

THE FRAGMENTED SELF/SUBJECT

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The existential gap consists in the fact that the reality of the subject lies beyond his own horizon.¹

Dr McShane's discussion paper drew my attention to the theme of fragmentation. There is the fragmentation in our sense of our known worlds brought about by the relentless explosion of change in our collective knowledge and the related life styles which it necessitates.² There is also the fragmentation in our sense of ourselves which will be our present concern. In Chapter 15 of *After Virtue*, entitled "The Virtues, The Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition," Alasdair Macintyre comments on the manner in which modernity partitions a human life:

So work is divided from leisure, private life from public, the corporate from the personal. So both childhood and old age have been wrenched away from the rest of human life and made over into distinct realms. And all these separations have been achieved so that it is the distinctiveness of each and not the unity of the life of the individual who passes through those parts in terms of which we are taught to think

¹ *CWL 18*, 281.

² Lonergan's major writings, being concerned with frameworks for collaborative creativity, are in a sense antidotes to fragmentation. The metaphysics of *Insight* can be interpreted as attempt to articulate the creative framework within which a scientific community operates. *Method in Theology* does the same for the theological community, *An Essay in Circulation Analysis* for the economic community.

and feel.³

A good deal of modern experience and thought has, for him, made our sense of the unity of a human life almost invisible. MacIntyre is against the tendency to think atomistically about human actions and conversations. He poses the question, how do actions and conversations add up or cohere in the unity of a human life? In this he is following the line of thought of Nietzsche and Foucault that the self is not something that is fixed but rather something that is constantly in the process of becoming.⁴ Translating MacIntyre's question we can ask: how might questions, insights, formulations, judgements, and decisions add up, cohere, and shape the form and identity of the self in time? It is a question which I believe students of Lonergan need to address.

I

A first window on the problem will be opened up by assembling a textual phantasm or image of the kind of remarks that Lonergan has made about the self and subject at different times in his life. Published in 1943, "Finality, Love, Marriage," with its acknowledgement that marriage involves the full realization of the existence of another self, hints at the question of the self and the other.⁵ In his notes for his course on Intelligence and Reality in 1951 the term self-affirmation occurs, possibly for the first time. Without self-knowledge, Lonergan suggests that the subject can become a self-regarding centre capable of ecstatic devotion to a person or a cause.⁶

In Lonergan's opening remarks on the self in Chapter 11 of *Insight*, written close to the start of the process of composing the autograph, the emphasis is on unity: "By the self is meant a concrete and intelligible unity-identity-whole."⁷

³ *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London: Duckworth, 1985), 204.

⁴ James Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault* (London: Flamingo, 1994), 69.

⁵ *CWL 4*, 33.

⁶ "Intelligence and Reality," Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto, Library Reference 131.5, 29, para 2.

⁷ *CWL 3*, 343.

That unity is for him a fundamental given: "What is meant is that a single agent is involved in many acts, that it is an abstraction to speak of the acts as conscious, that, concretely, consciousness pertains to the acting agent."⁸ What, he asks, does he mean by 'I'? He suggests that without formulation he knows very well what is meant and accordingly finds fault with various formulations. For him 'I' has a rudimentary meaning from consciousness. Consciousness is an awareness, not of known objects in the world but of the cognitional acts of the self, experiencing, questioning, understanding, and judging, which make those objects present. Such conscious acts or operations cannot be found in our known world. But this in turn poses the question: how, without insight and formulation, can we know the meaning of something? Is there not a need at this point to think about the cognitional self as characterised by an intellectual history, as incarnated in a tradition, and as engaged in a quest to know that is specific to each individual?

A further series of contexts for treating the self and subject follow. Chapter 4 of *Insight* deals with the relation between the theoretical knower and the known world of emergent probability.⁹ That knower is characterised by classical and statistical types of questioning, insights and judgements. The correlative known world is constituted by an emergent probability. Chapters 6-7 introduce the dialectically developing commonsense subject with its patterns of experience and the commonsense world that he or she engages with. If the cognitional self is defined in terms of conscious cognitional operations, the subject is defined in terms of its world, or later, horizon.

Somewhat tacitly chapter 14 of *Insight* introduces the dialectically developing philosophical self followed, in chapter 15, by the developmental self constituted by the operators and integrators to be determined by genetic method. Chapter 18 enlarges the field of consciousness from the cognitional to the ethical self. The last two chapters point towards a further

⁸ *CWL 3*, 350. This passage poses the question as to whether the self is a basic unity or a part of the wider unity of the agent, human being or person.

⁹ *CWL 3*, 128f., 138.

enlargement of the self into the realms of religion.

At the end of this itinerary one is left with the question, how do all of these aspects of the self pertain to its unity? As a unity is made up of parts the question arises, what are the parts of the self and the manner of their relation to the whole? How is self affirmation a part of the self? What implications does it have for the life of the self? Related is the distinction between the questions, what is happening when I am knowing something, and who knows? That second question is concerned with the manner in which a particular individual, through engaging with the questions of their life, comes to know certain facts and in so doing becomes the one who knows them. The specific questions and insights that an individual pursues constitutes their intellectual identity, makes them who they are.

Some of Lonergan's most sustained reflections on the meaning of 'I' and consciousness come in his *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, written in 1955/6 after *Insight* was completed but before it was published. There he seems to hold that the human person rather than some intellectual self is the ultimate subject of attribution. 'I' may refer to this person who I am and be filled out in terms of events I experience in the world with little reference to consciousness. 'I' may be taken to refer to conscious experiences of this person who I am and may be filled out with no reference to situations in the world.¹⁰

In 1957, shortly after writing *Insight*, Lonergan gave a course of lectures in Boston on Mathematical Logic and Existentialism. In them the notion of the subject and related categories, horizon, conversion and dread, rather than the self are more to the front. On the question of the unity of the subject we find him asking: "What is oneself? The oneself is the irreducibly individual element whence springs the choices of the decisive person and the drifting or forgetting of the

¹⁰ *CWL* 7, part 5, sections 2 and 3, 169-189. Lonergan offers five rather complex meanings of the referent of 'I'. He also addresses the question, what does 'I' refer to in Christ's statement: "Before Abraham was, I am."

indecisive person.”¹¹ He also defines the existential gap as the fact that the reality of the subject lies beyond his own horizon.¹²

In his 1958 lectures on *Insight* in Halifax the question of the unity of the self is again addressed:

Is there an ‘I’? Is the unity that perceives, understands, and judges merely a postulate, or are my insights into my sensible presentations, and is the rationality of my judgement dependent upon my insights and my experiences? Is there the one subject, not in the sense of finding the concepts, one subject, in oneself, but in the sense of finding in myself somebody at home, presence of the third type, that is intelligent and rational and performs activities that are described in this way... First of all, then, the unity is given.¹³

In 1959 in Xavier Cincinnati there followed his lectures on the Philosophy of Education.¹⁴ Central is the notion of the developing subject which is treated in the context of Piaget and the crisis of adolescence, of art, and the human good. Reference is also made to the scientific, philosophical, and moral development of the subject. In his treatment of development Lonergan poses the question, who is to be a man? There is involved here a transition in his thinking from the human being as substance to the human being as a conscious subject, as Dasein. The latter is characterised by a flow of consciousness, a structured unity which has a fundamental autonomy. The concrete existence of the subject involves concerns, a horizon and differentiation of horizons, and world. In the treatment of art and the developing subject there is a reference to differentiated consciousness as a stage in a development of the individual: “What one returns to is the concrete functioning whole. Organic function and organic

¹¹ *CWL 18*, 240.

¹² *CWL 18*, 281.

¹³ *CWL 5*, 140.

¹⁴ *CWL 10*.

interrelation.”¹⁵ Again we are left with the question about the relation between the concrete functioning whole and its parts.

In May 1961 Lonergan gave a course of lectures in University College Dublin entitled “Critical Realism and the Integration of the Sciences.”¹⁶ After introducing his notion of cognitional structure and its objectivity he began an analysis of the notions of subject, object, and presence. The fifth lecture found him comparing two types of subject, the spontaneous and the theoretic who have two quite different apprehensions of the world and distinct languages. There results two societies, the common sense and the theoretic. Lonergan next goes on to add the reflective structure of consciousness by means of which the subject comes to objectify and know both the common sense and the theoretic subject. This critical subject is also concerned with the transcultural: “To conceive the critical subject as bringing to one's mind the point where one's thinking is transcultural and historical does not arise within the field of theory, which is simply a matter of setting out objects.”¹⁷

The sixth lecture introduces the question of the existential subject, what am I to be? Am I to be a spontaneous, theoretical, or critical subject? Involved in going beyond the horizon of the spontaneous and theoretic subjects is a personal development that masters the differences between them: “The existential question is a question that is answered by a conversion, a purification, by a revolution, call it what you please, but what is meant is a development. And the lack of that development is what accounts for the decadence of the philosophical and scientific schools.”¹⁸ What is emerging here is the suggestion that self-appropriation is not simply a truth to be pursued but rather a foundational decision about the kind of subject one wants to be. This leads to a summing up of his realism:

Now I have described six types of realism, the realism of the spontaneous subject, who knows wolves and

¹⁵ *CWL 10*, 209.

¹⁶ A typescript of sections of the lectures is available in the Dublin Lonergan Centre. Page references are to that typescript.

¹⁷ Typescript, 42.

¹⁸ Typescript, 44.

bears, the realism of the theoretic subject who apprehends the same reality through theory, the realism of the critical subject who finds a basis both for the spontaneously known world and the theoretically known word, the realism implicit in the word of God, in the gospels and in the teaching of the Church, the realism implicit in dogmatic theology and finally, the realism that may be detached from theology, and that realism has as its fundamental point the equation between true judgment and reality.... But there is another realism called mythic realism. It starts off symbolically. The symbol is an affect laden image that conveys a meaning and mediates an apprehension of value. So realism is apprehended as a value, a choice or decision.¹⁹

Lonergan's later work in 1969, "The Subject," discusses the Neglected, Truncated, Immanentist, Existential and Alienated Subject but not the unity of the subject.²⁰

In *Method in Theology* (1972) there is a treatment of autobiography and biography as a preface to the problem of historical knowledge, his main concern:

There has emerged a new organization that distinguishes periods by broad differences in one's mode of living, in one's dominant concern, in one's tasks and problems, and in each period distinguishes contexts, that is, nests of questions and answers bearing on distinct but related topics. The periods determine the sections, the topics determine the chapters of one's autobiography. ... Biography aims at much the same goal but has to follow a different route. The autobiographer recounts what "I saw, heard, remembered, anticipated, imagined, felt, gathered, judged, decided, did..." In the biography, statements shift to the third person.²¹

What is significant from our present perspectives is that

¹⁹ Typescript, 48-50.

²⁰ *2 Coll*, 69-86.

²¹ *Method*, 183.

Lonergan does not seem to link the autobiographical or biographical projects with the projects of understanding the unity of the self. Many others, as we shall see, have taken that move.

In his lectures on *Philosophy of God and Theology* (1973) we find him using the term person rather than self or subject:

The contemporary view (of person) comes out of genetic biology and psychology. From the “we” of the parents and the symbiosis of mother and child comes the “we” of the family. Within the “we” of the family emerges the ‘I’ of the child. In other words the person is not the primordial fact. What is primordial is the community. It is within community through the intersubjective relations that are the life of community that there arises the differentiation of the individual person.

It follows that “person” is never a general term. It always denotes this or that person with all of his or her individual characteristics resulting from the communities in which he had lived and through which he had been formed and had formed himself. The person is the resultant of the relationships he has had with others and of the capacities that have developed in him to relate to others.²²

The strong emphasis here on intersubjectivity is notable.

Although Lonergan never expressed a view on the temporal shape or form of intellectual desire and was guarded about discussing his life, he did make a number of informal observations about the life process. He suggests that “Imagination will give you the big leads in your life.”²³ His reading of authors such as Stewart on Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Toynbee, Schumpeter, Snell and later Voegelin opened up his imagination in a way that gave birth to

²² *Philosophy of God and Theology* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1973) 59.

²³ *The Question as Commitment, A Symposium*, edited by Elanne Cahn and Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers/77, 1977), 110, also 19.

significant questions. Lonergan also recognised that although the unfolding of a life or a work cannot be planned, a direction is unfolding in it. Only after it has been in process for some time with maturity can it be recognised: “You know about it, eh? You come to know about it.”²⁴ He also acknowledges that one can cooperate or not with the direction: “Part of it is the golden cord you have to cooperate with or nothing happens. Part is the chain that jerks; if you pay too much attention to that you are just upset and wasting your time.”²⁵

In a related discussion about the way questions form in our lives Lonergan remarked that there was involved two stages. The first opened up the big questions that could occupy one for a lifetime, the second brings to light the subordinate questions which illuminate the big questions.²⁶ By temperament he needed big questions which would occupy him for long periods, even most of his life. The manner of the interaction of the big questions and their subordinate parts is of the form of a story, a narrative in which there is disclosed the who of the questioner. On an occasion in his later years in Boston when he was trying, unsuccessfully, to convince Harvey Egan about the significance of Progoff he commented that he had simply followed his own dynatype. In 1980 he restated this point:

The cognotypes are symbols. The dynatypes are the root of the life-styles to which we are attracted, in which we excel, with which we find ourselves most easily content. By the dynatypes our vital energies are programmed; by the cognotypes they are released.²⁷

Towards the end of his life he is stating that his imagination,

²⁴ *Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Pierrot Lambert, Charlotte Tansey and Cathleen Going (Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers/82, 1982) [hereafter *CAM*], 147. See also 95, 146-7, 198-9, 22-3.

²⁵ *CAM*, 147. For a discussion of the golden thread see Eric Voegelin, *Plato* (Louisiana: Louisiana State UP, 1981), 232 ff.

²⁶ *The Question as Commitment*, 9. This seems as close as he gets to affirming the significance of intellectual desire for an understanding of a life.

²⁷ “Reality, Myth, Symbol,” in *Myth, Symbol and Reality* Ed. A.M. Olson (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 37.

through symbolic cognotypes, led his pure desire to know, his dynatype, on its quest into the unknown.

A survey of the Lonergan texts on the self and subject leave us with questions about his understanding of the relationship between the parts and the unity of the self.²⁸ How our questions, insights, judgements, and decisions, how our horizons of common sense, theory, and interiority, our intellectual, moral, and religious conversions constitute the parts of that unity, remains to be worked out.

II

The question of the unity of the self has been widely discussed by philosophers in recent years. For present purposes I will offer a sample of the considerations of five, Hannah Arendt, Adriano Cavarero, Stephen Crites, Simone de Beauvoir, and Alasdair MacIntyre.

After discussing labour and work, Hannah Arendt opens chapter V of her 1958 work, *The Human Condition* with perceptive remarks on the human significance of speech and action.²⁹ It is through their actions and conversation that human beings become present to each other as human rather than as physical objects; show, not what, but who they are to the others who are present in their world. Out of this web of human actions and relationships stories emerge. In a passage in her lecture, 'Labor, Work, Action,' delivered on November 10, 1964, she brings sharply into focus what that means:

It is because of this existing web of human relationships with its conflicting wills and intentions, that action almost never achieves its purpose. And it is also because of this medium and the attending unpredictability that action always produces stories, with or without intention, as naturally as fabrication produces tangible things. These stories may then be recorded in documents and monuments, they may be told in poetry ... They tell us more about their subjects, the "hero" ... and yet they are not products

²⁸ The survey is necessarily minimalist. It is necessary to read each of the passages quoted in its proper context in the basic texts.

²⁹ *The Human Condition* (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1958), 175.

properly speaking. Although everybody starts his own story, at least his own life-story, nobody is the author or producer of it. And yet, it is precisely in these stories that the actual meaning of a human life finally reveals itself.³⁰

The accumulation of human actions produces an implicit story. For Arendt the fullness of the meaning of a human life is given, not in the labour of our bodies or in the works of our hands, but in the manner in which our actions add up in time to form a story. It is a somewhat startling claim.

Adriano Cavarero, drawing on Arendt, opens her *Relating Narratives, Storytelling and Selfhood* with a reflection on Karen Blixen's story of the stork.³¹ One night a man was awakened by a loud noise which seemed to come from the direction of a nearby pond. In the darkness, guided by the noise, he ran around and around until eventually he discovered a leak in the dike from which fish and water were escaping. He responded to the problem and when the leak was repaired returned to his bed. The next morning when he awoke he was surprised to discover, on looking out the window, that his feet had traced the pattern of a stork. At this point Karen Blixen asks herself: 'When the design of my life is complete, will I see, or will others see a stork?' Involved is the suggestion that the actions and conversations in our lives are not arbitrary but in a sense compose a design which is of the form of a story.

In her reflection on the story Cavarero makes a number of important points. Firstly, the design is not something one could self-consciously set out to live, rather it is left behind after the life has been lived. Secondly, the design has a story form. Thirdly, it is one thing to live the design; it is another to recognise it. Because of this there is such a thing as the narrative gap, the gap between the subject's notion or sense of the design in their life and the reality of who they are. It is only by writing one's autobiography or by someone else writing one's biography that in fact, existentially, that gap can be

³⁰ *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, ed. Peter Baehr (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 180.

³¹ *Relating Narratives, Storytelling and Selfhood* (London: Routledge, 1997), 1-4.

overcome. Narrating the story answers the question, who am I?

Stephen Crite's essay, "The Narrative Quality of Experience" addresses a different but related point, namely the tense structure of consciousness.³² Augustine in the *Confessions* pondered the manner of the interrelation of the past, present, and the future at every point in time in a human lifetime. Consciousness, for Augustine, "anticipates and attends and remembers, so that what it anticipates passes through what it attends into what it remembers."³³ It follows for Crites that the temporal structure of consciousness could never be a chronicle of actions or of questions and insights. Discussing the implications of this tense structure of the past, present, and future he concludes:

I want to suggest that the inner form of any possible experience is determined by the union of these three distinct modalities in every moment of experience. I want further to suggest that the tensed unity of these modalities requires narrative forms both for its expression (mundane stories) and for its own sense of the meaning of its internal coherence (sacred stories). For this tensed unity has already an incipient narrative form.³⁴

For Crites our understanding of the unity of consciousness in time will be in terms of a narrative insight. If this is the case there must be qualities of consciousness whose tense structure is narrative in order to make this possible. Obvious candidates would be the transcendental notions, the pure desire to know, and the desire for the good and values. The tense structure of problem solving is such that as it unfolds it presently unites the now past inspiration of the problem with a future anticipated solution. Through the natural operation of that activity an intellectual story of the problem solving comes to be written in the life but not yet read.

According to Jo-Ann Pilardi, Simone de Beauvoir in her autobiographical writings began to make her own life a

³² *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 39 (1971): 291-311.

³³ *Confessions* XI: xxvii

³⁴ Crites, op. cit., 303-4.

philosophical text: “The fifty two year old narrator, being both narrator and protagonist, insists that the only way to an understanding of the self is through the story of the life of the self, a ‘personal account’ of the autobiographer.”³⁵ Her life is an object; her self-life-writing is a description of that object. Tacitly it involves appropriating the design of one’s life, who one is.

There are parallels and differences in Lonergan’s exercise in self-affirmation. It does involve making one’s own intellectual life as it is involved in empirical science, common sense and later, scholarship, a philosophical resource. In so doing Lonergan’s concern is with enabling us to master the structure of what it is that is happening when someone is knowing something in the world. He differs from de Beauvoir in that he does not make the wider intellectual autobiography the text for self-affirmation. Making that further move makes more readily accessible the question of the unity of the self.

Alasdair MacIntyre’s remarks on fragmentation and attempts to think atomistically about human actions have been noted. Like Arendt he too asks the question, who acts and converses? He answers: “Narrative history of a certain kind turns out to be the basic and essential genre for the characterisation of human action.”³⁶ His discussion of the context of conversations leads him to conclude: “I am presenting both conversations in particular and human actions in general as enacted narratives.”³⁷ Addressing his basic question of the unity of a human life he continues:

It is now possible to return to the question from which this enquiry into the nature of human action and identity started: in what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer is that its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask what is the good for me is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion..... The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest.

³⁵ *Simone de Beauvoir, Writing the Self, Philosophy Becomes Autobiography* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 1999), 110-111.

³⁶ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 208

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 211.

..... A quest is always an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self knowledge.³⁸

In this MacIntyre is suggesting that in some sense an individual co-operates with the unplanned design that is emerging in their lives. The question arises, in what sense do we have ethical responsibilities for the narrative dimension of our lives?

III

As Arendt and MacIntyre posed questions about the manner in which actions and conversations accumulate within the unity of a life, students of Lonergan need to do the same for intellectual, ethical, and religious activities. Do our insights accumulate after the fashion of a chronicle or a story? Are the series of questions we pose and the related insights, judgements, and decisions we make so many isolated atoms of cognitional activity and knowledge or, from the perspective of the lifetime, can we discover an emerging design in our intellectual, ethical, and religious life, a story? Is it the case that cognitional activity constitutes our personal identity just as much as it constitutes our relation with the known world? How does intellectual, ethical, and religious activity add up in a life time?

Two observations are in place. Firstly, in his treatment of plot Aristotle was fully aware that only a small amount out of the myriad of actions that an agent engages in have a place in the plot or storyline.³⁹ Certain actions, conversations, questions, and insights belong in the narrative proper rather than the chronicle. To omit any of them would result in a gross distortion of the plot. Secondly, making sense of the relation between the unity of meaning and its parts in a narrative involves a grasp of narrative categories through related narrative insights.⁴⁰

³⁸ Ibid., 218-9.

³⁹ *Poetics*, Chapter 8, 1451^a 15-20.

⁴⁰ Dilthey's analysis of the relationship of the parts of a life to the whole in terms of the category of meaning complements Aristotle's plot based approach. See *W. Dilthey, Selected Writings*, edited, translated and

By a narrative moment or event is meant an event in a life which is such that its meaning cannot be understood in terms of the moment in itself. More generally Ira Progoff's steppingstones would be illustrations of narrative moments.⁴¹ The life moves through these events and its meaning is to be understood in terms of the manner in which each of them relates to and constitutes the meaning of the whole. The meaning of the narrative event is an integral part of the meaning of the whole life.

Examples of narrative events would be the awakening of the wonder of an agent to a significant problem, the emergence of a significant insight, a meeting and consequent experience of falling in love. Some narrative events stand out as constituting the beginning of a quest/story or of a chapter in a quest or story. Examples of a beginning would be Jacqueline du Pre's experience of hearing the cello for the first time when she was five years old or Gandhi's experience of being thrown off the train in South Africa. The meaning of the beginning is present in all that follows. Such a beginning, involving an awakening of the core desires of the subject to his or her path, has a directing presence in all that is to follow. From this perspective desires can function as the operators and integrators of a narrative. Further events in the journey could include a meeting with a person, an accidental event, the reading of a book, or, for Lonergan, attending Leeming's course of lectures in Rome in 1935.

The issue can be put to the test in the context of Lonergan's own life. In his life can we discover through a series of narrative insights what Progoff would term the steppingstones of the plot or Dilthey the parts of the unity of the meaning? A further task will be to contemplate how they give meaning to the unity of the life. By way of a response I offer the following account of Lonergan's steppingstones:

The Steppingstones of Lonergan's Life

1. I was born, the eldest son of Gerald and Josephine Lonergan, in Buckingham, Quebec, on December 26th

introduced by H.P. Rickman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1976), 235-245.

⁴¹ *At a Journal Workshop* (New York: Tarcher, 1992), chapter 7.

1904.

2. When I was 15 I found myself troubled by a religious vocation. I thought that a subsequent illness would have ended the matter but it persisted and sometime after, on a streetcar in Montreal, I made the decision to join the Jesuits.
3. It was in 1926 at Heythrop in Oxfordshire that my passion for philosophy was awakened by the unsolved problem of knowledge. I was suspicious of the philosophy I was taught and became a nominalist, but the path to *Insight* had begun.
4. Reading Stewart's *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* coaxed me out of naïve realist accounts of understanding and intelligence. The experience of the Depression in Montreal at the time began in me a 14-year quest to understand the causes of the economic cycle.
5. By accident I was sent to Rome for theology studies in 1933. While there I struggled with idealism and the philosophy of history until, in 1935, while attending Bernard Leeming's course I made a breakthrough on the meaning of judgement and its relation to existence.
6. In 1938 it was decided that I was to become a teacher of theology rather than of philosophy, as I had expected. My subsequent postgraduate studies in theology awakened my interest in the question of the method of theology.
7. Because of the war I returned to Montreal in 1940 and wrestled with the causes of the economic cycle. I had the insight into the dynamics of the pure rather than the trade cycle but in 1944 this project petered out.
8. In 1943, inspired by Hoenen's articles, I made the decision to research what Aquinas had to offer on the problem of knowledge.
9. In 1946, encouraged by the response to my course on Thought and Reality, I made the decision to research the vision of the new and compose the book *Insight*, as soon as the *Verbum* articles were completed.
10. In 1947 I was moved to Toronto, which I initially found upsetting. There resulted a short creative illness

after which, as I began to compose *Insight*, I enjoyed great peace of mind and consolation.⁴²

11. In the process of composing a proto-*Insight* I had my own insights into cognitional structure, the notion of being, and the problem of objectivity
12. When composing the autograph of the final text I had further insights into emergent probability, the dialectical development of common sense, the irreducibility of things, the dialectic of philosophies, process metaphysics. All of those insights guided the process of composition.
13. After *Insight* was completed I was moved to Rome. In 1958 after a conversation with Longman I made the decision to compose *Method in Theology*.
14. In the course of composing *Method*, in February 1965 I had the insight into the functional specialties. A year later, in the course of recovering from a life threatening cancer illness, I had the equally important insight into the distinction between theology and religion. Involved were significant insights into the religious significance of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.
15. Laboriously, I worked at composing the text, finishing it in 1971.
16. After *Method* was completed I made the decision in 1975 to return to economics. In my last years in Boston College I attempted to put my thoughts on that discipline in order.
17. After a further cancer operation I realised that my intellectual journey had come to an end and lamented that fact.
18. I died in Pickering, Ontario, on November 26th 1984.

The first significant narrative event in Lonergan's life is his

⁴² Lonergan's account of his state of consolation at the time in a letter to Louis Roy on August 16th, 1977 is quoted by F. Crowe in his *Lonergan* (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 7. Following Julia Cameron I believe that Lonergan at this point settled into his golden. See her *The Golden Vein* (London: Pan/Macmillan, 1996), 98-102.

response to his religious vocation, the second his awakening to the problem of knowledge at Heythrop. Further narrative events involved his reading of *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* by Stewart, attending Leeming's course, and, provoked by Hoenen, making the decision in 1943 to research Aquinas on mind. The meaning of these narrative events cannot be grasped within a particular limited context within the life but only within the context of the entire life story. Lonergan's religious vocation is in this sense a directing presence that remains throughout the entire life that follows. The intellectual awakening to the problem of knowledge in Heythrop is also the emergence of a presence that will remain. In this sense, following Dilthey, the meaning of the unity of the life, or equivalently person, self, or subject, is given in the manner in which the meaning of the distinctive narrative events interlocks. Each of them are parts of the story structure. The meaning and significance of the events in the list cannot be grasped in isolation from that of the remaining events. The conclusion of the analysis of the relation of the various events and moments in Lonergan's life is that it is narrative structured. Through this understanding an otherwise fragmented sense of the self is replaced by a more unified one.

A final comment has to do with Lonergan's view that the intellectual, ethical, and religious dimensions of the human person are related in terms of levels of consciousness. Complementing that approach the narrative understanding of the life invites us to explore how those levels interact with each other in the entire lifetime. The initiating narrative event is on the religious level. It is followed by a long period in which the intellectual level, awakened to the problem of knowledge, the economic cycle, and the philosophy of history, is dominant. This in turn gives rise to the emergence of the ethical level in 1943 and 1946 when he makes the decisions to compose *Verbum* and *Insight*. Those works were chosen as his values. It follows that even though their authoring was predominantly intellectual there is also an inevitable ethical presence and level involved in them. Might it be the case that a narrative approach to questions about the relation among the different levels of consciousness might have some light to shed on this difficult

topic?

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