivan Pavlov: A Russian Life in Science* (Oxford University Press, 2014, 617). The next pages relate Thorndyke’s “Law of Effect” to Pavlov’s own views and go on to brief pointers re other developments. I have to presume that you sense how my pointers are in an altogether different viewing of “effect,” indeed they tune into Lonergan’s reflections on both “natural resultance” (*Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, CWL 2, 145–47) and “exigence” (CWL 18, *Phenomenology and Logic*, 348–51; 354–55). We are on the edge of the mystery of human minding’s yes! (see the end of the quotation at my second-last footnote) to the “absolutely supernatural” (*Insight*, 747) that I tie in with Lonergan’s mad “yes” to *Isaiah* 2:2–4. “Is this to be taken literally or is it figure? It would be fair and fine, indeed, to think it no figure.” “Essay in Fundamental Sociology,” 44. One must replace Pavlov’s dog with McShane’s butterfly of Chapter 15, “Systematics and the Elements of Metaphysics,” in *The Allure of The Compelling Genius of History*. “There the butterfly flew / away over the bright water, / and the boy flew after it” (quoted *id.*, p. 175 from Hermann Hesse). How can we aid the Spirit in getting boys and girls dogging Lonergan to so fly towards the tenth millennium and beyond?

³⁸ By the groups below I mean the fields of logic, mathematic, physics, and chemistry. Common sense philosophies are the order of the day. Might I not simply refer to Lonergan’s lectures on logic and existentialism that appear in CWL 18, *Phenomenology and Logic*, as a representative of reflection on both zones? Add his reflections on the genetic grip on mathematics in *Early Works on*

Dealing with this loose spectrum of groups—we continue now into a focus on the second objectification as it is lifted into and by the third—requires the massive shift lurking in Lonergan’s seedy claim, “Theology possesses a twofold relevance to empirical human science.”³⁹ Seedy? Positively, there is the hope of seeding, but negatively, yes, it is a seedy hope at present. Might you pause again over the quotation from the final chapter of *Method in Theology*? Bill and I hope that it not be a repeat reading, a “fold”ing in of the twofold relevance à la the shrunken law of effect. We are both thinking of the effective nudging of those in the subset of situation rooms that is the world of Lonergan studies. We are thinking in a mad Dionysian fashion of a toning up of all the solitary and communal meetings with Lonergan. Might you smile over the notion of effective mouth to mouth resuscitation?⁴⁰

The subset is a small zone of “this historical process.”⁴¹ But might it not—indeed it will!⁴²—flame up out of it shocking ineffective pettiness? Perhaps, perhaps, with you, now, I hope, strangely willing to enter the Interior Lighthouse⁴³ and assemble and self-objectify objectively

Theological Method 2, CWL 23, “Understanding and Method,” 175–77. Recall note 3 above.

³⁹ *Insight*, CWL 3, at 766, line 29.

⁴⁰ I think now of my sing-along with Robin Gibb, *Æconomics 6*: “I Started a Joke.” How can we shift the shrunken law of effect in Lonergan studies? “If you think that the Sun and the Ocean / Can pass through that tiny opening / Called the mouth, / O someone should start laughing! / Someone should start wildly Laughing—Now!” Hafiz, “Someone Should Start Laughing,” p. 23 of the book cited in the final footnote below.

⁴¹ I refer regularly to the key challenge on *Phenomenology and Logic*, CWL 18, 306. “In so far as there is to be a resolute and effective intervention in this historical process, one has to postulate that the existential gap must be closed.”

⁴² See the quotation from Joyce at my second last footnote.

⁴³ I repeat note 41 of “The Coming Convergence of World Responsiveness,” *Divyadaan 30* (2019). *HOW 13*, “The Interior Lighthouse” introduced the topic, *Interior Lighthouse*, under that title. *Disputing Quests 12*, “The Interior Lighthouse II” continued the reflection, as did *Disputing Quests 13*, “The Interior Lighthouse Zero”. Those essays were followed by *Interpretation 4*, “The Interior Lighthouse III,” *Interpretation 16*, “The Interior Lighthouse IV: Twenty Seventh Lea,” and *Interpretation 17*, “The Interior Lighthouse V: Interpreting God”. The topic, however, goes back to *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minds* (1989) and the broad challenge is made explicit in the five essays, *Prehumous 4–8*, on “Foundational Prayer”. It is the heart of the matter in my recent book, *The*

Allure of the Compelling Genius of History. The drive of that series was towards an appreciation of the need for a contemplative ingestion of *Insight* if we are to arrive at a sub-population competent "Tower-wise" "to be a resolute and effective intervention in the historical process." *Phenomenology and Logic*, CWL 18, 306.

Lonergan's identification of that flame's "spooky"⁴⁴ "InWithTo"?⁴⁵

Charity is an eternal fire of optimism and energy, dismayed at naught, rebuked by none, tireless, determined, deliberate; with deepest thought and unbounded spontaneity charity ever strives, struggles, labours, implores, prays for the betterment of the unity of action of man, for the effective rule of sweetness and light, for the fuller manifestation of what charity loves, Wisdom Divine, the Word made Flesh.⁴⁶

We have arrived at a glimpse of the fullest law of effect, effective in its incarnation of an increasingly luminous and self-luminous genetics of finitude's "terminal value"⁴⁷ in which "errors, rationalizations, ideologies **fall and shatter** to leave one open to things as they are and to man as he should be."⁴⁸

But the openness, especially in its initial axial or pre-positive Anthropocene struggle, must grapple towards seeding countervailing

⁴⁴ "Mission and the Spirit," in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 25. The article is a relevant context. But I would note the context also of a self-luminous grip on the meaning of analogy as affirmation, negation, and eminence: something of deep practical importance in the ventures mentioned in the two bracketing footnotes here: the Lighthouse pilgrim journey to be InWithTo the Daring; Darlingⁱ Darkling^k Divine, G^jk. The spooky becomes a luminous and self-luminous darkness and, twinklingly, "the earth and every common sight take on the glory and the freshness of a dream." *Insight*, 556.

⁴⁵ *InWithTo* names the goal of a luminous self-explanatory climb beyond the descriptive indications of section 6, *The Triune God: Systematics*, CWL 12. A lead on the matter could be the quaint frontispiece I put to the essay, *Disputing Quests 10*, "Paul's Epistles and Functional Systematics": "In the Garden of Jesus, not a new or second Adam: an InWithTo new creation that yet was there, Bigbang Class-ping. Now in Your garden, Guarding, Double Big-Banged, I tune thornily — and tend and guard and bind and greet." It raises the thorny issue of a massive lift of scripture studies in all religions into the genetic poise that is the issue of this essay.

⁴⁶ "Essay on Fundamental Sociology," 43.

⁴⁷ In the spread of words on *Method in Theology*, 48. I would have you note the enriching heuristics of Chapter 2 of *Topics in Education*, CWL 10. So, for instance, one must come to grips with the mad "Dionysian" (*Topics in Education*, 40) dynamic of the third line in the subjects of that spread of words.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 52: boldface, mine.

symbolizations to all symbolizations of ideologies and disciplines and the symbolizations of their victim domains.⁴⁹ Such seeding is a massive task to be undertaken within each discipline by persons risen up in “a level of the times” standard model of theology that sublates the warped model of the discipline involved. A vague impression of such an effort can only be skimpily sketched in the process here of imagining and imaging how “positions are developed and counterpositions are reversed.”⁵⁰ The full result would be the core of the fruit of this final objectification of horizons, a pointing of the way towards grounding adequately the integrity of the push forward in botany focused on in *Insight* 489–92, and the push forward in theology identified as the solution to the problem indicated in *Insight* 763–64. The challenge is the luminous symbolic underpinning of the operative notion of thing that is the discomforting leap of Chapter 8 of

⁴⁹ My challenge here is to point you towards a distant meaning of this sentence. I was pointed towards it by my work of the past few years on the active convergence of religious people that I identify in footnote 53. Gradually the effort led me to pause for months over the frail claim of Lonergan “theology possesses ... relevance” (*Insight*, 766, line 29). I might start you thinking—indeed thinking of the effective details of the engineering of progress—by bluntly asserting that theology does not possess relevance nor does it show signs of ever possessing relevance. Might I tease you by saying it never “will” (see the conclusion of the quotation below at note 60)?

The project of the sentence above in the text is a massive Dionysian flexing challenge of the next century—ass-kicked by the Spirit’s weaving feeble willing round the global problems of climate and inequalities. On page 355 of the final chapter of *Method in Theology* Lonergan symbolizes the large task by referring to the volumes of *Handbuch der Pastoraltheologie*. Might I suggest that my parallel symbolism is that of the reference to *Schaum’s Outlines* in notes 51 and 56? But you are hardly going to rush to find that book. You might, though, be able to get your hands on some heavy survey of social theories, one that gives ample diagrammatization of theoretics and their applications. But perhaps you are up to flexing your imagination round my “situation room” imaging. The flexing is within the life-long contemplative Interior Lighthouse ascent: reach for some grip on the loose aggregate of spectrums of rooms on the globe, and the challenge of making each of them, in the remaining millennia of humanity, “a habitat” (*Insight*, 498, line 11) for “infinite craving” (*Collection*, CWL 4, 49, line 17). There are the rooms of village corners and megalopolitan domains, yes: but think also of stranger rooms: marine, submarine, sky spaces, star treks.

⁵⁰ *Method in Theology*, 250. The concluding words of “Dialectic: the Structure.”

Insight.⁵¹ The genetics of both sunflower and Sonflower have to be thus effectively conceived symbolically in their slimly-analogous concrete complexities through a fresh, heavily-discontinuous foundational effort, and cycled millennially into all situation rooms and cells.

With that abrupt peek at the peak,⁵² backed by the previous footnote, it seems best to cut back my third objectification to a helpful pointing to my own assembly efforts regarding that heuristic of situation rooms and cells.

⁵¹ An initial foolishness led me to think of treating this problem compactly in this little essay. I would have taken, for example, the most recent edition of Schaum's Outlines: *Biochemistry*, McGraw Hill, (mine is 2009), a 500 page text, and attempted abundant "illustration" (I recall relevantly the last line of *Insight* 491) of the drive into the huge task of bringing the heuristic notion of the notion of the thing (*Insight*, Chapter 8) into the human and floral operators: both unities-identities-wholes thus lifted into a refined explanatory dynamic of—let me designate them as "molecular negentropic disturbers." It is a help here to return to my early listing of Zanardi's voluminous efforts (note 5 above) regarding a genetic poise in interpretation. How many volumes might it take to lift treatments of the triggers of plant dynamics into the more complex unity-identity-wholeness of holding self and plant in such a heuristic *Praxisweltanschauung*? Here we are up against a core problem of the second and third objectifications in Dialectic. What advice can we give to those committed to pushing forward foundational fantasy, of, for example replacing a mythic information theory of genes by a sequential appreciation of the sunflower's sequential dance—not to mention the minding dance of the sunflower student and the gardener or even the Proustian passerby?

⁵² Think of the long climb needed even to fill out the sketch of the task. There is, within the 'natural' push of *Insight*, the shocking climb to come to grips with the real meaning of *energy* (it took me forty years: see the section on the *Insight* treatment [468–69] in Pierrot Lambert and Philip McShane, *Bernard Lonergan: His Life and Leading Ideas*, Axial Publishing, 2010, 178–88. Then there is Lonergan's push regarding the supernatural, *Early Latin Theology*, CWL 19, "The Supernatural Order," 253–255.

The key element in that pointing—I am poised over global Faith and its spectrum of beliefs⁵³—is the long-distance optimism⁵⁴ that is to be ontically and phyletically⁵⁵ weaved into the engineering of progress.⁵⁶ Faith

⁵³ More concretely, I poise you over the venture of my five articles in *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy & Education*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2019) where, starting from Whitson's *Coming Convergence of World Religions*, I developed the notion of an active effective convergence that is summed up in the sentence about which I commented in note 49 above. I still have copies of that volume, if you are interested in having it; or I can send an e-copy.

⁵⁴ The long-term optimism was an element in Lonergan's view of emergent probability in *Insight*, but the ethos of present theology was a discouragement. In the interviews that were later published in *Caring for Meaning* he mentions my nudgings towards thinking long-term but these mentions were edited out. See *The Redress of Poise*, page 78.

⁵⁵ Recall note 21 and pause again over the challenge expressed in notes 44–46, qualified by the pointers of the previous note. In this century there may well be a notional ascent regarding the climb, or even the occasional evolutionary sport of a real ascent. But the culture of apokataphatic life-climbing is indeed something of a long-distance optimism. I would note usefully, that in such a simple science as physics one can weave up through a doctorate leaning on talents of notional ascent. *Haute vulgarization* can be brilliantly eloquent in relatively initial meanings.

⁵⁶ Perhaps now is the time to pause over the title to this essay, "Assembling the Science of Interpretation," and sense the nudge towards viewing the cycle of 8 or 9 interpretative groups as a towering effort to engineer progress?

When I began talking and writing about engineering as the missed road of "bolder spirits" (*Method*, 3) I had not heard of conceptual engineering (see, e.g. Herman Cappelen, *Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering*, Oxford University Press, 2018) and would note that it too shall be weaved into the full enterprise touched on by Bill Zanardi, but it is not a priority. This issue of priority is itself an important piece of the Gracefully cunning effort to engineer progress. It could be a help here to dig into the analogy that we get by considering "Schaum's Outlines" introduced in note 51. There it is not a matter of tackling details but e.g. on entering the fray from that paragraph on *Insight* 489 on which I wrote 41 rambling essays. So, one starts from the vague descriptiveness of dynamic sunflower unities and sub-unities, and moves forward in that descriptiveness to see about tending a battered sunflower. Follow the analogy in musing over the battered Sunflower sown in the biased soil of the Roman Empire and badly twisted as a result a short 2000 years later. What moves to make and in what order? The question is a foundational question seeking for a cyclic lift of Luke 16:8, "The children of this world ..." —some of

in them needs to rise—I risk writing “to Molly-Bloom,” thus appealing to the Dublin *Ulysses* that represents all village heroes and heroines⁵⁷—putting arms around their particular Faith, him or her or pantheon,⁵⁸ in a rising symbolized by a Dublin statue,⁵⁹ answering the Isaian appeal of the following question—the question of following!—with pragmatic vigor: “Do you view humanity as possibly maturing—in some serious way—or just messing along between good and evil, whatever you think they are?” Might you face that question, alone in your objectifications or dodging of them, and let lips burst out from the kiss of being, mollycules blooming in saying something like the following?

how he kissed me under a Moorish wall and I thought well as well him
as another and then I asked him with my eyes to ask again yes and then
he asked me would I yes to say yes my mountain flower and first I put
my arms around him yes and drew him down to me so he could feel
my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I
said yes I will Yes.⁶⁰

“Would you think it odd if Hafiz said,

‘I am in love with every church
And mosque
And temple
And any kind of shrine

whom rule in Rome and Oxford—in order to cunningly rescue our battered axial humanity.

⁵⁷ I am thinking now, my dear possible heroine or hero, of that wild essay I wrote in Dublin in 2004, after that very unsuccessful Toronto gather for a 100th anniversary. The essay is a broad *Assembly*, *Quodlibet 8*: “The Dialectic of My Town, *Ma Vlast*,” where you and I can meet, musing over the complex of layered situations that is our respective neighborhood, village, town. I would note, at this late stage in this third *Assembly*, the odd discomfort of my presence here. It intimates such discomfort at mature Dialectic gatherings: someone pushing ahead can turn up and really rock the boat—think of Einstein in 1904.

⁵⁸ Recall *Insight*, 691, “In the twenty-sixth place, God is personal.” The twenty seventh question of Thomas’ *Summa Theologica* lifts us to the world of the tripersonal Christian God. Other religions can climb to the God of the 26th place, a God beyond the described God of Abraham or the philosophers: the road could be the book of common prayer that is *Insight*.

⁵⁹ See the image at the conclusion to *Quodlibet 8* and the comments there.

⁶⁰ The final words of James Joyce’s *Ulysses*.

Because I know it is there
That people say the different names
Of the One God.'

Would you tell your friends
I was a bit strange if I admitted
I am indeed in love with every mind
And heart and body.

O I am sincerely
Plumb crazy
About your every thought and yearning
And limb

Because, my dear,
I know
That it is through these
That you search for Him."⁶¹

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⁶¹ The Hafiz poem titled, "Would You Think It Odd?" found on page 15 of Daniel Ladinsky's *I Heard God Laughing: Poems of Hope and Joy*, Penguin, 2006.

