

IMPLEMENTATION: THE ONGOING CRISIS OF METHOD

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I thought I saw the fallen flower
Returning to its branch
Only to find it was a butterfly¹

1. Context and Divisions

The editor has raised what for me is the central present problem of Lonergan studies. His invitation to me is that I provide an etching of the problem, a brief basis for discussion. Immediately I think of Fr. Fred Crowe's old question, What functional speciality are you working in?, and my reply has to be an honest "none." This seems to me to be an important but simple aspect of the present problem. If one takes Lonergan's methodological doctrine, as described in *Method in Theology*, seriously, then one has to attempt some contribution to its implementation. Initially, such contributions are bound to be shabby. So, for example, history according to the von Ranke norm, sentence by sentence, proposition by proposition, is not easily accomplished. In present practice, in all fields, historical writing tends to mesh with what will eventually be identified as interpretational efforts. It can reach further, into research on the one hand, into evaluative writing on the other. Indeed, even when the writer struggles to be Rankian, the history tends towards being general, undifferentiated both in the functional

¹ "Rakka eda ni / Kaeru to mireba / Kocho Kana." The *haiku* is quoted from L. Van der Post, *A Portrait of Japan* (New York: William Morrow and Co, 1968), 107.

sense and in the sense of audience-directedness.²

Already, here, I am slipping into a specialised issue, one indeed that could be a topic of an entire volume of contributions. But my slip, or this initial direction of interest, is relevant. My basis of discussion must begin with history, the history of views of *The Perfectibility of Man*.³ I would emphasise the generalist sketchiness of my remarks. I would hope that they would provoke corrections, criticisms, enlargements, practical suggestions, ongoing collaboration. My hope goes deeper: as will appear below, especially in section 10, my hope relates to an optimism that regards humanity's butterfly history as being at present in a grey but golden chrysalis stage. Further, section 15 will help identify this essay as being in a ninth genus of implementation, a descriptive communication outside the zone of specialised implementations.

So, it seems convenient to give my suggestions regarding the problem of implementation in succinct descriptive points. I do not propose to make the pointings logically expansive and sequential, like the magnificent 26 or 31 places in *Insight*. Such a treatment should be the result of our collaboration, not the fruit of an initial foray. First, therefore, I venture some comments on the history of philosophy or method that carry me to the topic as it sits in the middle of Lonergan's definition

² Lonergan raises problems of general and critical history both in *Method* and in the final chapter of *CWL 10*. Handling such problems, however, requires refined functional specialist differentiations of hermeneutics (see, e.g., *Method*, 153). One arrives then at considering written history as a topic of all specialities. At this early stage I wish to note a further deep problem that is quite beyond a short article, but intimated by the addition of the word *ethics* to the problems raised: general history of ethics, critical history of ethics. Immediately there rises the problem of distinctions, refinements, specialisations. More about this in notes 8 and 10.

³ I refer here to an old classic by John Passmore (London: Duckworth, 1970). Feminists should find his few comments on women sadly entertaining. My other old book from the seventies on perfectibility is Elaine Morgan, *The Descent of Woman* (New York: Bantam, 1973). It gave a refreshing shift of perspective. I am sliding here over the complex issue of the relation of Lonergan's work to feminism, but I would note that the post-axial emergence of the third stage of meaning (see section 10 below) may well pivot on integrative feminine intuition.

of metaphysics. In the following, third, section, I shall sweep through the book *Insight* as presenting and representing the problem of implementation. The fourth section homes in on the presentation and representation of *Method in Theology*. A fifth section turns to the general cultural dynamic that was not Lonergan's focus in that book. Section six is a brief and provocative comment on Lonergan's achievement. The seventh section touches on the popular topic of feelings and values. Section eight moves to identify what I consider the central tone of Lonergan's life. Intellectual conversion, a central focus of his life's work, is considered, mainly from the pedagogical perspective, in the next section, and section ten seeks to put our human struggle in a fuller historical perspective. Sections eleven and twelve make a few points regarding the Latin works and the Roman seminars. Sections thirteen and fourteen note evident problems of the eighth speciality and the special categories. Finally, section fifteen seeks to throw some light on the differentiations of implementations. My concluding remarks, in section sixteen, bring us back and forward to our initial context.

2 Implementation of Wisdom in History

Certainly one can say that implementation was a mood of undifferentiated pre-Socratic and global wisdom, even in cases where the implementation was a strategy of oriental detachment, whether solitary or communal. Perhaps I might take the works of Eric Voegelin as a shared context here. Then, for instance, volume three of *Order and History* can be seen as describing the failed reaching of Plato and Aristotle for a humane city. I leap past the magnificence of the Christian surge and the Patristic reachings for the city of God only to note that Aquinas displayed an astonishing and naïve detachment as he moved, in his forties, to the perspective of his *Summa Theologica*, a perspective that was reduced in subsequent centuries to the convenience of its second part as a confessors' backup.⁴ Unlike Plato, Aquinas was not focused on the local city, nor could I fault him on this. But I would note

⁴ My source here is work by Leonard Boyle O.P. on the fate of the *Summa* unavailable to me in my remote retirement home.

that an absence of focus on the local city in its possibilities and probabilities persists as a central weakness of the reach for a Christian theoretic.⁵ There is the gap between the enrichment of the scriptural writings and the enrichment of streetlife.

3 The Problem of *Insight*

So I turn to the astonishing naïve detachment of Lonergan's great work. It is a naïve doctrinal work, and in the intervening forty-five years it has generated a large body of post-systematic literature. The systematic meaning, of course, was private to the forty-year old Lonergan, clear about the Butterfield shift of perspective,⁶ rich in remote possibilities.⁷ There is, I think, work to be done towards understanding Lonergan as being primarily of the temperament of *oratio obliqua*.⁸ But his concern was nonetheless practical, as he would say himself, interested in making all things new in Christ, interested in sublating Marx.⁹ So, he adds our troublesome word to the definition of metaphysics, "... and

⁵ In *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2002), I bring out a parallel lack in contemporary economic theories and texts. The two lacks merge to guarantee the irrelevance of Christian economic morality in global politics. In later notes I shall simply refer to this book as *Pastkeynes*.

⁶ Section 8 fills out this remark.

⁷ This golden hoard remains to be exploited, implemented. A key to its eventual implementation is the lifting, in later generations, of the work *Insight* into the spiral of functional specialization. See also note 13.

⁸ This is a large and important topic. For instance, in Lonergan's case, one can detect a poise towards retrieval in his life's work, even though his major achievements (see section 6) were forward-looking. His final years of teaching his forward-looking economics were very much focused on retrieval through Schumpeter's *History of Economic Analysis*. See Lonergan, *CWL 21*, xxviii-ix. In the case of his disciples, and of theology in general, precisions of futurology are sparse: a poise of such sophisticated direct speech needs slow incarnation. This relates also to the problem raised in note 2 above regarding differentiations of interest in ethics. There is a related neglected transcendental grounded in the modally distinct what-to-do question which might be proverbialized as "be adventurous," meshing with a category of fantasy.

⁹ See Michael Shute, *The Origin of Lonergan's Notion of a Dialectic of History* (Lanham, MD: UP of America, 1993); *The Making of a Catholic Marx: Lonergan's Early Writings on Economics* (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 2004).

implementation...”¹⁰ Now certainly the writing of *Insight* was cut short,¹¹ but it seems to me evident that the book “he had in him” at the time would have bogged down on that word. *Cosmopolis* was only a hope, and “the antecedent willingness of hope had to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialized auxiliary...”¹² *Insight* was a splendid solitary foundational work, written as a pedagogical moving viewpoint from a viewpoint that lacked the key insight into modern academic culture. It is in need of multiple elevations to shift the probability-schedules of hope.¹³

4 The Problem in *Method in Theology*

I had the opportunity of talking with Lonergan, during those difficult years of the late sixties, about the problem of writing *Method*. I recall one morning conversation in his room in the Bayview Regis College when he summed up his concern, “I can’t put all of *Insight* into the first chapter of *Method*.”¹⁴ I recall, too, Fr. Crowe and I coming out of a

¹⁰ Carry forward the context of notes 2 and 8, and add the problem of the absence of an entry on *implementation* in the index of either *Insight*. Fr. Crowe and I have joked with each other over the years about the gaps in our respective indices of *Insight* and *Method*. Recently, with a grin, he remarked that there was a lot more about feeling in the new *Insight* index. The next index should include *Implementation*. My own randomly-collected references are to [CWL 3] pages 254, 259, 261, 263, 415, 516, 530, 545, 547, 707-08, 747. But the problem is deeper, and certainly relates to the moving viewpoint of *Insight*. The conclusion of section 10 also adds a context. One might, for instance, reach a refreshing and disturbing view of business ethics by replacing, in the final sentence of that section, the two words *popular philosophy* with the two words *business ethics*. Serious ethics, within the new differentiations of metaphysics, shall be an operation of the specialties dialectic and foundations.

¹¹ I am relying here on conversations with Fr. Crowe and on a letter to him from Lonergan in 1952.

¹² *Insight*, 747.

¹³ I discuss some of these elevations in “Elevating *Insight*: Spacetime as Paradigm Problem,” *MJLS* (Autumn, 2001). (See also note 7 above.) I did not at the time of its writing advert with precision to what I might call the “ethical elevation” alluded to in notes 2, 8, and 10 above.

¹⁴ It is worthwhile to note that he had already sketched a chapter one, a much more powerful introductory chapter than what emerged in *Method*. See Darlene O’Leary, *Lonergan’s Practical View of History* (Halifax: Axial Press, 2003). But I do not think he looked back at his old files.

lecture of that period, when Lonergan presented a version of the third chapter, on Meaning, conversing about a spontaneous disappointment: we were tuned to expect greater things. I carried that expectation into the task of indexing *Method*, November-December 1971, and I recall vividly my delight in finding that Lonergan had his own answer to the problem of putting *Insight* into *Method*. There was first the reference to the book in relation to self-discovery.¹⁵ But, more importantly, there were the pages on general categories, which echoed the contents of *Insight*.¹⁶ It was only in the year 2000 that I came to temper luminously my delight. That tempering emerged, oddly, in my struggle to arrive at an integral perspective on Lonergan's two volumes of economic writings.¹⁷ It seemed to me that, if Lonergan's perspective in that field was to have a better chance – in a full statistical sense – of success, a broader foundational perspective would be more convenient. Briefly, that broader perspective would replace the doctrinal challenge of those pages in *Method* with a stand on two categorial attitudes: (a) a vaguer view of the human dynamic as one of *sensability*,¹⁸ a bent towards *making sense*: that phrase refers, indeed, to the concrete human capacity and need of page 48 of *Method*, but with a meaning that could be identified, foundationally, by the full range of present philosophical stands; (b) an empirically-founded view of Adam Smith's "division of labour"¹⁹ as a necessity in things of the mind, and

¹⁵ *Method*, 260.

¹⁶ Ibid, 286-7. Note the absence of reference to chapter 19. I suspect that this was due to an attitude of some participants in the 1970 Florida Conference. In later years he indicated that he had not backed down on the drive through the book to the existence of God.

¹⁷ I refer to Volumes 15 and 21 of the *Collected Works*. The integral perspective is offered in the book referenced in note 5 above. The original suggested title (see *CWL* 21, 325) was *Lonergan's Economics: Structures and Implementations*.

¹⁸ The neologism, with the shift from an inner *e* to an inner *a*, has, of course, all sorts of resonances, but as it stands it is acceptable to empiricists, pragmatists, whatever; by idealists in their own way; even by those who consider the *a* as epiphenomenal.

¹⁹ "The division of labour, so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase in the productive power of labour." (Adam Smith, chapter one of *The Wealth of Nations*.)

the empirical consequence that Lonergan's eightfold division fits the bill neatly and adequately.

(b) is the topic of the next section. Before turning to that, however, I would add two other comments regarding the problem of *Method in Theology*. First, there is the problem that Fr. Crowe and I sensed regarding the "low level" presentation of the problem of meaning in Lonergan's sixties presentation of chapter three. At the end of that presentation I give voice to my expectations by the question, Does the order of topics in the chapter correspond to a climb through mounting complexities of meaning? Lonergan replied modestly that the chapter just pointed out some significant areas of meaning.²⁰ It was only after a quarter of a century reading *Method* that a further and magnificent subtlety of page 287 of the book dawned on me and answered my question. The key paragraph relating *Insight* to *Method* is now, for me, not the dense listing that carries through the first half of the page, but the paragraph to follow regarding the vast enrichment of the meaning of the first half of *Method* that can occur when it is mediated by *Insight* in its transposition from doctrine to system by later generations. I shall return to this point briefly in section 15, but I would claim that it is of major significance in the cultivation of dialogue with contemporary sciences and secularities.

My second concluding comment ties in with the previous one. It is well known that Lonergan was a tired warrior when he wrote *Method*. One can sense a hurry to the end after the chapter on foundations. But the whole book was a tired effort, not even up to the standard he was setting for himself when he wrote a sketch of chapter one, probably after his discovery of functional specialization.²¹ Crowe tells of Lonergan's admission, in correspondence from Rome, of the old energy fading; he tells too, of Lonergan speaking of the short chapter on research as inadequate: after all, as he said, he had spent a great deal of his life doing research.²² In particular, the final

²⁰ Later (at note 65) we shall consider fruitfully in what way he was doing for our times what Damascene did around 740 A.D. That he was capable of much more is obviously the issue here.

²¹ See above, note 14.

²² I am recalling various conversations with Fr. Crowe. See also p. 113

two chapters are minimalist. If one traces his view on system throughout his works,²³ one finds on that topic not a short chapter that might well suit Aristotle but the seeds of a very large book that sublates Hegel, throws off Descartes and Husserl, exploits the best of modern biology, and gives a subtle heuristic of a genetic systematics adequate to this millennium's effort.²⁴

5 Fragmentation's Potential

I first tackled the question of what I call fragmentation potential in the late sixties while working on musicology in Oxford: the result was the second of two papers written for the 1970 Florida Lonergan conference. It was on the need for functional specialization in musicology and it is useful here to think of this need positively, "presenting an idealized version of the past, something better than was the reality."²⁵ In this sense one sees the fragmentation that I find paradigmatically symbolised by the transition from Aeschylus to Euripides as a positive need of adolescent humanity. The long period of history in which we now live little and move too much and have our schizothymic being is the axial way towards the second time of the temporal subject: but more on this in section 10.

What is important, in particular, is the need for the

of Crowe, *Lonergan* (London: Chapman, 1992), where he quotes a 1980 letter from Lonergan: "I fear that my book did not emphasize enough the importance of research."

²³ A task that Robert Doran is pursuing. See, for examples, "Intelligentia Fidei in De Deo Trino Pars Systematic," *MJLS* 19 (2001), 35-83 and "Bernard Lonergan and the Functions of Systematic Theology," *Theological Studies* 59 (1998), 569-607, and other articles in both journals.

²⁴ There is an account of genetic systematics in chapter 2 of *Pastkeynes*. One has to think of a genetic sequence of systems, including "reversed erroneous systems," inclusive of contrafactual historical analysis. So, for example, both Aquinas and Bonaventure occur as integrator-operator "cross-sections." Another perspective is "Systematics: A Language of the Heart," chapter five of Philip McShane, *The Redress of Poise* (Axial Press Website, 2002). An earlier effort of mine is "Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts," *Lonergan Workshop Volume 7*, edited by Fred Lawrence (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987).

²⁵ *Method*, 251.

intellectual division of labour as global, pointing to a global enterprise, a new *Wendung zur Idee*.²⁶ Most recently I have become sensitive to the need in physics, and in that most secure of ancient studies, geometry.²⁷ Lonergan's attention during the Roman period was on theology. While he was not unaware of the broader need, he touched on it only in a limited fashion.²⁸ An important task of Lonergan studies is to indicate clearly and pragmatically the full global need and scope of functional specialization. The structuring of that task is a large topic, aspects of which are treated elsewhere.²⁹

6. Lonergan's Achievement

This brings me to my next point for discussion. I would suggest, then, that Lonergan's major achievements are two: (a) the thematisation of functional specialization, (b) the lifting of economics to the level of a respectable empirical science that is

²⁶ Lonergan, in *De Deo Trino I : Pars Dogmatica* (Rome: Gregorian Press, 1964), 10, n.10, translates this as *displacement towards system*. He had not yet envisaged the functional system but he was, in that text, struggling to build in the perspective of a genetic systematics that would be a full and just retrieval of history. See note 23 above.

²⁷ This work was done in connection with my editing of *CWL 18*, springing from an analysis of Husserl's essay "On the Origin of Geometry," which is given as an Appendix to his last work on *The Crisis of European Science*. It forms part of chapter three of *Pastkeynes*. There is a fuller consideration of Husserl on geometry and Science in chapters 3 and 4 of my *Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*. (This is the sequel to *Phenomenology and Logic*, promised there under the title *Lonergan: Phenomenology, Logic, Grammatology*.) It adds a balance to Lonergan's reflections on the late Husserl by considering Husserl's neglected 1882 doctorate thesis (under the brilliant Weirstrass) on the Calculus of Variation.

²⁸ On physics, see *Method*, 126; on human studies, *ibid*, 364-5. See also William Mathews, "A Biographic Perspective on Conversion and the Functional Specialties in Lonergan," *MJLS* 16 (1998), 147, on Lonergan's interest in Wellek and Warren's *Theory of Literature* in late 1965.

²⁹ My broadest treatment of the topic is the third chapter of *Pastkeynes*. For law there is Bruce Anderson, *Discovery in Legal Decision-Making* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996). For musicology see chapter two of McShane, *The Shaping of the Foundations* (Washington: UP of America, 1976). For literature see McShane, *Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy*, chapter 5. The work cited in note 13 above deals with the need for functional specialization in physics.

adequately normative. The other generally recognised achievement is his rediscovery of the interiorly-directed perspective of Aristotle and Aquinas. I certainly expect this suggestion to be debated. But I would make two points towards my suggestion. In the first place, like any scientist, I would contend that a re-discovery that is not, so to speak, an independent discovery – think perhaps of Newton, Leibnitz and the calculus – cannot be considered as major cultural achievement. In the second place, interiority is an axial emergent, fermenting through other cultures and disciplines. Even within the Christian and Thomist traditions, there is no clear discontinuity between Lonergan and previous gropings. One can line up recent characters in the drama either from Thomism, like Marechal, or from the broader Christian culture, like Kierkegaard and Newman.³⁰ Indeed, such a scholar as Thomas Gilby O.P. was not off the mark when he wrote about St. Thomas' presentation of the decision process in the *Ia IIae*,

We take as model of a complete human act one not fraught with moral issues; it could be going to the dentist or planting a hedge as a wind break, but let us simplify: A night at the opera. From a newspaper I see there is to be a performance of *Così fan tutte* tonight. (1) How good to attend; (2) I've a good mind to; (3) it's perfectly feasible; (4) I will. So far the end, now for the means. (5) I can go up to town by car or by train; (6) I pursue the advantage of each; (7) I decide on a train; and (8) choose the 16.26 to Liverpool Street. So far nothing has been set in motion and I am still in my chair. (9) I must do something about it; and so (10) I bestir myself to (11) the performance of the appropriate actions, which culminate when (12) I settle down at the first bars of the overture to enjoy myself.³¹

³⁰ I recall here the various historical writings of G.A. McCool. Michael Vertin contributes an added perspective in his doctorate thesis on Marechal, available in the Toronto Lonergan Centre.

³¹ St Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Vol. 17 (*Ia IIae* 6-17), translated and edited by Thomas Gilby O.P., in Appendix 1, p. 214. A context for reflection on this text is F.E. Crowe, "Complacency and

7. The Decision Problem

The quotation from Gilby brings me to my next point. Certainly, the Decision Problem can be taken to refer in quite different senses to the two sets of lectures published in volume 18 of the *Collected Works*. But here my interest is in the problem symbolised by page 233 of that volume, where I diagram the move to a judgment of value. The diagram makes explicit (a) the what-to-do question, (b) the meshing of that question with feelings. The references given are to *Insight*. You notice immediately that I am dissociating myself from a tradition of Lonerganism that (a) neglects the planning-question, (b) finds a definite newness regarding value in *Method in Theology*. I cannot help bringing to mind the silly fellow sitting below me in the audience at Florida – I omitted his name in the edited version! – who asked Lonergan whether he discovered feelings when he read Scheler.³² Lonergan's pause was a delight and the beginning of his answer was "I've got feelings too!"

Not only had Lonergan feelings³³ but he had lived in the worlds of both St. Ignatius and St. Thomas. Ignatian discernment of feelings was a life-style; Aquinas' hylemorphism of the decision process was a step on the road to his doctorate.³⁴

Concern in the Writings of St. Thomas," *Theological Studies*, 1959. It is quite a tricky task of self-attention to correct the slips in Gilby's commentary.

³² "An Interview with Fr. Bernard Lonergan" in fact omits all the questioners' names and tidies up abrupt exchanges such as the one mentioned. It was originally published in *The Clergy Review* 56 (1971) and reprinted in 2 *Coll*, 209-30.

³³ Two anecdotes seem worth relating, referring to events in Lonergan's life separated by about seventy years. On a visit to Halifax in the mid-seventies, I played Beethoven's Kreutzer Sonata for him. His eyes lit up afterwards as he related how, as a little boy, he had paused, enthralled, in the open air, listening to his mother playing a piano version of it. My second story is of an exchange we had by phone. I had just returned from Boston and his economic lecture that I attended each Thursday in the Spring of 1978. This time I had left him a copy of Beethoven's last quartets and, as a matter of habit, I checked back with him. "What did you think of them?" I asked (foolishly). "I do not think: I feel!" was his reply.

³⁴ In spite of lack of discussion of feelings and sensibility in the text, and a corresponding absence in the ordinary index of *Grace and Freedom*,

8. Theoretic Conversion

And, I would claim, Lonergan so lived in the world of theory that he did not bother to specify the particular conversion that titles this section. Indeed, had he not written *Insight* from a strategic and moving viewpoint, might he not have described his own life and the full life of theory – recall the Greek Patristic sense of *theoria*³⁵ – as “the intellectual pattern of loving” rather than “the intellectual pattern of living”? One of the tricks of *Insight* is the dodging of the mention of the concrete dynamics of the absolutely supernatural, the ground, in Lonergan’s life, of the “call for relentless perseverance.”³⁶ Here I think of a study of the word *home* in Lonergan’s writings. So, for instance, systematic theology, however, elitist, “is really quite a homely affair.”³⁷ From conversations with Lonergan about mathematics and mathematical logic it seems to me that he was at home in the world of theory, as he was “at home in transcendental method”³⁸ in its difficult sense, a sense which includes the world of theory. He had chosen, in Christ, the finer way of Aristotle. The central message of *Insight* is that the theoretic way is a grim necessity of Christian renewal: grim, only because of present cultural and Christian bias. For the Lonergan of *Insight* the conjugates of $C_{55}H_{72}MgN_4O_5$ (Chlorophyll a) are talents of Wordsworth’s daffodils, and the aerodynamics of Hopkin’s *Windhover*, are “the achieve of, the mastery of the thing.” Certainly Lonergan admired “commonsense contributions to our self-knowledge”³⁹ such as those of Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Newman, as he admired the contribution of aesthetic consciousness.⁴⁰ But I suspect that

there is no doubt about his familiarity with the relevant sections in the *Summa* and other works. See the massive set of references in the Index of Loci, 481ff of CWL 1.

³⁵ Recall also Lonergan’s brief discussion of it in “Mission and Spirit,” 3 *Coll*, 27. In that same place Lonergan writes of Aristotle’s challenge “to live out what was finest in us.”

³⁶ CWL 3, 210.

³⁷ *Method*, 350; see also 351.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 14.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 261.

⁴⁰ The admiration was deeply personal, and one can hear it resonate in

he would find an unaesthetic commonsense Lonerganism breathless and unhomely.⁴¹

9. Intellectual conversion

It would seem odd to ask whether Lonergan was at home in intellectual conversion. In my first conversation with him, Easter 1961 in Dublin, I asked him about his experience, referring I think to that bracketed remark about startling strangeness in *Insight*. In his reply he talked of having to go and ask someone about it. I have often wondered since whether the someone had any clue to what he was at. Again, I recall in the late seventies talking one evening with him of a morning lecture in which it was claimed that Jesus was intellectually converted. I cheekily put it this way. “Jesus did not spend the forty days on the mountain reading *Insight*.” His succinct reply: “Exactly!” He went on to speak marvellously about the central element in life being “saying Hello,” raising his hand illustratively, talking of Dante’s Beatrice. But, for Lonergan, the Jesus of Galilee and of Thesis 12 of *De Verbo Incarnato* was not intellectually converted.

In this context, then, I would make three points. First, a good Christian, even one who has read *Insight*, may not be intellectually converted. Secondly, a good methodologist, even if intellectually converted, even after a lengthy time in that *position*, may not be at home in it: “no one reaches it easily; no one remains in it permanently; and when some other pattern is dominant, then the self of our self-affirmation seems quite different from one’s actual self, the universe of being seems as unreal as Plato’s noetic heaven, and objectivity spontaneously becomes a matter of meeting persons and dealing with things that are ‘really out there.’”⁴² In the two conversations that I mentioned, I, and I suspect Lonergan, were dealing with each other “really out there.” The transition to homeliness is a further differentiation and refinement of consciousness with

his delivery of the lecture on art, published as chapter nine of *CWL 10*.

⁴¹ *CWL 3*, 755, has the phrase “a little breathless and a little late.” Pages 442 and 566 give his blunt dismissal of commonsense pretentiousness.

⁴² *CWL 3*, 411.

which I associate the word *Poosition*. One can, in fact, struggle towards poositional conversation with some success, especially with a conversant that has a Plotinian edge on intellectual conversion. That struggle was, I think, not part of Jesus' life, nor was it part of Lonergan's vastly lonesome life. In Jesus' case, the struggle, certainly grasped in his beatific vision, full in its intellectual appreciation of actual finite being, could not occur since the prior conversion was not present in his human consciousness. In Lonergan, his lifestyle and companionships did not press him in this direction.

From these two points comes my third. Intellectual conversion is rare, even among Lonergan students. This is a conclusion of mine based on conversations with people with quite some expertise in Lonergan studies. It would seem better to recognise this more publicly: because one strange man fought his genius way to a luminous thematic possession of Aquinas' position on "Is? Is! Is," it does not follow that that possession can become relatively communal in the half-century to follow. But it seems to me that the pedagogy of the position, curiously, should involve the struggle I have identified descriptively. Jack and Jill⁴³ should look each other in the eyes, look at both their hands, edge and hedge their separate solitudes towards a poise that would cultivate the possession of the position.⁴⁴

10. Lonergan's Stages of Meaning

The "Poosition" may well be a possession of, a possessing of, a creative minority in the third stage of meaning. But here I am pushing for a refinement of Lonergan's discussion both of the stages of meaning and of the two times of the temporal subject.⁴⁵ I have treated this topic in various places, so here I shall be brief, offering the point for discussion.⁴⁶

⁴³ The context is given in Lonergan, "Cognitive Structure," *CWL* 4, 215.

⁴⁴ An extended invitation of this type, but from writer to reader, is given in chapter five of *A Brief History of Tongue*.

⁴⁵ The stages of meaning are discussed in *Method*, 83-99. For the two times of the subject see *De Deo Trino II: Pars Systematica* (Rome: Gregorian Press, 1964), 196-204.

⁴⁶ The first presentation was in the work cited at note 67, in "Middle

I think that Lonergan would sympathise with Toynbee's criticism of Jaspers' view of an axial time: Toynbee would see it as certainly including the time of Jesus. My own struggle with Toynbee, Voegelin, and Jaspers led me gradually, in the eighties, to envisage the axial period as a transition period between the two times of the temporal subject, considered phylogenetically.⁴⁷ The axial period would then separate the first and the third stage of meaning, and could be identified roughly as the second stage of meaning. Certainly, the *quest* of the third stage of meaning is an emergent of the second stage of meaning, which however primarily, lifted humanity's creative minority into science. But the shift to *method* in contrast to *content* is a slower emergent. *Method in Theology* and "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods" recognise this.⁴⁸ For me, the third stage of meaning is still remote from our stumbling and truncated adolescent humanity. One might associate that remoteness with what Lonergan calls third-order consciousness: "Second order consciousness is the presence of the subject to himself as introspecting; second-order intentionality has as subject a second-order object that in a first order is not an object but a datum of consciousness. Similarly, when as at present one introspects introspection, then there is a third order consciousness and a third-order intentionality."⁴⁹ It

Kingdom, Middle Man; *T'ien-hsia, i jen.*" The most recent is in chapter one of *A Brief History of Tongue*.

⁴⁷ The diagram on page 124 of *A Brief History of Tongue* links the three stages with a trinitarian theology of history that meshes with Lonergan's analysis of the the finite participations in divine personality (see *De Deo Trino II: Pars Systemtica*, Quaestio XXVI) and with a perspective Fr. Crowe developed (unpublished lecture notes).

⁴⁸ "The Ongoing Genesis of Methods." 3 *Coll*, 146-65. Tracking the topic "ongoing genesis" in *Method* is a tricky task of attending not only to discussion of mind's discovery but to the manners in which Lonergan edges *passim* beyond contents to methods.

⁴⁹ I am quoting from a nine-page beginning of a chapter one for *Method* from 1965, reproduced in the work by O'Leary referred to in note 14. In a separate part of the archives (A 697 in the new indexing) I discovered what seems a continuation of these nine typed pages, beginning with an incomplete p. 8 and running to p. 23, where it ends in mid-sentence. A quotation from page 14 adds a context to our topic. "As the labor of introspection proceeds, one stumbles upon Hegel's insight that the full objectification of the human spirit is the history of the human race. It is in

is perhaps useful to suggest that in the post-axial period philosophy might be expected to reach various maturities. First, methodology will be to methods – which, as Felix Klein remarked of mathematical method in the nineteenth century, shift from decade to decade⁵⁰ – what zoology is to animals. Third-order consciousness is then revealed in its full biohistorical richness. Secondly, methodology will acquire a respectable unity of efficiency.⁵¹ Thirdly, philosophy or methodology will be definitely philosophy *of*, in accordance with Lonergan’s later definition of generalized empirical method.⁵² Finally there will be a clear recognition of the distinction between popular philosophy as a ninth genus of reflection on method, and the inner eightfold dynamics of *Die Wendung zur Idee*.⁵³

the sum of the products of common sense and common nonsense, of the sciences and the philosophies, of moralities and religions, of social orders and cultural achievements, that there is mediated, set before us the mirror in which we can behold, the originating principle of human aspiration and human attainment and failure.”

⁵⁰ A brief review of the past two centuries of searchings reveals a genetic and dialectic complexification of methods in areas as disparate as mathematics, psychology, and history.

⁵¹ “It is quite legitimate to seek in the efficient cause of the science, that is, in the scientist, the reason why a science forms a unified whole.” *CWL 10*, 160. This should be linked with the problematic of ethics and implementation raised in notes 2, 8, and 10.

⁵² “Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject’s operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.” “Religious Knowledge,” *3 Coll*, 141. I would note a homely educational version of this: “When teaching children geometry, one is teaching children children”: geometry or anything else; and the teacher is also teaching the teacher. The cultivation of such a classroom lift, difficult at first, would shift the probabilities of the ending of the axial period.

⁵³ I have no doubt about Lonergan’s convictions in this regard, but the circumstances of his teaching often left him, ironically, with a reception in the mode of *haute vulgarisation*. The irony is focused in Volume 6 of the *Collected Works*, where his comments on *haute vulgarisation* (*CWL 6*, 121, 155) rest in a series of talks which lent themselves precisely to that reception. *CWL 18* and *CWL 10* are worth considering in the context of the same problematic. See also notes 2, 8, and 10 above. I would see an

11. Translating the Latin Works

The translation in question is not only the translation into other languages but the translation to the public. The scholarly importance of the Latin works should be noted. One instance suffices regarding difficulties in chapter 17 of *Insight*: the nature and concrete reality of mystery, the meshing of the two sets of canons, the actual dialectic of methodological viewpoints. My instance is the meaning of *pure formulations*.⁵⁴ Certainly, for me, this meaning was impossibly elusive until I extended my search for it into such a work as *De Verbo Incarnato*. Lonergan's precising of conciliar struggles illustrates the effort of interpretation in question here. More broadly, one cannot lift the meaning of this chapter from doctrinal reading to systematic understanding without adverting to the empirical background in Lonergan's own theological work. The majority of the Latin works, of course, post-date *Insight*, but their seeds are in the studying and teaching of Lonergan in the forties.⁵⁵

12. The Roman Notes

I refer here especially to the seminars that Lonergan gave over this period, some of which are familiar, e.g., *De Intellectu et Methodo* and various versions of his struggle with systems relation to history. I would hope that the "far larger" work promised at the end of *Insight* would be attempted by someone in the next generation, and a large source of enrichment of the impoverished treatment of *Method in Theology* lies here. For instance, my notion of a genetic systematics – of which, for instance Aquinas' system would be a neglected integrator-operator slice – emerged only from my struggle with this

especial danger in presentations of specialised ethics that do not acknowledge an ongoing dependence on the undeveloped speciality Communications. Ethics is isomorphic with metaphysics and shares the same burden of generalized empirical method (see the previous note).

⁵⁴ *CWL* 3, 602.

⁵⁵ It is good to see (*MJLS* 19 (2001)) Michael Shields' translation work emerging. His translations of Lonergan's writings on Providence, Faith, Supernatural Being, "On Intellect and Method" and "On Good and Evil" (a supplement to *De Verbo Incarnato*) deserve to reach a wide and needy public.

hidden resource. The notes should be available in all Lonergan centres, and eventually edited for publication.

13. Communications

By *communications* I mean both the eighth functional speciality and the communications that I conceive as the ninth genus of implementation. The chapter on this topic is subtle but altogether too slight.⁵⁶ It was never presented in his Summer method courses: even after finishing *Method*, he left me with the unenviable task of saying something about it in the Dublin Institute of 1971. Early scholarly struggles with the topic tended to shrink the meaning⁵⁷: I tried to restore the balance in “Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts.” A massive global genetic systematics is to be linked with interdisciplinary, transpositional, and media reachings⁵⁸ in order “to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness”⁵⁹ and to scientific and aesthetic consciousness, however reductive. Because of general bias’ effect within Lonerganism, the speciality of Communications requires massive dedication if it is to develop into the seriously remote global-local speciality that it should be. It brings to mind my favourite parable, The Unjust Steward, when I pursue the complexity and sophistication of secularity’s commitment to communication, the energy devoted to selling soap as compared to selling salvation. The children of this world seem, indeed, wiser.

14. Special Categories

Some few remarks. Lonergan’s sketchy treatment of these

⁵⁶ The first brief section, linked to the other brief section of the book, chapter three, section 6, is powerfully suggestive of the mature categorial character of post-axial times, mediating foundationally both the character of all hodiks (*Method*, 292) and eventually the character of culture, the topic of the second section. *Character* is full of deep resonances and also recalls the breadth of the beginning of the Aristotelian *Magna Moralia*.

⁵⁷ On this, see the concluding sections of Sinead Breathnach, *Communications in Lonergan*, a doctorate thesis in the Department of Higher Education, Trinity College, Dublin, 1986. A copy is available in the Toronto Lonergan Centre.

⁵⁸ *Method*, 132.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 99.

in *Method* is restricted to the Christian tradition. But it would seem methodologically wise to envisage a genus of such special categories, related to various groups that claim revelation, and even differentiated within Christian groups according to the character of their revelation claims. But I would also see secular groups making claims for special categories, whether they be groups of microbiologists or mysticisms of Africa and the Orient. The Global spiralling of what I term Hodic Method⁶⁰ calls for such a fuller tolerance. “The use of the general categories occurs in any of the functional specialities”⁶¹ but the special categories will also be operative, in an ongoing spiralling of mutual self-mediations and communal purifications.

15. Nine Genera of Implementation

We have, then, nine genera of implementation, with species and varieties that need to be made explicit in order to furnish a linguistic control of meanings. This effort should gradually generate a complex foundational literature. The implementation that interests me most immediately here is that which occurs at the level of H_4 and H_5 , the level of intellectual loving that eventually should replace philosophy as a discipline. Here we have an implementation that regards primarily the characters of that level: think, for example, of a dozen characters following the challenge of page 250 of *Method*, writing, criticising, self-criticising, in the manner brilliantly described by Lonergan. The topic is altogether too large for development here.⁶² But perhaps one small foray into “the use of the general categories” would be useful in illustrating the move towards developing the isomorphic differentiations of consciousness. Let me take, then, the question of comparison, which in the new structure of method

⁶⁰ I have been using the term *hodic* for some time now: it has both Indoeuropean roots and ordinary suggestive usage, as in that Joycean song, *Finnegans Wake*, “...and to rise in the world he carried a hod.” It is easier to talk about than “functional specialist” method.

⁶¹ *Method*, 292.

⁶² See Frank Braio, “The ‘Far Larger Work’ of *Insight*,” *Lonergan Workshop Volume 16*, edited by Fred Lawrence (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2000).

is a precise subtask of dialectics.⁶³ Consider a possible book or article or thesis that seeks to compare Yanah ibn Mansur ibn Sargun (67X- 749: better known as John of Damascus) and Lonergan. Lonergan studies, and indeed theses, abound in which some such comparison is attempted, and my comments here can be taken as a descriptive transposition of the “first principle of criticism” of the third canon of hermeneutics.⁶⁴ The old style comparison just won’t do, except in the eighth genus of commonsense communication.

But it is worthwhile being quite specific in the illustration. Take, then, the comparison of John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, round about chapters 27 - 38,⁶⁵ with the beginning of chapter three of *Method in Theology*. That section of Damascene can well be read as a marvellous shot – even to locating affectivities in the cerebellum – at descriptively categorising the dynamics of human emotions. The first point, then, is that the comparison is strictly a dialectic operation. But surely comparative comments would be legitimate in the new specialist history? No. Sentence by sentence, expression of the new history would be under the control of meaning of a differentiated consciousness. This certainly is food for thinking. What, then, of interpretation? Again, comparative comments find no place there. The interpreter of this section of *De Fidei Orthodoxa* would obviously be using his or her own categories, not somehow applying or “comparing” Damascene and Lonergan. However, it should be noticed how belief-structures enter into that use. First, if the interpreter accepts the hodic challenge of Lonergan, then there will be a nominal

⁶³ Again, I refer to *Method*, p. 250: lines 6-7. The article in the previous note gives a context. Here, perhaps, is a place to start lifting Lonergan scholarship, availing of the first principle of the canon of successive approximations. It would “make conversion a topic and promote it” (253), the conversion here from a comfortable established mode of writing to a mode that would lift hermeneutics towards the perspective suggested by Lonergan.

⁶⁴ *CWL* 3, 610.

⁶⁵ I am referring here to a Latin text of a particular version, edited by Eligius M. Buytaert O.F.M. (New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), 119-144. The corresponding chapters in an English translation are Book 2, chapters 13- 23, pp. 239-253 of *Saint John of Damascus*, translated by Frederic H. Chase, Jr. (New York: Fathers of the Church Inc., 1958).

assent to the categories as described in the relevant section of *Method in Theology*. Indeed, in so far as my own effort is taken seriously, the interpreter will be thinking nominally the terms *capacity*, *need* of p. 48 of *Method* as aggreformically structured: my odd identification of the human as $f(p_i; c_j; b_k; z_l; u_m; r_n)$ would be a heuristic aid to humility and progress. What is “feeling angry” for John Damascene? The interpreter will recognise and identify an early description of a reality that in our day we seek to define in the fullness of its lower conjugates and acts.⁶⁶ But the interpreter is not stuck with description: a nominal hold on the universal viewpoint boosts the struggle to an explanatory level. One might think here even of a pure formulation: but now we are flying away from my few “points for discussion.” It is time to bring my ramblings to a close.

16. Concluding Remarks

I had envisaged a penultimate section dealing with practical suggestions regarding implementations in education and in scholarly practice, but perhaps a collegial effort is a richer route here. At all events, the concluding chapter of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism* gives a sufficient generic indication for discussion.

I began with a *haiku* of butterfly-hope, previously used to begin a Preface to a Lonergan collaboration.⁶⁷ It seems suitable to end with the end of that same preface, which points hopefully to a new contemplative tradition that would take seriously in all its details the agony and the ecstasy of the Cosmic word.

Part of the glory of history is man’s envisagement of its schedules of probabilities and possibilities. If the

⁶⁶ *CWL* 3, 489 is the key page here. Note that when one is studying the human organism, then one can replace “study of an organism begins...” with “self-study of an organism begins...” The topic deserves much elaboration, e.g., what are “phantasm,” “dream,” “naming,” “nodding assent” etc as conceived with full heuristic adequacy?

⁶⁷ *Searching for Cultural Foundations*, edited by P. McShane, (Washington: UP of America, 1986). The book involved five meetings of five collaborators, Crowe, Doran, Lawrence, Vertin, and McShane.

sapling of history is cut down from within, still it can have, within, a vision of the temporal noosphere that, paradoxically, redeems God. The envisagement is the core of future academic growth: its opposite is an elderhood that is the fraud of being in reality “not old folk but young people of eighteen, very much faded.”⁶⁸ Our molecules, “our arms and legs filled with sleeping memories,”⁶⁹ passionately demand that we fly after the butterfly.

‘There the butterfly flew away over the bright water, and the boy flew after it, hovering brightly and easily, flew happily through the blue space. The sun shone on his wings. He flew after the yellow and flew over the lake and over the high mountain, where God stood on a cloud and sang.’⁷⁰

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⁶⁸ Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past* (New York: Random House), 1042.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 2, 874. The full note in the original text is relevant here.

⁷⁰ Hermann Hesse, *Wandering*, translated by James Wright (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1972), 89.