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Letter from the Editors

Welcome to the ninth volume of *Mapping Politics*. It has been a pleasure to work with a group of remarkable authors, volunteers and academic faculty to bring you this historic issue of the journal. This is the tenth year that *Mapping Politics* has operated at Memorial University and we are honoured to participate in the legacy of so many students and faculty at the university. It is fitting that this year the journal has marked ten years of operation by expanding to include a national team of volunteers and authors.

In 2009, the first volume of *Mapping Politics* was published under the leadership of Jillian Terry and a team of volunteer reviewers. Founded as an undergraduate journal in political science, *Mapping Politics* was supported by founding faculty advisor, Dr. Amanda Bittner and offered students an opportunity to engage in the peer-review process, strengthen their writing abilities and gain a wider audience for their ideas.

Since that first issue, *Mapping Politics* has remained in continual operation. Sustaining a student-led operation is challenging and we acknowledge the authors, editors and reviewers who have contributed to operation of the journal over the past decade.

We are pleased to present 12 articles in volume 9, the most ever published in a single issue of *Mapping Politics*. The articles contained herein explore a wide-range of topics and issues from nativism and populism to violence and sports. The scholarship produced by the authors is both relevant and informative. And for the first time ever, *Mapping Politics* is publishing work by student-scholars from outside of Memorial University. We are pleased to welcome authors from Acadia University, the Royal Military College of Canada, Wilfrid Laurier University, and the University of Windsor to *Mapping Politics*. Another first, we are pleased to include our first article written in French.

We extend our thanks to the volunteer reviewers who offered their time and thoughtful feedback during the peer-review process, including students at Memorial University, the University of Calgary and York University. We are also grateful to Dr. Valerie Vezina, Dr. Osvaldo Croci, Dr. Amanda Bittner and Emily Bonia for the time they gave to support the journal's first French language article. As always, we appreciate the faculty members at Memorial University and, now, at other universities who encouraged their students to submit their work to *Mapping Politics*; especially, Dr. Russell Williams, the journal's faculty advisor who continues to be extremely supportive.

MEGAN DE VRIES & JASON D. WATERS

About the Journal

Mapping Politics accepts submissions in all areas of political science and related fields from undergraduate and master's students at universities throughout Canada. This student led journal is hosted by the Department of Political Science at Memorial University of Newfoundland in St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador.

Volume 9

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The Causes of High Human Development in Cuba

CAM BORTOLON, *University of Windsor*

Abstract. Cuba continues to have a HDI score well above what one would expect from a country of its GDP. A unique case both regionally and globally, it presents an impressive degree of success in meeting human security needs. This paper compares key domestic policies used in Cuba with those used in comparable states in the region and worldwide in order to find the causes of Cuba's high HDI score. It finds that these results are due to a combination of factors, many of them based in the state's Marxist-Leninist ideology. Specifically, a combination of equitable land reform, a strong welfare state, and smart prioritization and allocation of government resources work together to deliver a high degree of human development. These findings show that while Marxism-Leninism is by no means a flawless ideology, in practice it can contribute to high human development. Cuba's remarkable success compared to countries with similarly low GDPs suggests that the policies and underlying ideology utilized there should be adopted in other developing nations in order to improve human development and security.

Introduction

The Caribbean is a region rife with poverty and low levels of development, and yet Cuba stands out as a country that maintains high levels of education and life expectancy. Despite a relatively low GDP per capita, Cuba's level of human development is impressively high. Cuba boasts lower infant mortality and HIV rates than America, as well as a higher literacy rate and similar life expectancy (Herman et al, 2011, p. 4). How is it that a poor island nation in the Caribbean measures up so well compared to the richest country on earth? While Cuba ranks 68th on the UN's HDI, it's GDP per capita is similar to those countries placing well below 100th (United Nations). It is reasonable and even important to ask what it is that has caused these admirable results. This puzzle is made even more interesting considering the unique adversity Cuba has experienced since the revolution. Regime change, the restructuring of major institutions, an authoritarian regime, the 'Special Period' after the collapse of the USSR, and the subsequent alienation Cuba faced on the international scale should all have impeded Cuba's human development, and yet it continues to punch above its weight on the UN's HDI. Why is Cuba's level of human development so high compared to other countries with similar amounts of money? In this paper, I will suggest that these favourable results can be attributed to Cuba's relatively unique domestic policies, which are in part based on the state's Marxist-Leninist ideology. Specifically, this paper will argue that equitable land reform, an exceptionally strong welfare state, and good governance through smart prioritisation and allocation of government resources have worked in conjunction to produce the impressive human development Cuba enjoys. This paper will further suggest that each of these three factors is necessary but not sufficient as an explanation of Cuba's high degree of human development.

This paper will proceed by reviewing the literature on this subject, focusing first on Cuban human development since the revolution, and later on works pertaining to the effects of Cuba's

land reform, universal social programs, and targeted spending on human development. I will then analyze why Cuba's HDI is so high, given its difficult circumstances and low GDP per capita. In order to do so I will take into account specific domestic policies and compare them to the norm in the region and in other comparable states. In doing this, I will show that the disparity between relevant policies is reflected in a disparity in outcomes as shown by HDI data, and that it is therefore reasonable to assume that these policies are the cause. I will conclude with a look at possible further inquires and address the importance of this issue as it relates to the study of human development and the developing world.

Literature Review

The ideal way in which to promote human development with a limited budget is of eminent importance to scholars of the developing world, and thus the relevant literature is vast and varied. First, general background on Cuba's experience since the revolution will be analysed in order to be sure that the high human development is a result of policy implemented by the Castro government. Next, a look at comparative studies of Latin America and the Caribbean will highlight Cuba's unexpectedly high degree of human development in relation to similar states. In the final three paragraphs of this section, land reform, welfare state policies, and good governance through targeted spending in important sectors will be noted. To be clear, the sources cited in these three paragraphs do not argue that their respective factors (land reform, welfare state policies, and good governance) are sufficient to explain Cuba's high HDI score, they only posit that they have had a positive effect on Cuba's HDI. All of these works form the foundation that allows this paper to advance its argument.

The general history of development in Cuba has been well documented, and such works provide the necessary background for this paper. Historical accounts of pre-revolution life and the vast improvements in human development since 1959 show that it was indeed the policies put in place by the Castro government that have led to the positive effects we see today, and not a prior advantage over other Caribbean states (Strug, 2009). Goicoechea-Balbona and Conill-Mendoza (2000) put forward a World Systems Theory approach to development in Cuba, and highlight the importance of American sanctions and pre-revolution Cuba's periphery status in the international capitalist system when it comes to development policy (p. 2-16). In his article, "Cuba: The Process of Socialist Development," Cole (2002) offers a detailed history of development since the revolution. This article provides an especially informative history of the Special Period and its effects on Cuban policy and the Cuban population (Cole, 2002: 8-14). Cole avoids placing too much influence on economic development, and instead focuses on a specific form of human development that he calls "socialist development" (2002: 5). It is clear from these works that Cuba's success can be attributed to the domestic policies enacted by the Castro government.

Cruz-Martinez (2014) offers an in-depth comparative account of the welfare states of many Caribbean and Latin American countries. Conspicuously absent in this report though, is Cuba. Nonetheless, this report provides valuable context with regard to welfare state systems in counties that share Cuba's geographic traits and history of colonialism. Cruz-Martinez also provides a solid background of the human development initiatives in comparable states for this paper. Alfaro's paper on comparative development strategies in Cuba and Central America makes the case that Cuba's radical model has performed better than the conservative approaches of development in every aspect of living standards (1987: 66). By documenting and analysing human development outcomes of the conservative and radical approaches, Alfaro establishes that human development

outcomes in Cuba are in fact higher than in comparable states in the region. These comparative studies further highlight that it is the specific policies of the postrevolution government that have produced such favourable human development results.

I will now turn to the competing explanations for what specific aspects of the Castro government fostered such impressive results. The redistribution of land after the revolution undoubtedly played a large part in producing the high level of human development we see in Cuba today. Many scholars attribute Cuba's high HDI score to the economic and social equality fostered by the Castro government's land reform policies. Lissner notes the plantation economic system, which was present in the Caribbean and Latin America since the colonial era, had profound effects on postcolonial development, and that these effects are relatively unique to the region (1986: 2). He further notes the different approaches that the newly decolonised states took, and how unopposed elites often continued to dominate, with chattel slavery transitioning to wage slavery, allowing vast inequalities to persist. Lissner's analysis of the Guyanese case is particularly instructive, and provides a good comparison in land reform policy (p. 3). By comparing two differing approaches to land ownership and analysing the human development outcomes of each, Lissner shows the effects of land ownership reform. In this case, the Cuban approach was clearly more effective. Also important to the understanding of Cuban land reform is Mandel's 1982 article, "Patterns of Caribbean Development: An Interpretive Essay on Economic Change," in which he argues that land reform was necessary to allow economic development independent from international actors. Schultz (2012) makes the case that Cuba's particular strategy of land reform made it especially helpful in terms of human development. By being more equitable than a free market capitalist system, the Cuban system promoted far greater outcomes for all citizens. By being more decentralised than the standard soviet model, the Cuban system of co-operatives proved to be less cumbersome and prone to inefficiencies, and thus more productive. Indeed, Schultz refers to the Cuban model as a "superior form of socialism" for just this reason (2012: 125). While land reform and the forced redistribution of land from its grossly inequitable pre-revolution form clearly made great strides towards human development, it alone cannot account for the favourable outcomes seen in Cuba. For example, Cuba's high literacy rate cannot be solely attributed to land reform. This paper will build on the above works by integrating the important effects of land reform with the establishment of universal social programs and the effective and strategic use of state funds in order to explain the high level of human development in Cuba.

The strength of the Cuban welfare state is of integral importance to this paper. Herman et al. (2011) offer a good review of Cuba's social services, especially as they compare to those in the United States. Their work also provides a compilation of informative statistics pertaining to human development outcomes in Cuba. (Herman et al., 2011: 4). By highlighting the Cuban governments priorities through analysing government spending figures, this article shows that Cuba's high HDI is made possible through a strong welfare state (Herman et al., 2011: 4). Although less empirical, this article's assessment of social work practices in Cuba is emblematic of an overall more progressive and interdisciplinary approach towards human development. Thomas (2016) offers insightful documentation and analysis of the Cuban Healthcare system, with particular focus on how it has held up since the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Special Period. His six idea-based and agenda-guiding principles provide a helpful link between ideology and policy (Thomas, 2016). While policies relating to the welfare state undoubtedly hold profound influence over the level of human development in Cuba, they alone cannot account for the impressive level of human development the country experiences. As mentioned above, only the synthesis of a strong and far-reaching welfare state, the elimination of land and wealth inequality, and good

decision making on important matters in domestic and international policy can explain these remarkable outcomes.

Good governance is a notoriously broad and ambiguous term, but for the purposes of this paper it can be defined as the smart prioritisation and allocation of government resources. This is obviously an important factor in the human development of all states, but is especially important in countries with limited resources, such as Cuba. Cuba's authoritarian state structure allows leadership to make strategic decisions on government spending quickly and decisively. This smart allocation of funds can be seen in a few particular sectors. The earliest example of smart state spending was in the years following the Cuban Revolution, when many previously well-paid medical professionals fled the country. The government reacted by investing heavily in medical education in this period, and has continued this pattern of high spending in the medical field up until the present (Herman et al., 2011: 2). In fact, today Cuba boasts the highest ratio of doctors to citizens, in no small part due to this intelligent focus of state funds (Herman et al., 2011: 3). Related to this is Cuba's engagement in the pharmaceutical, biotechnological, and medical equipment industries since the fall of the USSR (Cole, 2002: 12). It was in these industries that, according to Castro, Cuba could "compete successfully with developed countries" and achieve the necessary partial reintegration into the world economy (Borge, 1993: 115). Cuba is also renowned for its hurricane preparedness, and this too is an example of the positive effects of focused prioritisation by the government (Levins, 2005). Cuba puts ample resources towards ensuring the safety of its citizens during the hurricanes it frequently experiences. Included in these safety measures are special training for engineers in order to make buildings less susceptible to hurricane conditions, annual hurricane drills that span two days and involve every citizen, state funded evacuation, and well-planned reconstruction efforts that start as soon as the storm has passed (Levins, 2005). While these well thought out targeted uses of state funds have certainly contributed to Cuba's high HDI score, they alone cannot account for such impressive results. By considering the good judgment in targeted policy areas in conjunction with other relevant factors to human development this paper will more fully explain the high level of human development in Cuba.

Analysis

As seen above, there are a few distinct explanations offered for Cuba's remarkably high HDI score. Some may argue that it is Cuba's exceptionally strong welfare state and the government's commitment to universal social programs. Others might posit that it was the land reform policy, specifically Guevara's Agrarian Reform Law, that led to high human development. Still others could claim that Cuban leadership's investment in certain key programs and sectors is what has produced Cuba's success. This paper asserts that Cuba's high HDI score was not caused by any one of these factors acting alone, but by all three of them working in conjunction with each other. Each factor alone has undoubtedly had positive effects, but without taking the others into account, cannot fully explain the favourable human development Cuba enjoys.

As a socialist state, Cuba boasts an impressive welfare state apparatus. All citizens are guaranteed free education and healthcare. In addition, mothers are offered six weeks of pre-natal leave and a full year of post-birth maternity leave (Herman et al., 2011: 4). The presence of these universal programs certainly plays a part in explaining Cuba's high degree of human development. In countries without such a substantial welfare state, many citizens with medical problems often go untreated, and as a result, preventable premature deaths occur. This phenomenon, aggregated on a national scale, leads to a lower life expectancy, one of the three key factors measured by the

UN's HDI (Atun et al., 2013). Universal education works in much the same way, influencing the HDI's education component. It is clear that since 1959, the introduction of a strong welfare state has seriously bolstered Cuba's human development (Herman et al., 2011).

However, merely having a strong welfare state design does not lead to such high human development. Healthcare and education need to be paid for, and some countries whose welfare systems would otherwise be strong suffer for lack of funds. This leads to either failure of the state to provide the promised services or to the provision of subpar services that have limited effectiveness. North Korea, for example, displays the rhetoric of a socialist state with equality for all, yet this is clearly not the case. Merely having high-minded plans for an extensive welfare state while sorely lacking the means with which to achieve these plans has left the population of North Korea with low human security (Howe and Kim, 2011). Where Cuba has opened itself to the world economy enough in strategic sectors to maintain the funding of its welfare system, North Korea remains closed to the world, and where Cuba has targeted the problems that most affect its citizens (hurricanes and medical problems), North Korea has neglected them (famine and medical problems) in favour of military spending (Howe and Kim, 2011). Although lack of funds due to a lack of wise state decisions is surely not the only impediment to a strong welfare state and thus human development in North Korea, more attention to specific citizen needs and better investment practices would undoubtedly have a positive effect on the country's HDI. The lofty ideals of strong universal social programs are clearly not the only factor that contributes to human development.

One of the main goals of the Cuban revolution was to greatly diminish the extreme land inequality of the Cuban economic system. While many would argue that this is an admirable end in itself, those who do not accept this should look to how the elimination of land ownership inequality has increased the level of human development in Cuba. By eliminating the class of landless rural peasants, the Castro government greatly reduced unnecessary poverty. By expropriating foreign-owned land, the Agrarian Reform Law returned vast amounts of wealth to previously poor Cubans. For example, nearly two thousand square kilometers of land owned by American corporations became property of the state, and, by extension, the Cuban population (Kellner, 1989, p. 58). Rather than the funds produced by work done on this land leaving the country, this money was put to use inside Cuba. Cuba's particular form of small farmer's co-operatives incentivised work and kept profits to reasonable levels, lifting many out of poverty, thus raising the country's HDI score (Schultz, 2012).

Significant land reform alone, however, is not guaranteed to produce such favourable outcomes. With relatively similar colonial experiences and geographic locations, the Mexican case is applicable to this paper's study of Cuba. In Mexico, land reform has been an ongoing process, and has largely been successful in reducing the vast inequalities that were present during the colonial era and the years immediately following it (Albertus et al., 2016). Yet despite this, and with more than double Cuba's GDP per capita, Mexico still places nine spots behind Cuba on the UN's HDI (United Nations, 2016). This can largely be attributed to Mexico's comparatively weak welfare state apparatus, which fails to provide universal healthcare and education. Also important is the lack of smart governance through investment and stimulation of certain sectors. While Cuba has fostered the growth of key industries, Mexico has failed to do so. In 1970, the Mexican consumer electronics industry was poised to be among the most competitive in the world and was larger than that of Taiwan and South Korea. However, due to multiple blunders on the part of the governing PRI party, this opportunity for economic development was lost (Lowe and Kennedy, 1999). The funds gained from successful development of this industry may have been useful in establishing greater state capacity and a more far-reaching welfare state, and thus helped boost

Mexico's HDI. Clearly, extensive land reform alone is not a sure cause of high human development.

The Cuban government has an impressive track record of good governance through prudent use of state funds. Domestically, investment in medical training and hurricane preparedness has led to higher life expectancies, and thus increased Cuba's score on the HDI. Internationally, stimulating the healthcare technology and pharmaceutical industries proved wise, and contributed to an economic recovery over the past two decades that has been described as "nothing short of a miracle" (Cole, 2002: 4). The partial reintegration into the global economy could have been disastrous for Cuba, but by targeting those sectors in which Cuba could become competitive, the Castro government advanced Cuba's status on the international scale and secured enough international capital to maintain welfare state institutions in an exceptionally difficult period. Clearly, good decisions on key policy issues by the postrevolution government have had profound effects on Cuba's human development.

However, wise spending on practical domestic and international matters is not enough to create such high levels of human development as can be seen in Cuba. For this particular aspect, the Vietnamese case is instructive. Vietnam's economy has grown quite impressively over the past three decades (Vidal Alejandro, 2015). This has largely been attributed to the Doc Moi reforms introduced in 1986 (Ngoc, 2008). These reforms left behind soviet-style central planning, and allowed key sectors to grow. In much the same way Cuba targeted the key sectors of biotechnology, medical technology, and pharmaceuticals, Vietnam provided the conditions for rapid growth in the crude oil, textile, and footwear industries (Cima, 1989). While it is true that these measures have grown the Vietnamese economy, and even benefited the poor to some degree, these advances have done very little for human development. Where Cuban investment in medical training and equipment benefited its citizens first and foremost, Vietnam has opened itself to predatory multinational corporations, and has become famous for the sweatshop conditions many workers experience (Canada and the World Backgrounder, 1997). Vietnam thus remains 47 spots behind Cuba on the HDI, which cannot be explained by a mere $2000 deficit in GDP per capita (United Nations, 2016). Further, Vietnam is situated around countries with similar GDP per capita scores, while, as previously mentioned, Cuba places well ahead of countries with similar wealth when it comes to human development. It is clear that opening up to the world economy and the use of wise state strategies for growing key domestic and international sectors is not all that is necessary to achieve high human development.

Conclusion

Equitable land reform, a strong welfare state apparatus, and good governance through smart use of state funds in key sectors are all significant parts of a successful human development strategy. Cuba possesses all three of these important factors, and as a result enjoys exceptionally high human development for a country of it's wealth. However, none of these factors alone is enough to explain the unexpected success of the Cuban case. By examining other states that possessed one but not all of these traits, this paper has shown that all three features must be present in order to explain Cuba's high degree of human development. An equitable ideology and a strong welfare state plan is of little use without enough money to finance it, and this money is typically only found in states where good leadership decisions and wise targeting of key industries is present. Equalising land reform is only a part of successful human development, and without a strong welfare state a country's HDI will remain lower than it could be under the right conditions. Good

governance and smart state priorities are only useful in the quest for human development if they are done with the needs of the citizenry in mind. This paper has shown that each factor is necessary, but not sufficient for a high score on the HDI. Cuba's exceptionally high level of human development can only be explained by taking into account all three of these factors, as it is only when they work in conjunction with each other that they can produce such admirable results.

Through the course of my research for this paper, some new and interesting research questions came to mind. A more detailed comparison of both economic and human development in Cuba and Vietnam could shed light on the effectiveness of socialist and more free market oriented policies in states with past experiences with soviet style centrally planned economies. Another possible research opportunity could be a comparison in welfare state policies between Cuba and other states known for their robust welfare systems, such as the Scandinavian countries. While it is clear that Cuba lags behind these states in human development, important theoretical lessons could be drawn from each side, and could be mutually beneficial in producing better universal social programs for all involved parties.

As stated at the beginning of this paper, fostering human development on a low budget is of paramount importance for scholars of development and of political economy more generally. By synthesizing the three factors outlined above into a more comprehensive recipe for human development, this paper has shown that no one factor can lead to success, and therefore that no one factor is wholly responsible in the Cuban case. Many focus on the establishment of a strong welfare state in particular as the means by which Cuba has produced such impressive human development, and this paper has shown that while this has undoubtedly helped, it is by no means the only factor that has contributed to the unexpectedly high HDI Cuba enjoys. In a world with so much poverty, learning to cope and effectively take care of citizens should be a priority for the government of any developing state, and indeed any government. Considering the bleak state of human development in many of Cuba's neighbours today, Castro's reflection on the revolution continues to ring true today. Cuba, he truthfully claims "with modest resources but with a deep sense of social justice, has given man dignity like never before and has met his needs for education, healthcare, culture, employment, and well-being" (Castro, as quoted in Cole, 2002: 1). It is in the interest of all to understand what exactly has caused this to be the case, and to spread this much needed success around the world.

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"When in France, do as the French do!": The Front National and the European Union

A Battle for the Preservation of French Culture

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Abstract. With the rise of the far-right in Europe, previously unpopular right-wing parties emerge from the shadows to rival the dominant parties of their state. One such political party which has benefited from the wave of far-right movements in Europe is the Front National (FN) in France. One of the most distinguishing features of the FN is its criticism of the European Union (EU), arguing that the EU has contributed to the decline of France, specifically, the decline of French sovereignty. Embracing its Euroscepticism, the FN is the only outspoken anti-EU party in France, allowing it to further promote its role as the sole protector of the French culture. This paper contends that the condemnation of the European Union by the Front National is embedded in a cultural nationalist argument, where the EU is viewed as encroaching on the state's ability to provide for and look after "the French people," thereby being detrimental to the interests of France.

Introduction

Euroscepticism, which was once at the periphery of European politics (Brack and Startin, 2015), is becoming mainstream as the rise of the far-right spreads across Europe (Chakelian, 2017) with right-wing parties gaining traction and support, emerging from the shadows to rival the dominant parties of their state. The Front National (FN) in France, is one such political party which has benefited from the wave of far-right movements in Europe. One of the party's distinguishing features is its criticism of the European Union (EU), arguing that the EU has contributed to the decline of France, specifically, the decline of French sovereignty (Statham and Koopmans, 2009). The objective of the FN has been to create an economically stable and thriving French state for the French people, which, according to the FN, has not been accomplished because of external forces, with the main culprit being the EU. Moreover, the FN embraces Euroscepticism, since it is the only outspoken anti-EU party in France, and further promotes its role as the sole protector of the French culture (Goodliffe, 2015). This article contends that the condemnation of the European Union by the Front National is embedded in a cultural nationalist argument, with the EU infringing upon French sovereignty, considered as complete autonomy in the political and economic field, which prevents France from protecting and preserving its culture. Thus, the FN argues that the EU encroaches on the state's ability to provide for and look after "the French people," thereby being detrimental to the interests of France.

Euroscepticism is the questioning of or objection to the European integration process and doubts about the benefits of the European Union, displayed in discourses and behaviors of political actors/politics (Flood, 2002). Furthermore, Euroscepticism can be divided into two camps,

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principled and contingent Eurosceptics (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). The principled (hard) Eurosceptics oppose the EU and the process of European integration. Furthermore, they contend that withdrawal from the EU is in the best interest of the state. On the other hand, the contingent (soft) Eurosceptics do not directly oppose being members of the EU and the European integration process. The primary concern is in policy areas that are seen as disadvantageous to the state, with EU interests being at odds with the state's interests (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008). Following the above definitions, the Front National can be classified as a hard Eurosceptic, where it directly opposes being a member of the EU, demands more sovereignty and less interference from the EU, and is opposed to the process of furthering European integration (Lazone, 2017).

Although the FN can be classified as an extreme right-wing party, adhering to the politics of a strong state, nationalism, xenophobia, and racism (Carter, 2005), it is better categorized as an extreme right populist party (Rydgren, 2004). The FN has characteristics that are populist in nature, in that they seek further legitimacy by claiming they represent the will of the "people," specifically the will of the French people, believing that referendums will "permettre un réel exercice de la démocratie directe" (Le Pen, 2012, p.8). Furthermore, the FN has incorporated a populist argument primarily under Marine Le Pen (Rothwell, 2017). Le Pen promised to protect the identity of French culture, arguing that the EU infringes upon the state's capability to ensure that the voice of French citizens is not drowned out amongst the cacophony of voices that is the European Union. The Front National's national populist argument is revealed in its advocacy for a French state for the French people (Ramdani, 2017). The FN's conception of the French people lies primarily with citizenship (What does France's National Front stand for? 2014) claiming benefits only for those of French nationality (Le Pen, 2012). The FN defines French nationality, or citizenship, as the assimilation to the French culture and proficiency of the French language (Le Pen, 2012).

Furthermore, per Hainsworth (2008) the nationalist-populist discourse of the FN builds upon Barres' work, in stating that in France, the French are first, and foreigners are second[2]. The FN does not define what exactly constitutes the "French culture." The party has mainly argued that the French culture is based on European cultural traditions in a sovereign French state (Fagge, 2016) and frequently contrasts French culture with Muslim culture to categorize French culture as distinct and blames the EU for preventing France from preserving its culture.

Anderson (1983) depicts the nation as an imagined community in which its members construct an identity that is distinguished by the way in which its members inagine and/or think about such community/nation. Nationalism then becomes an act of the consciousness of the nation's members, or rather a state of mind of its members (Kohn, 1946). Therefore, nationalism can be viewed as the link between the concept of the state, nation-state and the state (Development of nationalism, 2000) and nationalism that focuses on a nation's culture highlights the individual aspects of such imagined community and becomes a mean for addressing the universal and allows such community to become distinct from others surrounding it (Todorov, 1989). Cultural nationalism can refer to the ideas and practices of a community, i.e., the nation, that focuses on the cultivation of a nation (Woods, 2015), thus promoting the national culture of the nation/community (Cultural nationalism, 2000). Moreover, according to Woods (2016), the end-goal of cultural nationalism is to provide the nation with an identity, destiny, and history, by using key players, such as intellectuals, to promote its view of the nation to the national community. For this paper,

[2] Maurice Barres was a French Politician and writer, known for his fervent nationalism (Maurice Barres, 2001). Barres was considered an intransigent nationalist, and his novels, entitled Les Bastions de l'Est, were used as French propaganda during World War I.

cultural nationalism is defined as the promotion of the preservation of a nation's culture, which refers to the ideas, practices, and language(s) of the members of such community/nation. Analyzing the economic policies of the EU and their effect on French sovereignty, this paper will examine the FN's argument that the EU encroaches on the state's sovereignty and prevents it, in a cultural nationalist aspect, from promoting and preserving French culture. Thus, the primary analysis of the article centers on the FN's criticism of key economic and immigration policies of the EU, which as argued by the FN, is leading to an erosion of French culture.

This article is organized into four sections. In section one, it provides a brief history of the Front National and its electoral success analyzing the evolution of the FN's views on the EU. It focuses on the party's desire to retain sovereignty and how this has affected its perspective on the EU, from Le Pen, the father to Le Pen, the daughter. In section two, it examines how the EU, as argued by the FN, encroaches on French sovereignty by analyzing its institutions and economic policies that are viewed as detrimental to the preservation of French sovereignty and culture. In section three, it assesses the populist argument of the Front National, focusing on the concept of "heritage populism," which has emerged under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, claiming France as a state only for the French. Section four examines the arguments put forward by the FN against the EU and how the FN has used cultural nationalism to promote its agenda. Finally, the article concludes by relating the risks of interdependent economies in a globalized world and briefly considers the significance of the 2017 French presidential elections.

History of the Front National and its Views on the EU

The Front National was founded in 1972 as the National Front for French Unity (FNUF), as a coalition of parties that could become a respectable parliamentary party (Shields, 2007). The FN declared itself to be right-wing from its inception with the intention of creating support for the nationalist cause, seeking to reconcile the differing views of the coalition parties, so as not to provoke discontent in voters. During the 1970s the Front National functioned only on the fringes of French politics, so that between 1972 and 1981, the FN began its journey to evolve into a mainstream party (Davies, 1999). As a recently formed party, its first electoral program was slightly moderate, and its primary concern was communism which it, along with other right-wing parties, viewed as the biggest threat. In 1978, the FN, under the growing influence of Duprat, a founding member, the party adopted its hard-line stance on immigration. In 1978, after the death of Duprat, Jean Pierre Stirbois could exert influence over the party, preparing it for electoral success, building upon the work of Duprat (Shields, 2007). In 2011, the FN came under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, daughter of the former President of the party Jean-Marie Le Pen (Lockett and Devlin, 2017). Under Marine Le Pen, the party also underwent a washing-down of its radical roots and enjoyed popularity in the French elections of 2016.

Electoral Success

The Front National rose to prominence in the 1984 European Elections, when the party won 10 out of 81 French seats with almost 11 percent of the vote (Shields, 2007). From this year forward, the FN would usually garner between 10 to 15 percent of the national vote. In 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen got through to the second round of the presidential election (Shields, 2007), where likewise, Marine Le Pen could accomplish the same (Lockett and Devlin, 2017). Although the FN has succeeded in establishing itself as a contender in French politics, it could never grasp

political power, but it has succeeded in developing itself as a formidable force in French politics. Thus, it is essential to analyze its Eurosceptic attitude and the foundational basis for this success.

Early Views on the European Union

The Front National has always been against any form of European federalism, and the party advocated for a strong, rigidly defined geopolitical bloc that would allow the preservation of the national identity of France (Davies, 1999). During the 1970s, the FN's discourse on Europe overlapped with its views on the West, which it saw as beneficial to the defense and protection of France. It viewed the European Union as a powerful bloc that could counter external forces that threatened the European states, but France could retain its identity. However, the Front National's views on Europe would change in the 1980s, when the party became extremely anti-American, its attack and fears of an ever-closer Europe became evident.

The signing of the Maastricht treaty would prove to be the turning point for the FN, with Le Pen arguing that France would disappear in a European Union that was becoming more federalist in character and power (Davies, 1999). Instead of a united Europe, the Front National advocates for a Europe of Nations, with the state retaining full sovereignty and control over its affairs (Davies, 1999), echoing the argument of former French President, Charles de Gaulle (Will, 2014). Furthermore, the FN's case that the EU is becoming more federalist and encroaching in states' affairs is reminiscent of that of Charles de Gaulle and his opposition to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), which led to the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965. Like QMV was for De Gaulle (Dinan, 2015), the Maastricht Treaty proved a pivotal moment in the FN's discourse towards the European Union. The treaty officially established the European Union and paved the way for a common currency (Kenealy et al., 2015). The FN champions the conservation of the French people, their culture and the ability for France to preserve the interest of the French. In economic terms, the FN's views are hostile to what it calls savage competition, resulting from deeper European integration and globalization. The Maastricht would require political integration that would weaken France's sovereignty by having to implement policies that were not designed for the French state. Therefore, the Front National argued that the decline of French sovereignty would lead to an erosion of the French culture.

Contemporary Views on the European Union

Although the Front National has never been a single-issue party (Atkin and Tallett, 2003), its Euroscepticism has allowed its populist approach to thrive, solidifying its argument as a party for the French people against a European elite that will destroy the identity of the French nation. The FN calls for a renegotiation of the treaties of the European Union to allocate more powers to the state and allow France to regain its lost sovereignty (Statham and Koopmans, 2009), specifically, control over its economic affairs. The Front National argues that under the increasing powers of globalization the state cannot perform its primary purpose, which is to protect the culture of France, because of its suppression of national borders (Evans, 2000). Furthermore, the FN argues that the nation is the only agent capable of protecting its citizens and no foreign powers should come prevent this from happening. The Single European Act, according to the FN, achieved a sufficient level of economic liberalization and should not have resulted in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. Marine Le Pen stated that the state knows what is in the best interests of its citizens, claiming that the European Union has made itself the judge, censor, bailiff, and tax

collector of its member states (OxfordUnion, 2015). To further illustrate her point, Le Pen criticized the EU stating that its power over the nation states ranges from determining the size of fishing nets to the grading of fruits and that its sole purpose is to redefine the state and its structural organization.

Marine Le Pen advocated for a reform of the treaties of the European Union, arguing that France should be allocated more benefits to protect its national identity or face a Frexit (Le Pen, 2017). Support for the European Union by French citizens has affected the argument put forward by the Front National (Goodliffe, 2015). After the crisis of the Eurozone, the level of support for the EU in France dropped dramatically to 30 percent in 2011. Since then, the Euroscepticism of the Front National has mainly focused on economic effects the EU has on the French economy, such as unemployment and debt, linking the negative aspects of the French economy with the European integration process. Importantly, the French have expressed greater discontent with the European Union at the economic level. In 2014, 78 percent of French citizens did not believe that the EU made living costs cheaper and 67 percent did not think the EU created more jobs, calling into question the economic benefits of the European integration process. In the same year, the FN could capture 68 percent of voters who expressed discontent with France's membership in the EU, in the European elections.

The discontent of the French citizens with the EU is mainly due to cuts in social spending because of the Maastricht criteria and the single market (Goodliffe, 2015). However, the rise in discontent and Euroscepticism in France is not a new occurrence. France has experienced a social and economic crisis since the 1990s. The European Union was viewed as a main cause for the high unemployment rate because European integration has led to economic liberaliztion. The Maastricht criteria set stringent rules for entering the Eurozone, targeting inflation, national debt, interest rates, budget deficit, and exchange rates (Maastricht Criteria, 2017). States that are part of the Eurozone cannot pursue economic policies, such as devaluing the currency to boost exports (Hayes, 2016). Furthermore, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is based primarily on the preferences of Germany (Dinan, 2015). The FN argues that France should restore its central bank (OxfordUnion, 2015) and that this would prevent external threats to the French economy.

The European Question: French Sovereignty in an Economic and Monetary Union

FN and the Economic Policies of the EU

The Euroscepticism of the Front National focuses mainly on the economic policies of the European Union that it views as encroaching on the French state. The FN concentrates its criticism on the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the fiscal and monetary structure of the EMU, and the Euro. Firstly, regarding socioeconomic costs, the FN argues that the Single Market and the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) have created conditions in which small and medium-sized French firms cannot compete with multinational companies (Le Pen, 2012). Furthermore, the FN claims that the EU places French workers in direct competition with low-wage developing countries (Le Pen, 2012), being one of the causes for the unemployment of French workers, with the unemployment rate fluctuating between 10.5 and 9.6 percent from 1996 to 2017 (France Unemployment Rate, 2012).

Second, the Front National argues that the fiscal and monetary structure of the EMU infringes on French sovereignty by limiting the control France has over its economic policies (Goodliffe, 2015). The FN argues that the Euro is detrimental to the French economy, with Le Pen stating that "for the past ten years, the Euro, the single currency, has failed to deliver on its

promises" (2012: 2). Le Pen (2012) also argued that France should return to using the Franc as its currency, which would boost economic prosperity. The Front National promises that upon abandoning the Euro, France would regain territorial, legislative and monetary sovereignty (Le Pen, 2017). The FN also argues that the strict fiscal criteria of the Euro has forced France to reduce social spending under the Stability Pact, which requires EU member states to remain within 3 percent of GDP annual spending limit (Goodliffe, 2015).

The FN cites these strict fiscal policies as evidence of the EU's infringement upon French sovereignty and how it can tie the hands of the French government and limit its ability to protect and ensure the survival of the French national identity. The future of the French economy is dependent on decisions made by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt, which does not understand or consider the needs of the French people. The FN has said that the Euro can coexist with the Franc, stating that the Euro's balance sheet has created an "explosion of prices, unemployment, relocations, and debt" (Le Pen, 2012: 2). Moreover, after the financial crisis of 2009, the FN built its case against the Euro arguing that funds diverted to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal instead of building the French economy, was, in the words of Marine Le Pen, condemning France to "mourir à petit feu" (Le Pen, 2012: 2).

The FN Views on Immigration: Protecting the Cultural Identity of France

In the same way, the FN links its arguments of preserving the economic sovereignty of France by opposing the free movement of goods and capital which it argues promotes Third-World immigration, that is detrimental to France's cultural identity (Godlifffe, 2015). The FN also voices criticism on the Schengen agreement, advocating for the exit of France from the agreement to prevent uncontrolled immigration (Lanzone, 2017). The Front National promotes border control, arguing that immigration produces a loss of control over national borders, which restricts the French state's ability to ensure the survival of the French culture and rights of French citizens (Reungoat, 2015). The Schengen agreement represented the FN's fear of frontier-less Europe, that would ultimately produce an influx of immigrants into France, threatening the national identity (Davies, 1999). Thus, the core argument of the Front National against the European Union, as viewed in economic terms, is that the EU fiscal policies reduce the French State's sovereignty which in turn limits its ability to preserve the French culture. Most importantly, by focusing its argument on the defense of the national identity and culture of the French state, the FN can tone down its racists and radical roots.

The FN and the Case of Heritage Populism

In the face of globalization, the fear of losing cultural and economic influence is pervading in Western states (Reynie, 2016) and the Front National has decided to ride in its wake. The FN refers to the decline of French sovereignty as the loss of the ability to protect the French culture and act in its economic interests, which leads to the reduction of the French state's influence in Europe and globally. Referring to the arguments put forward by the FN, heritage is the characteristics that pertain to a culture of a society, such as langue or traditions, that have historical importance (Heritage, 2017). Per Reynie (2016), heritage populism is the promotion of the protection of French heritage which can be tangible, such as living standards, or intangible, such as a way of life, combined with hostility towards the EU, Islam, and immigrants. The Front National, as argued by Reynie (2016), joined the ranks of heritage populists after the election of

Marine Le Pen as party president in 2011, to distance the party from the anti-Semitism of her father before her (Reynie, 2016). In doing so, Le Pen has succeeded in changing the racist aspect of the party and has labeled the party as the protector of French culture, thus, embedding the FN Euroscepticism in a cultural nationalist argument.

Marine Le Pen criticized the European Union saying that its "irresponsible policy" on immigration has only brought economic migrants into France (Rogers, 2016). As the FN argues, migrants become a financial burden and prevent the French state from safeguarding the rights and values of the French people. Le Pen maintains that France must regain control of its borders (Rogers, 2016), and by doing so, it can ensure the protection of the French social identity (Reynie, 2016). Immigration is further linked to the cultural nationalist argument of the FN when Le Pen stated that taxpayers fund immigration, but cultural assimilation is impossible when criticizing the EU and the European Central Bank. Le Pen indicated that multicultural societies always become multi-confrontational societies (OxfordUnion, 2015). Without borders, Le Pen argued, there can be no sovereignty, no independence, and no state. Le Pen called the EU "technocratic" with the end goal of dissolving the nation-state, which would impede France from protecting the French people, and the values and freedom of the French population.

Identity is a fundamental aspect when considering the Front National's discourse surrounding the French state (Davies, 1999). The Front National consistently portrays France as a state in need of being protected from external forces that contribute to its decline, specifically, from forces that are non-French, that is, forces that do not understand the French culture. Moreover, not only must France be protected from external forces, such as the European Union, but also internal forces. Those inside the French state that are not assimilated into the French culture and are viewed as non-members of a shared heritage (Hainsworth, 2008) and are perceived as a threat to the preservation of the French culture.

Thus, the discourse on heritage populism has allowed the Front National to broaden its base of support, is more appealing to middle-class workers, small businesses, private and public-sector workers, thereby representing all French citizens (Reynie, 2016). The Front National views the EU as an elitist creation, seeking federal power to dominate Europe. The European Union, as perceived by the Front National, wishes to amalgamate all cultures into one, by eroding the importance of the State. Thus, the Front National is the guardian of the French culture and economy, because the sovereignty of France is dependent upon its economic success, an area in which the European Union has produced only adverse effects.

Analyzing the Role of Cultural Nationalism and the FN's Argument Against the EU

As Kohn (1946) so eloquently wrote, it was with a French influence that the Enlightenment spread while promoting the individual and contributing to the inception of nationalism. Furthermore, the era sparked an interest in the past of people, i.e., nations or imagined communities, and a desire to learn about their ideas and customs (Kohn, 1946). The FN embeds its criticism against the EU in a cultural nationalist argument because it seeks to "enlighten" the French community to the detrimental effects of EU economic policies that integrate a myriad of different cultures, which do not take into consideration the diverse aspects of each state's economy. Thus, the goal of the FN is to promote what it defines as the future or destiny of France, and Le Pen is at the forefront leading the French to their destiny. In other words, the FN seeks to awaken the French, as almost as the calling to arms, to defend their culture and identity, which the party is forging as the sociopolitical climate changes.

Cultural nationalism, therefore, helps tone down the racist roots of the FN's past and allows the party's platform to appeal to citizens of the French state, or as the party contends, those who have assimilated to French culture and the French language whether by birth or assimilation. Critical to the FN's discourse surrounding French culture is its disposition to remain vague on how it defines French culture allowing the party to present itself as the guardian and the party of France, specifically, the party of the French people and culture by contrasting itself with the European Union. It views the EU as a hostile entity that seeks to abolish the importance of the state. Having to cut social spending because of the strict fiscal criteria of the EU has deterred the French state from being able to protect and serve the interests of the French people. More importantly, being a part of the Schengen agreement means that foreigners or those that are not assimilated into the French culture are receiving benefits that should be primarily for the French people. Furthermore, because of the freedom of movement in the EU and its immigration policy, France experiences not only external threats, such as the monetary policy of the Eurozone but also internal threats.

At the forefront of the Front National's propaganda has been the preservation of the cultural identity of France. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen, the FN adopted an ethnic-nationalist argument. However, to broaden its base of support, the party had to undergo a washing down of its racist roots and took a cultural nationalist argument that focused on heritage rather than ethnicity. By focusing on heritage, the Front National could focus its discussion on "France for the French" and advocate for an economically strong state that controls its borders and can ensure the survival of the French people against an encroaching and invasive European Union, with immigration being the primary concern.

Moreover, the FN did not always view the European Union with disdain. From its start in 1972 until the signing of the Maastricht in 1992, the Front National saw the European Union as another way to ensure the protection the identity of the French state, given the communist threat. However, when the European Union became an economic and monetary union the Front National began to view the EU as a threat to France's sovereignty and cultural identity. Since then, the FN has focused on the adverse effects that the EU has had on the French economy, such as unemployment and the cuts in social spending because of the Maastricht criteria. Thus, the EU, as argued by the Front National, limits the choices sovereign states can make to ensures to ensure their survival thus limiting its options and resources to preserve the French culture and identity.

Conclusion

Considering that the economies of states are so interdependent in a globalized world, the question arises: "Is the rise of the far-right a final gasp of the nation-state or the beginning of a revival?" The Eurozone crisis has managed to propel Europe into a mist of uncertainty in the face of the fact that if an economy fails, it could mean one for all and all for one. If anything, the 2017 French presidential elections proved once more that the fear of losing influence or status between economies is as real as the desire for economic success, and not only politicians change their tactics, but citizens are swayed by propaganda that promise to meet their needs before the betterment of society. In other words, pride, behind its many masks, is still a grave sin, and its effects on politics risk sociopolitical chaos. The importance of the Front National in French politics has not eroded considering the 2017 French presidential elections. France is a founding member of what is now called the European Union, and the rise of the far-right, especially in France, calls into question the benefits of the EU and its survival if the far-right manages to obtain political power in France.

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National Identity and Sports in Latin America

The Hundred-Hour Football War between El Salvador and Honduras

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Abstract. "La Guerra de Fútbol," Spanish for The Foodball War, erupted after a qualifying match in Mexico City between El Salvador and Hunduras for the 1970 FIFA World Cup. Despite El Salvador winning the match, the state dissolved diplomatic ties and invaded Honduras on July 14, 1969. However, a football match was not the primary cause of the war. Instead, the sport was used as a political tool by the government of El Salvador to direct the attention of its frustrated citizens towards the actions of its neighbouring state in expelling and attacking Salvadoran immigrants, while attempting to remain in power. This paper argues that citizens of El Salvador could be motivated to invade Honduras because of the build-up of tensions between both states, providing an optimal opportunity for the Salvadoran government to create an "us vs. them" mentality surrounding the events of the 1969 football matches. The role of the sport in Latin America is analyzed and considered how it could be used for a nationalist cause to invade another state. Moreover, the xenophobic feelings of Hondurans towards the Salvadoran immigrants (legal and illegal) is examined as is the economic distress and political tensions of both states and discusses how it ultimately played out in the football field because of a blurred line between sports and national identity.

Introduction

Governments have long recognized the socio-political importance of football and have used the sport to aid nation-building processes, promote ideologies, and create collective identities (Zec and Paunovic, 2015). Football is also an influential tool for governments in achieving other objectives. Such was the case in 1969 when El Salvador invaded Honduras following a football match. "La Guerra de Futbol," Spanish for the football war, erupted after a qualifying match in Mexico City between the two states for the 1970 FIFA World Cup, with El Salvador beating Honduras 3-2 (Russell, 2016). Despite its victory, and to the surprise of Honduras, El Salvador dissolved all diplomatic ties with Honduras and invaded the neighboring state after the match on July 14, 1969 (Newton, 2014). Although Latin-America is renowned for its love for football, the sport was not the primary cause of the war that lasted four days. Instead, football was used as a political tool by the government of El Salvador to turn the attention of its frustrated citizens towards the actions of the citizens and government of Honduras in expelling and attacking Salvadoran immigrants. Thus, this article argues that the build-up of tension between El Salvador and Honduras provided an optimal opportunity for the Salvadoran government to create an "us vs. them" mentality surrounding the events of the 1969 football matches. With the military government seeking to divert the attention of its citizens from domestic turmoil and consolidate

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its power, football became an influential tool in the Hundred-Hour war, with the defense of national identity at its core.

National identity plays a vital role in sports in Latin-America, especially in football. National identity is the perception of a state as a cohesive whole, represented by a distinct culture, traditions, and language (Oxford Dictionary, 2017) and sports play a central role in a state's self-perception (Grix, 2016). At the core of national identity is a sense of 'us,' proving to be a powerful tool that evokes the image of the nation as a 'person' with an autobiography, aspirations, predispositions, boasting evident characteristics (Hausmann, 2016). In international competitions, national teams represent the state and are commonly 'equated' with the nation (Grix, 2016), that is, it represents the national identity of the state, which is characteristic of Latin-America in their fervent support for their national football teams.

It is essential to analyze the role of football in Latin-America to understand how it could be used for a nationalist cause to invade another state. In the late nineteenth century, a massive influx of Europeans brought the sport to Latin-America (Reyes, 2015). Football spread rapidly because it transcended socioeconomic class, becoming a symbol for the different cultures that were divided by race and class. Crucially, in Latin-America football has served as a vehicle for reinforcing authoritarian, national, class-based aspects of identity and culture (Bar-On, 1997). Football rivalries, which also influence politics and identity, are prominent among neighboring states (Nadel, 2014). Citizens identified more with the game than they did with the institutions of the state, identifying with the sport at the neighborhood, regional and national level (Bowman, 2015). Thus, football became an influential weapon for politicians. The sport was used for political manipulations by the socio-economic elites of Latin-America for nationalist, class-based objectives, creating "us versus them" characters between states or different cultural groups within states (Bar-On, 1997).

Critically, language plays a crucial role in the development of national identity because it shapes and reflects how citizens interpret social realities (Sewpaul, 2009). More importantly, however, is that identities exist in different historical and geographical spaces, and at various societal levels (Sewpaul, 2009), which came to play a critical role in the Football War. Most Salvadorans immigrating into the southern departments of Honduras were indigenous farmers from the lowest socioeconomic class (Newton, 2014), meaning that their identity conflicted with that of the mixed-European Mestizos of Honduras and El Salvador who spoke Spanish. Thus, not only did national identity play a crucial role in the Football War but the regional identity of the immigrants and their socioeconomic status contributed to the escalation of tensions between the two states because Hondurans felt the need to protect their state and economy from free-riders.

This article is organized into four sections. In the first section, it provides a short history of the tension between El Salvador and Honduras leading up to the 1969 qualifying match which took place in Mexico City. It provides the necessary background concerning the migration of Salvadorans into Honduras and its contribution to the political stress between the two states. In the second section, it reflects upon the Honduran stance surrounding the Salvadoran immigrants and analyzes the motives behind the government of El Salvador and its reasoning for starting a war with Honduras, discussing the relationship between land scarcity in El Salvador and the increasing unpopularity of the Salvadoran military government. In the third section, it relates the actions of both states during the preliminary matches that ultimately led to war after the third game in Mexico City while analyzing the motives and actions of the Salvadoran government, specifically those of Pres. Sanchez Hernandez. In the fourth section, the article assesses the importance of sports in politics, specifically football in Latin-America, and its use as a tool by politicians eager to remain

in power. The article concludes by examining and discussing the relationship between football and national identity in Latin-America.

El Salvador and Honduras: Land Scarcity and Migration Issues

The tension between El Salvador and Honduras had lasted almost thirty years, with land dispute being the most contested issue (Carter, 2011). El Salvador is approximately five times smaller than Honduras, with a population that was growing faster than that of Honduras in the sixties (Russell, 2016). By 1969, the population of El Salvador was 3.7 million in comparison with 2.6 million in Honduras. Salvadorans began migrating to mostly uninhabited regions of Honduras and settling, mainly as farmers. The Land Reform Law of 1967 (Carter, 2011), started a series of events which would ultimately boil over onto the football field. Honduras began expelling many of the illegal immigrants as well as the legal Salvadoran citizens who had lived in the state for many years. Salvadoran citizens suffered physical violence at the hands of the Hondurans. Many were beaten, and there were allegations of torture and cruelty, escalating the tension between the citizens and government of the two states (Carter, 2011).

The actions of Honduras amplified the response of the government of El Salvador (Carter, 2011). From 1967 to 1968, the expulsions of poor, Salvadoran citizens from Honduras were minimal (Newton, 2014). However, this changed in 1969. Honduras began expelling large numbers of illegal immigrants from El Salvador, and the Salvadoran government closed its borders to its citizens. As the football matches were played, Salvadorans viewed Honduras as aggressors towards the citizens of El Salvador, calling the expulsions discriminatory by nationality. In other words, Hondurans were seen as hostile and treating the illegal immigrants unfairly, becoming the primary source of contention between the two states (Newton, 2014).

However, in the 1960s, Honduras was ill-equipped to deal with the massive influx of Salvadorans across its borders (Newton, 2014). Honduras, in the early twentieth century, had only recently begun to develop its economy by implementing projects such as road-building and foreign direct investment through banana companies which controlled most of the Honduran territory (Merrill, 1995). The immigrants were becoming a socioeconomic strain on an already economically burdened state, and with El Salvador refusing to address the situation, the Honduran government began forcefully removing the immigrants as a quick way to solve the problem (Newton, 2014). El Salvador then closed its borders to its citizens attempting to force Honduras to renegotiate the Land Reform Law (Merrill, 1995), a prominent factor that would set the stage for the football war.

The Honduran View on Salvadoran Immigration

Many Hondurans, as well as most politicians, were anxious and dissatisfied with the influx of Salvadorans into their state and held firm convictions that it did not benefit their society (Newton, 2014). Most of the immigrants were ‘campesinos’ a term used to refer to farmers who are largely from the lowest socioeconomic class in Central America. Primarily, the immigrants were viewed as an economic strain on an even poorer state than their own, and as shops owned by legal Salvadorans immigrants began to expand and succeed, Hondurans felt that their jobs were “taken away” (The 1969 ‘Soccer War’ between Honduras and El Salvador, 2017). The situation was deemed unfair and stirred unrest because although Honduras is much larger than El Salvador, the smaller state boasted of a better economic situation. In 1969, the Honduran GDP was two-

thirds that of El Salvador (Newton, 2014). Furthermore, large corporations in Honduras, such as Chiquita, which owned around ten percent of the state, sought to expand and viewed the Salvadoran immigrants as a threat to their plans (Russell, 2016).

The views of the government of Honduras and the population, in general, can be classified as having far-right sentiments, evidenced in their argument that the Salvadorans immigrants were leading to the further decline of their economy. Importantly, like right-wing parties, the government adhered to strong nationalist sentiments and promoting xenophobic feelings (Carter, 2005), arguing that the Salvadoran citizens, illegal as well as legal, were receiving benefits intended for the Honduran population, thus robbing the more impoverished Honduran state of opportunities to advance. So, as the tensions continued to rise, the Honduran population was primed to defend Honduras, and the events surrounding the football matches provided them with a reason to do so.

Behind the Curtain: El Salvador's Motives for War

El Salvador's motives begin at the root of distrust towards the military government by the lower socioeconomic class. The lingering memories of "La Matanza," Spanish for the killing, provoked feelings of discontent and distrust toward the government decades after it occurred (Haggarty, 1988). La Matanza was carried out by General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, mostly referred to as Martinez, who started El Salvador's history of military dictatorships (Lovato, 2011). Communist uprisings by the 'campesinos' or farmers led to retaliation by the military government, resulting in the death of approximately 30,000 indigenous people in 1932 (Haggarty, 1988). The message was clear: the military government was in control and no challenges to its rule would be accepted (Haggarty, 1988). Moreover, as the land monopolization produced drastic contrast between the upper class and the campesinos, the political unrest also increased, threatening the government's consolidation of power.

Unity in the Salvadoran society proved a difficult task for the government of El Salvador to achieve as it began facing harsh criticism in 1968 (Soccer War 1969, 2017). The economic situation of the state produced political unrest and growing labor conflicts, which escalated in 1969 when the Honduran government refused to renew the 1967 Bilateral Treaty on Immigration, calling the Salvadoran immigrants illegal land invaders. Moreover, the massive influx of Salvadorans into Honduras threatened to provoke social unrest, undermining support for the Sanchez government in El Salvador (Haggarty, 1988). The solution to the political turmoil, according to the government of El Salvador, was a war with Honduras and football became the rallying cry. The actions of the Honduran government, which saw its citizens resorting to physical violence to expel the Salvadoran immigrants, provoked nationalist feelings that resulted in the unity of the legal, political parties and a clear majority of Salvadorans, in support of the war to defend their state. Although the government of El Salvador most likely foresaw that such unity could not last and that immigration of its poorest citizens to Honduras temporarily lessened the economic strains (Haggarty, 1988), the war shifted the focus from its defects to the 'injustice' of the actions of the Honduran government.

The 1969 Football Matches: Ready, Set, Fight!

As the contention between the two states increased, the qualifying football matches for the 1970 FIFA World Cup not only became an outlet of anger for the frustrated citizens but an

alternative battlefield. That is, the football matches became an opportunity for the loyal and passionate fans to defend their national identity. A three-game elimination match as a preliminary to the World Cup occurred in June 1969 (Merrill, 1995). The first game was hosted by Honduras in its capital city, Tegucigalpa, on June 8 (Russell, 2016). The night before the game, Honduran fans beat tin pans, empty barrels, and set off firecrackers outside the hotel where the Salvadoran national team was staying (Kapuscinski, 1986). The idea was that a sleepless team could not win the match the next day, and it was so. The host state would go on to win the game, 1-0. However, Salvadorans disputed the win feeling "cheated," as the goal occurred in overtime (Russell, 2016). Also, igniting the fury of the Salvadorans was the suicide of Amelia Bolanios, after the loss of El Salvador (her home state) to Honduras (Kapuscinski, 1986). She became a national heroine, and a symbol of revenge against the Hondurans, leading up to the second match in El Salvador that would take both states down a path of no return.

The second game, hosted by El Salvador in its capital, San Salvador, occurred on June 15 (Russell, 2016). The night before the match, the Honduran national team experienced severe harassment from Salvadoran fans (Dart and Bandini, 2007). The fans broke all the windows of the hotel while throwing dead rats, rotten eggs, and stinking rags inside (Kapuscinski, 1986). The Honduran players had to be taken to the stadium in armored cars, to avoid bloodshed. As the National Anthem of Honduras was played, the Honduran flag was burned, and in its stead, a dirty dishrag was hoisted on the flagpole, as the crowds cheered and whistled. The military surrounded the pitch with sub-machine guns to prevent the Salvadorans fans from committing any crimes. El Salvador beat Honduras 3-0 (The 1969 'Soccer War' between Honduras and El Salvador, 2017). Furthermore, after the match, Salvadorans took to riots in their capital city, attacking buses and cars headed to Honduras, which resulted in the death of two Honduran fans (Russell, 2016).

As the news of what had occurred in El Salvador reached Honduras, Hondurans vandalized Salvadoran shops in the major cities of San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa and began attacking Salvadorans in mobs (Russell, 2016). Many were dragged out of their homes and beaten, forcing approximately 1,400 Salvadorans back to their home state daily, traveling mostly by foot. Houses belonging to Salvadorans were broken into and burned, as fleeing Salvadorans were robbed. The government of El Salvador called on the Organization of American States (OAS) to intervene as they accused Honduras of committing genocide, but to prevent further turmoil, the OAS remained impartial to the situation (Russell, 2016).

The third and final match occurred in Mexico City on June 26, with El Salvador beating Honduras 3-2 (Russell, 2016). Despite their win, and the first-time qualification to a World Cup, Salvadorans were blood drunk with revenge and angered at the lack of international response to actions of Honduras against Salvadoran citizens. The government of El Salvador dissolved diplomatic ties with Honduras, justifying its actions because the Honduran government did not punish its citizens for their crimes against Salvadoran immigrants (Hickman, 2017). Both governments expected a military confrontation and purchased World War II vintage fighters from private sellers. Notably, the football war was the last war to use piston-engine fighters. On July 14, 1969, El Salvador's Air Force began striking targets in Honduras, starting with the international airport in the capital city, Tegucigalpa (Hickman, 2017). On July 18, 1969, four days after the war began, the OAS could arrange a ceasefire, which became effective two days later (Cartohistory, 2017). With the truce in place, it would not be until August 2, that El Salvador would begin to withdraw its troop after the OAS threatened economic sanctions and Honduras promised that the remaining Salvadoran immigrants would be protected (Cartohistory, 2017), which was a pivotal moment in easing the tension between the two states.

Fidel Sanchez Hernandez: A President Fighting for the Salvadoran People?

Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, the President of El Salvador at the time of the Football War (Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, 2018), was a man with an extensive military career using his presidency as a forefront, because, in reality, the National Conciliation Party (PCN), was the political face of the Salvadoran Armed Forces (Martinez, 2016). Importantly, the PCN, during the 1960s and 1970s, was the dominant political party of El Salvador while it was supported by the military (Haggarty, 1988). Herein lies the importance of the Football War: A military man, using the government to his advantage, was nothing new to Salvadorans. Presidents like Mr. Sanchez Hernandez had become a norm since the early 1930s and citizens from poor socioeconomic background, such as the campesinos, could not trust, or identify, with such governments. Thus, as the paper has argued, the events surrounding the football matches provided an optimal window of opportunity to remedy the broken relationship between the Salvadoran government and its citizens. So, unlike his Honduran counterpart, Pres. Sanchez actively engaged with the training of Salvadoran troops, visiting and claiming the territory previously inhabited by the peasant Salvadorans in Honduras during and after the war (Martinez, 2016).

What was the government of Sanchez Hernandez doing? Plagued by economic difficulties due to a decline in world prices of coffee and cotton (Schultze-Kraft et al., 2018), it sought to divert the attention of Salvadorans to the issues surrounding the football matches and the Salvadoran immigrants who were forced back to a home-state that was already overpopulated (Martinez, 2016). President Sanchez began preparing for a war with Honduras several weeks before the third match took place in Mexico City, as the Honduran president relied on the Organization of American States to solve the dispute between Honduras and El Salvador (Martinez, 2016). Importantly, the football war showcases that in times of political unrest, a government can use sport to divert the attention of its citizens to issues that benefit the government. Key to the Salvadoran government's actions is that the President, who was considered a man of arms, actively supported his troops, visiting them and encouraging the invasion of Honduran territory from which the Salvadoran citizens were expelled. With the lingering memory of La Matanza by Gen. Maximiliano, the actions of Pres. Sanchez could be viewed as heroic and interpreted as him being more than a military president, but a president who cares for citizens oppressed by such governments.

Moreover, there is a darker, more sinister nature to such actions. Here, a president seeks to construct an identity of "us vs. them," surrounding the violence of the football matches, thus creating, briefly, an inclusive Salvadoran national identity since citizens identified with football more than they did with the Salvadoran state. As outlined by Grix (2016), national teams are commonly viewed as representing the state and are usually 'equated' with the nation. What does this imply? It implies that the Hundred-Hour war represents the skillfully crafted manipulation of national identity by a government seeking to maintain a stranglehold on power.

Analyzing the Motives for War: Did Football Cause the Hundred-Hour War?

El Salvador's motives are called into question concerning its role in the "Guerra de Futbol." Was the government angry at the lack of remorse from the international community? Or was there a mixture of hidden motives behind the invasion of Honduras? The actions of the government of El Salvador in its refusal to acknowledge or attempt to solve the migration crisis transformed the issue into a defense of national identity. Most of the land in Honduras at the time was uninhabited,

and the state presented better job opportunities in the banana companies for citizens of poor socioeconomic backgrounds (The 1969 "Soccer War" between Honduras and El Salvador, 2017).

However, Hondurans viewed the Salvadoran immigrants as "stealing" the best jobs and slowly invading their sovereign state. The Salvadoran citizens, beginning in 1967, began to view the Hondurans as hostile and aggressors against citizens of poor socioeconomic backgrounds (Merrill, 1995). Moreover, facing political criticism at home, the football matches shifted the attention of Salvadorans away from the government towards the actions of Honduras in expelling Salvadoran immigrants and harassing the national football team as a symbol of attack on all Salvadorans.

Would the war have occurred in the absence of the preliminary matches for the 1970 World Cup? The political tension between El Salvador and Honduras spilled over into a rivalry that played out on the football field (Pike, 2016). The cause of this tension resulted from the land scarcity issue in El Salvador which saw the Salvadoran immigrants representing roughly 12.5 percent of the population of Honduras in 1969 (Newton, 2014). With the increasing tension between the two states, the 1970 FIFA World Cup qualifier exacerbated the patience of Salvadorans and Honduras. In Latin-America, football is a source of national pride (Nadel, 2014) and the borders around football and national identity are blurred (Kapuscinski, 1986), that is, football becomes equated with the national identity and losses or insults are taken to mean abuses against the individual people of that state. Thus, the necessary conditions for war were already in place, but the events surrounding the football matches acted as a catalyst and justifiable reason to start an invasion.

The actions of the Salvadoran fans ignited the fervent nationalism that is characteristic of Hondurans (Kapuscinski, 1986) to which they resorted to violence as the only way to achieve justice. The burning of the Honduran flag was not merely an act of disrespect but a symbol of defiance to the national sovereignty of Honduras. Honduran public schools are passionate leaders in providing education that centers on allegiance to the flag, teaching Hondurans to respect it as a symbol of peace, unity, liberty, and justice (Redhonduras, 2003). Furthermore, Article 315 of the Constitution of Honduras dictates that although there are no specific sanctions against the misuse of the national flag, any disrespect to a National symbol would result in two to four years of jail and a fine of fifty to one-hundred thousand Lempiras (Redhonduras, 2003). Moreover, the flag must only be burned when it is no longer fit for display or has touched the ground during a national ceremony because it embodies the national sovereignty of Honduras. Hondurans felt provoked and called to protect their national identity. Importantly, the five stars of the Honduran flag symbolize unity between the 'five sisters' states of Central America. Thus, the burning of the flag could be viewed as a direct attack on the bond between the former Spanish colonies. The football war, as it was termed by the Polish journalist Kapuscinski (1986), is perhaps the correct name for the 1969 War between El Salvador and Honduras, as it was the football matches that promulgated the "us vs. them' feeling between citizens of both states.

Conclusion

The Football War showcases the importance of the sport in Latin-America and how it is used by political leaders to either consolidate power or to shift the national attention when political unrest threatens their government. El Salvador could not address the return of its citizens due to land scarcity and political and economic unrest of its citizens caused by the land monopolization of the oligarchy. Further contributing to the turmoil in El Salvador was Honduras' refusal to renew

the Immigration treaty of 1967, and forcefully expelling the immigrants back to their home state. Against the backdrop of political turmoil, fans greeted the football matches for the 1970 FIFA World Cup with anticipation, anger, and filled with the need for revenge.

Football was recognized by the government of El Salvador as a powerful socio-political tool that could create an 'us vs. them' mentality, useful for directing the attention of the citizens to other issues. In the history of Latin-America, the sport helped solidify the identity of the states that were former colonies of Spain since citizens identified with the sport at the community, regional, and geographic level. Thus, as politicians needed to garner support or unite their state, football became the go-to method. In 1969, the sport provided an optimal opportunity for the citizens of El Salvador to join and identify with the sport as well as with the government, thereby fostering an identity that became contrasted with Honduras.

The football matches that would ultimately lead to the war between El Salvador and Honduras could also be viewed as passionate, extremists' fans seeking to ensure the victory of their national team. However, the fans quickly interpreted the losses and action of each other as an attack on the national identity of the other, which, when mixed with the tensions of land reform and illegal immigrants, boiled over into a war over football. Thus, the historical and cultural importance of football runs deep in the souls and minds of Latin-Americans, proving to be a useful tool in times of political crisis and even in winning elections.

The Football War, aided by xenophobic feelings, economic distress, and political tensions, ultimately was the result of a blurred line between sport and national identity. That is, in Latin-America, football is thought to be the heart of the state, with an attack on the national team as a means of survival, turning the sport into a powerful and dangerous tool in the hands of politicians who seek to consolidate power. In other words, football, the sport of the common man, can also be used as a silent weapon to pursue political objectives of identifying a government with a forgotten people, providing false hope that social reforms could be possible, thereby quelling any threat to what such governments consider their "rule." Thus, the Football War leads one to question whether the sport, fervently promoted as the sport that can unite and change the world, is not merely another veil of darkness covering the eyes of those suffering from the malady that is poverty.

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Canals, Consent, and Coercion

A Critical Approach to the Political Economy of Transnational Mega-Projects

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Abstract. Ever since Chinese telecommunications magnate, Wang Jing announced in 2013 that construction would be going ahead for an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua, the proposed mega-project has garnered considerable attention and criticism. In order to analyze the political dynamics between the private investor and the nation-state, this paper seeks to move beyond a state-centric approach that has been used to frame this project specifically, as well as other infrastructure projects of a similar nature. By moving away from a conventional state-centric approach, this paper explores both how and why actors govern in the context of environmental politics. In order to do so, this paper adopts a critical political economy approach to assess the politics of global environmental governance.

Introduction

Ever since Chinese telecommunications magnate, Wang Jing announced in 2013 that construction would be going ahead for an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua, the proposed mega-project has garnered considerable attention and criticism. Wang, backed by his private infrastructure investment group, the HKND (Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Group), was granted a fifty-year concession to manage the project by the Nicaraguan legislature in 2013, in what many critics deem a "notoriously nontransparent [process]" (Daley, 2016). Not only is the Nicaraguan state legally obliged to uphold the contract for fifty years, but there is no specific timeline in the contract for the construction of the project. This contract drew immediate criticism from observers who argue that the concession is tantamount to Nicaragua surrendering its sovereignty (Wünderich, 2014). These perspectives have become increasingly critical as there are still no signs of progress on the $50 billion mega-project. International criticism is mounting (Wünderich, 2014) and there were close to one hundred domestic protests against the project in 2017 alone (Vasquez, 2017).

The viability of the Nicaragua Canal looks increasingly doubtful; however, the fifty- year concession granted to the HKND still retains legal bearing. This concession has worried critics, both locally and globally, as the HKND will retain access to a sovereign *place* for years to come regardless of the construction progress on the canal. The transnational power that the HKND wields over sovereign actors—including the Nicaraguan state and other local actors—is the focus of this paper. First and foremost, what social forces facilitate or allow for this wide-scale environmental degradation to occur? Specifically, how exactly did the HKND, a private entity with no experience in infrastructure investment, receive unbridled access to a sovereign place? What economic and social conditions, both globally and locally, enable the HKND to constrain other autonomous actors? Whose rules rule? And, at what cost?

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In order to analyze the political dynamics between the private investor and the nation- state, this paper seeks to move beyond a conventional, regime-centric approach. Such a theoretical approach presumes that nation-states are the primary actors and that national interests are the primary incentives for large-scale infrastructure projects. In the case of the Nicaragua canal, it would be misleading to reduce the project to a bilateral interaction between China and Nicaragua. Doing so obscures the historical, material, and social forces that facilitated this proposed project—on both a global and local scale. Instead of a regime- centric approach, this paper will explore *how* and *why* particular actors govern in the context of environmental politics. More specifically, this paper adopts a critical political economy approach to assess the politics of global environmental governance (Newell, 2008).

First of all, this paper will refute the aforementioned regime-centric approach that has been used to frame this project specifically, as well as other infrastructure projects of a similar nature. In addition, this paper will introduce a more comprehensive theoretical framework using a critical political economy approach that is more appropriate for analyzing the politics of transnational mega-projects. Secondly, this paper will provide an empirical description of the proposed mega-project in Nicaragua. This section aims to highlight the profound risks this project poses—both environmentally and socially. And finally, this paper will analyze the aforementioned case study through the theoretical lens and argue that this case has greater implications for other projects of a similar nature.

Theoretical Framework: Beyond a Regime-centric Approach

In recent years, scholars and commentators have noted China's increasing presence in Latin America. Whether through comprehensive trade agreements or through the support of large infrastructure projects many scholars have concluded that this increased interest is evidence of China's geopolitical 'agenda' in the region (Gallagher, 2016; Yip & Wong, 2015). A state-centric approach—wherein the Chinese state is presumed to be the primary actor—has been applied to the proposed Nicaragua Canal. Although scholars that hold this approach concede that the Chinese state does not directly finance the proposed interoceanic canal, they argue that because it lines up with their "geostrategic" interests in the region, the Chinese state is a primary actor. For example, Stratfor's 2014 article explicitly states: "Chinese investment in the [canal] … aligns with Beijing's broader trend of investing in ports and other infrastructure projects …" (2014). Other authors follow this logic by arguing that because China will benefit—economically, geopolitically, or otherwise—from the canal, it is a key actor in the project (see Yip and Wong, 2015).

A state-centric analysis of the Nicaragua canal, and of transnational infrastructure projects in general, is analytically expedient as it provides a "nice, neat, and above all simple explanation of the past" (Strange, 1982: 480) and in doing so, ignores the question of *how* and *why* environmental problems arise. In the aforementioned Stratfor article, for example, there is no mention of *how* or *why* a private, transnational entity, the HKND, governs in Nicaragua. Instead of engaging with the actual politics of environmental governance—who governs, how do they govern, and why do they govern—a state-centric approach obscures the social forces that facilitate these power relations. Saurin argues that "international political analysis continues to be conducted as if environmental goods and bads are produced, accumulated, and therefore regulated by public organizations. They are not." (Saurin, 2001: 80). Here, Saurin implicitly suggests that other non-state actors have taken a dominant role in global environmental politics, a role that a state-centric approach doesn't necessarily account for.

Newell expands on Saurin's argument and asserts that there has been a "widening and deepening" of non-state actors implicated in environmental governance and regulation that are "dispersed, global, private, [and] beyond state regulation" (2008: 511). These private, transnational actors, argues Newell, have a certain power in a highly financialized and interconnected global economy as they control the materiality—measured through trade, production, and finance—of global environmental issues. In the case of the proposed Nicaragua canal, the HKND provides the capital for the project, and thus controls the actual construction of the canal. As a result, it regulates and governs a sovereign, environmental space in Nicaragua. Therefore, suggesting that this project is part of China's 'geopolitical agenda' is not only reductive, it also obscures the material reality of the proposed canal.

Newell provides an effective theoretical framework to counter regime-centric analyses of infrastructure projects: a critical political economy approach. Newell explains that in order to understand environmental governance in a global neoliberal context, one must study, "the ways in which 'macro' social and economic forces in the global economy configure the 'micro' practices of environmental politics in particular sites without losing a sense of what makes those sites unique" (Newell, 2008: 528). Newell's theory of the critical political economy approach is useful in that it provides an empirical reference—the 'macro' and the 'micro'—to the theory. In addition, Newell asserts that those non-state actors at the 'macro' level have material, organizational, and institutional capabilities which effectively give them power in the realm of environmental governance. On a macro level, Newell also highlights the role that international financial institutions play through structural adjustment policies that make states more receptive to the "interests of transnational capital" (2008: 513). These 'macro' forces, argues Newell, are what drive 'micro' practices of environmental degradation. Newell also highlights the importance of *place*, and the social, political, and material relations they are comprised of.

The Proposed Nicaragua Canal

Not only would Ortega be surrendering sovereignty in legal terms, the 50-year concession to the HKND also implies surrendering Nicaragua's natural environment and ecosystems. As the tentative canal would be three times the length and twice the depth of the Panama Canal, and the "largest movement of earth in the planet's history" (Daley, 2016), it has repeatedly come under fire from environmentalists who warn its damage would be irreversible (Chen et al., 2016). The construction of the Nicaragua canal necessitates a 50-mile trench through the largest freshwater lake in Central America (Lake Nicaragua). This would risk salinating and contaminating the lake, damaging both freshwater reserves, as well as biodiverse ecosystems. Moreover, the canal would cut through so-called "virgin forests" which are home to endangered species, as well as the land of indigenous and non-indigenous populations. Chen et al. succinctly summarize the devastating environmental impact this canal would truly have, "The canal's construction process alone may pose huge risks of natural and ecological damage, even before the consequences of the canal itself are taken into consideration … At the same time, it threatens to destroy local social and cultural structures in Nicaragua, including historical and archaeological sites, indigenous communities, etc." (2016, p. 88).

Chen et al.'s empirical data provide a compelling insight: environmental changes are inextricably linked to social relations. However, considering these factors independently is erroneous. Humans are invariably shaped by physical environments—and they simultaneously shape those spaces to create *places*. Wapner extends this line of logic by arguing that "there is no

such thing as nature unto itself" (Wapner, 2014). Here, Wapner suggests that the study of environmental politics must move away from a human/environment dichotomy, and instead explore the environment as a socio-biophysical relationship.

Wapner's insights are particularly relevant to the proposed Nicaragua Canal as the environmental destruction legitimized by the Nicaraguan state—and executed by the HKND—will irreversibly affect socio-biophysical relations in Nicaragua. For example, thousands of people—both indigenous and non-indigenous—will be forcibly displaced during the construction phase (Wünderich, 2014). Upon the canal's hypothetical completion, their physical environment and sense of *place* will be fundamentally altered. Natural environments do not exist in a vacuum and dramatic changes to Nicaragua's physical space implies both the coercion of its sovereign citizens as well as the degradation of its ecosystems, its biodiversity, etc. Evidently, these forces are intimately linked, and a socio-biophysical framework is useful because it provides a comprehensive understanding of the canal's impacts, both socially and environmentally.

Canals, Consent and Coercion: A Critical Political Economy Approach

Building on Newell's theoretical framework, there are two 'macro' variables that have shaped the 'micro' practice being examined. In the context of a global neoliberal economy, the first 'macro' variable is the institutional power of international financial organizations, and specifically, the effects of structural adjustment policies on Nicaragua. The second 'macro' variable in this case analysis is the economic power that the HKND wields as an autonomous, non-state financier. These variables are intimately related. The effects of structural adjustment policies consolidated the need for transnational capital—and thus the HKND. The particular 'micro' practice in question is the aforementioned infrastructure project in Nicaragua—and specifically the 50-year concession that was granted to the HKND. This paper contends that the macro variables mentioned *enabled* the 'micro' practice—that is, the concession to the HKND.

The first 'macro' variable to examine is the role of international financial institutions in the context of global neoliberalism. Since the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF have played a fundamental role in re-structuring developing markets in Central America. Through its structural adjustment policies (SAPs), these financial institutions fundamentally shaped the way in which states like Nicaragua gained access to global capital markets (Alvey, 2014:

284). By the late 1990s, however, these institutions began to acknowledge the limitations of these so-called structural adjustment policies, and moved to use new policy tools in developing states, most notably the "Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper" (PRSP). Despite rhetorically promising a shift away from the SAPs, "the introduction of the PRSP approach could be understood as an attempt by the IFIs to rebuild hegemony around their highly contested neoliberal policy prescriptions" (Rückert, 2007: 93). As one of the first countries to adopt the PRSP, Nicaragua quickly "internalized the neoliberal policy stance" represented by the IMF and the World Bank (Rückert, 2007: 104). This resulted in the privatization of welfare systems and public utilities; further trade liberalization; and ultimately an increased presence of multinational firms in Nicaragua. Newell describes the way in which neoliberalization operates, "In a context of weakened state structures, the power and privileges of business groups are enhanced … [through] weaken[ing] environmental legislation and generally … align[ing] state policy more closely with the interests of dominant and transnational capital" (Newell, 2008: 513).

This is the key insight to understanding the environmental governance of the Nicaraguan Canal: in the context of a "weakened" Nicaraguan state, transnational capital—provided by the

HKND—has the power, as well as the incentive, to govern. The HKND agreed to finance the project and provide the labour in the construction process and thus, they control the materiality of the project. As Saurin notes, those that control the materiality of environmental governance, control "the *actual* transformation of nature" (2001: 74). In other words, they control *what* is produced and *how* it is produced. However, the influence of the HKND is not limited to the "transformation of nature" as Saurin suggests; the HKND's power extends to the social realm if environmental space is to be understand as a socio-biophysical relationship. This, in turn, suggests that the HKND has the ability to disrupt and re-shape the existing social and natural elements of a *place*.

The corresponding 'micro' practice, the 50-year concession effectively signing away Nicaragua's sovereignty (Wünderich, 2014), is thus the result of a system that enables private financial entities, like the HKND, to invest its highly liquid and mobile capital abroad. By doing so, the governance of environmental politics is transferred away from the state and towards private transnational entities. However, the state still remains a significant actor, argues Newell, as it is the main actor that bargains with the private actor. Moreover, the state "suppl[ies] coercive power … [to] strip local communities of their historical property right in nature" (Newell, 2008: 515). In this way, the HKND and the Nicaraguan state are not antagonistic actors; in fact, they are complementary forces. Indeed, the concession was only possible because the Nicaraguan state indirectly forfeited the *consent* of the people that might be affected by the mega-project. In doing so, this project necessitated the *coercion* of these people, albeit indirectly through the nontransparent decision-making process (Newell, 2008: 515).

The Personification of Infrastructure Projects: Canals as Political Actors

Although this paper focuses on the complex governance issues at the heart of the proposed Nicaragua Canal—specifically, who governs, how do they govern, and why do they govern—there are several observations that also apply to transnational infrastructure projects more generally. Firstly, a state-centric analysis is an inadequate and reductive framework for exploring the governance issues of these complex projects as it "ignores the vast area of nonregimes," which, in turn, excludes "hidden agendas" and thus obscures the actual politics shaping environmental governance (Strange, 1982: 480). Moreover, it does not adequately address the materiality of infrastructure projects, which reveal the key governance issues surrounding such projects.

Newell's critical political economy approach is useful in that it engages with the social forces that shape environmental governance. His analytical schematic, which implies causation between global, 'macro' forces and local 'micro' practices, is particularly useful in that it highlights *whose rules rule*. In tandem with Wapner, Newell's framework suggests that forces in the global economy shape local practices which erode sovereignty in favour of transnational interests. The case analysis discussed, the proposed Nicaragua Canal, reflects the complexity of transnational infrastructure projects. When conceived nontransparently they inevitably become areas of contestation. Moreover, they reflect the contentious socio-political antecedents—on both a global and local scale—that enable their construction. Regardless of their completion, infrastructure projects themselves become powerful actors as they necessitate the coercion of, and thus forfeit the consent of, sovereign citizens, their natural environment, and the socio-biophysical relationships formed therein.

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Ethnicity, Regime Type and the Tendency for Violence

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Abstract. Within the study of ethnicity and violence, there is a compelling puzzle: the number of ethnic groups in the world exceeds the number of violent ethnic conflicts. This puzzle alludes to an important question: what explains the tendency for violence among ethnic groups in multiethnic states? This essay argues that the tendency for violent ethnic conflict in multiethnic states depends on the regime type of the state. Using data from the *Democracy Index* developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2017) to classify regimes, this paper will argue that 'anocratic' regimes have a higher tendency for ethnic violence than states classified as 'full democracies' or 'authoritarian regimes'. This essay contributes to the literature on ethnic violence and how regime type is an important and overlooked variable for explaining its onset.

Introduction

Within the study of ethnicity and violence, there is a compelling puzzle: the number of ethnic groups in the world exceeds the number of violent ethnic conflicts. This puzzle alludes to an important question: what explains the tendency for violence among ethnic groups in multiethnic states? This essay will argue that the tendency for violent ethnic conflict in multiethnic states depends on the regime type of the state. Using data from the *Democracy Index* developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2017) to classify regimes, and building off a theoretical explanation from Fearon and Laitin (2003) regarding regime type, this paper will argue that 'anocratic' regimes have a higher tendency for ethnic violence than states classified as 'full democracies' or 'authoritarian regimes'. In full democracies, such as Canada, the freedom to engage in collective action and the presence of institutions to accommodate ethnic groups make violence less appealing. In authoritarian regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, the state has the capacity to use coercion and fear to repress ethnic groups, making ethnic violence less likely to occur. In anocracies, such as Iraq, the state does not have the capacity to accommodate ethnic groups nor repress them, providing the conditions in which there is a higher tendency for violent ethnic conflict. One key variable plays a role in this argument: state capacity. Regardless of whether a state is accommodating or repressing an ethnic group, it requires the capacity to do so.

Given that ethnicity is a broad concept, it is important to establish a definition. This essay will adopt the definition of ethnicity posed by Anthony Smith, "Individuals that share i) a common trait such as language, race, or religion; ii) a belief in common descent and destiny; and iii) an

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association with a common piece of territory" (1986: 22-31; Toft, 2012: 583-84). The goal of this essay is not to claim that violent ethnic conflict does not occur in full democracies or authoritarian regimes, but to analyze the conditions in which violence is most likely to occur.

In order to develop this argument, a literature review of three hypotheses will be conducted to explore current theoretical explanations of ethnicity in relation to violence. The first hypothesis claims: if one or more ethnic groups accumulate grievances toward the state and have the opportunity to create an insurgency, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. According to this hypothesis, accumulated grievances (Keen, 2012) and an opportunity for collective action (Bara, 2014) best explain the tendency for ethnic violence. The second hypothesis claims: if opposing ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. According to this hypothesis, geographic concentration and increased competition between ethnic groups best explain the tendency for ethnic violence (e.g. Toft, 2003; Weidmann, 2009; Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010). The third hypothesis claims: if the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress an ethnic group, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. According to this hypothesis, anocratic regimes have a high tendency for violence because of their low state capacity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Each hypothesis was formed based on the reading of various theoretical explanations pertaining to ethnicity and violence and will be tested to develop the initial argument regarding regime type.

After the literature review is conducted, there will be three brief case studies that show the significance of regime type in relation to violent ethnic conflict. Each case was chosen based on its regime type: Canada, a full democracy that has allowed collective action and accommodated ethnic diversity to decrease the tendency for violent ethnic conflict; Saudi Arabia, an authoritarian regime that has prevented the minority Shi'a population from effectively mobilizing and engaging in violence; and Iraq, an anocracy that has endured widespread ethnic conflict and civil war, yet does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress the groups engaging in violence. Using the *Democracy Index*, Appendix 1 provides an overview of why each country is coded as a specific regime type, considering the variables of electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017).The argument posited in this essay is important for two reasons: First, it identifies a condition in which there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. Second, while the argument being posed in this essay is used to explain civil war onset, there are scarce explanations that relate regime type with ethnic violence. Within the scholarly debate of the relationship between ethnicity and violence, regime type is not a common explanation, but this essay will demonstrate that it is a salient variable.

Literature Review

There are various theoretical explanations that attempt to explain the conditions under which ethnic violence is likely to occur. Toft has identified 283 ethnic groups since 1945 at risk of political discrimination and repression, claiming that approximately half of these groups have engaged in violence (2012: 582). The frequency of violent ethnic conflict demonstrates why scholars have interest in understanding the conditions for when it occurs. During the research phase of this essay, there were three identified schools of thought involved in the debate on which conditions cater to violent ethnic conflict. These schools include greed (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), grievance and opportunity (Bara, 2014), and geographic concentration (Toft, 2003).

However, an explanation that is comparably absent is the role of regime type, and the state's capacity to accommodate or repress ethnic groups.

This literature review will demonstrate the importance of regime type in the relation to ethnicity and violence and will test three hypotheses focusing on grievance and opportunity, geographic concentration, and regime type. Greed explanations are not included in this analysis; despite economic resources being necessary to sustain or repress a rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 563-564), greed explanations assume that the accumulation of material resources is the most salient variable for explaining the onset of violence (Toft, 2012: 586). Violence assumes a high risk of battle-related death, and greed explanations fail to show why combatants are willing to sacrifice their lives for material gains that they may not benefit from. Therefore, greed alone has limited explanatory power for the tendency of violent ethnic conflict to occur. However, other schools of thought require further analysis, the first being grievance and opportunity.

Grievance and Opportunity

Grievances are significant in all accounts of ethnic violence; it is obvious that an ethnic group would not engage in violence if they did not possess grievances. Grievance is frustration derived from a difference between the life conditions people expect (e.g. civil liberties), and the conditions that they actually receive (Gurr, 1970: 24). Another key aspect of grievance is opportunity; without the opportunity to act upon grievance, successful collective action is improbable (Bara, 2014: 696). It is difficult to find any instance of violent or non-violent collective action where grievance did not play a role, making this an important theoretical explanation to further analyze.

Grievances are present amongst all ethnic groups engaging in violence. Tackling the greed vs. grievance debate to explain the onset of violence, Keen argues that the grievance explanation is best suited to explain the tendency for violent conflict (2012: 757). Building on the concept of 'horizontal inequalities' that accumulate social and economic grievances between groups, it is shown that grievances built over time cause violence (Keen, 2012: 757). Keen (2012) poses a compelling argument, showing how accumulated grievances lead to a higher tendency for violence between ethnic groups. However, there are two limitations to this explanation: First, Keen fails to explain why grievances cause violence between ethnic groups at a particular time. Assuming a linear relationship between grievance and violence, Keen shows that more grievances lead to a higher tendency for violence (2012: 777). Not only is the 'level' of grievance difficult to measure, but if accumulated grievances alone explain the onset of violence, then there is a gap failing to explain why violence occurs at one point in time instead of another. Second, and perhaps most significant, Keen ignores the salience of the state in the onset of violence. Grievances, while showing why groups wish to engage in violence, do not explain why groups are able to mobilize in some cases but not in others.

Bara (2014) effectively mitigates the gap in Keen (2012) through combining grievance with opportunity. Bara argues that both grievances and opportunity explain the onset of violent conflict between ethnic groups (2014: 707). For example, in countries with an oil 'resource curse', ethnic groups that do not profit from oil accumulate grievances, and when the state weakens because of low oil prices, it provides opportunity for an insurgency (2014: 705). Opportunity is important for determining when ethnic groups are able to engage in collective action and violence. Also, state capacity plays a significant role in opportunity; state capacity determines whether the opportunity for ethnic groups to mobilize is available. In the Rwandan genocide, for example, the

absence of a state-based or international military power provided an opportunity for ethnic violence to occur. Therefore, in full democracies and authoritarian regimes, the opportunity to engage in violence is absent compared to anocratic regimes where ethnic groups cannot be accommodated or repressed (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 88). However, focusing on opportunity does not explicitly signify the importance of regime type in determining state capacity or the tendency for violence to occur. While opportunity is important, having the opportunity for violence is contingent on the top-down capacity of the state to accommodate or repress ethnic groups.

Taken together, Keen (2012) and Bara (2014) formulate the following hypothesis:

> H1: If one or more ethnic groups accumulate grievances toward the state and have the opportunity to create an insurgency, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

However, the above literature review demonstrates that grievances alone do not explain the tendency for violent ethnic conflict. While grievances play a role in all instances of violent and non-violent collective action, they do not explain why violence occurs at a particular point in time, or why violence occurs in some cases but not in others. Despite this, the idea of opportunity is salient; in order for a group to act upon their grievances, they must have the opportunity to do so. This hypothesis recognizes the importance of opportunity but fails to show how this opportunity is both created and constrained by the state. Therefore, grievance and opportunity alone do not explain the tendency for violent ethnic conflict to occur.

Geographic Concentration

The next school of thought that attempts to relate ethnicity and violence is geographic concentration. According to this school of thought, how an ethnic group is organized within a particular territory determines the opportunity to mobilize, the level of competition between groups, and the tendency for violent ethnic conflict to occur (e.g. Toft, 2003; Weidmann, 2009; Toft, 2012). Each of these explanations will be reviewed for their accuracy in demonstrating the tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

Toft (2003) provides an in-depth analysis of the relationship between ethnicity and violence. In her book, Toft argues that the indivisibility of territory, and ethnic groups viewing it as crucial for their survival explains why ethnic conflict turns violent. If an ethnic group is a majority within a region of the state, and view its territory as indivisible, it will be more willing to engage in violence against other ethnic groups and the state to achieve independence. If this scenario does not exist, then a negotiated settlement between competing ethnic groups is more probable (2003: 14). Focusing on groups seeking independence from the state, Toft conflates ethnic group and nation, which are two distinct political concepts. Discounting this conflation, there are multiple cases, such as the Catalan's in Spain, where large-scale violence does not occur between national or ethnic groups. Applying Catalonia to Toft's argument, Catalan's are the majority population within Catalonian territory in Spain and view their territory as indivisible with over 90% of people voting for independence in the most recent referendum (CNN, 2017). However, large-scale violence has not occurred between the Catalan's and Spanish. While geographic concentration does not explain this outcome, Spain has allowed collective action in Catalonia to express grievances, making violence less desirable. Other prominent nationalist conflicts, such as those within the former Yugoslavia, highlight the significance of geographic

concentration in exacerbating nationalist tensions. Despite this, geographic concentration alone discounts the role of the state and its inability to repress tension.

Weidmann (2009) and Toft (2012) further develop the relationship between geographic concentration and ethnic violence. Weidmann argues that there is a higher tendency for violence amongst geographically concentrated ethnic groups (2009). This argument is supported by two claims: First, when a group inhabits a clearly defined territory, they will be more willing to fight and protect it from nearby groups. Second, close geographic concentration of an ethnic group provides an opportunity to mobilize for collective action (Weidmann, 2009: 526). Toft poses a similar argument, claiming that ethnic groups inhabiting their own territory are more likely to engage in violence (2012). Also, violence is most likely to occur in 'peripheral' regions outside of state capitals and urban centers, especially along borders where rebels can find sanctuary in neighbouring states (Toft, 2012: 590). These arguments are compelling; geography is salient in determining the opportunity for mobilization and collective action. However, both Weidmann (2009) and Toft (2012) discount the importance of state capacity. Although Weidmann (2009) successfully demonstrates how concentration enhances the opportunity for ethnic mobilization, the ability to mobilize and engage in violence is contingent on not facing repression from the state. While the desire to engage in violence may be present, the ability to mobilize is not guaranteed. Toft (2012) experiences similar limitations: geographic peripheries are less significant if the state has the capacity to exercise authority over its entire territory. Also, it is debatable whether a neighbouring state would assist a rebellion if its neighbour has high state capacity that translates into a powerful military. Both explanations fail to acknowledge the salience of the state in accommodating or repressing ethnic groups, which are significant limitations for understanding the relationship between ethnicity and violence.

Taken together, geographic concentration explanations form the following hypothesis:

> H2: If opposing ethnic groups are geographically concentrated, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

However, this explanation is not well-suited to demonstrate the conditions under which there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. Geographic concentration is vital for ethnic mobilization in a specific territory, and the political relationships within said territory determine whether grievances are present. Despite this, geographic concentration alone does not guarantee a successful mobilization, and there are several cases where geographic concentration combined with grievances do not lead to violence. This outcome is explained by the capacity of the state to accommodate or repress certain ethnic groups. Therefore, the optimal explanation for demonstrating the tendency for ethnic violence requires a further analysis of regime type.

Regime Type

Compared to grievance and geographic concentration, regime type explanations are scarce for considering the tendency of ethnic violence. This is surprising given the importance of the state in accommodating or repressing ethnic groups. While explanations explicitly focusing on regime type are scarce, it does play a role in other schools of thought. For example, grievance explanations highlight the salience of opportunity (e.g. Bara, 2014), and this opportunity is often provided or constrained by the state. Similarly, the ability for geographically concentrated ethnic groups to engage in violence is contingent on them not being repressed by the state. Although grievance and

geographic concentration are important, regime type either precludes or increases the salience of these variables for inciting violence. This section of the literature review will show the significance of regime type in relation to the tendency for ethnic violence.

Elkins and Sides demonstrate how democracies and dictatorships mitigate the tendency for ethnic violence. They argue that the institutional design in a multiethnic state, particularly states with democracy, proportional representation, and federalism will unify groups and mitigate the tendency of violent conflict (Elkins and Sides, 2007: 693). Elkins and Sides observe the institutional structure of 51 multiethnic states, placing a particular emphasis on Iraq (2007). They claim that while authoritarian governments use fear and coercion to repress conflict, democracies must have certain institutions in place (Elkins and Sides, 2007: 693). Iraq, according to this perspective, will strengthen its democracy through proportional representation and federalism. While making a compelling argument about how regime type influences the tendency for violence, this explanation is limited by only coding regimes as 'democracies' or 'dictatorships'. This binary does not consider regimes that fit between these two types (i.e. anocracies). To code Iraq as a democracy is flawed, and does not consider the low state capacity, oppression of individual rights, and violent conflict occurring in Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Therefore, studies on regime type and the tendency for ethnic violence require an acknowledgement that not all regimes are full democracies or authoritarian.

Vreeland disputes the salience of regime type in precluding or influencing the onset of violence, arguing that there is a direct relationship between prolonged political tensions and escalation to civil war. Despite this, regime type does not influence when violence is likely to occur (2007: 401, 419). This explanation counters the central argument of this essay, claiming that states which transition into anocratic status through prolonged political conflict do not have a higher tendency for violence (Vreeland, 2007: 419). Ultimately, it is prolonged political conflict that translates into violence. Vreeland makes a significant contribution, highlighting that regime type is multivariate, and that even states coded as full democracies or authoritarian can become anocratic and lead to violence (2007: 403, 418). However, this also reveals a limitation: Vreeland focuses on cases that 'became' anocratic during prolonged political conflict, instead of observing political regimes that were established for a long period of time[2]. Also, Vreeland implicitly lends support to the central argument of this essay; Vreeland claims that prolonged political conflict eventually causes violence (2007: 419), but political conflict is only prolonged because the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress politically mobilized groups. For example, Saudi Arabia swiftly quashed Shi'a uprisings during the Arab Spring (Matthiesen, 2012: 628), but in Iraq the government has been unable to accommodate or repress mobilized groups. This difference is attributed to regime type and the state's capacity to accommodate or repress ethnic groups.

Therefore, the theoretical explanation that best explains the tendency for violent ethnic conflict is Fearon and Laitin (2003). This explanation argues that regime type, not ethnic or religious diversity, determines a countries susceptibility to civil war. Particularly, anocracies, countries which are militarily, bureaucratically, and financially weak, favour insurgencies within

[2] One of the case studies for this essay, Iraq, became anocratic after the United States intervention. This does not change the argument presented in this essay; Vreeland (2007) focuses on the duration of political conflict, but this essay focuses on state capacity to accommodate or repress ethnic groups.

the state. Furthermore, a large population, poverty, and instability are better determinants of civil war onset than grievances or ethnic diversity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 88). In full democracies, peaceful collective action is normal and a better alternative to violence, while in authoritarian regimes, the state uses coercion and fear to repress collective action. However, in anocracies, the state does not have the capacity to repress or accommodate collective action, making violence a more probable outcome (Vreeland, 2007: 401-402). Ultimately, it is state capacity that influences or precludes the tendency for ethnic violence. While Fearon and Laitin (2003) make a compelling argument, it has not yet been applied to explaining the tendency for ethnic violence in multiethnic states. While grievance and geographic concentration explanations are robust in the literature, regime type is comparably absent despite its salience.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) aids to form the following hypothesis:

> H3: If the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress an ethnic group, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

This hypothesis finds support in the literature: grievances and geographic concentration are less significant in a regime with high state capacity. In full democracies, for example, grievances can be expressed, and sometimes accommodated through non-violent means- making violence less desirable. In authoritarian regimes, the state has the ability to repress the violent mobilization of geographically concentrated ethnic groups. It is when the state does not have the capacity accommodate or repress ethnic groups when there is a tendency for violence to occur.

To demonstrate this empirically, three brief case studies will be conducted: A full democracy- Canada; an authoritarian regime- Saudi Arabia; and an anocracy- Iraq. Each case study will explain why each country codes as a certain regime type, and provide an example of how state capacity within these cases encourages or precludes the tendency for ethnic violence. Although these case studies are brief, they are meant to lend support to the initial argument, and show why regime type transcends grievances and geographic concentration for explaining the tendency for violent ethnic conflict.

Case Studies

Full Democracy: Canada

There is a low tendency for ethnic violence in full democracies, despite several of them being multiethnic (e.g. Canada and Switzerland). Within these regimes, most people give affinity to the nation instead of an ethnic group. Full democracies are generally open to collective action, and allow grievances to be expressed and accommodated through non-violent means (Vreeland, 2007: 401). Canada is a prime example of this regime type, a country that is exceptionally high in civil liberties, political participation, and functioning of government (see Appendix 1). However, whether it be 'non-separatist nationalism' in Newfoundland (Vézina and Basta, 2014: 67), or long-standing nationalist tensions with Quebec, Canada has experienced a certain degree of ethnic and national conflict. Despite this, there is an absence of large-scale violent conflict in Canada. One explanation for this is Canada's democratic institutions, fostering an environment of ethnic and national accommodation. An example of this is Canada recognizing French as an official language, and allowing the preservation of French culture. This has occurred for various reasons, including brokerage politics and embracing multiculturalism (Forbes, 1993: 69-72).

Neither grievance nor geographic concentration explanations show why violence has not occurred in Canada. Prolonged grievances are present within Quebec[3]; almost 50% of Québécois voters in the 1995 independence referendum voted to leave Canada, yet still remain in Canada today (CBC News, 2015). Geographic concentration is also relevant; there are over eight million people in Quebec, most of them being ethnically French (Statistics Canada, 2017). To understand why these variables have not resulted in violence, it requires analyzing Canada's regime type. Aside from having the state capacity to accommodate multiple nations and ethnic groups, there are two reasons why Canada's regime type mitigates the tendency for violence: First, it is difficult for proponents of violence to convince people that violence is necessary when there are non-violent methods to express grievances. Given the possibility of battle-related death and the significant resources needed to sustain an insurgency, violence is significantly costlier than non-violent collective action (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 136). Second, given the civil liberties granted to people in Canada, engaging in violence with unpredictable outcomes is less desirable. Therefore, it is full democracy, not factors relating to grievances and geographic concentration that decrease the tendency for ethnic violence.

Authoritarian Regime: Saudi Arabia

Contrasting full democracies, authoritarian regimes use coercion and fear to repress violent mobilization. Authoritarian regimes are generally repressive of collective action, and are usually not open to accommodating grievances. Saudi Arabia is an example of this, a country with no electoral process, and mass oppression of civil liberties (see Appendix 1). While oppressing individual liberties, Saudi Arabia possesses a strong military that had an expenditure of 9.6% GDP in 2016 (World Bank, 2017). Combining authoritarianism with a strong military provides a condition where ethnic mobilization and violence is difficult to achieve. In authoritarian regimes, people require creative and hidden ways to express grievances, but this usually does not result in violence because the state can repress any mass mobilization (Johnston, 2012: 55).

An example of this was Shi'a protests in the Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province during the Arab Spring. Facing a history of state oppression, a portion of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a population rapidly mobilized to challenge authoritarianism in 2011. While these demonstrations resulted in one of the longest protests in Saudi Arabia's history, the protests did not spread to other parts of the country, were quashed by the state, and achieved little success (Matthiesen, 2012: 628). This example illustrates two important points relevant to this essay. First, prolonged grievances and opportunity during the Arab Spring did not result in a successful violent mobilization against the state. Second, 2.5 million Shi'a people are geographically concentrated in Saudi Arabia's Eastern province (Matthiesen, 2012: 630), and while this made it easier to mobilize, the state maintained its control over the territory and eventually quashed protests. Therefore, while grievance and opportunity along with geographic concentration provided a medium for mobilization, it was ultimately Saudi Arabia's regime and state capacity that precluded violence.

[3] This section of the essay is meant to demonstrate how institutions within full democracies foster accommodation and decrease the tendency for ethnic violence. While Quebec is a nation instead of an ethnic group, it is still an appropriate example to show how regime type transcends both grievance and geographic concentration in determining the tendency for violence to occur. However, more research is needed to determine whether the central argument being posited is applicable to nationalist conflict across all regime types.

Anocracy: Iraq

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iraq has been unable to end violence or mitigate the tendency for ethnic mobilization and collective action. This is attributed to Iraq's regime type, an anocracy that is militarily and bureaucratically weak with low state capacity. Iraq has a moderate degree of pluralism, and an electoral process combined with political participation, but it has exceptionally low functioning of government (see Appendix 1). While there are several proponents of the United States intervention of Iraq, the subsequent process of democratization has created an anocratic regime incapable of accommodation or repression. This is alluded to by Wimmer, who claimed that the democratization of Iraq would fail if the state did not have the institutions or capacity to accommodate all citizens (2004: 111).

Over the last decade, Iraq has been plagued by ethno-religious conflict, terrorist organizations, and civil war. Between 2004 and 2016, the Iraqi government has been a part of six dyads, totaling 52, 178 casualties in state-based violence (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017). Grievances and geographic concentration are important variables in Iraq; the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress grievances, while the failure to exercise its authority over the entire territory facilitates easier mobilization. However, these variables are salient because of Iraq's anocratic regime, which enhances the tendency for ethnic violence. Ultimately, it is regime type, not grievance or geographic concentration that precludes or enables ethnic violence.

Conclusion

This essay has found support for the following hypothesis: if the state does not have the capacity to accommodate or repress an ethnic group, then there is a tendency for violent ethnic conflict. Through the literature review and case studies, there were two main findings: First, anocratic regimes have a higher tendency for violence than full democracies and authoritarian regimes. Second, while grievances and geographic concentration are important variables for determining the tendency for ethnic violence, their importance depends on the state's regime type. These findings are supported theoretically and empirically, but there are two limitations that require acknowledgement: First, there are significant differences between the cases studied in this essay, one of which is the salience of ethnicity. For example, in Canada it is difficult to find ethnic tensions that could translate into violence because most people give their affinity to the nation. However, in Iraq, ethnic connections are significant. Second, the findings of this essay are only applicable to ethnic violence with a degree of state involvement. Given the focus on regime type, it would be difficult to apply these findings to non-state ethnic conflicts.

Despite these limitations, this essay poses two important contributions. First, it highlights a scope condition for when ethnic violence is more likely to occur. Second, it integrates regime type, a variable that is scarce in the literature, into the debate on when there is a tendency for ethnic violence. Building on these contributions, there are two fruitful avenues for future research that are worthwhile: First, whether regime type influences the tendency for nationalist conflict as it does for ethnic conflict. Second, under which conditions is there a tendency for violence in full democracies and authoritarian regimes? This essay provides a useful starting point for answering these questions, and more importantly, adds further discourse into the relationship between ethnicity and violence.

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Appendix 1: Democracy Index

Country	*Electoral Process and Pluralism*	*Functioning of Government*	*Political Participation*	*Political Culture*	*Civil Liberties*
Canada [Full Democracy]	9.58	9.64	7.78	8.75	10.00
Saudi Arabia [Authoritarian Regime]	0.00	2.86	2.22	3.13	1.47
Iraq [Anocracy]	4.33	0.07	7.22	5.00	3.82

Appendix 1: Existence of each variable ranked from 0.00 (low)-10.00 (high). Data retrieved from The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2017. "Democracy Index." http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf

Analyse comparative de la montée du populisme aux États-Unis et en Europe

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Abstract. Les dernières années au sein de la société occidentale furent marquées par de multiples instabilités politiques sous la forme d'un concept : le populisme. Dans cette recherche, nous analysons les causes de la montée du populisme en France, en Allemagne, au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis. Avec comme point de départ la crise économique de 2008, notre recherche établie la cause principale de cette montée à une récession économique avec comme facteur intervenant les afflux étrangers récents. Nous présenterons les conséquences de l'économie et des afflux selon les programmes politiques des partis, les politiques publiques et les discours politiques.

Introduction

But de la recherche

Le but de cette recherche sera d'élucider les causes réelles de la montée du populisme en Occident et de confirmer que les facteurs de l'économie et de l'afflux étranger eurent un impact majeur sur cette montée. Pour ce faire, nous étudierons la situation au sein de deux emplacements géographiques occidentaux : les États-Unis et l'Europe. Comme l'Europe n'est pas un pays, nous avons choisi trois pays pour représenter la situation européenne, soient la France, l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne. Les quatre unités d'analyse ressentirent les impacts de l'économie et de l'immigration et nous pouvons analyser les conséquences de celles-ci sur les pays choisis. Par example, parmi ces phénomènes nous retrouvons l'élection de Donald Trump aux États-Unis, la montée des appuis électoraux de Marine Le Pen, le Brexit au Royaume-Uni, ainsi que la montée de l'*Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) en Allemagne. Nous croyons que les États-Unis représente l'apogée de la culture occidentale et que les trois pays européens choisis représentent aussi des figures emblématiques du vieux continent. De plus, trois des quatre pays de notre analyse ont un siège sur le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, ainsi que l'Allemagne étant un contributeur important du budget de l'ONU. Par conséquent, les résultats obtenus de la part de ces pays pourront nous aider à anticiper d'autres phénomènes au sein de pays occidentaux.

Notre thèse soutient que la montée du populisme est directement liée à la crise économique et à ses conséquences, avec comme facteur d'intensification l'afflux d'immigrants et de réfugiés. Notre première hypothèse est que la crise économique et ses conséquences, accentuée par la forte immigration et l'accroissement du nombre de réfugiés, sont les causes directes de la montée du populisme. Notre deuxième hypothèse est que l'immigration abondante et les réfugiés créèrent un sentiment d'insécurité physique de la part des populations des pays engendrant la montée de ces partis populistes et de leurs projets anti-immigrations.

Une analyse comparative divisée en trois sections, soit l'économie, l'afflux étranger et les conséquences de celles-ci sur la montée du populisme nous permettront d'obtenir des résultats pertinents qui répondront à nos hypothèses. Notre variable de contrôle est la mondialisation, dans l'optique où les valeurs libérales prônées par cette nouvelle structure internationale eurent des

conséquences néfastes sur les populations et engendrèrent une réaction contraire, soient les partis populistes.

Définition du populisme

Afin de faciliter la compréhension du raisonnement analytique de cette thèse, nous devons en définir le concept clé, soit le populisme. Pierre-André Taguieff considère le populisme comme un concept encore incompris de beaucoup et qui ne serait réductible ni à un régime politique particulier ni à des contenus idéologiques fixes (1997: 4). Il sépare ensuite son analyse du populisme selon six concepts distincts, chacun relié de manières différentes à cette idéologie. Le populisme-*mouvement* prend la forme d'un type de mobilisation de la classe moyenne et populaire. Dans cette définition, le populisme exprime la volonté des masses à vouloir se dégager du système déjà établi. Taguieff fait le lien avec la crise de modernité que connaissent les sociétés traditionnelles avant de devenir « moderne » (Taguieff, 1997 : 14). Selon nous, cette définition démontre la première étape de l'implantation de la pensée populiste au sein d'une population. Ensuite, il décrit le populisme-*régime* comme la réalité des régimes autoritaires où un chef charismatique gagne le pouvoir en reflétant les idées nationalistes du peuple et en représentant l'âme profonde de la population. L'émergence de différentes personnalités politiques tenant des discours nationalistes au sein des démocraties libérales occidentales comme Donald Trump aux États-Unis ou Sebastian Kurz en Autriche illustrent bien cette définition. Cette définition caractérise le peuple comme la base fondatrice de la société et la dénonciation de la haute société. La dernière définition de Taguieff (1997) identifie le populisme sous un aspect rhétorique. Il définit le discours populiste comme étant l'utilisation de l'appel au peuple en axant un discours parallèlement à celui de l'opinion publique pour manipuler les masses.

Pour Ernest Laclau, la définition du populisme ne se limite pas à un régime ou une idéologie politique fixe, mais plutôt à la manière d'articuler le message politique (Panizza, 2005 : 33). Encore une fois, le principe d'opposition au pouvoir est central à la définition du populisme de Laclau, expliquant qu'il ne peut pas y avoir de populisme sans la construction discursive d'un ennemi, d'un ancien régime ou la dénonciation de l'oligarchie.

D'un autre côté, Robert Jansen (2011), de l'Université du Michigan, identifie le problème du populisme au sein des recherches en sociologie par les lacunes à de sa définition. L'usage général du terme s'appliquant à toutes personnes, mouvements ou régimes faisant des revendications en se basant sur la masse populaire rend son usage erroné pour toutes recherches scientifiques (Jansen, 2011 : 76). Il s'éloigne de la perception du populisme comme un parti politique, un régime ou un mouvement, pour adopter une vision où le populisme serait une série d'actions que les politiciens et leurs partisans font. Finalement, la notion du peuple contre les élites revient dans sa définition comme un élément central à la rhétorique populiste, et ce peu importe le régime politique et les partis en place.

Maintenant que nous avons défini le populisme sous différentes perspectives scientifiques, nous pouvons en regrouper les éléments importants et former notre propre définition. Il n'y a tout d'abord aucun doute sur la présence d'une opposition binaire au sein du discours politique sous la forme du peuple et de son ennemi, majoritairement les élites et ceux qui possèdent un contrôle sur la société. Le populisme ne se présente pas sous la forme d'un régime ou d'une idéologie politique comme le libéralisme, le marxisme ou le fascisme, mais plutôt comme un processus et un outil utilisé par le peuple et les politiciens afin de soutenir un but politique. Le populisme apparait sous la forme de trois composantes clés : un désir antisystème, l'autoritarisme et le nativisme (Inglehart

et Norris, 2016). Par exemple, nous connaissons principalement le populisme occidental dans les démocraties libérales sous la forme de l'émergence d'un nationalisme sournois dans un monde régit par la mondialisation. Néanmoins, ce même populisme peut émerger dans une autre société avec un régime politique différent en utilisant les mêmes outils, soit la volonté de la masse populaire et la voix du peuple. Nous pensons aussi que le but principal de la politique et du politicien permettent la propagation du populisme : l'élection. En effet, la traduction des désirs du peuple dans le discours politique augmente la popularité électorale, surtout lorsque ces motivations touchent les valeurs fondamentales d'une société comme l'identité nationale et la sécurité. Ainsi, le populisme s'illustre comme l'eau dévalant la rivière et non comme le lit même de cette dernière au sens où il s'adapte et prend la forme du moule politique dans lequel il nait.

Variables

Afin de mener une recherche efficace et de bien identifier les différents aspects construisant notre problème, nous devons en identifier les variables clés. Nous trouvons trois types de variables dans notre recherche, soit les variables dépendantes, indépendantes et intervenantes. La variable dépendante est plus souvent causée par un phénomène, mais elle peut aussi dépendre de ce dernier, ou être la fonction d'une variable indépendante (Johnson et coll., 2016). Une variable indépendante, à l'opposé, influence, affecte, ou cause d'autres phénomènes. La variable intervenante apparait plus près dans le temps à la variable dépendante et elle est aussi affectée par d'autres variables indépendantes.

Au sein de notre recherche, la variable indépendante sera l'économie. Marquant le début de l'échelle temporelle durant laquelle nous établirons l'analyse, la crise économique de 2008 et les différents aspects liés à une mauvaise économie sont, selon nous, les éléments indépendants de notre schéma d'analyse. Les variables dépendantes de notre recherche sont les discours, les politiques d'immigration et les plateformes politiques des pays que nous avons choisis.
À notre avis, ces variables permettront de montrer l'apparition du populisme et l'intensité de ce dernier. Finalement, notre variable intervenante sera l'immigration et les réfugiés - soit l'afflux étranger. Le problème de la crise des réfugiés et de l'immigration est survenu quelques années plus tard que la crise économique, mais son impact sur les variables dépendantes reste indéniable.

Tableau 1: Variables de recherches et sous-unités d'analyse.

Variables de la recherche	
Indépendante	Économie: Crise de 2008, inégalités croissantes et impacts
Intervenante	Afflux étranger: Immigration et Réfugiés
Dépendante	Populisme: Programmes, politiques et discours

Selon nous, l'économie est la cause principale de l'apparition du populisme, mais l'immigration a joué un rôle majeur dans l'intensité et la rapidité de l'avènement de ce nouveau phénomène. Par ailleurs, bien que les plateformes politiques, les discours et les politiques d'immigration ne représentent pas intégralement le concept du populisme, elles en sont toutefois altérées et seront nos sous-unités d'analyse. Notre analyse comparative sera de type mésothéorique, plus particulièrement selon la théorie de l'institutionnalisme sociologique. Il faut

prendre en compte que le concept de souveraineté fait partie des fondements de la politique comparée, mais que l'interdépendance complexe présente de nos jours rend difficile la détermination des réelles variables indépendantes (causes) et dépendantes (résultats). Dans une période marquée par la mondialisation, nous nous attendons à ce que nos résultats ne soient pas entièrement justes en considérant qu'une multitude de facteurs influencent les électorats de chaque pays de manières différentes et à des intensités variées. L'utilisation classique de la politique comparée devient plus complexe par l'effacement de certaines frontières physiques et économiques. Conséquemment, notre étude prendra en compte ces facteurs dans la dernière section.

L'impact économique

Notre première section concernant l'impact de l'économie sur la montée du populisme représente notre variable indépendante. Nous analyserons l'ampleur de la crise économique de 2008, la montée des inégalités en Occident et les théories portant sur les conséquences de l'économie sur une population afin de comprendre le lien entre économie et populisme.

L'ampleur de la crise de 2008

Dans cette portion de la section économique, nous utiliserons des graphiques et tableaux démontrant l'évolution de l'économie de chaque pays de notre analyse selon différentes variables représentant des perspectives économiques différentes de chaque pays.

Parmi nos indicateurs économiques, on retrouve les échanges de biens et services calculé selon le pourcentage du Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB) au sein d'un pays, le revenu national net, le taux d'emploi selon le pourcentage de la population d'âge actif, la productivité et utilisation du travail, l'utilisation de la main d'œuvre, le taux de croissance annuel exprimé en pourcentage, puis finalement le taux de chômage des jeunes comprenant le nombre de chômeurs au sein d'un pays dans la tranche d'âge des 15 à 24 ans. Tous ces indicateurs nous permettent d'avoir une vue d'ensemble sur l'ampleur de l'impact de la crise économique en comparant la variation des indicateurs utilisés au sein de chaque pays de notre analyse sur une période de dix à quinze ans. Parmi nos résultats, on note que de l'année 2008 à 2009, le taux du revenu national net allemand est de -3,5%, représentant son pire taux sur une échelle de 11 ans et la plus grande baisse des quatre pays de notre analyse selon les données de l'OCDE (2018). L'indicateur du taux de croissance annuel en pourcentage représente l'exemple le plus flagrant des conséquences de la crise au sein des quatre pays. Les États-Unis connurent la pire baisse avec un taux de -4,3%, puis l'Allemagne avec -4%, la France avec -3,1%, et finalement le Royaume-Uni avec la plus faible baisse étant de -1,3%. Afin d'analyser la débâcle économique dans chacun des pays selon les différents facteurs, nous avons utilisé un tableau regroupant les résultats de chaque indicateur économique par pays et démontrant quel pays fut le plus touché selon un indicateur spécifique. En conclusion, selon les indicateurs économiques que nous avons utilisés, la France fut la plus durement touchée, suivie des États-Unis et de l'Allemagne exæquos, et finalement le Royaume-Uni en dernière place. Ces résultats nous servirons dans notre analyse finale pour comprendre l'importance de l'économie au sein des partis politiques. Nous sommes néanmoins ouverts à partager l'ampleur de nos résultats dans cette portion de notre section sur l'économie.

La croissance des inégalités économiques en Occident

Selon nous, une bonne analyse économique servant à expliquer le phénomène populiste ne peut se limiter à l'impact de la crise sur les citoyens de nos quatre pays, mais doit traiter aussi de la croissance des inégalités entre les citoyens au sein d'un même pays. En considérant que le populisme, comme concept, se caractérise par le combat du peuple contre les élites, nous sommes dans l'impératif de démontrer l'évolution de l'écart économique entre les élites et le reste de la population pour mieux cerner la disparité des richesses au sein des démocraties libérales. Notre analyse des inégalités se divisera en deux parties majeures, soit une partie théorique et une partie statistique. La première partie traitera des différentes formes d'inégalités ainsi que les causes pouvant accentuer celles-ci au sein d'un pays, mais aussi les inégalités entre les pays. Ensuite, nous analyserons les données quant aux inégalités sous forme de statistiques afin de constater l'ampleur de la situation.

L'importance d'analyser les inégalités dans notre recherche vient de sa capacité à fragiliser la démocratie au sein d'un pays. Par ailleurs, les inégalités augmentent la polarisation politique, brise la cohésion sociale et diminue le support et la confiance en la démocratie (Cox, 2017 : 1). Deux facteurs ressortent en ce qui concerne l'impact des inégalités sur la durabilité d'une démocratie, soit la récente augmentation de la concentration des richesses dans les mains d'une minorité d'individus et l'augmentation des inégalités entre différentes classes économiques au sein des États. Par ailleurs, les inégalités se séparent en trois catégories distinctes (Piketty, 2013 : 691)

1. Inégalités des revenus (Salaire).
2. Inégalités des richesses (Patrimoine).
3. Inégalités des opportunités (Éducation).

Ainsi, nous divisons notre analyse des inégalités selon la montée de la concentration des richesses et l'augmentation des inégalités au sein des classes en considérant les trois sous-unités d'analyse mentionnées précédemment. Dans le cas des inégalités au sein de la population et des classes économiques, Thomas Piketty illustre de manière concise l'augmentation à laquelle les pays occidentaux font face, où la classe des 10% les plus riches s'enrichissent et où le 90% restant s'appauvrit.

Tableau 2 : L'inégalité totale des revenus (travail et capital) dans le temps et l'espace.

Part des diffrents groupes dans le total des revenus	Inégalité faible (pays scandinaves, années 1970-1980)	Inégalité moyenne (Europe 2010)	Inégalité forte (États-Unis 2010; Europe 1910)	Inégalité très forte (États-Unis 2030?)
Les 10% les plus riches « classes supérieurs»	25%	35%	50%	60%
dont: les 1% les plus riches («classes dominantes»)	7%	10%	20%	25%
dont: les 9% suivants («classes aisées»)	18%	25%	30%	35%
Les 40% du milieu «classes moyennes»	45%	40%	30%	25%
Les 50% les plus pauvres «classes populaires»	30%	25%	20%	15%
Coefficient de Gini correspondant	0,26	0,36	0,49	0,58

Source: Thomas Piketty (2013). Le capital au XXIe siècle, Éditions du Seuil, p. 392.

En ce qui concerne la concentration des richesses dans les mains d'une minorité d'individus, Piketty présente une analyse plus ou moins solide, mais néanmoins représentative de la réalité du 21e siècle. Il illustre notamment que, de 1987 à 2013, le nombre de milliardaire dans le monde est passé de 140 à 1400, alors que le patrimoine total des milliardaires a augmenté de 300 à 5,400 milliards de dollars en l'espace de seulement 26 ans.

La troisième et dernière partie de la section économique porte sur la théorie et les analyses scientifiques concernant les conséquences de l'économie sur les valeurs humaines et sur les choix politiques d'un électorat. Seulement analyser l'ampleur de la crise et les inégalités ne peut suffire à expliquer les phénomènes populistes du 21e siècle et la rébellion du peuple contre les élites au sein des pays occidentaux les plus puissants. Le politologue américain Ronald Inglehart et l'économiste français Thomas Piketty présentent des visions intéressantes de l'impact d'une crise économique et de ses effets sur la démocratie.

Impact de l'économie sur les électorats

Nous nous intéressons particulièrement à l'impact de l'économie sur les valeurs matérialistes ou postmatérialistes des individus. Ronald Inglehart, dans son livre *Culture Shift*, décrit les valeurs matérialistes comme prônant la stabilité économique, la sécurité physique et

économique et la fierté nationale. En contrepartie, les valeurs postmatérialistes priorisent les concepts d'esthétiques, d'intellectualité, le sentiment d'appartenance, l'estime de soi, la liberté d'expression et une société moins impersonnelle (Inglehart, 1990). Dans son analyse, Inglehart note que l'environnement sociopolitique d'un individu joue un rôle important dans les valeurs de celui-ci. Ainsi, en analysant différentes cohortes, il note que les personnes nées durant des périodes de calmes économiques tendent à prôner des valeurs postmatérialistes tandis que les personnes nées dans des conditions économiques plus difficiles, comme lors de la crise économique de 1929, prônent des valeurs plus matérialistes. Ainsi, sur une période de 30 ans, les cohortes qui autrefois étaient matérialistes ont laissé leur place à des cohortes prônant des valeurs postmatérialistes. Cet élément fait un lien entre la débâcle économique récente en Occident et l'impact possible de celle-ci en politique.[1]

La section économique présente d'abord une vision plus globale de la situation économique des quatre pays, puis approfondi vers une analyse des inégalités économiques entre les individus au sein des pays occidentaux. La troisième portion sert de pont entre les données économiques présentés dans les deux parties précédentes et les conséquences de celles-ci en politique, reflétées par la montée du populisme en Occident.

L'afflux étranger

Nous divisons cette section selon deux provenances distinctes, soit l'immigration et la crise de réfugiés. Les nombres guerres et conflits armés en périphérie de l'Europe depuis maintenant quelques années comme en Iraq, en Syrie, au Libye, au Mali et en Afghanistan obligèrent des populations entières à fuir les conflits vers un lieu sécuritaire et prometteur : l'Europe. Dans le cas des États-Unis, le problème des réfugiés n'est pas de la même envergure que pour le cas européen, mais on retrouve toutefois un problème avec la frontière du Mexique en matière d'immigration légale et illégale.

Ainsi, en 1990, 53% des immigrants dans le monde résidaient dans les pays les plus développés. Aujourd'hui, ce chiffre s'élève à 58,6%, soit une augmentation de plus de 5%, ce qui représente un nombre d'immigrants colossal en considérant la quantité d'immigrants totale dans le monde (Dumont, 2015: 3). En 2013, les quatre pays de notre analyse sont parmi les douze pays comptant le plus grand nombre d'immigrants avec en première place les États-Unis. En ce qui concerne le pourcentage d'immigrants au sein de la population en 2013, les États-Unis se compose de 14,47% d'immigrants, le Royaume-Uni de 12,34%, l'Allemagne de 12,16%, puis finalement la France avec 11,76% selon les données des Nations Unies. En 2017, le nombre d'immigrants a maintenu une augmentation constante au sein des quatre pays, mais le pourcentage d'immigrants sur la population totale a cependant augmenté. Ainsi, la tendance suggère que la population totale reste constante en raison de la hausse du pourcentage durant les dernières années. Le taux de fécondité, correspondant au nombre d'enfants que chaque femme pourrait mettre au monde si elle vivait jusqu'à la fin de sa période de fécondité et si elle donnait naissance au nombre d'enfants correspondant au taux de fécondité par âge de l'année considérée, et le taux de population jeune, correspondant à la population des personnes de moins de 15 ans, illustrent ainsi une baisse drastique des naissances et de la succession du patrimoine national au sein des pays de notre analyse durant les dernières décennies (OCDE, 2018 : Taux de fécondité). Il faut un taux de

[1] Dans son analyse des cohortes, Inglehart utilise les critères suivants pour différencier les valeurs matérialistes (M) de postmatérialistes (PM) : Maintenir l'ordre dans la nation (M), Donner plus de d'importance à la population dans les décisions gouvernementales (PM), Combattre la montée des prix (M), Protéger la liberté d'expression (PM), Maintenir un haut niveau de croissance économique (M), Avoir un pays avec des forces armées puissantes (M), Donner plus de libertés à la population dans les affaires communautaires et au travail (PM), Avoir de belles villes et de belles campagnes (PM), Maintenir une économie stable (M), Combattre le crime (M), Vivre au sein d'une société plus amicale et moins impersonnelle (PM) , Vivre dans une société où les idées sont plus importantes que l'argent (PM).

fécondité de 2,1 pour maintenir une population stable, alors qu'aucun des quatre pays n'a atteint un tel taux depuis les dix dernières années. Ainsi, nos données démontrent que le nombre d'immigrants augmentent de manière constante au cours des dernières années en corrélation avec une augmentation du pourcentage d'immigrants au sein de la population totale. Simultanément, le taux de fécondité et le taux de population jeune connaissent des baisses constantes depuis les 15 dernières années, démontrant une modification démographique drastique au cours des dernières décennies.

La deuxième portion de notre analyse sur l'afflux étranger analyse l'apport des immigrants dans l'économie et l'afflux de réfugiés en nombre et selon leur provenance. Nous considérons que l'apport des étrangers sur le marché du travail peut avoir des conséquences sur les électorats, notamment dans le cas d'insécurités économiques. En effet, dans des pays touchés par la crise économique et où le taux d'emploi est déjà faible, une augmentation du nombre d'habitants, dans ce cas causée par l'afflux étranger, peut avoir des conséquences sur le marché du travail.

Le taux d'emploi trimestriel selon le lieu de naissance et le sexe de 2012 à 2016 nous permet d'avoir un aperçu de la situation économique des étrangers au sein de leur pays d'accueil. Par exemple, le taux d'emploi trimestriel en 2016, hommes et femmes combinés, correspond aux États-Unis à 70% chez les étrangers et 67,9% chez les personnes nées dans le pays. Au Royaume-Uni, l'écart est de 2% en faveur du taux d'emploi trimestriel chez les personnes nées au Royaume-Uni. Finalement, les cas allemands et français démontrent tous les deux un écart de presque 10% supérieur en faveur des personnes nées au sein du pays en comparaison aux étrangers selon les données de l'OCDE (2018: Taux d'emploi trimestriel). L'importance de ces données vient de l'impact économique de l'immigration au sein des pays d'accueil et présente une manière d'évaluer la qualité économique de l'immigration intégrant nos quatre pays. En ce qui concerne la comparaison du taux d'emploi de 2012 à 2016, les taux fluctuent de manière constante et proportionnelle. Afin de permettre une perspective plus vaste du taux d'emploi chez les natifs et les étrangers, nous avons inclus le taux d'emploi trimestriels chez les hommes seulement et nous remarquons que les écarts s'accentuent en faveur des étrangers aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni, mais en défaveur de ces derniers en France et en Allemagne. Notre interprétation de ces données suggère deux possibilités, soit que l'immigration française et allemande possède des niveaux de qualifications moins élevés expliquant les taux d'emploi plus faibles, ou que les marchés du travail français et allemand sont beaucoup plus restrictifs que les marchés américains et britanniques. Nous penchons cependant vers la première possibilité en considérant l'avantage géographique des Américains et des Britanniques avec pour conséquence une plus grande facilité à régulariser les immigrants entrants au pays selon leurs besoins, et ainsi la capacité de ces derniers à intégrer le marché du travail.

Comme dernière partie de notre section sur l'afflux étranger, nous analysons le nombre de réfugiés dans chaque pays et la provenance de ces derniers afin d'avoir une perspective globale de la situation démographique des quatre pays. Entre 2002 et 2016, le nombre de réfugiés entrants sur le sol américain passe de 26,785 à 84,989 (Homeland Security, 2017). Par ailleurs, l'année de la crise économique de 2008 démontre une hausse de 14,495 réfugiés. Dans le cas des pays européens, on observe une nette augmentation avec en Allemagne où l'on trouvait 441,800 primo-demandeurs d'asile en 2015 et 722,265 primo-demandeurs en 2016, représentant une évolution de 63% en seulement un an. Le cas français, bien que moins important, connait une évolution de 8% avec 70,570 demandeurs en 2015 et 75,990 en 2016. Finalement, le Royaume-Uni est le seul pays ne connaissant pas une hausse entre l'année 2015 et 2016, où l'on retrouve 39,720 demandes en 2015 et 38,290 demandes en 2016, soit une baisse de 4%. Il ne faut pas oublier que l'année 2016

au Royaume-Uni se caractérise par le Brexit. En 2016, en ce qui concerne la provenance des réfugiés, 49% de ceux-ci aux États-Unis viennent de la République Démocratique du Congo, de la Syrie ou de la Birmanie (PewResearch, 2016). En France, l'Albanie, l'Afghanistan et Haïti sont les trois principaux pays d'origine des réfugiés en 2013. Pour la même année au Royaume-Uni, la provenance des réfugiés est majoritairement d'Iraq, du Pakistan et de l'Iran. Finalement, la Syrie, l'Iraq et l'Afghanistan sont les trois principales provenances des réfugiés allemands en 2013 (Europa, 2015).

Les données amassées dans cette section démontrent que la quantité d'immigrants au sein des pays de notre analyse augmente de manière constante alors que la population locale diminue. Par ailleurs, certains pays comme les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni démontrent un plus grand apport économique des immigrants sous la forme d'un meilleur taux d'emploi trimestriel que dans le cas français ou allemand.

Tableau 3: Comparaison de la situation migratoire aux États-Unis, en France, au Royaume-Uni et en Allemagne.

	États-Unis	Royaume-Uni	France	Allemagne
Nombre de migrants en 2017 (millions)	49,7	8,82	7,9	12,17
Migrants/Population totale en 2017 (%)	15,3	13,4	12,2	14,8
Migrants venant de pays moins développés (%)	57,7	44,1	40	62,7
Taux d'immigrés au sein de la population (%)	13,4 (2015)	12,3 (2013)	12,04 (2013)	12,8 (2013)
Taux de fécondité (2015)	1,8	1,8	1,9	1,5
Taux population jeune	19,31	17,77	18,43	13,07
Taux d'emploi (Hommes et Femmes)	Étrangers	Locaux	Locaux	Locaux
Taux d'emploi (Hommes)	Étrangers	Étrangers	Locaux	Locaux
Nombre de réfugiés	84 995	91 070	33 310	198 255
Pays d'origine principal des réfugiés	Rep D. du Congo	Iraq	Albanie	Syrie

Note: Provenance des réfugiés aux États-Unis en 2016 (PewResearchCenter). <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/03/where-refugees-to-the-u-s-come-from/> (consulté le 30 mars 2018).

**Les sources utilisées dans ce tableau sont nombreuses et nous sommes prêts à communiquer celle-ci.*

Le tableau 3 possède toutes les données statistiques de notre seconde section selon les pays et nous sommes en mesure d'apporter des clarifications plus amples en cas de questionnement.

Analyse des conséquences de la crise économique et de l'immigration sur les électorats aux États-Unis et en Europe.

La troisième et dernière section de notre analyse expliquera les conséquences de l'économie et de l'immigration sur la montée du populisme. Nous analyserons cette montée selon nos trois sous-unités d'analyse, soit les programmes politiques, les politiques d'immigrations et les discours.

Les programmes des partis politiques

Le programme politique du Front National, intitulé *Les 144 engagements présidentiels*, illustre une réaction populiste sous une forme politique. Avec comme première partie *Une France Sure*, Le Pen démontre son objectif visant la sécurité du peuple français. Parmi les points

mentionnés dans cette section, on retrouve la mention de supprimer le droit du sol, appliquer la tolérance zéro et en finir avec le laxisme judiciaire, rétablir l'expulsion automatique des criminels et des délinquants étrangers, fermer toutes les mosquées extrémistes recensées, et bien d'autres (Le Pen, 2017). Dans sa deuxième section, on retrouve la mention d*'Une France prospère*, amenant maintenant l'aspect économique au programme politique du FN. Dans cette section, on mentionne notamment la mise en place d'un plan de réindustrialisation (il faut se rappeler que la base des inégalités fut aussi l'expatriation de compagnies industrielles à l'étranger), instaurer un vrai patriotisme économique en se libérant des contraintes européennes et en réservant la commande publique aux entreprises françaises (faisant référence à un protectionnisme et un sentiment nationaliste économique allant à l'encontre des valeurs libérales de l'Union européenne), faire de la France une terre d'innovation (l'innovation étant un pilier du développement économique des pays comme mentionnés par Piketty), ou même d'aggraver les sanctions contre les dirigeants d'entreprise coupable d'ententes ou d'agissements frauduleux qui ponctionnent une partie du pouvoir d'achat des consommateurs. Bref, tous ces points portent un message commun, qui serait de mettre les besoins français avant les besoins des autres pays comme nous l'avons vu par le passé. Les autres parties de son programme politique s'intitulent *Une France Juste, Une France fière, Une France puissante et Une France durable*. Toutes les sections de ces recommandations comportent donc un remède aux conséquences économiques et étrangères qui causèrent originellement la montée du populisme, donc de son parti. Parmi les éléments mentionnés dans ces partis du programme, on retrouve la mention d'une baisse des impôts de 10% sur les revenus des trois premières tranches, répondant aux problèmes des inégalités que nous avons mentionnés dans notre première section. Par ailleurs, le programme soutient la défense de la langue française, promouvoir l'assimilation républicaine (principe plus exigeant que celui de l'intégration), rétablir l'égalité réelle et la méritocratie en refusant le principe de discrimination positive, et bien d'autres. Bref, le programme politique du Front National nous démontre de la réaction populiste causée par la baisse de l'économie sous tous ces aspects, mais aussi de la limitation de l'immigration et des réfugiés entrant au pays.

Pour ce qui est du cas britannique, nous avons pris les mêmes données que pour l'analyse du programme politique du Front National, mais dans ce cas de l'*United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).* Tout comme le cas français, les deux premières parties principales du programme politique sont dédiées à l'économie et à l'immigration, soit nos deux causes reliées à la montée du populisme. Dans la section économique du programme, on discute notamment d'assurer que les grandes corporations paient leur part des taxes, de monter le minimum de revenus pour la taxation afin que ceux sur le salaire minimum paient moins, ainsi que d'ajouter une tranche de taxation au sein de la classe pauvre et classe moyenne afin de permettre aux plus démunis d'avoir plus d'argent (Farage, 2015). Pour ce qui est de l'immigration, on retrouve des points comme quitter l'Union européenne et reprendre le contrôle des frontières britanniques, ce qui fut réussi avec Brexit à l'aide d'un référendum. Par ailleurs, on mentionne la fin de l'immigration pour les travailleurs non formés, l'introduction d'un système de points pour qualifier l'immigration en copiant le modèle australien et la demande à tous les visiteurs arrivant au Royaume-Uni d'avoir une assurance maladie valide. On voit aussi la mention de l'éducation en ce qui concerne les frais de scolarité et une baisse de ces derniers afin de permettre à une plus grande partie de la population d'accéder à une éducation supérieure, plus particulièrement dans les domaines de la science, la technologie, l'ingénierie, les mathématiques et la médecine. Finalement, le programme s'engage à renforcer le salaire minimum, protéger les droits des travailleurs et permettre aux entreprises britanniques d'employer des travailleurs britanniques avant tout.

Le programme politique américain met encore plus l'accent sur l'aspect économique que les deux autres précédents. À prendre en note avant notre analyse du programme politique du Parti Républicain[2], le parti n'est pas un parti populiste en soi comme les trois autres pays, mais son dirigeant représente les valeurs populistes qui se reflètent dans le programme du parti. Ainsi, la première section du programme politique américain intitulé *Restoring the American Dream*, traite de la reconstruction d'une économie forte et la création d'emplois en sol américain. Ainsi, on mentionne la limitation de la signature de traités de libre-échange, la taxation de grosses compagnies, le rapatriement des compagnies américaines en sol américain, faire des avancements en matière de technologie, libérer les marchés financiers (Priebus, 2016). Deux autres parties majeures du programme politique américain s'intitulent *Government Reform* et *Great American Families, Education, Healthcare and Criminal Justice*. Dans ces parties, on traite de l'économie et de l'éducation sous une perspective proaméricaine. Le parti admet que la grande récession est derrière eux, mais que la majorité des Américains souffrent encore de cette dernière. De plus, on mentionne que l'immigration devrait avantager les intérêts des Américains et servir l'intérêt national, que le budget doit être balancé, puis on mentionne aussi l'importance de la différence entre immigration légale et illégale dans le genre d'individu que l'on veut en sol américain. L'aspect important de la portion sur l'éducation du programme exprime le désir de donner la chance pour chaque enfant d'obtenir une éducation, mais aussi le problème de pauvreté qui dure depuis les 50 dernières années et l'instauration d'une nouvelle culture d'espoir. Finalement, *American Resurgent*, le dernier chapitre du programme, exprime les désirs du parti républicain à redonner la prestance internationale et la puissance d'une première grande puissance mondiale que les Américains connaissaient il y a des décennies, donc le programme propose une expansion de la puissance militaire américaine.

Finalement, le programme politique d'*Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD), présente les mêmes aspects que nos trois pays précédents, soit l'économie, l'immigration, l'éducation et la sécurité. Toutefois, le parti allemand donne plus d'importance à l'immigration et fait même une mention directe de l'Islam et des problèmes qu'elle engendre dans son programme. Dans sa première portion, *National security and Justice*, le parti mentionne l'importance de la protection des frontières, ce qu'Angela Merkel ne sut pas faire par le passé en voyant les statistiques sur le nombre d'immigrants et réfugiés entrants sur le territoire allemand. Les deux plus importants chapitres du programme sont, selon nous, *Culture, language, and identity* et *Immigration, Integration and Asylum*. Dans ces chapitres, le parti traite directement d'un problème flagrant sur le territoire allemand : l'afflux de réfugiés et immigrants illégaux provenant de pays en conflits comme la Syrie, l'Afghanistan ou l'Iraq. On mentionne la préservation de la culture, de la langue et de l'identité allemande, la tolérance face à la critique sur l'Islam, que l'Islam n'a pas sa place en Allemagne, l'Islam et ses relations tendues avec le système de valeurs allemand, pas d'immigration irrégulière via les lois d'asile, contrôle de l'immigration des pays non membres de l'Union européenne, puis l'Allemand comme culture prédominante au lieu du multiculturalisme (Priebus, 2016). Pour ce qui est de la portion *Economy, Digitalization, and Consumer Protection*, les mêmes suggestions à caractère populiste sont faites que les autres partis de notre analyse, soit une économie de marché au lieu d'une économie régulée par l'État, garder des hauts standards d'accords de libre-échange, et bien d'autres. Il est important de mentionner que le programme

[2] Bien que le cas Parti Républicain ne fut pas toujours le parti qu'il est aujourd'hui, nous le considérons tout de même parmi nos partis à caractère populiste car il a malgré tout adopté une position politique à l'image de son chef, soit Donald Trump. Notre définition du populisme démontre que le populisme s'adapte et prend la forme selon les différents contextes politiques. Dans ce cas, un parti avec des racines historiques profondes en témoigne selon son plan politique aux idées populistes.

politique de l'AfD ne consacra que trois pages aux problèmes environnementaux et le reste de son programme aux problèmes récurrents de l'économie, l'immigration et tout autre enjeu émanant des valeurs matérialistes.

Tableau 4: Comparaison des programmes politiques français, britanniques, allemands et américains selon l'économie, l'immigration, les inégalités et la sécurité.

	France	Royaume-Uni	Allemagne	Etats-Unis
Parti populiste	*Front Nationale (FN)*	*United Kingdom Independance Party (UKIP)*	*Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)*	*Republican Party (Trump)*
Slogan	*« Au nom du peuple »*	*« We want our country back »*	*« Sense and reason instead of ideology »*	*« Make America Great Again »*
Économie	Une France Prospère. Mettre en place un plan de ré-industrialisation. Fixer l'innovation en France. Instaurer un vrai patriotisme économique en se libérant des contraintes européennes et en réservant la commande publique aux entreprises françaises. Aggraver les sanctions contre les dirigeants d'entreprise coupables d'ententes ou d'agissements frauduleux qui ponctionnent une partie du pouvoir d'achat des consommateurs.	Assurer que les multinationales paient leurs parts des taxes. Sortir la partie de la population sur le salaire minimum de la taxation. Augmenter la limite de 40% de taxation aux rémunérés de £55,000 et introduire une taxation de 30% sur les personnes rémunérées entre £45,300 et £55,000. Ramener les maisons inutilisées en usage. Permettre aux entreprises anglais d'employer des Anglais (es) prioritairement.	Axé sur une économie de marché plutôt qu'une économie régulée par l'État. Maintenir des hauts standards en ce qui concerne les accords d'échanges. Libérer le marché de toutes restrictions non nécessaires et empêchant une économie prospère. Réduire les taxes liés à l'héritage et à la richesse, ainsi que réguler plus concieusement les taxes liées aux échanges.	Reconstruire l'économie américaine et ramener des emplois au pays. Ramener les companies américaines en sol américain. Améliorer l'analyse des traités de libre-échange avant leur signature et s'assurer de leurs impacts sur l'économie américaine avant tout. Balancer le budgets américains et sauver la justice sociale. Promouvoir l'essor des petites companies et des start-ups. Libérer les marchés financiers. Taxation plus juste des grandes companies.
Inégalités	Une France Juste Baisser de 10 % l'impôt sur le revenu sur les trois premières tranches. Priver d'accès aux marchés publics les multinationales qui pratiquent l'évitement fiscal. Revaloriser le travail manuel. Réduire les dépenses de logement des ménages.	Enlever les frais de cours dans les secteurs de la téchnologie, science, ingénérie, mathématique et de la médecine. Prioriser l'allocation de logements pour les personnes venant de la région. Renforcer le salaire minimum. Protéger les droit des travailleurs.	Augmenter les salaires minimums. Augmenter les exigences minimum de l'éducation en matière de compétences. Promovoir l'Allemagne comme un exemple en matière d'innovations technologiques.	Implanter une taxation égale et juste pour promouvoir la croissance économique. Impotance de l'éducation pour tous et l'opportunités pour tous les enfants américains d'avoir la change à une éducation. Améliorer le système d'éducation et demeurer l'exemple mondial. Promouvoir l'innovation technologique.
Immigration	Rétablir les frontières nationales et sortir de l'espace Schengen. Fermer toutes les mosquées extrémistes recensées. Défendre la langue française. Promouvoir l'assimilation républicaine, principe plus exigeant que celui d'intégration. Rétablir l'égalité réelle et la méritocratie en refusant le principe de « discrimination positive »	Quitter l'UE et reprendre le contrôle de nos frontières. Mettre fin à l'immigration pour les travailleurs non qualifiés pour une période de cinq ans. Introduire un nouveau système de visas différenciant asile, immigration et réfugiés. Introduire un nouveau système de pointage similaire au système australien permettant de réguler l'immigration pour assurer une analyse égale de toutes les demandes.	Allemagne comme culture dominante et fin au multiculturalisme. Protéger les frontiées allemandes. L'Islam n'a pas sa place en Allemagne et tolérer la critique de l'Islam dans le discours publique. Abolition de la reconnaissance publique pour des organisations islamiques. Préserver la langue, la culture et l'identité allemande.	Priorité numéro un étant de sécurisé les frontières nationales et d'enforcer les lois concernant l'immigration. Les politiques d'immigration doivent servir au peuple américain et les immigrants ne doivent pas voler les emplois des Américains. L'importance de l'immigration légale et juste en contraste avec l'immigration illégale.
Sécurité	Recentrer la police et la gendarmerie sur leur mission de sécurité publique. Rétablir l'expulsion automatique des criminels et des délinquants étrangers Renforcer les moyens humains et techniques des services de renseignement intérieurs et extérieurs Augmenter dès la première année du mandat le budget de la Défense à 2 % du PIB puis tendre vers 3 % à l'horizon de la fin du quinquennat. Quitter l'OTAN.	Augmenter les dépenses concernant la Défense de 2% comme l'accord de l'OTAN le requiert. Prévenir l'importation de criminels étrangers en sol britanniques et déporter ceux commettant des crimes sur le territoire. Refuser de donner le vote aux criminels. Avoir une tolérance zéro pour les pratiques culturels inacceptables, comme la mutilation génitale féminine.	Resserer les forces de l'ordre et améliorer le système de justice criminel. Augmenter la puissance des Forces Armées Allemandes. En désaccord avec la création d'une armée européenne. Pas d'immigration irrégulière via les lois concernant l'asile. Se concentrer sur l'immigration en provenance d'autres pays membres de l'Union Européenne. Protéger les frontières allemandes.	Construction d'un mur à la frontière méxicaine pour se protéger de l'immigration illégale en provenance du Mexique. Augmenter les dépenses militaires et rebâtir l'armée puissante américaine d'antan. Assurer la supériorité militaire américaine dans le monde entier. S'engager dans des conflits concernant la sécurité des américains avant tout. Déstituer sur les cartels de drogues sur le territoire.

Note : nos données proviennent des programmes politiques de chaque parti et nous sommes en mesure de donner plus d'informations.

Le tableau 4 démontre que les arguments de chaque section occupent non seulement la majorité des programmes politiques des partis de notre analyse, mais reflètent les problèmes émanant de l'économie et des afflux étrangers. La portion économique du tableau reflète les conséquences de la crise économique, mais aussi du système libéral déjà en place depuis plusieurs années, donc reflètent des valeurs *anti-establishment* qui sont présentes au sein de chaque discours populiste. Ensuite, on mentionne les inégalités et une réponse à la montée de celles-ci dans les quatre programmes politiques de manière différente, mais avec la même approche, soit qu'il faut rétablir un certain équilibre entre la classe la plus démunie et la classe la plus riche. Le problème de l'immigration et des réfugiés est plus important chez certains pays comme l'Allemagne ou le Royaume-Uni, surtout en raison de l'afflux étranger massif des dernières années, et plus particulièrement depuis la crise des réfugiés de 2014. La réaction est claire pour tous les pays : protéger ses frontières et réguler les individus voulant traverser leurs frontières. Cet aspect va encore à l'encontre des principes déjà établis en Occident. Finalement, la sécurité est un concept qui comporte la plupart des problèmes liés à l'économie et à l'immigration, car un sentiment d'insécurité peut être autant physique qu'économique. Ainsi, la protection de sa population sur son territoire se répète au sein des quatre programmes, mais aussi l'augmentation de la puissance militaire pour se protéger contre les actes hostiles venant de l'étranger. La tendance que nous remarquons en analysant les propositions politiques des quatre partis est la récurrence des problèmes liés à l'économie et l'immigration, ainsi que toutes les répercussions résultant d'une mauvaise économie et d'une forte immigration. Par ailleurs, en voyant l'importance donnée à des sujets liés aux valeurs matérialistes dans un monde jusqu'alors dominé par des valeurs postmatérialistes démontre la présence d'un renversement au cours des dernières années dans les valeurs des populations occidentales. Ce renversement vient des insécurités économiques et physiques éprouvées par les Français, les Britanniques, les Allemands et les Américains engendrées par la crise économique de 2008, mettant fin à la prospérité économique connue à la fin du 20^{e} siècle, ainsi que la forte immigration et l'afflux de réfugiés qui commença en 2014. Ces facteurs renversèrent les besoins primaires des populations et déplacèrent l'accent politique sur des problèmes plus importants à leurs yeux, même si cela allait à l'encontre des valeurs établies que nous connaissions depuis des décennies

Les politiques publiques des gouvernements

Les politiques d'immigration représentent la deuxième sous-unité d'analyse de notre recherche et analysent de manière plus concrète les actions des dirigeants politiques des partis politiques.

Les politiques du Président français Emmanuel Macron à Calais représentent bien la réaction populiste d'un parti au pouvoir face aux problèmes des réfugiés. En effet, en donnant une prime aux forces de l'ordre en renforçant la présence policière à la frontière à Calais, Macron a pour but de limiter l'entrée par ce point stratégique entre la France et l'Angleterre et ainsi limiter le nombre d'asiles en territoire français (Geai, 2018). Dans le cas britannique, le principal exemple en ce qui a trait aux politiques d'immigration est clair et assez récent : Brexit. En effet, le référendum du 23 juin 2016 démontre de la victoire du parti populiste de l'UKIP, mais aussi témoigne de la volonté des populations à vouloir limiter l'immigration, donc affirme que la population réagit face à l'augmentation de l'afflux étranger. En 2017, la Chancelière allemande Angela Merkel appliqua une limite de 200,000 demandeurs d'asile par année suite aux demandes de partis d'opposition, ce qui s'oppose à son discours des années précédentes où l'AfD n'avait pas

autant d'importance dans le clivage politique (Eddy, 2017). Aux États-Unis, le seul pays où un populiste est entré au pouvoir, on retrouve des politiques comme un mur à la frontière du Mexique et l'interdiction d'entrer au pays pour des habitants de plusieurs pays musulmans.

Les politiques adoptées au sein des quatre pays démontrent la réaction populiste des populations occidentales face aux enjeux économiques et migratoires des dernières années.

Les discours des partis politiques

Notre troisième et dernière partie de l'analyse des conséquences de l'économie et de l'immigration sur la montée du populisme porte sur les discours des dirigeants politiques des partis populistes au sein des quatre pays de notre analyse.

Tableau 5: Comparaison des discours des dirigeants politiques populistes français, britanniques, allemands et américains.

	Citations de discours des dirigeants de partis populistes
France	Si la migration mondiale continue, elle annonce la submersion de notre continent et de notre pays, donc à terme : leurs disparitions.
	Les peuples qui renoncent à lutter cessent d'exister.
	Il n'y a pas de sociétés sans limites.
	Ordre économique bouleversé par une mondialisation sauvage et les révolutions numériques et robotiques qui sont à l'œuvre.
	Défis technologiques qui nous expose aux risques de la relégation économique ou de l'asservissement si nous ne savons pas le relever et le réguler.
Royaume-Uni	We need a tougher approach to security and integration.
	Lack of courage from politicians to name the source of terror within our borders, islamist extremism.
	Debate to routinely armed the police force, at least double the number of police officers.
	Do more to prevent the propagation of extremist ideas.
Allemagne	Increase immigration cannot solve alone for a declining population.
	Spending millions on families instead of maintaining and integrating migrants who do not have the right to be here or do not have the qualifications required to find a job
	There isn't enough qualified workers to sustain the immigration rate proposed.
	Denies the policy requiring the look at the equivalency of migrant's qualifications after they come in the country.
États-Unis	Small group ripped the reward while the people paid the cost.
	We make other countries rich while the wealth of our country as dissipated over the horizon.
	Funding other nations and protecting other nation's borders while refusing to defend our own is wrong.
	Protection will lead to prosperity and strength.
	2 Rules : 1. Buy american 2. Hire american.

Le tableau 5 soutient que la montée du populisme se reflète dans les discours politiques de ses dirigeants politiques, mais aussi que la différence entre la situation économique des pays ou l'ampleur de l'afflux étranger tend à changer l'intensité du discours entre ces deux variables. Par exemple, le cas allemand démontre une forte importance à l'immigration et le cas américain présente l'économie comme le problème central au sein des discours.

Conclusion

Les informations amassées selon nos quatre unités d'analyse ne laissent aucun doute sur l'ampleur de la crise économique et ses répercussions, mais aussi sur l'ampleur du nombre d'immigrants et de réfugiés émigrants de leurs pays jusqu'aux territoires occidentaux. Notre section sur l'économie, divisée en trois parties, démontre l'étendue substantielle et la complexité des conséquences de la crise de 2008 au sein des États, mais aussi dans les inégalités au sein de la population. En analysant différents aspects économiques, nous sommes venus à la conclusion que la France fut la plus durement touchée, selon nos critères d'analyse, que les États-Unis et

l'Allemagne fut touché de manières égales, et que le Royaume-Uni fut le moins touché de nos pays d'analyse.

Ensuite, notre analyse des inégalités sous deux critères, soit inégalités au sein des États et les inégalités émanant de la concentration des richesses au sein d'une minorité, a démontré que les États-Unis est le pays avec les plus grandes inégalités, soit une inégalité forte, où la classe bien nantie possède plus de la moitié du revenu national. En ce qui concerne l'Europe, on y retrouve des inégalités moyennes. Par ailleurs, le patrimoine des milliardaires qui augmenta deux fois plus vite que le nombre de milliardaires en l'espace de 30 ans démontre la forte concentration des richesses au sein d'une classe minoritaire de la population.

Ronald Inglehart et sa théorie sur les valeurs matérialistes et postmatérialistes nous a permis de faire le lien entre l'économie, donc une forme d'insécurité, et les discours des partis populistes. Les concepts d'Inglehart s'appliquent aussi aux cas de l'immigration et des réfugiés, car les valeurs matérialistes ne traitent pas seulement de l'insécurité économique, mais aussi de l'insécurité physique.

Notre analyse de l'immigration nous a donné des résultats intéressants sur la quantité d'immigrants et de réfugiés par pays, ainsi que l'augmentation de ces derniers durant les dernières années. Selon nos résultats, l'Allemagne fut le pays le plus durement touché par la crise de réfugiés, mais les États-Unis possède aussi un haut taux d'immigrants et une grande augmentation de ce taux sur une courte période de temps. De plus, le continent européen fut plus durement touché par la crise de réfugiés, donc les pays européens présentent un taux plus haut de réfugiés en comparaison avec leur population totale que les États-Unis. Ce phénomène est la conséquence de l'emplacement géographique de l'Europe, qui est à proximité de plusieurs conflits et guerres au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord, mais aussi en raison de l'espace de Schengen qui élimine les contrôles aux frontières territoriales de 26 pays européens.

La dernière section de notre analyse portait sur les conséquences de la montée du populisme, donc de la relation des variables indépendantes et intervenantes avec nos sous-unités d'analyse, soit les programmes politiques, les politiques d'immigration et les discours politiques des dirigeants des partis populistes. Dans les trois cas, on observe des éléments clés des valeurs matérialistes et des répercussions du populisme au sein des partis politiques.

Nos résultats de la dernière portion d'analyse confirment notre hypothèse selon laquelle la crise économique de 2008 eut des répercussions sur les inégalités et sur la situation économique générale des populations des quatre pays, et que les afflux abondants d'immigrants et de réfugiés agissent comme facteur d'intensification à la montée du populisme au sein des quatre pays. Il reste toutefois que la crise de 2008 demeure le point de départ et que l'aspect économique demeure la cause principale de la montée du populisme.

Notre recherche ne soutient pas que l'économie et l'immigration et les réfugiés sont les causes uniques de la montée du populisme, mais ces deux variables regroupent tous les éléments composant la cause de la montée de ce dernier. Nous apportons une nouvelle perspective à cette littérature encore nouvelle en considérant que le populisme est un phénomène bien défini et étudié que depuis quelques années.

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Campaigns as Gendered Institutions

A Case Study Between B.C. Premier and California Gubernatorial Campaigns

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Abstract. This paper will explore campaigns as gendered institutions using Acker's framework of gendered organizations. Acker notes political institutions are defined by the absence of women, and campaigns are no different. This paper will explore two case studies: British Columbia's 2017 Provincial Election and California's 2010 Gubernatorial Race to identify how gendered institutions operate across electoral races. The framework of gendered institutions is applied by exploring how four components: the historical bias in job evaluation and candidate selection of the preferred "gender" traits; the decisions and procedures that control and construct hierarchies based on gender; the construction of symbols and gender ideology that give legitimacy to the institution and the process of "doing gender". The case studies demonstrate that campaigns generally seem to be gendered in the same way with the exception of how campaign fundraising operates, which warrants further investigation. Additional research is needed to understand the extent to which campaigns as gendered institutions operate across political systems.

Introduction

For the first time in 2016, during the American Presidential election, the western world saw a candidate from each sex campaign for arguably the most gendered position in the world. Democrat Hillary Clinton and Republican nominee Donald Trump battled it out for over a year. Gender often became a central theme in their campaigns, which highlighted questions about their ability to lead due to their sex and perceived limitations to run the country because of these socialized norms. However, what was less obvious during the campaign was how the process of campaigning itself was gendered; favoring the male candidate who most closely fit within the masculine typology of who is most "natural" and "presidential." As the political scientist, Georgia Duerst-Lahti noted, white men, "have played an overwhelming role in the political world's creation and evolution, it is only "natural" that masculine preferences have become embedded in its ideal nature. It takes on a masculine gender ethos," (Thomas and Schroedel, 2011: 49). The presidential campaign favoured the Republican nominee for his masculinity, his symbolism as a warrior-leader compared to that of the more dove-ish female Democrat, which ultimately contributed to the election of Donald Trump. Given these recent political events, this paper will be asking the question: how does the gendered nature of campaigns change over time and across elections?

Sociologist Joan Acker coined the phrase, "Gendered Institutions," defining it as a set of, "gendered processes in which both gender and sexuality have been obscured through a gender-neutral, asexual discourse," (1990: 140). These institutions exist in nearly all social forms – education, economic, legal, military and religious life are all gendered. While the realm of politics

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is certainly no exception, the role of the campaign as a gendered institution has been overlooked until recently. Women have been excluded from campaigns, both as candidates and as campaign staff, or considered a 'novelty' within them well until the late twentieth century. While campaigns operate across unique political landscapes, in which institutional norms and expectations matter to varying degrees, the underlying processes of campaign institutions operating across political time remain equally gendered across races (Dittmar, 2012: 16). This makes campaigns an ideal case study to explore how gendered power operations contribute to gender disparities in political life.

The underlying gendered processes that Acker identified and defined have led me to question: if we know that all campaigns are institutionally gendered, are they, in fact, all gendered in the same way across all elections? Are some campaigns more susceptible to be institutionally gendered than others? Literature has barely begun to scratch the surface in terms of understanding how campaigns function as gendered institutions, and this paper certainly will not be able to answer all of these questions. My aim, however, is to focus on this specific research question: does the gendered nature of campaigns change over time and across regional elections? I intend to begin to address this question by comparing two case studies: British Columbia's 2017 Provincial and California's 2010 Gubernatorial campaign. I hope that using two diverse cases across countries, political systems and time will help to shed light on how gender operates within campaigns to varying degrees. While I expect that gender will operate in a relatively similar way within campaigns in both cases, this analysis will begin to identify systematic ways in which campaigns work to women's disadvantage due to the level of masculinity built into the institution and encourage more discovery in this field. If we can understand how different campaigns are gendered in similar or different ways, then, ultimately, we can help to identify the institutionalized gendered barriers that candidates face when they elect to run in a political race.

Gendered Institutions

Acker is considered the first to introduce the concept of gendered organizations, arguing that institutions are not gender neutral; rather, assumptions about gender underlie the processes built into the organizational constructs (1990). Acker's theory of gendered organizations is built on Dorothy Smith's foundational work, who argues that organizational sociology is built around the worlds of men and their experience and interests arise exclusively in relation to the framework of societal power(institutions) (Smith, 1987: 148). Smith's contribution in *The Everyday World as Problematic* first highlighted the potential of gendered institutions as an undervalued theoretical perspective, which Acker further developed. Acker claims that the gendered nature of an organization is obscured through the embodied nature of work (1990: 139).

Acker situates gender as, "the patterning of difference and domination through distinctions between women and men that is integral to many societal processes," (1992: 565). Due to social misunderstandings of gender difference and sex, more specifically gender meaning sex, it is often only associated as a characteristic of individuals and overlooked as a function of the distribution of work in organizations. In Acker's 1992 article, "From Sex Roles to Gendered Institutions," she outlines four major components of gendered institutions: (1) a historical bias of the institution in terms of job evaluations and candidate selection of the preferred "gender" character traits; (2) decisions and procedures that control, segregate, exclude and construct hierarchies based on gender and race; (3) construction of symbols and gender ideologies that justify, explain and give legitimacy to institutions; and (4) process of replication and "doing gender" within the organization. Understanding social institutions as gendered, Acker argues, allows us to look at

institutional structures with a new lens to recognize how all aspects of institutions, including their authority and processes are gendered. Elements such as stereotypical expectations for women and men's attributes, behaviour and perceptions, personal relationships, dominant ideologies, and distributions of power and organizational processes all contribute to this gendering process (Thomas and Schroedel, 2011: 48). Through these four processes, Acker argues that gender is a pervasive symbol of power at both the individual and organizational level. Most societies are organized along the lines of gender through institutional structures in various sectors of social life and gendering results in a disadvantage to one sex, depending on which is dominant in the social institution. Furthermore, as Acker delineates, the process of institutional gendering, the structures, behaviours, and ideologies conform to the gender that aligns most with the institution. Often, institutions reward types of masculinity, while feminine preferences are often seen as falling outside the institutional norm and are devalued by the structures in place. Thus, the subordination and exclusion of women have been built into institutional principles, while certain types of masculinity are linked to maintain and perpetuate institutional constructs.

Campaigns as Institutions: Literature Review

There is little literature on campaigns functioning as gendered institutions and some may argue that campaigns perhaps do not fit within the 'gendered institution' label. Early research on political campaigns have debated how effective they are, and if they truly influence the political institutions. Scholars in the 1950's argue that vote choice was determined by party identification, and not impacted by campaigning (Berleson Lazarsdeld and McPhee, 1954), however more recent scholarship has demonstrated that campaigns do play a role in determining candidate success (Dolan, 2005). As Acker has noted, political institutions have been defined by "the absence of women" (1992: 567), and campaigns are certainly no exception. Campaigns are not gender neutral and are defined by masculinity. They are described in terms of warfare and battle and are an integral component of the political institution which, "suffer from compulsory masculinist ideology that serves as the standard for both men and women," (Heldman, 2011: 20). There is more than just a bias within the institution; rather, men and masculinity are the systemic 'norm' and women and femininity are the 'other' of the institution. Campaigns practice the exclusion of femininity from the ideological work of the institution and as a result, cater towards masculine processes due to the fact that the history of campaigns has been constructed by men, about men, and for men.

Political science has historically overlooked how institutionalized gender plays a role in political arenas. Lovenduski was one of the first scholars to explore how gendering organization impacts political science research, noting that the concept of gender needs to be re-considered in terms of how we think and what we know about political life (1998: 335). Lovenduski's ground-breaking paper in the field connects the characteristics of gendered institutions to the field of political science capturing the concept that all institutions are implicated in the shaping of gender relations, including both private and public, such as state organizations (1998).

Kirkpatrick identified in the first comprehensive analysis of women participating in the campaign process, "campaigning requires so many types of behavior believed to be difficult, if not impossible, for women. To campaign it is necessary to put oneself forward, to "blow one's own horn," to somehow demonstrate one's superiority and dominance. What can conventionally well-behaved ladies do in such an arena?" (1974: 86). This demonstrates the issue of campaigns as more

than just a built-in bias against women and femininity, but rather systematic institutional omission and practice of exclusion of women from the political and campaigning arena (Smith, 1987).

Given the masculine bend in all aspects and processes of politics, this can explain why campaigns are often overlooked. When campaigns are discussed as an 'institution,' it is generally only in regard to the American presidential campaign, often considered to be the most gendered office in the world. Heldman delves into the masculinity and cultural barriers that follow during a presidency campaign (2011). She argues that the masculinist ideology is exclusively a male prerogative, and female candidates are at an automatic disadvantage as they cannot embody and demonstrate their commitment and power to the creed of masculinity (Heldman, 2011: 21). Through the use of language in popular culture, the "feminization" of campaign opponents, the cultural female objectification, and masculinity defined traits associated with the office of the presidency, Heldman argues female candidates are shackled to normative constraints on who can hold public office, ensuring campaigning is not an equal playing field. Conroy builds on Heldman's work and slightly contradicts some her findings. Conroy explores how the hierarchy of masculinity plays a role in American presidential campaigns and its relation to electoral success (2011). Her analysis finds that masculinity traits, whether present in male or female candidates, often finds more electoral success, which works against strong feminized candidates. Conroy's results found that the presidency is so entwined with masculinity that gender becomes a major yet often overlooked factor in presidential elections (Heldman, 2011: 22).

There is some foray into exploring how campaigns for other offices are gendered institutions, although this research is limited. Dittmar (2012) explores how campaign actors in Gubernatorial races shape perceptions of gender through campaign strategies and messages and how, and in what way, gender matters in political campaigns. Her research questions whether gendered institutions have the potential to be "re-gendered" through internal processes created by campaign teams, including redefining what it means to be a candidate so that women can break from the masculinized candidate mold.

While some may argue that campaigns cannot be considered an institution due to their short time frame, I would argue that the constraint of time actually offers a chance for more disruption in terms of gender due to the short and sporadic nature of their existence. This is one major difference between campaigns compared to other political institutions, as campaigns may be more malleable and susceptible to change more willingly. Yet, campaigns still function, "according to norms, processes, and motivations distinct to electoral settings, and are influenced by a unique group of institutional actors," (Dittmar, 2012: 19). Hence, they play a crucial role in propagating power disparities, especially given their "gatekeeping" role to the other political institutions associated with elected office.

Methods

I chose to look at two different case studies – British Columbia's 2017 Provincial and California's 2010 Gubernatorial campaigns – to explore the question, "do campaigns as gendered institutions, change across regions?" These case studies were chosen for a number of reasons. Both Canadian Provincial and American Gubernatorial races are similar in the power of the position and provide comparable results in terms of desired electoral position. While there has been some limited research done on the impact of institutional gender in American campaigns at a Presidential and Governor level, there is no such research on Canadian campaigns. Thus, comparing two cases across countries will demonstrate (i) if institutionalized gender exists across political systems and

(ii) if it exists in the same way in varying types of electoral campaigns and political systems. While there are several differences between these races, I believe that there is enough overlap to demonstrate the institutional gender aspect as a function of campaigns. On a more granular level, B.C. and California were chosen because of similar geography and political leanings. While their populations are different (California is the largest state population, B.C. is the third largest province in Canada), they both have similar economic and cultural traits and are likely to share similar political issues in campaigns, such as environmental protection, and housing affordability. Additionally, both regions are significant players in their countries' political, economic and cultural spheres.

Both campaigns had a strong right-wing female candidate (Christy Clark for B.C. Liberals and Meg Whitman for the Republicans), running against a left-wing male opponent, (John Horgan for the NDP in B.C. and Jerry Brown for the Democrats in California). In both cases, the more right-wing parties (Liberal and Republican) were also both incumbent positions. Christy Clark had been elected B.C. Premier for nearly 8 years, while in California, Arnold Schwarzenegger had been the Republican governor in California completing his 8-year term limit. This opened the door for Meg Whitman to step in as the new Republican nominee in 2010.

While it is important to note that B.C. has four political parties, compared to the two-party system in California, it is easy to argue based on the history of politics in B.C. that it has been a mostly two-party province for decades; between the B.C. Liberals and NDP. The two other parties, Conservatives and Greens are not a notable factor in the comparison as they fluctuate between being dormant to gaining at most one seat in the legislature per term.

These case studies also differ somewhat in terms of timing. Due to the timing of elections for each race, it would not be possible to compare two recent electoral races taking place in the same year that is similar across other measures, identified above. Other differing variables that have been excluded from the case study comparison include the role of outside actors, such as American super PACs that can finance their own ads outside of the campaign, and the role of the leader which differs slightly across each race. Technically, a candidate for governor is responsible for their own race and not state-wide races, whereas, in provincial elections, the outcome of the party province-wide determines who will be elected Premier. However, in both cases, the candidates for Governor/Premier end up campaigning for their party's candidates across the region in an attempt to ensure a majority in the legislature once elected.

It is also significant to note that the undertaking of this research is not to argue that this methodology or these particular cases are considered the optimal way to study institutional gender in campaigns, but rather, intended to demonstrate how institutionalized gender exists within campaigns and to varying degrees across different political systems, regions and time. This approach will contribute to the dearth of literature on gendered campaigns and demonstrate how crucial further study is needed within this area to understand the full effect of gendered campaigns on candidates.

I will analyze each case study using Acker's four components of gendered institutions. I will operationalize each component in the following way:

(1) a historical bias of the institution in terms of job evaluations and candidate selection by evaluating the history of the electoral office incumbents and previous candidates who have run

(2) decisions and procedures that control, segregate, exclude and construct hierarchies based on gender and race, by evaluating the financial contributions for each candidate in the campaign to determine hierarchies in terms of business and political support for each campaign

(3) construction of symbols and gender ideologies that justify, explain and give legitimacy to institutions through the use and effectiveness of 'going negative' in terms of ad campaigns for each candidate in the campaign and;

(4) the process of replication and "doing gender" within the organization by evaluating the media and public perception of each candidate during campaigns debates to determine how each candidate performed or strayed from their expected gender traits (West and Zimmerman, 1987).

B.C. and California Case Studies

According to the B.C. Elections Act, few requirements are actually in place to run a campaign, and the gendered aspects, certainly, are not apparent. According to Elections B.C., candidates must be a Canadian citizen, over the age of 18 on voting day and not have a criminal record that precludes them from being able to run or vote (Elections BC, 2016: 2). However, in most cases, many unofficial requirements exist, which arguably make the prospects for feminized candidates more difficult. In general, these include "prior political experience, name recognition, party support, adequate funding and fundraising abilities, strong appeal for the base of the party…and strong leadership and communication skills," (Han, 2011: 5). According to California state laws, to run for governor, candidates must be 25, an American citizen and a resident of the state for five years preceding the election day (California Secretary of State, 2018). Similarly to B.C., many unofficial requirements exist that have been layered on top of these basic candidate guidelines. As a result, a number of informal qualifications limit the pool of potential candidates who participate in campaigns. The gendered nature of campaigns are exposed through the layering of these cultural norms during candidate selection, which are often linked to features of hyper-masculinity, which is traditionally intertwined with the political arena.

Historical Bias in Job Evaluation

The 2017 British Columbia Provincial election saw the nearly 8-year incumbent for the Liberal party, Christy Clark, face off against rival party leader, John Horgan for the NDP party, and Andrew Weaver, B.C. Greens. NDP was the main opponent for the Liberal party, with the Greens as an outlier that only ever gathered a single seat each election (Shaw, 2017a). In terms of Acker's components of a gendered institution, the B.C. premiership had to date 40 elections since its inception as a province. Women have led a party and been Premier only twice in its history. Christy Clark, who became Liberal leader in 2011 was the first female B.C. leader to run a successful campaign and elected Premier in addition to winning a campaign in two consecutive elections (2013 and 2017) (Elections B.C., 2018). Historically, the Premier position has been generally defined by the lack of women until only recently in British Columbia. While women have been cabinet members for a longer period of time, these are subordinate positions to the masculine role of Premier. Acker identifies this gendered hierarchy as key components of a historical bias in a job evaluation towards masculinity within an institution (1992). One could argue that the two successful campaigns led by Christy Clark could still be considered a novelty for the position. Clark represents a right-wing party in B.C. that has focused on more 'masculine' policies including cuts for small businesses and a focus on economic growth, which are generally considered more congruent with masculine traits and values. This aligns itself with the idea that leaders are, "expected to distance themselves from femininity and uphold the ideals of masculinity, which embody strength, independence, determination, and single-mindedness," (Conroy, 2011:

138). Yet, one could also make the argument that while Clark bucks the trend of the historical bias in terms of sex, there is some argument that her presented 'gender' supports the preferred masculine ideals upheld in campaigning and politics.

In terms of historical bias in the job evaluation, California has never had a female governor. Neither candidate was in the incumbent position. Although a Republican held the governor position for the past eight years, and Brown had previous political experience; Whitman was an outlier: new to politics and a former president and CEO of the tech giant eBay (Nagourney, 2010). Whitman could be considered an exception to the rule of the typical female running for an elected position in that she was able to run because she had previous access to another gendered institution: corporations. She had managed to reach a leadership position within another highly gendered organization, giving her enough cultural and social capital to make the move across institutions and still be considered a legitimate, viable candidate. Whitman was the third woman in a twenty-year period to unsuccessfully run for governor in California. Like B.C., the history of the office has been defined by the lack of female presence at the helm. Whitman, also similarly to Clark, represented the more right-wing party of the two candidates in the Gubernatorial race, which arguably focuses on more 'masculine' policies, such as supporting the economy by freezing bills that may impact it, e.g. greenhouse gas emission cuts (Ballotopedia, 2011). However, she also supported abortion rights, a more controversial position that is not considered a 'masculinized' issue in the political realm. Whitman demonstrates both masculine traits that align with the historical job requirements of the governorship yet has clear deviations into "feminization" of the position. Her attempt to buck the trend and become the first female governor of the state demonstrates internalized institutionalized bias towards female candidates, as media and public attention placed on Whitman focuses on her 'uniqueness' and as an outlier candidate. Brown had previously been the California governor in late 1970's, his win in 2010 made him a governor holding three non-consecutive terms in California. He previously held the attorney general position in California, giving him exceptional amount of political capital and historical success within the political institution compared to that of Whitman.

In comparing these two campaigns in terms of job evaluation bias, it becomes obvious that the political position is a major factor in terms of the gendered institution. Even though campaigns aren't officially gendered by job evaluations, they interact with several other gendered institutions; such as the ability to raise money, project power, and align with an acceptable masculine and feminine norm framework. Femininized candidates must negotiate this gendered political landscape and campaign bias through a number of means, which, as already noted, effectively limits the participation of both women and more 'feminized' candidates in this institution.

The Process of Replication and "Doing Gender" Within the Organization

When exploring how Clark 'does' gender (West and Zimmerman, 1987) in terms of campaign debates, the analysis demonstrates that she is held to a higher standard than male opponent, John Horgan and masculinity is idealized. Visually, Clark plays up her traditional feminine traits, with full hair and make-up and in a bright teal suit on television. This is in stark contrast to the two male opponents in demure blue suits (FactPoint video, 2017). The debate highlights the bind that Clark is in to 'do gender'; when she responds to a comment about the budget from the NDP opponent, John Horgan, she is immediately interrupted by Horgan several times. He accuses the moderator of working for Clark and unfairly giving her extra time, although she is still within her designated time (FactPoint video 2017: 6:59). Within the first ten minutes,

Horgan repeatedly speaks over Clark during her allocated time within the debate, and an exasperated Clark pauses several times to collect herself and combat this while still portraying the appropriate soft, patient feminine norms expected from a woman. Eventually, Clark responds to Horgan's interruptions by laying her hand on his arm in a soft and 'feminized' fashion and tells him to "calm down" (Shaw, 2017a). This feminized response demonstrates Acker's point about doing gender and remaining within the masculine hierarchy of the political institution. Even though Clark's campaign platform is focused on more traditional masculine concepts in politics, she remains a physical representation of feminine norms. Horgan utilizes the hierarchy of masculinity to his advantage in the debate by reproducing the gendered understructure of society's institutions allowing him to interrupt Clark without cause or recourse, (Acker, 1992: 567). His operation of the masculinity hierarchy ensures that Clark is put in her place as a woman, effectively removing her space to speak openly, by repeatedly speaking over her. Horgan knows that in 'doing gender' appropriately, Clark will never be able to respond aggressively, or in any fashion that threatens this hierarchy. It is worth highlighting that this type of exchange never occurs across the two male candidates during the debate, Horgan and Weaver, who both display more preferred displays of masculinity, both in physical and performative manifestations.

In California, the debate highlights how both candidates "do gender" and most prominently demonstrates the gendered nature of campaigns. An earlier campaign scandal which involved a Democrat campaign worker leaving a voicemail and referring to the Republican nominee, Meg Whitman, as a "whore"iIs highlighted during the debate. The moderator notes that Brown has never apologized or shown remorse for that scandal, and Brown excuses the incident, "he doesn't apologize for how the term was used," (C-Span, 2010: 30:16) but apologizes that a private conversation with a 'gargled transmission' was illegally obtained, and he is sorry to Whitman that the word was said. When Whitman attempts to demonstrate that the term is offensive not to only her as an individual, but to all female voters and Californians, Brown shuts her down saying that using the word "whore", "doesn't represent anything that happens outside of a campaign," (C-Span, 2010: 31:46). This exchange demonstrates how, "gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present," (Acker, 1990: 142) in politics. Even with a culturally offensive term designated to women, this term is simply reduced to institutional campaign behaviour. Within the context of institutions, men believe their behaviour represents general human behaviour in structures and processes of organizations. Thus, this term is simply seen as part of politics-as-usual and a process operating outside of gender. Brown equates that Ms. Whitman isn't a whore because she is a woman, but rather because she is in the political race and his opponent; therefore, it's not offensive to her or women. Whitman can only respond by 'doing gender' and responding in a way that fits within culture's idealization of feminine nature (West and Zimmerman, 1987: 130). Her response demonstrates this problematic institutional bind because she must perform within the confines of her femininity. She cannot respond, other than politely suggesting to Brown that this is offensive to all women and then move on.

Both case studies demonstrate the gendered aspect of campaigns and how the process of replication of 'doing gender' contributes to the institution and maintains the masculine hierarchy in politics. Neither Horgan or Brown are impacted by their sexist comments towards their female opponents or their hyper masculine actions displayed in these debates, demonstrating the hierarchy of masculine norms within campaign institutions. As Acker notes, "gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present," (1990: 142). Neither Clark nor Whitman can break the "femininization" of their gender and respond to comments to demonstrate to the public the full

effect and disadvantages that gendering in campaigns has towards candidates who do not fit within the expected masculine norm of politics.

Decisions and Procedures that Control, Segregate, Exclude and Control Hierarchies Based on Gender

Using financial contributions as a marker determining the decisions and procedures that control and exclude based on gender demonstrates some malleability in terms of gender institutions within campaigns. One would generally expect in a gendered institution that financial contributions to campaigns would be higher and more supportive of the more masculine idealized campaign. However, in analyzing the data from B.C. elections, top donors for Clark's Liberals include mostly private resource companies and companies which would flourish under international trade, which aligns with Liberal policies (Carman, 2017). In contrast, the NDP's fundraising mostly comes from unions, which again, aligns with their policies and platforms directly. What is interesting is that Clark's Liberals have nearly three times as much fundraising capital as the NDP's with the median donation at $360 dollars, compared to NDP's $200 (Carman, 2017). These results highlight the potential malleability of institutionalized gender within campaigns, as the Liberals are highly funded. This may be due to the party politics component, and supporters may be funding the general party platform, more than the candidate themselves. Further research is needed on this front to conclusively determine how financial contributions play a role in terms of decisions and procedures that control, segregate, exclude and construct hierarchies based on gender. However, one can infer that there may be some malleability as Clark has been the leader of the party for nearly 8 years; to some extent, donors are supporting her leadership. Campaign funding contributions are the sites of concrete institutional functioning. Because, "Processes and practices of different types can be analytically distinguished, although they are inherently connected elements in ongoing social life," (Acker, 1992: 567) in theory fundraising should be more exclusionary to Clark's Liberals given her inherent femininity. However, in part, because fundraising supports both the party and the leader it is difficult to discern if Clark is being included and gender perhaps does not matter as much in this component, or if the focus for donors is more on the long-term party policies.

In California, the financial contributions are equally as significant and ambiguous in terms of revealing how campaigns are gendered. It is also worth highlighting as a difference across races that in theory, in California, donors have a wider range of options in terms of donations. If they do not support their party candidate for Governor, they can donate to Democratic or Republican candidates for other state offices. Across the Whitman and Brown campaigns, Whitman raised substantially more funds, with the caveat that most of her funding came from her own contributions. Of her total $176 million raised through her campaign; she self-funded over $119 million of that dollar amount, which she attributed to making her a more 'independent' candidate and able to more freely act in the interest of voters than on behalf of large-scale contributors (National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2018a). However even when factoring out her own contribution, she still raised $57 million of donor funding. Her top donors included $4 million from securities investment, and nearly $3 million from the real estate sector, (National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2018a). Brown's funding differs significantly. He raised only $40 million with his top donors being the Democratic party at $8.7 million. General unions contribution $7.6 million and lawyers and lobbyists contributing $4.5 million (National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2018b). Again, the funding aspect to the campaign lacks clarity to draw distinct

conclusions on the impact of genders function in a campaign. One would expect that Brown would have raised more given his political capital and previous experience in politics; yet Whitman raised much more, even when factoring out her own personal contribution.

Both Clark and Whitman fundraised the most in each campaign, which based on Acker's framework, one would expect an increased financial contribution to align within the gender hierarchy of the institution, which in the political case, is masculinity. Future research is needed to explore how financial contributions function within the framework of gendered campaigns, as neither case is overtly conclusive. Based on these results, fundraising could be more divided across masculine focused policies rather than the gender of the candidate, as both Whitman and Clark support traditionally 'masculine' issues compared to both Horgan and Brown. Future research exploring how fundraising within individual races functions across time may help to further understand its function in constructing gender hierarchies in campaigns.

Construction of Symbols and Gender Ideologies that Justify, Explain and Give Legitimacy to Institutions

In terms of Acker's component of the construction of symbols and gender ideologies that justify, explain and give legitimacy to institutions, the use of candidates going negative through ads during the campaign is explored. Negative ads are sufficient gender symbols that legitimize campaigns given the fact their messages, images, and traits symbolize the ways in which they choose to communicate both their own gender traits and their opponents to the public (Dittmar, 2015) and can influence the degree to which a woman or feminine candidate can be normalized. Dittmar found that gender functions most importantly in informing campaign strategy, (2015: 2), therefore we can expect that it would have an impact on the distribution of negative ads.

In the 2017 B.C. Provincial campaign, negative ads were frequently used throughout the campaign. Horgan and the NDP created a number of attack ads that depicted Clark as a corrupt leader who bends for her corporate donors, while Clark's Liberals portrayed Horgan as being in the pocket of the unions. The negative ads only increased throughout the campaign, as the NDP released a video linking Clark to the suicide of a fired health researcher in 2012. The Liberals sent out a "truth truck" which crashed NDP events in the region with anti-Horgan information and signs (Shaw, 2017a). While this election was highly charged with numerous negative attacks, compared to previous elections, the negative symbols in terms of media representation and favor, seemed to generally work in the hands of Horgan and backfire on Clark (Shaw, 2017a). This demonstrates within campaign ads, "deeply embedded unconscious gendering is operational," (Thomas and Schroedel, 2011: 45) which seems to benefit the hierarchy of the preferred political masculine ideals. Horgan is not punished by the media or public for going negative, while Clark's negative tactics are questioned by media and she is considered doing, "too much politics and not quite enough policy initiative," (Shaw, 2017b).

In California, negative ads functioned slightly differently. While both candidates produced their own negative ads, a union PAC backing Brown also launched numerous negative attack ads early on in the election attacking Whitman for her spending record as a CEO, and tax break plans (Ballotopedia, 2011). The only official negative ads Brown released compared Whitman physically to Pinocchio, and showed her nose growing 'by the millions' highlighting her billionare status with her plans to cut taxes to only benefit the wealthy. Whitman's official attack ads focused on Brown's previous political record and did not allude to his physical appearance (Ballotopedia, 2011). The PAC ads were unique, given they were produced on behalf of Brown, and not approved

by Brown, they could be far more aggressive in their language. However, it was Browns negative ad which commented on Whitman's appearance and traits as a billionaire that demonstrated the embedded gendering within campaigns. Whitman did not have a super PAC supporting her campaign, and therefore her aggressive ads came directly from her, which specifically focused on spending records in Brown's past.

There is a deeply embedded gendering at play in campaigns, which becomes prominent when comparing the function of negative ads across these cases. The consequences for the ideal masculine candidates seem to be far less substantial or nonexistent compared to their feminine counterparts, demonstrating the systematic gendering within campaigns. Negative ads are understood as 'just part of campaigning' which is a noticeable disadvantage to feminine candidates who are limited in the type of negative ads they use, and how frequent they can run them before being held to a higher standard in the public's eye. Whereas masculine candidates have the freedom to attack both policy and physical appearance of their femininized opponents, demonstrating the symbolic power of masculinity within campaigns.

Conclusion

Acker introduced the concept of the gendered institution and research has been fruitful in exploring the ways in which these social institutions exist and impact individuals and cultural norms. The exploration of campaigns in this paper was intended to review the institution with a relatively new lens. Campaigns are an especially important institution because they essentially determine who has access to the other institutions of political power. In other words, they principally act as a first gate to keep certain people (e.g. women and femininized candidates) out of other, more powerful, institutions that are also very gendered. Exploring two case studies: B.C. 2017 Provincial and California's 2010 Gubernatorial campaign allowed for the exploration of institutionalized genders existence across political systems, and how it exists in varying ways, shaping electoral campaigns and political systems in the process. This research demonstrated how both campaigns are gendered in relatively similar ways. However, the gendered function of financial contributions in a campaign is not as clear as other aspects of campaigns. Based on the debate component of 'doing gender', one could argue that there is potentially more leeway (less gendering) in Canadian elections with a more direct link to the party than the individual. Further research is needed in this area of study given the dearth of literature. In particular, understanding how the role of super PACs and financing impacts and plays a role in the gendering of a campaign would be valuable as this paper barely scratched the surface. What this research most clearly points out is that further research is needed to understand the extent to which campaigns as gendered institutions operate across all political systems and regions. To re-gender the political realm, campaigns must first be addressed and to do so, it is imperative to further understand how gender operates in all types of campaigns across time, space and electoral race.

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An Ever-Closer Union

Communitarization of the European Union's Border Security

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Abstract. From the signing of the Maastricht Treaty to the formal implementation of Schengen into European law, the postwar integration of Europe through the idea of a European identity has pushed the current member states of the EU to abolish their internal borders and erect stronger external ones. Pushed by changing circumstances, the EU has had to alter how it polices its external borders by further supranationalizing its security processes. By examining primary sources that have been crucial to the supranationalization of European border security, this paper answers the following research question: how has the EU created institutions that supranationalize its border security processes? After searching through primary sources and conducting a discourse analysis on the Maastricht Treaty, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, the Treaty of Lisbon, Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, Regulation (EU) 1052/2013, and Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, this paper concludes that the EU has created institutions that gradually shift the sovereignty from member states to the supranational level as per the rhetoric of securitization. This has generated significant pushback as the chain of command becomes less clear due to communitarization and power to conduct external affairs shifts from member states to EU institutions.

Introduction

External threats have made border security an important issue in European politics, transcending national governments and finding itself under the jurisdiction of the European Union. Policing the entirety of the Schengen Area, Frontex and other agencies are tasked with preventing illegal entry into the EU. Considering existing writings on the supranationalization of the EU, this article builds on examining how the EU has created institutions like Frontex that have supranationalized its border security processes, allowing it to emerge as a coherent actor. Crises in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the Central African Republic have put increasing pressure on EU governments to stem the flow of refugees into their respective countries. Some credit the rise of anti-immigrant parties like Italy's Five Star Movement, UKIP, or France's National Front to the increased flow of refugees. Over 2.5 million people applied for asylum in 2017 alone and 2.3 million people illegally entered the EU, with 73% of Europeans wanting governments to do more to manage the situation (European Parliament 2018). These same parties are increasingly skeptical of the EU and its ability to enforce its external borders, with several calling for referenda to abandon the European project altogether. To determine how the EU supranationalized its border security, analysis of primary sources was necessary. This article tracks the official development and supranationalization of border security processes which were written into the founding documents of the European Union. Taking these institutions into account, this article proposes to answer the following research question: how has the EU created institutions that supranationalize its border processes? Noting that a gap has emerged in the literature around the communitarization of the EU's border security processes, this paper argues that it has done so through the rhetoric of securitization, which has resulted in the integration of member states through a unified border patrol and strengthening of

supranational security institutions, allowing the EU to become an actor in the border security of its member states, though subject to pushback. Section 2 conducts a literature review on previous writings on the supranationalization of European border security. Section 3 provides an analysis of how the EU has become a central actor in the border security of its member states.

Literature Review

Examining literature on European border security policy brings to light a recurring theme: the inside/outside distinction and the construction of threats. Nations within Europe strongly identify as 'European' as a result of the Second World War (Colliver 2017a). The idea of a European identity in the postwar period "granted a visionary, emotive quality to the prosaic necessity of finding remedies for the collective economic disarray of the postwar era. 'European identity' was the construct of a Europe torn apart by World War - a Europe hard-pressed by the requirement to rebuild its economic and moral strength" (Colliver 2017b). This has made it easier for supranational organizations that ultimately formed the basis of the EU, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community, to coalesce into a single supranational entity, thereby constructing an 'inside' (Gabel 2010). Javier Argomaniz (2009) discusses how this European identity plays into the construction of an inside/outside dynamic within and outside the EU. After acts of terrorism were committed in Madrid and London these attacks were "interpreted as external crises that…encouraged rapid policy and organizational expansion" (Argomaniz 2009, 153-54). By framing the issue with an inside/outside perspective it pressured governments of member states into compromise. As Michael Smith writes, norms like regular communication and consultation, confidentiality (in regard to member states not voluntarily embarrassing one another), and decision making by consensus pushed member states to "not always resort to the lowest common denominator position, as inter-governmental theories often suggest, but tend toward compromise and a median position in the hopes of reaching a decision" (2004: 745).

In discussions on the construction of an inside and an outside, this paper refers to the othering that occurs by utilizing framing techniques to create an 'us vs. them' mentality. This othering fits with the writings on securitization theory, which argues that security, "is ultimately an outcome of a special process or 'speech act' rather than an objective condition… [arguing that] nothing is a security issue by itself, rather it is an issue that only becomes a security issue if someone labels it as such… [thus] the meaning of security in contemporary global politics is ultimately constructed through the speeches and representations made by relevant political actors" (Sethi, 2015). Securitization theory has been employed when discussing seemingly existential threats, notably around topics like immigration or defense. Barry Buzan et al., write in *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* how three points are essential in securitization theory: referent objects where things are seen to be existentially threatened, securitizing actors who declare referent objects existentially threatened, and functional actors who influence decisions in the field of security by calling for security on behalf of the referent object (1998). An example would be a company that is polluting, as they would be central actors in the environmental sector while not a referent object nor trying to securitize environmental issues (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). The strengths of using securitization theory allow for a linear path to be followed when observing the development of policy by following the three points discussed by Buzan et al.: existentially threatened referent objects, securitizing actors who declare an existential threat, and actors who influence decisions by calling for security on behalf of the referent object. Securitization theory is

beneficial because it can be used as "a theoretical tool of analysis with which the analyst can trace incidences of securitization and desecuritization" (Taureck, 2006: 55). However, this can also be a weakness of the theory, as focusing solely on speech acts can discount the nuances and intricacies of particular issues. Taureck discusses how securitization can be employed theoretically or practically, with practical applications of the theory having tangible consequences. She quotes Wæver when noting,

> "As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try and assist in shaping the continent [Europe] in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence — even if this occasionally means invoking/ producing 'structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization." (Taureck, 2006: 61).

Attempts at compromise are not always successful. Several member states within the EU have pushed back against what they see as an increasingly bureaucratic and out of touch organization located in Brussels. These forms of resistance have come from several member states, like the UK refusing to join the Euro, Brexit, Poland refusing to sign the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, or Denmark refusing to join the area of freedom, security, and defense (EUR-Lex 2017). Tonra and Christiansen discuss how there is a push against supranationalization by member states within the EU, specifically regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), designed to assist the EU in functioning as a cohesive unit (2004). Tonra and Christiansen argue that no formal supranationalization has taken place, instead referring to the phenomenon of the EU gaining more power and influence in the domestic affairs of member states as 'Brusselization', defined as "a gradual transfer, in the name of consistency, of foreign policy-making authority away from the national capitals to Brussels" (2004: 29). Tonra and Christiansen (2004) and Argomaniz (2009) discuss 'Brusselisation' and the effects it has on the EU, with Argomaniz presenting the argument that following the Madrid attacks the EU faced a juncture, choosing to layer institutions on top of one another over bricolage, defined as the "combination and reuse of 'old' structures to perform new functions", allowing for the "the gradual shifting and drifting of an institution…which increases its structural complexity while leaving its basic core untouched". (Argomaniz, 2009: 157). This has contributed significantly towards the 'over-crowdedness' of the policy space, a criticism often raised by experts and policy-makers (Argomaniz, 2009: 157).

Amongst the criticisms brought forth to the EU, the erosion of sovereignty is front and centre. Certain member states argue that initiatives like Frontex erode the ability of the state to have the final say over decisions made on their sovereign territory. The existence of Frontex itself represents the institutionalization of an inside/outside dynamic perpetuated by the EU, as exemplified in the aftermath of 9/11. Andrew Neal points out that on September 20th, 2001 the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council of the EU met to "examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments" (2009: 338). This response "brought migration and the right of asylum into question and linked them both with security, constructing a tension between the demands of security on the one hand and rule compliance on the other. It demonstrates an assumption that the human rights and asylum regime is being abused or taken advantage of by actual or potential terrorists and is an immediate externalization of threat which is by implication foreign" (Neal 2009, 338-339). The construction of an external 'Other' through the language of security became a

central impetus in binding member states' interests together to push for the development of a European Border Police by France, Germany, Belgium Spain, Italy; however, this sentiment was not shared by all. As Neal discusses, the UK led the charge against the idea as it had serious reservations about the erosion of state sovereignty (2009: 340). In his discussion of sovereignty within the EU, Neil notes that because a major function of the organization is to bind its member states to a common set of laws, rules, and procedures that are upheld in EU courts it would be ideal for the Union to decide the exception (2009: 337). This notion of an exception being decided by a seemingly distant power did not sit well with certain member states but the consequences of ignoring the need for Brusselization are evident. Neal argues that the creation of Frontex was a result of the disintegration of a common EU response to security, migration, and borders following the 9/11, London and Madrid attacks (Neal 2009, 346). This resulted in collaboration being pushed amongst member states and the European Council taking a leadership role in border security efforts.

Existing arguments discuss the creation of an inside/outside distinction, and how that has led European nations to fear a foreign 'other' as established through the rhetoric of securitization, necessitating a strong border force. Houtom and Pjipers note in their article, "The European Union as a Gated Community," that the process of bringing the EU together through a single market, abolition of internal borders has reinforced a state of abnormality portrayed by those outside the EU looking for safety within (2007: 2). Authors like Argomaniz (2009) have undertaken discourse analyses to dissect how the creation of an inside/outside distinctions has played into tangible policies, such as the expansion of the mandate and force of Frontex or the increasing role the European Council and European Commission are playing. These issues are addressed because it is imperative for the EU to have a functioning chain of command when crises like the London or Madrid bombings occur. Much of the communitarization of the EU since those attacks has occurred in the name of securing the continent. Communitarization is defined as the transfer of authority to support collective goals (Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva, 2008: 3). The points Neal (2009) makes in his writings on the creation a border force for the Union under supranational control are valid, as the EU should have the power to decide the exception when a crisis occurs. Neal notes how the benefits of a common crisis response would assist in the interconnectedness of the EU (2009). If each member state were to take a different approach to border security it would create confusion and disorder amongst a supranational entity that has prioritized order and standardization, leading to instability and the beginning of a decline in the European project.

The process of communitarization initially received mixed reactions from European countries. Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva (2008) discuss how the communitarization of the EU, with issues under the Third Pillar of the EU such as visas, asylum policy, and immigration increasingly coming under the jurisdiction of the EU has generated resistance from some EU member states. This fits with the writings of Tonra and Christiansen who discuss pushback against communitarization by certain member states. However, Kasack and Shisheva note that communitarization has occurred even though member states like the United Kingdom have been skeptical of certain moves, including the communitarization of third pillar issues such as visas, asylum policies, and immigration (2008: 10). In the late 1990s, Germany substantively saw the completion of an area of free movement governed by common provisions on asylum and immigration as a priority while institutionally favouring communitarization and a greater role for the European Parliament, Commission, and European Court of Justice (Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva, 2008: 8). The UK "rejected what it considered unnecessary transfers of powers to supranational institutions [and noted that] The EU should concentrate on what needs to be done at

a European level, and doing it well" (Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva, 2008: 8) The UK substantively supported the idea of a common area of freedom, security, and justice but noted that coordination with supranational institutions should be conducted sparingly while staying firmly against communitarization (Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva, 2008: 8) In the view of the United Kingdom,

> "Intergovernmentalism need not jeopardize smooth and efficient decision-making. Thus, it suggested measures to improve the efficiency of JHA cooperation, while keeping the role of the Commission and the EP strictly limited. The UK believed that the EU obtains legitimacy via the national route. National parliaments and not the EP should hence be given a greater role in JHA policies." (Kraft-Kasack and Shisheva, 2008: 8).

These competing visions of the role of the EU have generated skepticism towards the supranational European project, fueling the rhetoric of Eurosceptic politicians who decry the bureaucracy and elitism prevalent in the EU and posing what some have described as an existential threat to the EU (Boffey 2017). Much of the research conducted on the strengthening of the external borders of the EU has focused around the pushback by Eurosceptic actors. This paper contributes to discussions on the EU by examining how primary source documents integral to the foundation of the EU's external borders have constructed a safe 'inside' and dangerous 'outside' using the rhetoric of securitization.

Analysis

This article analyzed seven primary sources through the lens of securitization, consisting of: the *Schengen Agreement,* 1985; the *Maastricht Treaty,* 1992; *Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004*, 2004 (establishing Frontex); the *Treaty of Lisbon,* 2007; *Council Decision 2009/371/JHA*, 2009 (establishing the European Police Office); *Regulation (EU) 1052/2013*, 2013 (establishing Eurosur); and *Regulation (EU) 2016/1624*, 2016 (expanding the mandate of Frontex). These seven documents were chosen because they are considered foundational texts in the communitarization of the EU's border security and in constructing an 'inside' and 'outside'. Conducting a written discourse analysis by examining the construction of othering through the creation of a relative 'inside' and 'outside' provides insight into how the EU has created institutions that supranationalize and communitarize its border processes, striving for an ever-closer union. The use of discourse analysis as a deconstructive reading of themes of these various documents is beneficial for seeing a progression in terms of the rhetoric used and allowing one to understand the conditions behind a specific problem. In this vein, discourse analysis is useful for understanding the rhetoric of securitization as it allows one to see the progression of rhetoric in the name of security. However, discourse analysis as a method does not provide definite answers and is dependent on the quality of the rhetoric, thus rendering its findings subjective.

Schengen Agreement, 1985

The Schengen Agreement created the framework for Europe to expand. Each state that signed onto the agreement committed to the gradual abolition of checks at common borders to create a market in an "area without internal frontiers" (European Council, 2000), which would ease the movement of peoples and goods. The agreement allowed for the citizens of France, West

Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium to cross their borders without any checks, a revolutionary concept that had been the dream of the European project for many decades. This was not immediately adopted by all parties in the EEC as there was concern amongst members that it would result in the erosion of sovereignty by moving decision-making authority regarding external relations to a supranational body. Schengen laid the framework for the development of the pillar system that the EU would adopt in 1992, with the third pillar covering cooperation in justice and home affairs. The Schengen Agreement sets out how each individual country is responsible for the external borders of the EU "within the scope of national powers and national law and taking account of the interests of all Contracting Parties" (European Council, 2000). The treaty begins to form the common perception of a European identity by gradually eliminating internal borders and allowing citizens to live and work in signatory countries, contributing to a gradual 'Schengenization' of what was to become the EU. This also gave the external borders of signatories far more attention, as internal borders were becoming less important in the supranational context and the rhetoric of securitization labelled external borders as a security issue. Numerous clauses in the Schengen Agreement discussing policing the external border ended with the phrase "taking into account interests of all Contracting Parties" (European Council, 2000), which gradually made the external border a security issue, thus necessitating the consolidation of power and decision-making authority under the auspices of a supranational government to control. However, there are some clauses that ensure national governments have the final say over major decisions made in regard to the external border. This includes Article 6.1 which states cross border movement at external borders shall be subject to checks by competent authorities carried out by personnel of the respective country instead of a supranational entity (European Council, 2000). These clauses use the rhetoric of securitization to put emphasis on external borders, with sovereign decision-making still allowed under the jurisdiction of the EU, thus being labeled as a security issue.

Maastricht Treaty, 1992

The Maastricht Treaty established precedents for the modern EU by marking "a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities" (European Council, 1992: 4). The Maastricht Treaty, and its successor Treaty of Amsterdam, built the EU on three pillars: the first a common market and single monetary policy under the European Community, the second a common foreign and security policy meant to "safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter" and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs to "provide citizens a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security, and justice" (European Parliament, 2017: 2). The third pillar is important as it covers controls on the external borders of the EU, the creation of a European Police Office, and a common asylum policy. This pillar also creates an inside-outside distinction, using securitization rhetoric to frame the inside of the EU as the safe 'home' under its leadership and the outside as dangerous and disorderly. The process of integration is mentioned in the preamble as implementing "a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity" (European Council, 1992: 4). Here the idea of a collective European identity is mentioned to minimize the importance of national boundaries and facilitate integration amongst member states. Article B of Title I states that the Union shall strive for "close cooperation on justice and home

affairs," (European Council, 1992: 7) signifying the gradual erosion of sovereignty towards the government of the Union. Article C discusses how under a "single institutional framework" the Union shall "ensure the consistency of its external activities in the context of its external relations, security, economic, and development policies" (European Council, 1992: 7). This article begins the discussion of supranationalization of border security processes, as it places external activities under the jurisdiction of a single institutional framework. The word 'border' is only mentioned four times in the entirety of the Maastricht Treaty, with the most significant passage under Title VI Article K.1. This section, under the Third Pillar, states that for the purposes of achieving the Union's goal of the free movement of people "Member States shall regard the following areas as matters of common interest" (European Council, 1992: 64) including asylum policy, rules governing the crossing of external borders and who controls those borders, immigration policy, judicial cooperation, and police cooperation by placing their jurisdiction under the EU. Article K.3 is important in determining chain of command, as it stipulates that the European Council can take initiative in promoting cooperation amongst member states, but the European Court of Justice (ECJ) "shall have jurisdiction to interpret their provisions and to rule on any disputes regarding their application" (European Council, 1992: 65). The role of the ECJ is important as signatories of the Maastricht Treaty are signing over part of their sovereignty to a supranational entity that uses the rhetoric of securitization as justification to take precedence over the nation-state. The precedents set by the ECJ as a supranational entity capable of determining national policies undoubtedly played into the dynamic from which Frontex was established, as national entities were no longer the only relevant factors in determining foreign and security policies.

Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, 2004

The establishment of Frontex heralded stronger cooperation amongst European intelligence agencies in the post 9/11 period. The official name of the law is "[E]stablishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union" (European Union, 2004: 1), demonstrating how the precedents established in the Maastricht Treaty were implemented as border security came under the jurisdiction of the EU. Article 1.2 of Chapter 1 details how although control and surveillance of external borders still lies with member states, Frontex shall "facilitate and render more effective the application of existing and future Community measures relating to the management of external borders" (European Union, 2004: 3). Frontex supranationalizes the processes of border security in Article 11 of Chapter 2 by retaining the authority to "take all necessary measures to facilitate the exchange of information relevant for its tasks" (European Union, 2004: 5) clearly taking precedence over the willingness of member states to share information by labelling it a security issue. Forcing this ensures that information flows smoothly across borders in the name of collective security, again referring to the idea of reinforcing and securitizing a 'European' identity. The establishment of the agency itself is a clear indication that an EU priority is to create institutions that transfer the control over border security from member states to a supranational authority, as Article 15 of Chapter III dictates that the "Agency shall be a body of the Community" (European Union, 2004: 6) instead of an independent agency. This supranational authority has the most resonance regarding funding the organization. Article 29.1 of Chapter IV stipulates that part of the Frontex's revenue shall consist of "a contribution from the countries associated with the implementation, application, and development of the Schengen acquis" (European Union, 2004: 9). The term 'countries' is very clearly used instead of 'member states' in the hopes that more

European states will join (what was) the European Community and pay membership fees. However, it was the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007 that pushed member states to pursue an ever-closer union more than any other document or agency formed.

Treaty of Lisbon, 2007

The signing of this treaty was arguably the most important event in the history of the EU. It was the culmination of numerous treaties, including the Maastricht Treaty, in uniting Europe towards a common identity through common policies. Of those common policies, Article 77 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, an addendum to the Treaty of Lisbon, stipulates that the Union will gradually introduce an "integrated management system for external borders" (European Union, 2007: 62). Articles 67 and 77 provide legal basis for the establishment of organizations like Frontex and contributed to the increasing 'communitarization' of the borders of the Union. These are done in the name of creating an "area of freedom, security, and justice" (European Union, 2007: 59) framing the document in a manner consistent with the rhetoric of securitization by creating an inside/outside distinction. Several articles in the Treaty frame Europe as free and secure while nations outside the borders of the Union are less secure, implicitly reinforcing the rhetoric of securitization. The inside/outside distinction is reinforced most firmly by the formalization of Schengen into European law, with Article 67.2 ensuring the "absence of border controls for persons" while creating a common policy on immigration, asylum, and external border control "based on solidarity between member states, which is fair towards third-country nationals" (European Union, 2007: 60). That article defines third-country nationals as "stateless persons" (European Union, 2007: 60) and frames them as inferior to those residing in the Union, creating the foreign 'other' necessitating securitization and communitarization of the EU's external borders.

Most importantly, the Treaty of Lisbon created the conditions of possibility for a unified border patrol and police force by pushing integration further. The goal of the EU is to strive for an ever-closer Union, doing so by merging many aspects of the already existing European Community, including the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, as set out in Chapter II of the Treaty. This served to assist organizations like Europol or programs like Eurosur to take shape, with the goal of framing "a common defence policy that might lead to common defence" (European Union, 2007: 27). Though a European standing army is not in the foreseeable future, the creation of institutions like Europol and Eurosur have formed the conditions of possibility for such a force should the need arise.

Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, 2009

The establishment of Europol was meant to occur shortly after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, but it took several years to formally organize. In the Maastricht Treaty, the institution was meant to create a "Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol)" (European Council, 1992: 64). Council Decision 2009/371/JHA built on this development in the light of 9/11, 7/7, and the Madrid bombings to formally integrate Europol into the Union. Article 5 of the preamble declares that establishing Europol as an entity of the Union funded by its general budget would enhance the role of the European Parliament in oversight and leadership, simplifying its mandate and streamlining its chain of command (European Union, 2009: 1). This council decision has the consequence of strengthening Europol by expanding the

scope of their powers to "have direct access to all data in the Europol Information System" (European Union, 2009: 1) further assisting in the supranationalization and securitization by labelling data as a security issue. Article 3 of the Council Decision dictates that the objective of the organization is to "support and strengthen action by the competent authorities of the Member States and their cooperation in preventing organized crime, terrorism, and other forms of serious crime affecting two or more states" (European Union, 2009: 3). There is ambiguity as 'competent authorities' are defined as "all public bodies existing in the Member States which are responsible under national law for preventing and combating offences" (European Union, 2009: 3). Ambiguity around terms such as 'crime', 'terrorism', and 'serious crime' within the document give Europol a wide berth from which to operate, especially with the clause stipulating that crime affecting two or more Member States is under their jurisdiction. By expanding their mandate and being given these extraordinary powers, Europol also has the power to maintain the Europol Information System (EIS), which includes information like one's name, nationality, place of residence, social security numbers, and "specific objective physical characteristics… and DNA profile" (European Union, 2009: 3). The use of this information and intelligence sharing has become a crucial issue as Britain prepares to leave the EU. The attacks in London in March 2017 highlighted the importance of institutions like Europol. The EU Committee of the House of Lords "found considerable consensus…on the EU tools and capabilities [the UK] would like to see retained" (Stanley-Becker, 2017) after it leaves the EU. Europol has contributed further to the strengthening of European security by interacting with member states one-on-one. In 2016, the UK reported more than 3000 cross-border crimes to Europol and European arrest warrants were issued to fast-track the removal of offenders from the United Kingdom (Nelsen, 2017). Even with the rhetoric of securitization, discussions about sovereignty through major events like Brexit have prioritized the idea of ensuring internal security over external security. This is notable as the UK wishes to avoid becoming the outside 'other' as they leave the European Union by March 2019.

Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013, 2013

The establishment of Eurosur has complemented Europol and Frontex as it facilitated the free flow of information across borders. The first point of the preamble declares that Eurosur will "provide [relevant] authorities and [Frontex] with the infrastructure and tools needed to improve their situational awareness and reaction capability at the external borders of…the Union for the purpose of detecting, preventing and combating illegal immigration and cross-border crime" (European Union, 2013: 1). Immediately an inside/outside distinction is constructed as the agency is framed in such a way that depicts events happening inside the EU as good and the outside as bad. Eurosur is tasked with integrating itself into the existing framework of Frontex and improving "the exchange of information and cooperation with other Union bodies" (European Union, 2013: 1). The scope of the agency is immense, as Articles 2.1 and 2.2 provide the agency with the power to monitor the sea, land, and air borders of the Union (European Union, 2013: 4). Eurosur is notable because it folds in the functions of Frontex while widening the scope of its mandate. This contributes to the "development of the Common Information Sharing System" (European Union, 2013: 1), which integrates existing surveillance systems and gives relevant authorities the information they need (European Fisheries Control Agency, 2017). By enabling agencies like Frontex and Europol to access information provided by Eurosur, this trinity has facilitated the emergence of the EU as a communitarized actor in the border security processes of its member states, thereby supranationalizing their border security. Member states still retain autonomy over

areas of their border security, as the legislation stipulates that Eurosur will establish national coordination centres in each member state to "be the single point of contact for the exchange of information and for the cooperation with other national coordination centres and with [Frontex]" (European Union, 2013: 5).

Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, 2016

In response to the challenges of the Syrian Refugee Crisis, Frontex's mandate was expanded in 2016 to combine its pre-existing resources with "the Member State authorities responsible for border management" (European Commission, 2017) into the European Border and Coast Guard. The rationale behind the expansion of the agency was to "address migratory challenges and future threats…to ensure a high level of internal security within the Union…while safeguarding the free movement of persons within it" (European Union, 2016: 10). This once again perpetuates an inside/outside distinction that has been prevalent since the establishment of the EU, with the rhetoric of securitization justifying the labelling of migratory challenges as a threat to the free movement of persons within the EU. Frontex gained the authority to organize appropriate responses at relevant border 'hot spots' if a member-state requests so and can "organize rapid border interventions" (European Union, 2016: 19) should the situation require it. Article 15.1 of Section III stipulates that any member state in the EU can request Frontex's assistance in a border security operation to deal with "present or *future* threats at its external borders" (European Union, 2016: 19; emphasis added). Member states having the ability to pre-emptively request extra security infrastructure is a counterweight to the increasing supranationalization of the EU's agencies, providing some assurance that sovereignty is not completely lost at the hands of bureaucrats in Brussels and soothing fears from more Eurosceptic member states like the United Kingdom. The agency has seen a substantial increase in budget since the expansion of its mandate, with €143.3 million allocated in the third quarter of 2015, increased to €254.035 million in 2016, and €300.029 million in 2017 (Frontex, 2017). The rhetoric of securitization has made these increases possible, which have been utilized to fund equipment for rapid border interventions that supplement existing infrastructure courtesy of the European Border and Coast Guard. Operation Trident, Frontex's assistance mission coordinated with the Italian government to stem the flow of refugees from Libya, has received an additional €2.9 million, two ocean-going and coast guard vessels, two motorboats, two planes, and a helicopter as part of a request by the Italian government (Reazione ANSA, 2014). This project has demonstrated that Frontex has played a crucial role in Italian and European border security, with no easy end in sight.

Conclusion

A discourse analysis on the supranationalization and communitarization of European border security processes through the rhetoric of securitization have shown a consistent effort to create an inside and an outside distinction through integration of member states, creation and expansion of a singular border force, and strengthening of supranational security processes. The gradual shift in sovereignty has created a more powerful supranational entity through communitarization, as evidenced by the growing power of Frontex to respond at 'hot spots' of the EU's external border. Budgetary allocations towards border controls have increased, which ties back into the literature on securitization in that securitization rhetoric typically results in increased focus on these issues. This will have policy relevance when it comes time for the European

Parliament to approve a new EU budget after elections in 2019, which may see a rise in Eurosceptic parties represented in the Parliament. By examining how the EU has created institutions that supranationalize its border processes through primary source analysis, it is evidently not a straight path. Moves for the communitarization of issues under the jurisdiction of the Third Pillar have been met with significant pushback from Eurosceptic member states, resulting in safeguards inserted as leverage for those who are afraid of the loss of sovereignty. The departure of the United Kingdom from the EU in 2019 and the rise of populist anti-EU national governments will present challenges to the communitarization process, forcing the remaining member states to re-evaluate their priorities within the supranational bloc. Future research should cover how the relationship between member states and organizations has evolved because of these documents and institutions.

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The Determinants of Differing Legislative Responses in Similar States

A Nordic Case Study

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Abstract. This article examines the domestic legislative responses of three of the five social-democratic Nordic states: Norway, Sweden, and Finland. This exploratory study attempts to answer the question: Why do the social-democratic Nordic states differ in their legislative responses to terrorism? It analyzes state membership in supranational bodies (NATO, EU), [domestic] political climate, the number of 'high-profile' terrorist attacks on [domestic] soil, and the perceived level of threat. The field lacks significant comparison between states, specifically the Nordic states. The main differences between these Nordic states are their counter-terrorism policy responses towards law enforcement, immigrants, gun-control, and their levels of Europeanization.

Introduction

The five Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have enduring political, economic, and social commonalities since the start of the twentieth century. During the Cold War, these countries were collectively known as the 'Nordic balance' as they strived for neutrality between the two competing superpowers (Rieker, 2005; Pontusson, 2011). But soon the Cold War would slowly wane and the collective idea of 'Nordic Balance' would also wane as these states started to integrate into the global market individually and at different paces. Soon, the European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were all created. These supranational bodies were signs of global integration and security as a global time of relative peace would begin.

Although the phenomenon of globalization started to increase, the Nordic states have managed to stay vastly connected. The idea of 'Nordic balance' may have waned, but the Nordic states remain socially and economically intermingled because they share one common identity: social-democracy. Still today, these states are collectively known as the 'Nordic model' which refers to their commonalities: comprehensive welfare states, state-level collective bargaining, protectionist measures, and free-market capitalism (McWhinney, 2013). Although these states have significant commonalities, they remain vastly different in their legislative responses to a particular phenomenon: terrorism. These differences include police powers (interrogation methods, funding, allocation of resources), immigration laws, gun-control, criminal codes (number

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of years in prison) and their levels of Europeanization (see Moller and Bjereld, 2010; Rieker, 2004; Council of Europe, 2014; Appleton, 2014; Husabo, 2013; Jakobsson and Blom, 2014).

Terrorism has been around for decades, but research in the field of political terrorism did not garnish much attention until the 9/11 Twin Tower attacks in the United States. Political terrorism research has been limited to states that have experienced domestic attacks or are involved in the global fight against terrorism. The Nordic states have been under-researched as they have remained relatively isolated from terrorist-related activity until recently. As terrorist-related activity has grown in connection with these Nordic states, so has field research (see Appleton, 2014; Perliger, 2012; Rieker, 2004; Peers, 2003). Since interest in the Nordic states has grown, a number of studies have researched why the Nordic states have adopted certain policy responses towards terrorism (see Malkki, 2016; Rainne, 2008; Rieker, 2005). It is here, where the theoretical weakness within the field of political terrorism lies. There is a lack of a comprehensive and systematic list of variables that can explain why these similarly structured Nordic states differ in their legislative responses towards terrorism. In other words, why do these similarly structured states legislate a particular phenomenon differently?

This study introduces a comprehensive and systematic list of variables, based on ideational and institutional theory to empirically investigate if these variables can account for the counter-terrorism legislative differences between three of the five social-democratic Nordic states by attempting to answer the question: Why do the social-democratic Nordic states differ in their legislative responses to terrorism? The variables presented in this study include: (1) state membership in supranational bodies (NATO, EU); (2) domestic political climate; (3) the number of 'high-profile' terrorist attacks on domestic soil; and (4) the perceived level of threat. These prominent variables allow or constrain certain types of legislative responses to occur. It is important to highlight that these variables are not mutually exclusive, they can work in succession with each other. The central argument in this study is that state membership in a supranational body, such as NATO or the EU plays the most significant role in allowing or constraining certain legislative responses to occur in a state. States that operate in a more autonomous matter are able to construct certain types of legislative responses in accordance with its own agenda. Membership in a supranational body hinders a state's ability to act without a conflict-of-interest. Thus, this study illustrates that the Nordic states' legislative responses differ from each other in large part because of their individual participation in different supranational bodies. Although this study is exploratory in its nature, these variables showcase that the Nordic states' counter-terrorism policies do not form in a vacuum.

There are three main reasons why this research is warranted and thus, important in the field of political terrorism. The field of political terrorism lacks significant comparative analysis between similarly structured states explaining why they differ on certain matters. Developing explanations may in turn help predict future legislative responses to terrorism in non-Nordic regimes. Studying the differences between states' responses to terrorism is considerably important to supranational bodies and how they can move forward on institutional matters-- i.e. the European Union and NATO. And furthermore, domestic legislative responses may conflict with international law and international norms, or hinder bilateral relationships (Perliger, 2012: 492).

The next section outlines the key scholars, debates, theoretical approaches, and variables used within the field of political terrorism. This section includes peer-reviewed scholarly work as primary-sourced data is utilized in the later sections of this study. This section will illuminate the shortcomings of prior research and explanations to further illustrate the current research gap that this study seeks to fill.

Literature Review: Key Scholars and Debates

Although political terrorism-related research on the Nordic states has increased, studies have not deeply investigated what factors take place "behind the scenes" that influence policy creation. This is where the theoretical weakness within the field can be found. This weakness is that there has been little attention given to the political processes that shape counter-terrorism policies (Perliger, 2014: 491). However, it is important to note that the field of literature contains some significant insights into the politics that take place behind enacted counter-terrorism policies and the common theme amongst these studies is the use of a constructivist framework (see Omelicheva, 2007; Katzenstein, 2007). These studies have researched how political culture and institutions play a role in developing counter-terrorism policies and highlight that there exists some agreement around the role that specific variables play in developing counter-terrorism policies.

Given that this study draws on counter-terrorism policy literature, regime characteristics, state security identities, and terrorist-related events it is significantly important that this section highlights the variation of my approach. The current literature gathered can be grouped into one of two groups: structuralist-comparative or institutional-policy formation. These specific camps are indicative of the theoretical perspectives and approaches that scholars have taken towards their research. Steve Peers (2003) focused on the European Union's responses to terrorism. This study mainly focused on the structural-measures enacted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Peers stated that is it generally agreed upon in the scholastic community that the EU has been extremely active in implementing new counter-terrorism measures relating to cross-border policing and criminal law (2003: 227). One of the most important enactments by the EU is the supranational agreement amongst its members on the definition of terrorism. The EU defines terrorism under Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism (2002) as a criminal offence against persons and/or property: "… seriously intimidating a population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country of an international organization" (Peers 2003).

Peers' (2003) study takes a structuralist approach that highlights the different types of enactments and agreed upon laws that seek to combat terrorism in the continent. The study investigates the legislative responses from the major players that make up the EU, mainly the domestic courts and parliaments of member states. The exploratory purpose of this study is to highlight the framework of the EU and the associated issues that arise between upholding liberal democratic values and protecting citizens in member-states (Peers, 2003: 243). Peers' (2003) work has uncovered important variables that have played a role in allowing or constraining certain EU legislative responses to occur in order to combat terrorism. By utilizing a structural-comparative approach Peers (2003) has shown how state-membership in the EU has changed member-states' policy discourse in response to terrorism as the structural body can influence domestic regimes. This article showcases a wide variety of variables and associated issues with counter-terrorism measures that may affect the Nordic states differently. This affirms the value of utilizing a constructivist theoretical underpinning.

Included in the camp of institutionalism is Catherine Appleton's article, "Lone wolf terrorism in Norway" (2014), which investigates the 2011 Andres Behring Breivik massacre of seventy-seven people in Norway. This project investigates the responses of Norwegian authorities, courts, and government. This work is of great importance to this study since it investigates how a new domestic terrorist attack played a major role in developing subsequent policy responses. The

attack heightened the perceived level of threat in Norway and neighbouring democracies and in turn, this has had a direct influence on the domestic institutions to enact a response due to immense societal pressure (Appleton, 2014: 127-128). This source was crucial in the development of this study since it was able to illustrate that local law enforcement can play a substantive role in guiding a state's response(s) to terrorism (Appleton, 2014: 127). In sum, this work is similar in its institutional approach to that of Peers' (2003) study in the avenue that it examines how institutions can allow or constrain a state's response(s) to terrorism.

Pernille Rieker's (2004) work is a key piece of literature in the field of political terrorism since it specifically examines the Nordic states that have traditionally been ignored in this academic field. Rieker argues that the Nordic states' security policies have been idiosyncratically shaped due to their differing rates of greater European integration (2004: 369). According to Rieker (2004), the Nordic states have integrated into specific European-wide institutions for self-interested purposes-- mainly security (Rieker, 2004: 373). This work highlights the different responses undertaken by the Nordic states towards counter-terrorism and the framework needed to undertake a comparative analysis and reconfirms the notion that the Nordic states have differing policy discourses towards terrorism. However, this work has a substantial gap as it does not offer evidence as to why these Nordic states differ and what variables cause these differences. Again, this reconfirms the 'research gap' within existing literature.

Lastly, Arie Perliger's "How Democracies Respond to Terrorism" (2014) study is the most extensive piece of literature in structural-comparative political terrorism. Perliger (2014) argues that the field lacks a comprehensive theory explaining why states construct different counter-terrorism policies. To this point, Perliger suggests that the democratic foundations of the state, whether the state is strong or weak, and the symbolic effect of terrorism are the main factors that shape security responses (2014: 490). The importance of this study is the combination of ideationalism and structural-comparative perspectives that allowed for the investigation into the domestic 'ideas' of terrorism and perceived threats. This work ultimately allowed for the construction of the 'perceived threat' variable used in this study. In addition, Perliger's (2014) work was of immense importance to this study through its examination of the structural components of eighty-three democracies and how this, in turn, can affect policy discourse on terrorism. Although Perilger's (2014) work highlights several important variables, it does not investigate a wide-range of variables or the social-democratic Nordic states and again, this further exemplifies the gap within political terrorism literature.

Although I have only highlighted some of the examined literature, these works have confirmed prior assumptions and highlight important comparative and theoretical perspectives. All four of these studies have incorporated overarching constructivist frameworks that have allowed the scholars to undercover previous hidden variables that shape policy discourse. These works confirm the prior assumption that supranational bodies such as the EU and NATO have played intrusive roles in shaping security policy in the Nordic states.

The next section outlines the theoretical approach adopted in this study. The theoretical approach adopted is the use of a constructivist framework as policy discourse on counter-terrorism tends to be historically and socially constructed because of one's experience with the phenomenon. Thus, this theoretical perspective lends itself to qualitative methodology. Examined below are the chosen methodologies and the limitations of this study.

Methodology: Underpinnings and Limitations

The last decade has seen a rise in comparative studies between states that explain different typologies and normative assessments in regard to counter-terrorism policy responses (Perliger, 2012; Foley 2009; Reinares, 2000). As aforementioned, the theoretical weakness in the field of political terrorism is the lack of a comprehensive and systematic list of variables that can help explain why states enact different counter-terrorism legislative measures when they share similar characteristics. However, political terrorism literature does provide an agreed upon constructivist framework that is adopted in this study (see Béland, 2009; Rieker, 2004).

The investigation in this study is undertaken by adopting an ideational-institutionalist framework (Béland, 2009). This framework combines the core concepts of ideationalism with historical institutionalism which allows for the investigation and exploration into how the proposed variables in this study can influence the creation of counter-terrorism policy to occur and how institutions operate. This framework also allows for the investigation into the changing evolution of government institutions within these Nordic states in response to these variables. Ideational-institutionalism can help investigate three specific gaps: why policy-makers choose to address certain issues, what the policy addresses, and the construction of policy (Béland, 2009). This framework lends itself to qualitative methodology as it seeks to explain what variables can account for the different policy outcomes in these Nordic states. To fully investigate and explain why these Nordic states differ in their counter-terrorism policy outcomes it was critical to use process-tracing, triangulation, and discourse analysis as additional qualitative tactics. In addition, the definition of terrorism used in this study is adopted from the European Union as defined above in Article 1 of the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism (2002).

Exploring why specific states adopt certain policy responses, specifically counter-terrorism policies requires the use of qualitative methodology as this study is investigating what is allowing or constraining policy discourse. Exploring these causes did not require the finding of causal relations as the purpose of this study is the investigation of hidden factors, not specific explanations. Comparatively, quantitative methodology lends itself towards statistical analysis in which finding causal mechanisms is the goal (John, 2010). The proposed research question did not infer causal relationships, rather it inferred the investigation of possible explanations of why a particular phenomenon occurs. The undertaking of a three-state case study allows for greater generalizability which is commonly a limitation of qualitative methodology (Vromen, 2010). Specifically, a limitation of this study is that Iceland and Denmark were not included because of time constraints and lack of sufficient data. Qualitative methodology allows for greater in-depth analysis of both the historical context and long-term dynamics that can help explain the reasons why there are differing counter-terrorism policy outcomes between these Nordic states. For this reason, qualitative methodology was the appropriate choice for this study.

Furthermore, in an attempt to investigate whether these variables could account for different policy outcomes the method of process-tracing was used. Process-tracing is a qualitative tool used for drawing descriptive inferences from examining a wide amount of relevant literature and/or evidence (Collier, 2011; Rieker, 2004). Process-tracing was vital to this study because it allowed for the investigation of whether these proposed variables have had any impact on subsequent counter-terrorism policy responses and whether these variables could help explain any differences between these Nordic states. This method was combined with the method of discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is the interpretation of relevant documents and texts through certain political, social, and cultural lenses that can deepen the understanding of policy discourse

(Vromen, 2010). In addition, triangulation was used; this is the use of various sources as a method to establish a theory (Rudestan and Newton, 2007). Triangulation was used to provide greater empirical evidence to address the research question as it allowed for the examination of a wide variety of related literature to develop a concrete theoretical basis to help guide the construction of the four variables that were ultimately used in this study.

This study is primarily source-based as it relied on a multitude of texts and oral speeches. Due to time constraints fieldwork was not a viable option. This is unfortunate as it would have provided first-hand experience that could provide vital information relevant to political institutions and political climates. Rather, this study explored the chronological order of changes in these Nordic states by interpreting official speeches, documents, texts, policy and peer-reviewed scholastic work. Scholastic work was investigated in order to provide a theoretical lens that could answer the research question. Primary source-based tools and associated political rhetoric were used in order to provide an empirical lens that could address the research question as well. Although this qualitative approach may not be able to generalize why states' counter-terrorism policies differ, this study can hopefully contribute towards a greater understanding of the policy dynamics that take place within these three Nordic states.

The next section will examine the four variables proposed in this study in an attempt to observe whether they can help explain the differences in the Nordic states' counter-terrorism policy outcomes. Through the use of different methodologies and an examination of the literature, these variables have been put together to address the observed 'gap' in political terrorism literature as mentioned above.

Key Findings

Political Climate

Although the Nordic states are vastly similar in their governmental systems and social and economic policies, one characteristic that remains slightly different is their domestic political climates. The political climate of a state can be described as the aggregate, or the current opinions and moods of the populous in accordance to their shared experiences and/or perceptions. The political climate of a state can create path dependency or change rapidly during a critical juncture. For example, a domestic terrorist attack may shift the political climate and new criminal punishments may be enacted creating a path of harsher punishment.

Conditions created after the end of the Cold War saw a rapid rise in the levels of Europeanization. Europeanization gradually consolidated parts of Europe which created the vast interconnectedness of European nations culturally, socially, and economically (Rieker, 2004: 369-370). The Nordic states' security approaches have changed in sequence with the European integration process. However, the security approaches of the Nordic states took different paths as their political climates allowed or constrained different levels of integration based on their views of post-Cold War conditions. Norway's political climate has viewed the United States in a more positive light than both Finland and Sweden. This is evident since Norway is the only Nordic state that participates in NATO. Norway's political doctrine of territorial defense was accepted by the United States during the Cold War and thus, the practice of Atlanticism became entrenched in Norway's political climate (Rieker, 2004: 375). Atlanticism is the practice of being militarily aligned with the United States, including regional interests. Norway's reluctance towards the European integration process was driven by its security policy consideration of Atlanticism as they feared that a common European identity would weaken NATO which, in turn, would affect its

position in European security policy (Rieker, 2004: 373). Thus, Norway's political climate of traditional security discourse has remained and by this, the state has not adopted any European-wide political or economic consensus on terrorist-related matters in addition to NATO. The political climate of Norway can explain why its counter-terrorism and security policy discourse has been largely self-driven.

Sweden was initially skeptical of greater European integration due to its long-lasting doctrine of neutrality. However, greater integration became widely accepted within Sweden as its Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ulf Dinkelspiel, convinced the nation that it should not hinder the movement of a greater political force (Rieker, 2004: 374). The statements made by the minister proved to be a political 'critical juncture' within the state (Malkki, 2016: 344). This critical juncture effectively changed Sweden's traditional policy (neutrality) discourse and its security approach began to reflect greater European influence. Sweden's political climate has traditionally viewed both superpowers in a negative light, especially the U.S. This is another guiding reason why Sweden opted for greater European integration: to protect itself from both superpowers. Soon, explicit changes to Sweden's constitution would be enacted. For example, constitutional references to a European comprehensive security approach began to replace the traditional references to the doctrine of neutrality (Rieker, 2004: 384-85; Malkki, 2016: 345).

Change in traditional security-policy discourse is most evident in Finland. Finland has always been in a unique position because of its proximity to Russia. But, due to the fall of the Soviet Union, Finland's political climate finally allowed for open discussion on European integration (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 377). The reason for open discussion was because the residents of Finland viewed the end of the Cold War as a critical juncture where Finland would have the chance to protect itself from being politically colonized by the Soviet Union (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 376). Greater acceptance of European integration influenced Finland to allocate more monetary resources and to enact structural measures to parts of its military. These measures enacted by Finland were much more conservative in nature than seen in Norway and Sweden (Loik et al., 2016; Husabo, 2013; Rainne, 2008; Riker, 2005: 395-95). The political climates of these Nordic states illustrate different levels of openness to European integration after the Cold War. In other words, different critical junctures have influenced domestic policy discourse. Security policy does not operate in a vacuum, rather the security policies of these nations have been enacted due to the immense number of factors that have influenced each state differently and individually (see Council of Europe, 2014: Sweden, Finland, and Norway).

Domestic Terrorist-related Event(s)

Collectively, the Nordic region has experienced relatively few terrorist-related activities. The region is amongst the safest areas from terrorism around the globe. However, post-WWII, terrorist-related activities have been slowly increasing in the region, especially since the 9/11 Twin Tower attacks in the United States. This variable only includes the most 'influential' terrorist-related attacks where explicit policy responses could be observed. On July 22, 2011, Norway was struck by two lone wolf terror-attacks of unparalleled magnitude that destroyed several government buildings (including the prime minister's building) and thus, claiming seventy-seven lives (Appleton, 2014: 127). This marked the first time that Norway would be in the international spotlight in regard to terrorism. Soon after these attacks strong counter-terrorism rhetoric not only permeated within Norwegian parliament but would also come from various political leaders

around the globe, notably U.S. president Barack Obama and Australian Security Intelligence Director David Irvine (Appleton, 2014: 128).

Norway's traditional policy response to issues of national security has been more democracy, more openness, and greater political participation. However, the 2011 lone wolf terror-attacks combined as the largest modern terror-related mass-killing to take place in Norway (Appleton, 2014: 132). These two terror events led to 31 enacted legislative policy responses from the Norwegian government, all conservative in their nature. Amongst these enactments were greater controls on weapons and chemicals, police and military reforms, and the amendments to the criminal code—for example, the maximum sentence for a terror-related incident increased from 21 years to 30 years (Appleton, 2014: 135; Jakobsson and Blom, 2014: 483; Norwegian Criminal Code, 2014; Wall Street Journal, 2013; Risk Daily Report, 2011). Norway's counter-terrorism legislation became much more conservative in nature in large part due to its domestic terrorist experience that led to increased public support for harsher legislation and an increased [domestic] perceived threat level. Ultimately, this attack led Norway to increase proactive police powers, including covert and coercive interrogation and surveillance methods to a much greater extent than its Nordic neighbours (Husabo, 2013: 3).

As for Sweden, the threat of terrorism has been relatively insignificant. The most significant terror-related activity to take place on Swedish soil has been a suicide bombing outside a shopping mall in 2010 in which no one died but several were injured. Since the damage and casualty count from the attack was much less than what Norway experienced in 2011, it comes as no surprise that the policy discourse to follow was also less extensive. There were no explicit changes to the criminal code or enacted conservative legislative policies. Rather, the associated policy responses that did occur were changes to the language in Sweden's existing criminal codes and legislature. These associated policy responses changed traditional Swedish counter-terrorism strategies from mitigation to prevention (Strandh and Eklund, 2015: 359; Swedish Criminal Code, 2014). The most noteworthy change was the construction of the Swedish Counter-terrorism Cooperative Council designed to specifically investigate and monitor terrorist activity. Other small changes included increased funding and resources to the Swedish Security Service and parts of the Swedish police (Council of Europe, 2014). Compared to Norway, Sweden did not increase its maximum sentence for terrorism (18 years). In sum, this terrorist-related event on Swedish soil did not register a perception of threat within the nation due to its small scale of damage and casualty count and thus, the policy discourse arising from it was not extensive nor conservative in nature.

Finland, on the other hand, has had zero official terror-related events on domestic soil. In fact, Finland is ranked as one of the world's safest countries. Although Finland has experienced zero official terror-related events since WWII, the country remains in a unique position geographically. This unique position is its shared border with Russia. There has been outspoken public discontent about NATO's expansion and future Finnish membership from the Kremlin (Russia) that could threaten the "peaceful" relationship between the two states as it currently stands (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 378). Future terror-related threats from Russia remain an important topic for Finnish counter-terrorism policy discourse. However, since Finland has experienced zero official terror-related events there have been no associated policy responses that could account for a difference in counter-terrorism policy discourse. Therefore, this variable does not apply strongly to Finland as it currently stands. Overall, Norway has experienced the harshest terrorist event of these three nations and because of this Norway's policy discourse has become more conservative in nature, comparatively speaking.

Perceived Level of Threat

This variable is based upon the attitudes and associated rhetoric of governments and citizens alike. Collectively, the Nordic countries have a low perception of threat as compared to the United States, United Kingdom, and France as comparatives. The previous variable is vastly connected to this variable as domestic terror-related experience can vastly alter a state's perception of threat. In other words, how individuals perceive their own risk of being a victim of a terrorist attack and the motive behind a terrorist attack can play an influential role in determining how people will respond to an attack (Jakobsson and Blom, 2014: 483). The 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway directly led to heightened perceptions of threat not only in Norway but in Finland and Sweden as well. Notable government officials of both the Swedish and Finnish governments have commented that the likelihood of something similar happening in their nations has increased (Appleton, 2014: 128-130). Both Interpol and the United States publically announced that this attack symbolized a great threat to the Nordic countries (Appleton, 2014: 128). The domestic terror-events and associated rhetoric in Norway are largely responsible

for the heightened perception of threat in the nation that led to the aforementioned conservative legislative responses. In addition, the perception of threat in Norway is also heightened due to its participation in NATO, unlike Finland and Sweden. By participating in this supranational body terrorist groups such as IS (Islamic State) and Al-Qaeda have directly threatened any nation that participates in this international organization (Dahlburg, 2016).

The threat perception in Sweden is relatively low compared to Norway. The 2010 terrorist attack in Sweden has had no significant impact on Swedish threat perceptions. However, threat perception in Sweden has increased slightly due to the 2011 terror-attacks in Norway

primarily because it is a neighbouring country with similar values. Although several highly-ranked government officials have publically stated that a similar event could take place on Swedish soil, the public perception of threat is low as the old doctrine of neutrality is still immensely embedded in the nation's political culture. This doctrine is vitally important in Sweden as public opinion still vastly supports military non-alignment due to the perception that future membership in NATO would increase terror-related threats (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 371). In other words, public opinion on the notion of military non-alignment is in turn connected with perception of threat since the populous of Sweden believes military non-alignment with NATO lowers the risk of terror-related threats. And because of this public belief, there have been no conservative legislative measures in response to this variable.

The perception of threat is most unique in Finland. As previously mentioned, Finland shares a border with Russia and its perceived level of threat is much different than Norway and Sweden due to its fear of Russia. Finland has experienced zero domestic terrorist attacks since WWII, but its perception of threat is higher due to its close proximity to Russia. The fear of Russia has led the Finnish government to express good bilateral relations with the United States in order to seek greater protection (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 372). The fear of Russian terrorism had led Finland to adopt various counter-terrorism policies that place a stronger emphasize on national defense rather than military alignment as seen in Norway (Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 366).

In addition, since Finland has taken on a greater and more influential role within the European Union, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (FSIS) has started to provide in-depth assessments of terrorism threats to the Finnish government. The increased workload of the FSIS has led to an increase in arrests of individuals who have ties with terrorist organizations (Malkki, 2016: 350). As the FSIS develops into a more experienced institution, the more terrorist activity

that it reveals will cause potential increases in threat levels (perceptions). The increased level of threat has influenced Finland to adopt one of the four pillars of the EU's international counter-terrorism strategy (prevention) into its own domestic legislation (Malkki, 2016: 351). In sum, Norway has the highest level of risk perception due to its participation in NATO and domestic terrorism experiences which have led to more conservative legislative measures. Sweden has altered its domestic legislation to reflect 'prevention' rather than 'mitigation' due to its isolated and small-scale terrorist attack in 2010. As for Finland, it remains in a unique position because of its proximity to Russia and thus, its few counter-terrorism legislative responses have reflected the threat of Russian terrorism.

Supranational Membership

A state's membership in a supranational body, particularly NATO or the EU can influence the state's counter-terrorism policies most significantly. Norway's legislative responses have been more conservative and more draconian in nature because of its participation in NATO and close relationship with the United States. Membership in NATO has drastically changed Norway's counter-terrorism policy responses to reflect the greater interests of the membership and particularly the largest member-- the United States. This membership dynamic has influenced and thus changed Norway's traditional security approach to reflect a more comprehensive security outlook (Rieker, 2004: 385). Norway's counter-terrorism legislation closely resembles U.S. security policy in the 'Age of International Terrorism.' This is particularly observable in the expansion of proactive police powers after the 2011 terror-attacks (Husabo, 2013; Rieker, 2005: 395).

Sweden as a member of the EU has been greatly influenced in the avenue that it is the only Nordic country to undergo explicit constitutional change in state identity (domestic security policy). Although the doctrine of neutrality has been eliminated in many instances, it remains a reason as to why Sweden will not join NATO. The EU offered Sweden a chance to integrate politically but due to the EU's increasing involvement with security, Sweden has been socialized differently because of this phenomenon without the initial intent of changing its national security policies (Rieker, 2004: 374). The impact of the EU on Sweden is evident through a set of regional, institutional, and ideational forces affecting domestic counter-terrorism policies, practices, and politics (see Moller and Bjereld, 2010: 365).

Finland is also a member of the EU, but its membership has been significantly different than that of Sweden. Finland assumed the EU presidency in 2006 and as a result of this appointment the nation undertook several institutional and structural changes in regard to terrorism policy. In addition, due to the EU presidency, the workload of the FSIS gained increased confidence and thus, it has taken on a greater international role. Finland's counter-terrorism policies have been "broadening" to incorporate cross-national terrorism issues, for example: incitement, recruitment, and financing (Malkki, 2016: 342). Finland's membership in the EU has dramatically increased counter-terrorism policy debate in parliament. Prior to Finland's EU presidency, terrorism was only mentioned four-times in the previous decade; post-2006, this has increased to nineteen-times in a single year (Malkki, 2016: 347). In sum, this variable has shown that counter-terrorism policy development does not occur in a vacuum. These similarly structured Nordic states have been pressured internationally to varying degrees which, in turn, has influenced their domestic responses to terrorism in varying fashions.

This variable is the most significant in influencing different legislative responses for two main reasons. First, international agreements, especially membership bodies can infringe on state sovereignty as they may require domestic legislation to be altered to match the goals and objectives of the membership. This requirement ultimately requires the explicit change of a state's constitution and in the context of this study, the security approach of the state—implicit and explicit changes due to supranational membership have been observed in all three states examined. And secondly, the democratic make-up of supranational bodies may influence a state's domestic institutions, policies, and political culture through socialization, adaptation, and coercion. Even if a state has not experienced domestic terrorism (Finland for example), membership in a supranational body may nonetheless influence policy responses based on the experiences of neighbouring countries. The biggest distinction between this [supranational membership] variable and the three other variables examined above is that a domestic experience does not have to be present for a security policy change to occur within a state.

Conclusion

Through the use of various methodological approaches, mainly literature reviews and process-tracing this paper shows that the field of political terrorism suffered from a theoretical weakness. This theoretical weakness is that little attention had been given to explaining how or why certain policy responses occur in response to terrorism. Specifically, this study investigated the similarly structured Nordic states and provided a systematic and comprehensive list of four variables that can help explain why these states differ in their counter-terrorism legislation despite similar political structures and institutions. These variables have highlighted that counter-terrorism policy does not occur in a vacuum, but rather counter-terrorism policy develops and is influenced by a states' individual experiences, political climate, and notable international forces. The main limitation of this study is that the findings and use of these four variables may not be generalizable to non-Nordic states and this is precisely where greater research is needed. However, the findings of this study suggest that state membership in a supranational body or group of supranational bodies through socialization, adaptation, and coercion is the most impactful variable in explaining why these Nordic states differ in their counter-terrorism legislative policies. Ultimately, by attempting to answer the question: Why do the social-democratic Nordic states differ in their legislative responses to terrorism? this study has sought to fill the gap within political terrorism literature which lacks comprehensive explanations for differing legislative responses between similarly structured states.

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Will Enough Ever be Enough?

Examining the Discrepancy Between Public Opinion and Congressional Action with Regards to Gun Control Legislation

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Abstract. Within the United States, public outcry for the tightening of gun control legislation has been seemingly widespread. This paper examines the apparent discrepancy between public opinion and congressional action with regards to the implementation of further gun control policies within the United States. Through the examination of the history of congressional decision-making as well as the history of gun control policies, it is the main contention of this paper that under the current policy-making environment within the United States further, gun control measures will fail to materialize. This will be argued on the basis that congressional actors are self-interested, seek to maximize concentrated costs and minimize concentrated benefits, and given the rise of condition party government and levels of party polarization.

Introduction

In 2015, of 100,000 Americans, approximately 11 of them would die from gun-related incidents (National Center for Health Statistics, 2017). In 2016, this number would rise to approximately 12 Americans per 100,000 who would become victims of firearm-related causes (National Center for Health Statistics, 2017). At the time of writing this paper in November of 2017, approximately 93 Americans were killed each day due to gun violence (Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System, 2017). In the United States today, statistics such as these have become a permanent reality within the economic, political, and social realms of the country. Due to the continuous and steady rise in these statistics, it would be easy to declare Americans have simply accepted these deadly consequences and are no longer bothered with mitigating the fallout. However, in many spheres of public opinion in American society, the opposite appears to be true, as private citizens, as well as the public media, often express their worry, concern, and the need for changing these troubling statistics.

While public outcry has seemingly been vocal and plentiful, the gun control that individuals express the immediate need for has never actually materialized. Therefore, an apparent disparity exists between public attitudes and opinions and the actual implementation of policy to match these wants and needs. This paper will examine this phenomenon and offer specific explanations for its occurrence. Due to the fact the American political landscape is a complex one, this paper will specifically examine the impact the institution of Congress has had on the lack of substantial gun control legislation. Fundamentally, the institution of Congress itself, as well as the actors who comprise it, makes the actualization of further gun control measures an unlikely possibility. This paper will argue that it is unlikely that further gun control legislation will materialize under this policy-making environment due to the fact that Congress is made up of self-

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interested individuals who principally seek reelection who specifically seek to minimize or avoid concentrated costs and only serve diffuse general benefits when absolutely necessary. As a result, the discrepancy between public opinion and congressional action will not diminish.

The Policy Environment: How Congress Makes Decisions

Before understanding the specific nature of why gun control policy has not materialized within the United States, it is first relevant to discuss the general role Congress plays in the creation of policy and how they make decisions within the legislative process as a whole. While facts regarding Congress' infrastructure are relatively straightforward, theories surrounding how the decision-making body operates exist in plurality. In his seminal work, *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, David R. Mayhew pioneered the perspective that Congress was comprised of rational decision makers (1974). From Mayhew's perspective, the legislative process within Congress functions as rational actors aim to maximize their chances of re-election (1974: 13). In order to maximize these reelection chances, Mayhew argues congressional actors engage in three activities: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking (1974: 73). First and perhaps most simply, advertising consists of the cultivation of a certain "brand" to express and convey to constituents (Mayhew, 1974: 49). In addition to this, legislators will engage in the activity of credit claiming, or the act of promoting that the reason for the success of the implementation of an initiative or the creation of a policy should be attributed to the sole legislator claiming the credit for it (Mayhew, 1974: 52-53). Finally, the act of position taking is crucial for legislators as they aim to explicitly exemplify to their constituents that their beliefs align with the relevant actors who are voting for them (Mayhew, 1974: 61). Through engaging in these activities, legislators aim to demonstrate to relevant actors, in particular, their constituents, that they are consistently enacting policies and taking points of view that align with the goals and beliefs of their electorate, thus increasing their overall chances at reelection.

Mayhew also offers an interesting perspective on the role of political parties within Congress. He argues that parties exist within Congress solely to "suit members' electoral needs" (1974: 97). Mayhew largely shuns the act of "party voting," which he argues has been rapidly decreasing, in favour of stressing that the most crucial role each congressman seeks to play is to "be free to take positions that serve his advantage" (1974: 103; 99). Thus, parties should, and in reality, do follow a very hands-off approach when providing directives for their members and as Mayhew clearly states, the most vital service a party can provide to its members is to "leave them alone" (1974: 100). Overall, the picture that Mayhew paints of Congress is one in which allegiances to political parties matter very little, and instead legislators perform their song and dance very carefully, taking positions and claiming credit only when they feel their electorate is watching closely and their chances at reelection can be strengthened (1974: 115).

Expanding on this premise, R. Douglas Arnold assumes that a driving force behind the actions of legislators is the desire to be reelected (1990: 5). Additionally, he argues that when members of Congress are confronted with decisions on policy matters, legislators move through a cost-benefit analysis of sorts (Arnold, 1990). Through this analysis, legislators seek to maximize concentrated benefits from certain policy decisions in an effort to bolster their chances at praise and eventual reelection and minimize or completely avoid concentrated costs for which they may be punished (Arnold, 1990: 3-4). This cost-benefit analysis, however, is contingent on the actual or potential salience of the policy decision and outcome (Arnold, 1990: 142). In this regard, legislators will only seek to serve the interests of the public at large if the salience of the

consequences from their decisions become too noticeable to ignore or if coalition leaders can frame the issue to limit traceability to individual legislators (Arnold, 1990: 142-143). However, in many cases, this is a difficult corner to back legislators into, either because "general effects are too small for citizens to notice or because the causal connections between governmental policy and these general effects are too long and complicated for citizens to appreciate" (Arnold, 1990: 143). Thus, Arnold furthers our understanding of how Congress makes decisions, arguing that legislators largely aim to maximize concentrated benefits and minimize concentrated costs as long as the consequences or outcomes of these decisions remain minimal and inconspicuous to the general electorate.

Congress cannot be examined as a static body, and in reality, has undergone various internal changes and developments since the analysis undertaken by Mayhew. Nonetheless, one similarity cuts across all the theories: while legislators may possess secondary goals, their primary one is to obtain reelection (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 237). As identified by David Rohde and John Aldrich, one of the most significant and impactful changes is with respect to the role of political parties within Congress (2010: 234). During Mayhew's period of study, around the 1950s through the 1960s, he found the action of "Party voting" within the House specifically, was rapidly decreasing (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 235; Mayhew, 1974: 103). However, Rohde and Aldrich argue that during Mayhew's time period, parties were exhibiting "decreasing internal agreement," a trend that would reverse itself in the 1980s when internal agreement began to rise (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 236). This began the phenomenon that Rohde and Aldrich deem "conditional party government" (CPG) (2010: 235). Under CPG, as individual legislator's opinions come to be more closely aligned with the opinions of their party as a whole, they will be more likely to consolidate their power and interests with the political party leadership as a whole (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 241). This is due to the fact that if members are likely to make the same decisions as their party, members have less reason to fear the party will take actions that hinder or prevent individual members from retaining the support of their constituents (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 241). Furthermore, the increased strength of political parties within Congress allows respective parties to "achieve their more consensual partisan ends" through the promotion of increased "party-line voting" (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 234-235). However, the rising importance and strength of political parties has led to both "increased intraparty homogeneity and interparty conflict" (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 249). Therefore, as parties confer their interests internally, their respective interests also move further away from each other on the ideological spectrum. The 21st century Congress we see today exhibits anywhere between a 23.4 percent to 31.1 percent increase in party polarization since 1972, creating a unique policy-making environment distinct from past iterations of Congress (Sussell and Thomson, 2015: 19). To conclude, the incarnation of Congress, as it exists today, diverges somewhat from Mayhew's original conception. While members and their actions can still be considered to be strongly driven by their aspirations to be reelected, with the rise of conditional party government and increasingly polarized parties, political parties within Congress have become a central and influential institution.

Interest Groups within Congress

This paper would be remiss if it did not discuss the impactful presence that interest groups can have on how Congress makes decisions. In a general sense, the support or punishment of an interest group can significantly affect a legislator's chances at achieving his/her reelection dreams, which, as examined previously, is the primary goal of those in Congress. Simply put, interest

groups act as the gatekeepers to two very important resources: money and votes. In their study of the correlation between position-taking within Congress and direct contributions and funding from interest groups, Michael Rocca and Stacy Gordon found significant links between non-roll call voting and funds received (2010). Specifically, Rocca and Gordon found a "strong relationship" between bill sponsorship and the resulting funding from ideological PACs (2010: 393). Thus, it can be said that interest groups play a role in the funding of legislator's campaigns and terms in Congress. Similarly, as described by Mayhew, "some national interest groups watch the votes of all congressmen on single issues and ostentatiously try to reward or punish members for their positions" (1974: 66). The extent of this influence, as put by former Attorney Generl Jeremiah Nixon and Paul Maguffee, is the simple fact that "money talks" (2000: 662). In their 2016 study of how campaign contributions affect access to policy-makers, Kalla and Broockman found that when scheduling meetings individuals who donated to campaigns were "between three and four times" more likely to gain access to their representative (2016: 545). Baumgartner et al. identified a similar phenomenon, exhibiting that eventual policy outcomes and decisions favoured "the side that enjoyed greater resources" (Gilens and Page, 2014: 568). These resources were measured in terms of contribution size, lobbying expenditures, and membership size of the group (Gilens and Page, 2014: 568). Thus, in the interest of funding their successful campaigns with eventual hopes of reelection, members of Congress are likely to skew their attention and their voting in favour of individual donors and powerful interest groups that can facilitate this goal. As will be examined later, this practice is perhaps most visible in the actions and reactions from members of Congress towards the National Rifle Association (NRA). Therefore, it is critical to take into account that, often, members of Congress are not acting completely of their own volition, and instead, must take into account the interests of powerful groups working within Congress.

Public Push: Public Opinion on Gun Control Legislation

The basic function of Congress is, in an ideal world, to listen to the interests of constituents and to then reflect these interests in the form of bills that will eventually become laws. Various studies have shown an incredibly strong support for basic gun control measures that include background checks and increased waiting periods before purchase, as well as "a majority of Americans [supporting] a ban on high-capacity ammunition magazines" (Wozniak, 2017: 257). Furthermore, through the examination of Gallup polls between 1938 and 1972, Hazel Erskine observed that at least two-thirds of the citizens in the United States were consistently in favour of gun control (1972: 455). Finally, as examined by Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, in response to the poll question "Do you favor or oppose federal laws which would control the sale of guns, such as making all persons register all gun purchases no matter where they buy them?" 70 percent of citizens responded in the affirmative (1981: 41). Exemplifying the stability of these beliefs, in a Gallup Poll completed in March of 2018, 67 per cent, only three percentage points lower than Schuman and Presser's 1981 study, responded "more strict" to the question "In general, do you feel that the law covering the sale of firearms should be made more strict, less strict or kept as they are now?" (Gallup Polls, "In Depth Topics A to Z: Guns"). However, not all citizens express their interests in the same manner. In their study of the "attitude-action" correlation with respect to opinions on gun control, Schuman and Presser found citizens with negative views towards gun control were "quite likely" to voice their opinions, whereas those who were in favour of the policy were less likely to take action on these attitudes (1981: 40). In this regard, those who felt very strongly against the implementation of gun control legislation were much more likely to

engage in actions such as "letter writing and fund raising" (Schuman and Presser, 1981: 47). Therefore, a critical discrepancy occurs as citizens who hold certain attitudes in favour of gun control fail to translate these attitudes into real actionable and visible tasks. Nonetheless, as examined by numerous scholars, public support for increased gun control legislation does exist and exists at consistent levels. What is missing, and inconsistent, is an appropriate response from Congress.

Congressional Response: Failed Initiatives & Unrealized Goals

The history of gun control within the United States speaks to the country's dynamic, onerous, and often stagnant process of legislation. As aptly noted by Hazel Erskine, "It is difficult to imagine any other issue on which Congress has been less responsive to public sentiment for a longer period of time" (Erskine, 1972: 456).

Gun Control from 1911-1968

To start, modern gun control laws can be said to have begun in 1911 with the implementation of the Sullivan Law in the State of New York (Carter, 2002: 568; Hansen, 1976: 8). With the passing of the Sullivan Law, all individuals within New York were required to possess a permit if they owned a handgun and in order to acquire a handgun (Vizzard, 1995: 341). Then, in 1934, the National Firearms Act would come into effect which created a registry that originally was meant to cover a larger category of guns but, after negotiations, only included specific and especially dangerous weapons, such as "sawed-off shotguns, silencers, bazookas, and machine guns" (Carter, 2002: 428; Vizzard, 1995: 342). This act was significant for two reasons: it was the first significant piece of gun control legislation that applied at the federal level, and it was also the first piece of legislation that the NRA would attempt to influence as an interest group (Carter, 2002: 428; Hansen, 1976: 28). The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 stipulated that persons wishing to sell guns have to possess the relevant permits, as well as keep informative records on the sales of their guns (Vizzard, 1995: 342). However, the law largely lacked any and all "mechanics for enforcement" and often the standards of obtaining permits and keeping records were not adequately met (Vizzard, 1995: 342). In 1968, the Gun Control Act was passed in response to the overwhelming violence of the decade, which included the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and others, which rocked the foundation of many Americans across the entire country (Carter, 2002: 238; Vizzard, 1995: 342). While this was one of the strictest attempts at gun control legislation, implementing "restrictions on the import of firearms; the prohibited persons list of people who are barred from possessing guns; and a point-of sale-system of gun owner registration," approximately 20 years later Congress and President Reagan passed legislation to soften some of the restrictions (Carter, 2002: 238).

The Brady Bill to Present

Finally, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, commonly known as the Brady Bill, was passed in 1993, which many see as the last drastic attempt at gun control legislation (Aborn, 1995: 418). The Brady Bill required that persons who wanted to buy a gun would need to wait five days before they could obtain the gun (Aborn, 1995: 418). The impetus behind this waiting period was the need to supply adequate background checks as well as provide a "cooling-off" period of

sorts, between purchasing a gun an actually receiving it (Aborn, 1995: 418-419; Carter, 2002: 75). However, the Brady Bill is just another paradigmatic example of gun control legislation in the United States as it was described by many as "a long and torturous struggle" (Aborn, 1994: 419). Particularly telling is the fact the Brady Bill was "immensely popular in the polls," but languished in Congress for upwards of six years from 1987 to its eventual passage in 1993 (Aborn, 1994: 419). Additionally, the five-day waiting period would eventually be struck down in favour of instant background checks and the "cool-down" period was eliminated (Carter, 2002: 75). Thus, it is important to note a trend among these pieces of relevant legislation. While it cannot be said that legislation pertaining to gun control has never been passed in the United States, it can be said that the legislation is increasingly difficult to pass and only does so after extensive debate and compromise. Additionally, legislation that begins strong is often either unenforceable at the scale necessary or is weakened in succeeding years by succeeding Congresses. As such, it can be concluded that in response to relatively strong public pushes for stricter gun control; Congress has only offered in return a series of failed initiatives and unrealized goals to address the public's desires.

Analysis: Will Gun Control Legislation Ever Materialize?

Thus far, this paper has examined the general policy-making environment of Congress, public opinion with regards to gun control, and the limited congressional response to these opinions. Hence, a single question remains: will further gun control legislation ever materialize within the United States of America? The short answer to this question is no, or at least it is very unlikely that specific legislation tightening or limiting of gun ownership laws will ever come to fruition. In particular, three important considerations arise that severely impact the likelihood that further gun control legislation will ever materialize.

First, gun control legislation will not come to fruition due to the fact legislators are self-interested individuals who wish to maximize their chances at reelection. As examined previously, we can assume that the primary goal of legislators is obtaining reelection (Arnold, 1990: 5; Mayhew, 1974: 13; Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 237). Therefore, it is important to reflect upon the fact that interest groups can significantly hinder an incumbent's chances of reelection through a variety of tactics such as disparaging remarks in the media and press or the withholding of funds and votes. Consequently, it is important to recognize that interest groups within the gun control policy field, specifically the National Rifle Association (NRA), can also improve a legislator's chances of getting reelected. When combining these two factors, we would expect to see legislators avoid potentially harmful confrontation with the NRA and instead lean into their policies and preferences thus promoting their reelection interests. The empirical evidence to support this observation is plentiful. For instance, Rocca and Gordon, in their 2010 study, found that "specifically, sponsoring labor and gun control bills increases contributions from labor and gun control PACs, respectively" (393). In addition, totaling both money spent "on behalf of candidates" and money directly donated, numerous members of the House and Senate have received upwards of one million dollars each from the NRA, with Senator John McCain leading the pack with almost eight million dollars in funding (Leonhardt et al., 2017). Furthermore, perhaps the most telling quote comes from a former NRA spokesperson, who stated, "The NRA's membership, if it had one trait, one political trait, they vote…That's the deal. You are a politician. You want to get elected. You want votes. NRA has votes," (Wozniak, 2017: 272). Lastly, in his study of Senate voting on the 1993 Brady Bill, Leo Kahane found "the greater the political

contributions by the NRA, the more likely a senator voted in the direction favouring the NRA" (1999: 384). This impact is especially relevant in primary elections where candidates must typically appeal to a party's strong ideological base in order to get elected (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 240). Thus, consistently, it has been shown that legislators vote along NRA lines or appease NRA interests in order to maximize benefits from the group in the form of votes and monetary donations, which, in turn, betters their reelection chances and demonstrates their self-interest. Therefore, gun control legislation will not materialize within the United States policy-making environment since members of Congress continually hold their reelection interests as their ultimate goal and attempt to appease powerful interest groups that aid in the achievement of this objective.

Second, gun control legislation will not materialize in the United States policy-making environment as legislators aim to maximize concentrated benefits, minimize concentrated costs, and only serve the interests of the larger general public when it becomes necessary (Arnold, 1990: 142-143). While studies have shown there is constant public support for further gun control measures, this consistency could be the fundamental problem. When examining the long-term public opinion, Vizzard shows that over the past twenty years public support for stricter gun regulation has declined (2014: 887). Arguably, because the level of public support for gun control has remained relatively stable, evidence suggests that salient costs for the general public have not risen to levels the public deem critical; thus, legislators view addressing these issues as equally non-critical. In reality members of Congress are not actively voting against public interests, they are instead keenly aware of the lack of upward movement in support for gun control measures. For instance, Kevin Wozniak studied public support for gun control after the Sandy Hook shooting and found that the shooting "did not dramatically alter the distribution of support or opposition to gun control among the American people" (2017: 270). Wozniak additionally found this finding was consistent for numerous other mass shootings over the years (2017: 270). If the salient costs for the general population do not reach catastrophic levels after the shooting of 26 people, 20 of them young children, then many doubt it is likely they ever will (Wozniak, 2017: 255). Therefore, legislators carry with them much trepidation on serving the benefits of the general public at the expense of incurring large concentrated costs from opponents of gun control legislation (Schuman and Presser, 1981: 41). Congress is much more content to serve the interests of groups, such as those against gun control, who actively share their positions and interests and where concentrated benefits exist (Schuman and Presser, 1981: 40). Overall, the costs of a lack of gun control legislation for the public have not risen to a noticeable level of salience to warrant legislators taking action on the matter. Thus, according to Arnold's theory of why Congress makes decisions, legislators have no incentive to address the larger interest of the diffuse public and instead will continue to serve the concentrated opponents of gun control, until such a time as general costs of the former become noticeable.

Third, gun control legislation within the United States is an unlikely outcome due to the rise of conditional party government and increased party polarization. As opposed to Mayhew's original assessment, as examined by Rohde and Aldrich, political parties within Congress are becoming increasingly impactful institutions (Rohde and Aldrich, 2010: 234). Furthermore, over the past 32 years, political parties have doubled their levels of polarization, and thus, parties are subjected to increased internal agreement, but by virtue of this phenomenon, also increased external disagreement (Rohde, 2013: 850; Theiault, 2008: 134). As parties become increasingly polarized, Congress is subject to increasing policy stalemates and general difficulty in straightforward law-making (Theiault, 2008: 8). Subsequently, it then becomes increasingly difficult for members of respective parties to find common ground regarding policies, especially

those seen to pertain to moral or partisan issues, such as gun control (Ansolabehere et al., 2001: 555). For that reason, the debate on gun control has transformed from a simple dichotomous choice to a decision that encompasses partisan ties within a Congress that are increasingly polarized. As a result, with the rise of "intraparty homogeneity and inter-party divergence," gun control legislation within the United States is unlikely to materialize due to increased party polarization that makes agreement on partisan issues a near impossibility (Rohde, 2013: 861). As parties continually focus on supporting and upholding their specific "brand" of politics and policy preferences, they move farther away from discussion of any kind regarding partisan policy preferences, like gun control (Rohde and Aldrich: 2010, 238). Thus, as this polarization persists and manifests further, it is not likely that further gun control legislation will materialize.

Conclusion

To conclude, gun violence within the United States statistically occurs at a staggering level. While it would be convenient to say the American people have accepted these statistics, this is not necessarily the case. In society today, a discrepancy exists between high levels of support for gun control and a lack of legislation passed by Congress to match these opinions. However, it is the main contention of this paper that gun control legislation will not materialize and this discrepancy will remain under the current policy-making environment of the United States. This is due to the fact that legislators are self-interested actors that value, as their primary goal, to be reelected; legislators also seek opportunities to minimize concentrated costs and maximize concentrated benefits; and finally, with the rise of conditional party government and party polarization it has become increasingly difficult to pass, what many view as partisan legislation. Therefore, notwithstanding public sentiment, the legislative environment within Congress lacks the requisite force to spur change of any kind concerning enacting stricter gun control legislation.

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Unequal Under the Law

Indigenous Originalism and the Living-Tree Approach within Canadian Constitutional Jurisprudence

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Abstract. This paper examines the use of two contrasting doctrines of judicial interpretation utilized within Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. On one hand, the Supreme Court of Canada interprets cases involving non-indigenous claimants with a living-tree approach, allowing for the modernization of rights into the 21st century. In a contrasting sense, the highest court in Canada has continually rooted indigenous rights in the past, through utilizing the doctrine of originalism, in turn, preventing the flourishing of indigenous rights within Canada. This paper will further contend that, not only does this divergence in approaches exist, it permeates as a precedent through succeeding Court decisions and, in turn, hinders the ability of indigenous communities and indigenous rights to move forward and progress into the 21st century.

Introduction

The history of colonialism within our world has inflicted many scars upon the earth and the indigenous populations that inhabit it (Borrows, 2016: 107). In the case of Canada, this pattern of occurrence follows the rule, and not the exception. From the onset of European contact, indigenous populations within Canada have been marginalized in numerous economic, social, and political facets of life (Kennedy, 2007: 77). However, when examining the marginalized position of indigenous peoples in Canada, few would think to turn their heads towards the judicial system. The allegorical Lady Justice is portrayed as blind and the principle of the rule of law in Canada calls for everyone, regardless of their position in society, to be treated equally under the law. Nevertheless, in an attempt to reconcile indigenous rights with settler rights, the Canadian judicial system has adopted differing approaches to handling the entitlements of each population (Kennedy, 2007: 79).

This paper will examine these different approaches in both a theoretical perspective, reviewing the doctrines of originalism and the living-tree approach; and in a practical perspective, through examining relevant Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decisions. Furthermore, this paper will illustrate that there is a clear divergence in the methods of interpretation utilized by the SCC as indicated by disparate application of the doctrines of originalism in cases involving indigenous claimants and the use of the living-tree approach when compared to cases involving non-indigenous claimants. Finally, this paper will examine the fact that, not only does this divergence in approaches exist, it permeates as a precedent through succeeding Court decisions and, in turn, hinders the ability of indigenous communities and indigenous rights to move forward and progress into the 21st century.

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Section 35(1): The Inclusion of Indigenous Rights in the Canadian Constitution

Prior to examining the methods utilized to interpret the Canadian Constitution, it is first relevant to understand the form that indigenous rights have occupied within the Canadian constitutional landscape. The first constitutionally relevant document in Canada's history came to be through the "marriage" of the British colonies of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick (Borrows, 2016: 105). What was originally entitled *The British North America Act*, later renamed the *Constitution Act, 1867*, holds the well-known phrasing pronouncing that Canada is to have "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom" (*Constitution Act, 1867*). Thus, in line with the United Kingdom, the Canadian Constitution was to be, and remains, largely unwritten, with certain written aspects (Borrows, 2016: 105). With respect to indigenous peoples, largely disregarding the autonomy, freedom, and culture of pre-existing communities; under section 91(24) of the *Constitution Act, 1867* "exclusive legislative authority relative to 'Indians and lands reserved to Indians'" was granted to the federal government (Borrows, 2016: 107; *Constitution Act, 1867*). During this time period, as established by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in *St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. R.*, indigenous rights, particularly land entitlements, were conceptualized as usufructuary rights (Mickenberg, 1971: 149-150). Meaning, indigenous rights within Canada outwardly presented the facade of being legitimate entitlements but in actuality, they existed solely at the good "will of the sovereign" and could be unilaterally extinguished and heavily regulated by the government of the day (Kennedy, 2007: 81). The 1973 SCC decision in *Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia* would alter this exception slightly, by recognizing that indigenous peoples do have an "ownership interest" in their historical lands (Anderson et al., 2004: 639). Nonetheless, indigenous rights still had a long road to travel becoming constitutionally entrenched.

Moving forward, as Canada increasingly sought full independence from the United Kingdom, indigenous peoples would not become heavily involved in constitutional discussions until 1978 (Borrows, 2016: 115). During this period, in an effort to be included, indigenous communities mobilized in support of the recognition of their rights within the Canadian constitutional framework. These movements would take the form of the 'Constitutional Express' where 500 indigenous participants marched from Vancouver to Ottawa and various other attempts to get invited to the discussion tables with federal and provincial governments (Borrows, 2016: 116-117).

Finally, the *Constitution Act, 1982*, section 35(1) would uphold that the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed" (*Constitution Act, 1982*). For the purposes of this Act, section 35(2) confirms that "aboriginal peoples of Canada" refers to the Indian, Inuit and Métis communities within Canadian borders (*Constitution Act, 1982*). While this section of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, represented formal recognition and protection of indigenous rights within Canada, the subsequent interpretation from the judiciary of what section 35 rights would encompass within the Canadian constitutional landscape would fall short of hopeful expectations (Walkem & Bruce, 2003: 224-225).

Methods of Constitutional Interpretation

The two methods of constitutional interpretation that will be examined in this paper are the living-tree approach and the doctrine of originalism. First, the utilization of the living-tree approach stems from the idea that the interpretation of the constitution should not be rooted in the

original intentions of the framers who drafted the document (Hogg, 1987: 97). Instead, the living-tree approach calls for the progressive interpretation of constitutional matters, in order to allow for the "growth and expansion [of the constitution] within its natural limits" (Hogg, 1987: 98).

As examined by Bradley Miller, this method of interpretation encompasses a notion of "progressive interpretation" calling for the language and ideas within the constitution to be continuously interpreted to match new realities and circumstances (Miller, 2009: 335). The living-tree approach also calls for a "purposive approach to interpretation" (Miller, 2009: 339). Using the purposive approach, the courts disregard the intended purpose of the framers and instead, aim to identify the larger purpose of the specific guarantee and thus provide "individuals [with] the full benefit" and protection possible (Miller, 2009: 339-340). Finally, while the living-tree approach may appear to place no weight in the history or the intentions of the past, as constitutional scholar Peter Hogg identifies, all interpretation still "must be anchored in the historical context of the provision (2017, 15-50; also Miller, 2009: 343, 349). Notwithstanding this, while there is some place for the original intent of the framers, their intentions are by no means binding on the courts eventual decision (Hogg, 2017, 15-50; Miller, 2009: 343, 349). Thus, a constitution is forever a "work-in-progress" as this method of judicial interpretation enables progressive and constant adaptation and modernization of the living document (Borrows, 2017: 123).

In a contrasting sense, the doctrine of originalism places greater emphasis on the original or historic meanings and intentions of a constitution. This method rose to prominence around the 1970s in the United States as conservatives aimed to ensure constitutional interpretation stayed true to the past (Borrows, 2017: 122). Two common approaches are taken under the originalist approach: either the document is to be interpreted to satisfy the intent of the original framers and draftsmen of the constitution, or it is to be interpreted in order to satisfy the aims of the original population under which the constitution was made for (Greene, 2009: 8). As noted by Jamal Greene, this method incorporates the idea of constant "constitutional fidelity" through resisting interpretations that incorporate aspects of "social change and judicial innovation" (2009: 8-9). Instead, judicial interpretation is focused on the intentions and purposes the original framers and peoples intended to instill upon the constitution (Greene, 209: 8-9). Thus, those utilizing this method of constitutional interpretation, seek to root their analysis in the historical context of the guarantee in order to provide meaning and direction aligned with the original intention of the document.

Two Methods, One Society: The Living Tree Approach & Originalism in Canadian Jurisprudence

As examined prior, two divergent methods dominate the landscape of constitutional interpretation. However, in Canada, as argued by scholars and as upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada itself, the living-tree approach firmly monopolizes the judicial landscape within Canada. In the case of *Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board),* the SCC affirmed that, "This Court has never adopted the practice more prevalent in the United States of basing constitutional interpretation on the original intentions of the framers of the Constitution" (para. 409). John Borrows has echoed this sentiment, stating that originalism has never obtained significant support within Canada and is largely deemed an unacceptable method of interpretation (2016: 130). Similarly, Peter Hogg has affirmed that through their decisions the highest Court in Canada has repeatedly upheld that, in their interpretation, "that the language of the constitution is not to be frozen" (1987: 97). Thus, it appears as though the support and utilization of the living-tree

approach within Canadian constitutional circles is over-whelming. In reality, however, through the examination of SCC decisions in matters involving non-indigenous claimants and matters involving indigenous claimants it becomes evident, two methods of interpretation actually exist.

To begin, in cases involving non-indigenous claimants, the highest court in Canada often acts prudently to ensure the Canadian Constitution continues to reflect the society governed by it. For example, in *Edwards v. Canada (Attorney General)*, more commonly referred to as the Persons Case; the Privy Council, which represented the highest court in Canada at the time, upheld that under section 24 of the *British North America Act, 1867* (now the *Constitution Act, 1867*) the words "qualified persons," included the eligibly of women for appointment to the Canadian Senate (para. 7). While this decision may not seem groundbreaking, it is a clear example of the living-tree approach, as a strict interpretation of the phrase "qualified persons" as intended in 1867 would clearly be limited to men (Borrows, 2016: 132). However, the Privy Council utilized a "large and liberal interpretation" that allowed for a natural growth in the term "qualified persons" that adapted to match the way in which women had been integrated into society (Borrows, 2016: 132). Similarly, in their decision handed down in the *Same Sex Marriage Reference*, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of same-sex marriage. Through adopting an originalist approach, "it would have been understood that marriage should be available only to opposite-sex couples" as intended by the original framers in 1867 (Borrows, 2016: 133). However, the SCC recognized the importance of modernizing the constitution on par with new societal realities and that cementing the constitution in "frozen concepts" ran contrary to the principle that "our Constitution is a living tree" (*Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage*, para. 22).

Finally, in *Re Employment Insurance Act*, the Court grappled with the new reality of women re-entering the workforce after having children, and in the 2005 decision they upheld that federal jurisdiction over employment insurance extended to covering women on maternity leave (Miller, 2009: 336-337). Once again, the Court adopted a living-tree approach, recognizing the need for the Constitution to change "with the needs of the labour force" (*Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.)*, para. 66). Thus, it is evident that in handling cases that involve non-indigenous claimants, the SCC has consistently and continually prescribed to the method of constitutional interpretation known as the living-tree approach; continually updating and modernizing the Canadian Constitution so that it reflects the continually changing landscape of the rights and realities of Canadian society.

In stark contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada's handling of cases involving indigenous claimants have been strictly rooted in the concepts of tradition, history, and the significance of the past. This has led to what scholar John Borrows has dubbed the concept of "(Ab)Originalism" in the interpretation of cases involving the section 35(1) rights of indigenous peoples (2016: 130). The first case to reach the SCC that invoked section 35(1) of the *Constitution Act, 1982* was *R. v. Sparrow* (Walkem & Bruce, 2003: 201). In the *Sparrow* decision, the SCC was asked to determine whether or not the Musquaem Indian Band in British Columbia possessed an aboriginal right, pursuant to section 35(1) of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, to fish for food (*R. v. Sparrow*, para. 1-3; Walkem & Bruce, 2003: 201). While the Court ruled in favour of the indigenous claimant, their reasoning was rooted in the fact the community could show a past connection to the land and historical evidence of their fishing patterns (Macklem, 2001: 162-163). In subsequent cases such as, *R. v. Van der Peet*, Dorothy Van der Peet of the Sto:lo nation argued she had an aboriginal right under section 35(1) of the *Constitution Act, 1982* to sell fish (*R. v. Van der Peet*, para. 5-6). The use of the doctrine of originalism would be firmly cemented in the case of *R. v. Van der Peet*, through the establishment of what would come to be known as the 'Van der Peet Test'. Pursuant

to this three step test, indigenous claimants must show "the existence of an aboriginal right", that the practice, custom, or tradition is "of central significance to the aboriginal society in question", and that a continuity exists between the claimed practice and the practice that existed pre-contact with the Europeans (*R. v. Van der Peet*, para. 50, 54, 59).

This "integral to a distinctive culture" standard, rooted in customs, practices, and traditions solely of the past, would go on to be applied to countless SCC decisions involving indigenous claimants and further cement the doctrine of originalism (Borrows, 2017: 120). For example, in 1993 case of *R. v. Powley*, Steve Powley and his son sought to uphold their right as members of the Métis community to hunt for moose in the area of Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario (para. 6). In order to accomplish this task, the Powleys had to turn to history, and provide evidence to the courts that there was a clear link between their modern practice of hunting and the hunting patterns of their ancestors (*R. v. Powley*, para. 41, 45, 37). This has led to Métis rights claimants to feel the Courts are seeking "an unreasonably narrow" definition of what constitutes community and land ownership in direct opposition to the meaning the Métis people have (Sloan, 2016: 145). This constant need for aboriginal claimants to turn to history has had real and recognizable impact on the ability of aboriginal claimants to further the protection of their rights. For instance, in cases where the decision handed down in *Powley* was applied, only three claimants out of a total of 50 cases were successful in their trials (Sloan, 2016: 145).

In the 2001 case of *Mitchell v. Minister of National Revenue (M.N.R.)*, Grand Chief Michael Mitchell of the Mohawk of Akwesasne held he possessed an aboriginal right to transport goods for trade across the US-Canada border without being required to pay customs duties on the items (para. 1-2). While the territory of the Mohawk of Akwesasne transects the US-Canada border, the group's rights to mobility and trade across this territory were established in both the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent (Mitchell, 1989: 112). However, the claimant in this case would fall victim to the aforementioned *Van Der Peet* Test, as Canada's highest court deemed that "this practice [of trading] was neither a defining feature of their [past] culture nor vital to their collective identity" therefore no aboriginal right could be present (*Mitchell v. MNR)*. Furthermore, in the case of *Delgamuukw v. Attorney General of British Columbia*, Indigenous claimants argued they held aboriginal title to approximately 58,000 square kilometres of territory in the province of British Columbia (para. 7). Although the case was lost on a technicality, Chief Justice Lamer still affirmed that an indigenous claimant must identify "that [they] occupied the lands in question at the time at which the Crown asserted sovereignty over the land" (*Delgamuukw v. Attorney General of British Columbia,* para. 144).

Thus, evidencing the Court's insistence on rooting any potential for the existence of an indigenous right to a specific and unchangeable moment in history (Borrows, 2017: 128). This has created a necessity within cases involving aboriginal claimants in which these claimants must reach back into the past to somehow prove the legitimacy of their rights as they exist in present day. Overall, while some indigenous claimants have been successful in obtaining recognition of their rights under section 35(1), in a larger sense, the necessity to root indigenous rights in "pre-contact" terms negatively impacts the potential for progression and modern recognition of indigenous communities and their rights (Macklem, 2001: 163-164).

Rooted in the Past: Preventing Progression & Modernization of Indigenous Rights

Through the examination of both SCC decisions involving indigenous and non-indigenous claimants it becomes clear the jurisprudence differs dramatically. Not only do these approaches

differ, but, as examined by Ardith Walkem, through adopting an approach of originalism in matters regarding indigenous claimants, the highest court in Canada has sharply hindered the modernization of indigenous rights and has actively restricted the "constitutional, political, and legal space available to Indigenous Peoples within Canada" (Walkem & Bruce, 2003: 216). Thus creating an impossibility for the recognition of "contemporary" claims to indigenous rights when the courts would never refuse recognizing the present-day rights of other identifiable groups such as women, gay, or lesbian persons (Borrows, 2017: 115). Moreover, unlike the interpretation and recognition of non-indigenous claimants' rights, indigenous communities and their rights become "problematically rooted in abstract reasoning" that further divides and segregates them from the realities faced by other Canadians as the SCC continually invokes the necessity of historical significance and continuity (Borrows, 2016: 4).

Additionally, through minimizing the space indigenous rights are permitted to occupy, the Court only affirms the over-arching authority of the state (Walkem and Bruce, 2003: 216). As examined by Dawnis Kennedy, "The [Van der Peet] test [Lamer C.J.C.] develops…hinders the ability of Canadian courts to achieve" any level of civil engagement with indigenous peoples in Canada (2007: 85). Clearly, exposing a paradigmatic relationship between the Crown and indigenous peoples that is only further cemented through succeeding decisions handed down by the SCC in their interpretation of the section 35(1) rights of indigenous peoples (Walkem & Bruce, 2003: 216). As highlighted by Audra Simpson, this discourse exposes a larger paradigm where settler law and resulting rights are usually, if not always, placed ahead of the rights and law of indigenous peoples (2008: 191). Thus, not only does the SCC maintain an originalist approach to handling cases involving indigenous claimants, in essence, the Court has actively harmed the progression of indigenous communities within Canadian borders by recognizing them only as "past-tense peoples" and failing to recognize the potential and allow for the recognition of their progressive rights and entitlements (Borrows, 2017: 120).

In a time when the Canadian state is emphasizing the need for reconciliation, the judicial branch of the state is ensuring that very goal stays fully out of reach. With their repeated and steadfast insistence on utilizing the doctrine of originalism the Canadian government is effectively creating what Shin Imai deems a "disincentive to negotiate" (2003: 309). Imai believes this disincentive is created when courts continually rely on historical evidence to solve what are largely contemporary issues (2003: 320-321). Instead of encouraging open and productive communication this framework continuously hinders the rights and interests of indigenous groups in favour of the rights and interests of the state's apparatus. Thus, without the necessary advancements in the Canadian courts this fractured relationship with continually permeate and place stress on an already tenuous relationship between indigenous groups and the Canadian state.

Conclusion

In theory, the Supreme Court of Canada endorses the utilization of a living-tree approach that seeks to progressively and purposefully interpret the Canadian Constitution, creating a living document that naturally grows and evolves with Canadian society. In actuality, it becomes clear that in matters involving indigenous claimants versus non-indigenous claimants, the Supreme Court of Canada has actually adopted two distinct methods of constitutional interpretation. In instances involving indigenous claimants, the Supreme Court adopts an originalist doctrine, seeking to root and freeze indigenous rights in the past or in a specific historical moment. This is accomplished through requiring indigenous claimants to showcase historical significance and

historical continuity of any potential right they seek to actualize. Not only is it clear that the Court utilizes divergent methods to interpret these cases, the negative impact on the recognition of contemporary indigenous rights and the relationship between indigenous communities and the state also becomes plainly apparent. While an optimal concept of justice promises to serve the public blindly, impartially and consistently, the Canadian reality has proven to be removed from this ideal perspective through utilizing dual methods of interpretation dependent on the claimant of the case. Thus, while non-indigenous peoples have seen their rights grow, flourish, and modernize in line with a living-tree approach to constitutional interpretation, indigenous peoples within Canada have seen their rights constricted and fixed in the past under the doctrine of originalism.

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Brexit, Secession, and Euroscepticism

A Matter of Perceptions

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Abstract. This paper seeks to develop a forecasting tool for movements to separate within the European Union. Using a primarily cultural approach, the attitudes that exist in all EU countries will be looked at and compared to secessionist movements at the sub-state level. Despite the fact that the European Union is not a state, it has taken on many of the functions of one and the movements in states to separate from the EU are similar to sub-state secession movements. Attitudes leading to separation from the EU do differ from those guiding internal secession and these movements have their own term: Euroscepticism. The question guiding the research is: what public perceptions allow Eurosceptic political movements to take hold? The answer supported by this work is that a combination of institutional, cultural and economic perceptions, not economic realities, lead to Eurosceptic tendencies. To support the hypothesis, this paper presents a model that measures Eurosceptic attitudes in order to forecast future secession movements.

Introduction

In recent years the European Union (EU) has been suffered from a political phenomenon known as Euroscepticism. As the name implies, a Eurosceptic view is one that is highly skeptical of, and in extreme cases advocates for separation from, the European Union. This attitude culminated in 2016 with BREXIT, the referendum in which the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU. While states within the EU are still technically sovereign, the EU has become a massive, and far reaching organization. The EU even has its own elected governing body, the European Parliament. Each of its 28 member states hold elections to fill said parliament. Currently, the power and scope of the EU make it more akin to a super-state. Albeit one with a high degree of political autonomy in the sub-units. So, rather than saying the UK is leaving a trade agreement, or international organization, it is more accurate to say the UK is seceding from the European Union. Secession is a phenomenon that is rarely experienced at the sub-state level. While many secession movements do exist, and some have been successful, not one has ever managed to achieve its goal in an advanced democracy (Sorens, 2005: 319). So what factors made Brexit different? What public perceptions culminated in the UK actually attaining over 50% of the vote to leave? These questions are precursors to the ultimate question: what public perceptions allow Eurosceptic political movements to take hold? The hypothesis is that a combination of institutional, cultural, and economic perceptions, rather than economic realities, lead to Eurosceptic attitudes. Furthermore, anyone of these factors alone are not sufficient to explain secession movements across the EU. By analyzing literature about Euroscepticism, and secession, a model will be created that allows one to forecast the future strength of Eurosceptic movements based on public perception. It is important to note that the reasons these perceptions exist will not be analyzed here. The Brexit campaign has come under scrutiny due to allegations of interference and misinformation. The argument here is that for the use of this model these allegations do not matter. If certain perceptions exist in the public, regardless of the reasons, they can lead to secession.

First, in order to map these perceptions a blend of cultural and rational choice theories will be used. The Cultural approach will be used with rational choice being used to a lesser degree. Then literature about both Euroscepticism and secessionist movements will be addressed with the theories in mind. The model constructed using the theory and literature will then be explained and the data presented. The importance of this data, and how well it maps to actual Eurosceptic movements will be discussed. Finally, the implications of this model for the European Union will be addressed.

Cultural Approach

An issue such as secession can be discussed using any of the three major comparative politics approaches. Explanations can easily be found based on economics, political structure or culture. However, this paper will focus on the cultural approach. The rational choice approach will be evaluated to a lesser degree, as much of the secessionist, and Eurosceptic literature focuses on economic disparities (for example, Hetcher 1992; Molnar 2016; Ritzen et al., 2016; Sorens 2005). While rational choice is more comprehensive than just economic factors, this is the area much of the literature focuses on. Other rational choices lenses, such as mutual defence, are not nearly as prevalent in the literature as economics. The structural approach will not be used, as it does not provide any insight for the forecasting tool. This is because this paper does not seek to explain concrete issues with the structure of the EU but is focused on the perceptions the public holds of the EU. When dealing with perceptions, the cultural approach is particularly useful. In this case, it will be seen if people within each state believe in the overarching idea of the EU. One excellent example of this is the Euro, it does not matter whether or not adopting the Euro actually benefits a state, what matters is if people believe it does (Molnar, 2016: 65). If people in a country strongly believe in the Euro, then the culture in that country is less likely to breed secession. The rational choice approach would be more geared toward economic realities. In this case, if a state is receiving net benefit from adopting the Euro, they are far less likely to secede, as leaving holds no actual benefit. The cost-benefit notion is the major driving force behind the joining of most international institutions, and adoption of their policies. A state will not join if it believes that is not in its best interest, nor will it leave if it believes it will suffer. These approaches are both addressed to demonstrate that the cultural approach better explains why secession movements happen. People cast votes based on perceptions they hold, rather than actual hard data. In terms of secession, especially when it is proven that leaving will make things worse economically, these perceptions are often shaped by fear. There is a great deal of rhetoric coming out of Eurosceptic parties who claim the EU is an evil super state, seeking to dominate members and destroy national identity. While many do not hold views quite this extreme, their perceptions are shaped by hearing this and a general culture of fear can quickly develop. To shape this culture, these Eurosceptic groups use a rational choice narrative when advocating for leaving the EU. For instance, during Brexit it was pointed out how the UK pays more into the EU than it receives. While this is true, it does not account for all the benefits of being a member, such as access to foreign work, increased labour pool, no duties on imports and exports. So, it can clearly be seen that Brexit was shaped far more by a culture of EU fear, than actual rational choices. Since elections are determined by feelings, which are rarely based in pure fact, the cultural approach offers the most insight into secession movements.

Tying Secessionist and Eurosceptic Literature

Understanding Secession

There is a great deal of literature on secession movements and on Euroscepticism. Yet despite their similarities, there is little literature attempting to link the two. When looking for works discussing the EU and secession, many works focus on how sub-state secession, such as Catalonian independence may affect the EU (for example, Vaubel, 2013; Lehning, 1998). However, these works do not take the extra step of discussing how a movement like Brexit can be compared to a secession. Various works on secession and Euroscepticism will be looked at to compare what underlying principle drives both movements. There have been many successful secession movements in autocratic states but there are no examples in advanced democracies. While some examples of successful secession exist in early democracies, such as Norway from Sweden in 1905, or Iceland from Denmark in 1944 exist, none have ever taken place where suffrage has been present for more than ten years (Sorens, 2005: 319). Despite their lack of success, secession movements are still major political influences (Suesse, 2016; Lehning, 1998: 1). Perhaps only because they are taken seriously do, they never succeed. "The Cross Sectional Determinants of Secessionism in Advanced Democracies" by Jason Sorens (2005) is work that aims to map and forecast possible secession movements at the sub-state level, and there are several valuable theories to be taken from this work. Firstly, the idea of wealth distribution is addressed as "regions that receive more in expenditures than they pay in taxes are poor ground for secessionism, because independence would mean the loss of subsidies" (Sorens, 2005: 310). Sorens goes on to say, "In democracies, redistribution tends to flow from wealthy to poor, and poor regions naturally enjoy the benefits, whereas affluent regions fear tight union" (2005: 310). This is contrasted with autocracies, in which the wealth is typically taken from poor regions to be given to the rich. Therefore, the first piece of the theory is that in advanced democracies, richer regions are more likely to separate as rich regions receive less benefit and fear entrapment. When explaining his model Sorens states "The dependent variable is vote share for secessionist parties in elections to the lower houses of countrywide and provincial legislatures, averaged over all elections of each type" (2005: 315). Survey data concerning secession movements is rarely gathered, except where they have already taken root. Elections however, are often held in advanced democracies and give a good view of what issues are important to the larger public. While secessionist parties are not always single-issue, secession is often the most important part of their platform. It can therefore be assumed that any votes they receive translate well into a desire to secede. Much of the remainder of Sorens' work focuses on history, and language, and how the presence of differences leads to secession. While this may be true, history and language are ultimately useless when looking at differences within the European Union. Every state within it has a different language and history than any other state. Under Sorens' theory, every state in the EU is ripe for secession. However, the EU is not quite a state, so traditional secessionist theory's limitations are easily explained for this case. In the case of the EU, Eurosceptic literature offers alternative explanations.

Hard and Soft Euroscepticism

Firstly, there are two distinct streams of Euroscepticism, hard and soft (Molnar, 2016: 52). Hard Euroscepticism is the stream that is actively anti-EU, highly national, and wants to see an exit or radical change in the system. This type is most similar to secession movements at the sub-state level. Soft Euroscepticism focuses on peeling back the scope of the EU and on increased local

autonomy for certain issues. Many of these soft movements are in fact anti-secession. An example of an anti-secession, soft Eurosceptic party is the Law & Justice party in Poland. This party currently has the most seats in the Polish Parliament and holds a majority government. They are opposed to political integration but are for general economic integration. Based on their policies they have been grouped into the soft Eurosceptic category. Analyzing a party that has no desire to leave the EU does not make sense for the forecasting tool being developed. So, the focus needs to be on the hard stream of Euroscepticism. An example of a party that is hard Eurosceptic is, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP has always stated that their main goal is to have the UK leave the EU. Due to their exit policy UKIP fits much better into secessionist theory.

Factors Driving Hard Euroscepticism

Once the hard/soft distinction is understood, the next step is to understand the feelings driving secession and hard Euroscepticism. According to "Euroskepticism, Income Inequality and Financial Expectations" the factors that motivate one to be a Hard Eurosceptic can be grouped into the general categories of: "National Identity, National Institutional Performance, Utilitarian theory" (Ritzen et al., 2016: 542). The first two are relatively self-explanatory, they have to do with the sense of nationalism one feels about their home state, and how effectively one feels the national government is performing, respectively. Utilitarian theory is based purely on economics and is exactly what Sorens put forth. If a state is receiving money it is less likely to exit than if it is giving money. Interestingly, these three factors map well onto the three comparative politics approaches: cultural, structural, and rational choice. "Euroskepticism, Income Inequality and Financial Expectations" took, as indicated by the title, the utilitarian approach and focused on economics. Financial expectations had a strong effect in Western Europe, "but a nonsignificant negative effect on Euroskepticism in the post-communist countries" (Ritzen et al., 2016: 554). This shows that there are different factors leading to Euroscepticism in these areas. It is suggested that the East-West difference is due to the positive association Eastern Europe has with the EU because of the significantly beneficial economic reforms in the post-communist period. While the East-West difference is mentioned, no effort was made to map these positive sentiments and their strength. Euroscepticism was measured by asking the question "Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the European Union is… (1) a good thing, (2) a bad thing, (3) neither good nor bad, or (4) don't know" (Ritzen et al., 2016: 551). A single survey question is a weaker approach to analyzing real Eurosceptic strength than election data since there is no way of knowing how those answers transfer into actual secession votes. One might dislike the EU, but another party might have a better platform. Also, reducing feelings about the EU to a binary or even multiple-choice question is ineffective in longer term attitudes and does not address why and on what issues these feelings exist. Instead, by using Sorens' idea of secessionist vote counting, the strength, not the sentiment, of these movements can be measured. So, by combining the three factors that may lead to Euroscepticism and by using Hard Eurosceptic Vote Share (HEVS), a holistic, full picture of what leads to secession in the EU can hopefully be achieved. These two works have been focused on for the creation of the model but there is a fair deal of secessionist literature that has been consulted.

Secession and Rational Choice

Two other papers on secession, "Causes and Consequences of Secessionist Movements: Lessons from the Soviet Breakup" by Marvin Suesse (2016) and "The Dynamics of Secession" by Micheal Hechter (1992), were consulted to gain a better understanding of how movements form on the state level. Both these works focused heavily on the rational choice approach and how economics affect these movements. Both these works are critical as they show how secessionist movements are major political forces. The Soviet Union was a super-state that inevitably fell to major secessionist pressures, fracturing into multiple independent states. Direct parallels between this case and the case of the EU are difficult to find however. This is due to the democratic nature of the EU and the importance of analyzing election data for the model being constructed. Nevertheless, the breakup of the USSR demonstrates that secessionist movements can be major political forces.

Secession and Europe

Several works did discuss secession within the European Union such as, "Theories of secession: An introduction" by Percy B. Lehning (2005) and "Secession in the European Union" by Roland Vaubel (2012). However, these two works only focused on how movements within states may affect the European Union as an organization, neither of them sought to address Euroscepticism as secession or even the notion that states may separate from the EU. Two works that did address Euroscepticism directly were, "So what's wrong with the EU? Motivations underlying the Eurosceptic vote in the 2009 European elections" by van Spanje and de Vrees (2011) and "Economic Crisis and Euroscepticism: A Comparative Study of the Hungarian and Italian Case (1990–2013)" by Anna Molnar (2016). These articles addressed Euroscepticism but not as secessionist movements. Any mention of secession in these works was viewed in sub-state terms. The article by Molnar took a rational choice approach, and analyzed how the value of the Euro, and the strength of the European Economy affected Eurosceptic votes. The model made by van Spanje and de Vrees is the most similar model found to the one created here, as it also focused on perceptions. Rather than using three major categories, van Spanje and de Vrees focuses on five: performance, utilitarianism, negative affection, strengthening, and identity. Furthermore, van Spanje and de Vree's model analyzed to what degree parties were Eurosceptic under each facet. While this model can be useful for seeing how Eurosceptic attitudes form and on what issues, it does not address the issue of secession directly. Pieces were taken from all of the mentioned works in order to build the final model, which has been built to link Eurosceptic and secessionist literature.

Confidence Model

Data Used

The "Confidence" model constructed uses over 2000 individual pieces of data but it is simple in its construction. All 28 states in the European Union were used, as it allows a complete data set, seeing as how the model applies only to the EU. The dependent variable is the Hard Eurosceptic Vote Share (HEVS) received in the 2014 European Parliament election. The focus was on Hard Eurosceptic parties, and thus every attempt to use only their vote share was made.

However, distinction in platforms can be difficult and distinguishing between hard and soft Euroscepticism may seem arbitrary. The main distinguishing factor was if a party advocated in a clear way for withdrawal from the EU in their 2014 platform. Since many parties were smaller and platforms change over time, not all this data was easily available. The reason for using European Union Parliament elections is that the elections happen in every state concurrently, which in this case was 2014. Since a survey and election data both exist for 2014, it was much easier, and allowed for more accurate modeling. Also, while Eurosceptic parties often run at the national and sub-national levels, the analysis in this paper focuses on how attitudes translate into action in the EU. To ensure that the model and results could be easily reproduced for other years all the data was taken off the Eurobarometer survey "Special Eurobarometer 415: Europeans in 2014." These public opinion polls are regularly conducted by the EU, so data is not difficult to access for subsequent uses. The ease of access and high reliability of the source were the main factors in selecting where the data came from.

Construction of the Model

The "Confidence" model was constructed by analyzing and taking parts from previous secessionist and Eurosceptic literature. Where the "Confidence" model strongly differs from the Eurosceptic literature is in how the three factors were built. The literature suggests "National Identity" and "National Institutional Performance" data are gained from surveys on how people feel about the state they live under (Ritzen et al., 2016). The idea is that the trust in the state will map to the trust in the EU. This idea is flawed, as in fact many states seem to trust the EU because they do not trust their own institutions, and this is especially true of poorer regions (Molnar, 2016: 64). Looking at the Eurobarometer, similar questions had very different answers if they were asked about the EU, rather than national governments. Instead, the survey data for how people feel about the EU were used to build two data sets called "Belonging" and "Institutional Trust", this data can be seen in Tables 1 & 2, respectively. Belonging is the purely cultural aspect, and has to do with identifying as European, knowing one's rights as a European, wanting to know one's rights, and so on. Trust has to do with faith in government and institutions, and whether the power of the EU should be increased. Finally, there is the "Utilitarian theory" which in this case has been changed to "Economic Trust", found in Table 3. The important distinction is that trust is entirely based on perceptions, not actual economics. The metrics here are quality of life in the EU, faith in the EU economy, etc.

Excluded Eurobarometer Data

Data not taken from the Eurobarometer was: data that had to do with feelings regarding one's home state and the data where preferences/most important attributes were scored. An example of this is: "What does the EU mean to you", applicants then had to pick three ranked options, such as economics, culture, sports, etc. This is due to the complexity of analyzing such responses, which stems from analyzing which answers have to do with secession in a meaningful way versus the simple analysis of positive/negative answers. Apart from this, all the survey questions were used and put into one of the three categories, depending on their relevance.

Sorting of Questions

Selecting which section to put each question in was one of the more difficult parts in constructing the model, as it requires a good deal of personal discretion. This was especially true between the "Institutional Trust" and "Belonging" categories. For instance, the question relating to democratic satisfaction could easily be put into the institutional category, as it relates to how those institutions work. Ultimately, questions put into "Belonging" were based on general feelings and perceptions about the European Union, how one fit in, and how one felt others fit in. These are questions that were phrased in a way that presented Europe as a concept or idea. Questions put into "Institutional Trust" were those that framed the EU as an institution or discussed specific pieces of that institution. The question of democratic satisfaction was geared more towards a culture of democracy, rather than any specific system or elections, thus it was placed in the "Belonging" category. The distinction for "Economic Trust" was simpler, as it simply required the question to be related to financial matters.

Score Calculation

Once in a category, each individual question had a sub score found. The formula for a question with four options is seen in (1), referred to as Attitude, or "Att". For questions with two options (2) was used, this score was called Difference or "Diff". In all cases, neutral answers or "Don't Know" answers were discarded.

(1) (Very Positive) + 0.5(Positive) - 0.5(Negative) – (Very Negative) = Attitude
(2) (Positive) – (Negative) = Difference

Each number inside the brackets is the percentage of people who answered that way for the question. Three exceptions to these general rules exist. For the question regarding attitudes towards the formation of a European super state similar to the United States, the answer "Depends" was counted as half a positive vote. That answer shows a willingness to work with the EU and increase their power, which is not secessionist, while not being entirely satisfied. Also, for the questions "would (COUNTRY) fair better outside the EU," and "Do you believe there is too much government" the negative of the score is taken, as a high score here indicates a lack of trust. After all the questions had scores calculated and were placed in a category, all three categories had their individual question scores added together, then divided by the number of question scores. This is to ensure equal weighting among the three categories, since, for example, Trust had more sub scores than Economic Trust, but they are all considered equally important as overall factors. Next, these categories underwent a simple transformation, as seen in (3), so that they could be represented as percentages.

(3) (Raw Score + 100)/2

This serves a two-fold purpose: firstly, percentages are easier to understand on their own versus positive/negative integers; secondly, since HEVS is measured in percent, it allows for an easy comparison. Finally, these categories were added together into an aggregate, "Confidence," which was divided by three to put it into percent. "Confidence" and HEVS, as well as the parties that are counted, can be found in Table 4. All four of these categories, "Belonging," "Institutional

Trust," "Economic Trust" and "Confidence" were compared to the dependent variable, HEVS and graphed as seen in Figures 1-4. The strength of these correlations ideally shows how strongly related secession movements are to certain attitudes in the EU.

Alternate Explanation

Another model was built with the aim of dispelling the competing economic explanation for secession. Much of the Brexit campaign centered on the idea that Britain was losing money to the EU. In order to see if, and how, actual economic contributions affected attitudes about the EU, the amount in Euros per capita given to, or received from, the EU was found. This economic data is seen in Table 5. The logic for using Euros per Capita was that it better represents the actual financial strain or benefit a state feels, rather than total contributions in Euros. These numbers were then also graphed against HEVS and financial trust in the EU, as seen in Figures 5-6. If there was a strong correlation in Figure 5 that would demonstrate that giving money to poorer regions increases the secession demand in richer regions, as purported by Sorens. If there was a strong correlation in Figure 6, it could mean that "Economic Trust" is dependent on the flow of money.

Data

All the raw and supporting data can be found in Annex A. The data tables will be seen on pages 128 to 132, and figures from pages 133 to 135. For all survey questions a score was found, using the method previously described in (1) and (2). All survey questions were give a letter, ranging from A-V. Shortened versions of the questions can be found under the relevant graph, with the range of answers in brackets. This was done to ensure each graph would fit on one page. The full questions, and ranges of answers can be found in Annex A. All data for Figures 1-4 was from the "Special Eurobarometer 415: Europeans in 2014", all data for figure 5 was from the Eurostat website. All election data was found from the European Parliament website, under "Results of the 2014 European Elections".

Table 1 – Belonging Data

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	
State	Att.	Att.	Diff.	Att.	Att.	Att.	Att.	Att.	Score
Belgium	34.5	0	-48	28.5	-2.5	-35.75	3.25	9.5	51.09
Bulgaria	-12	-21.5	-27	40	-17.5	-37.5	39.25	0.5	50.03
Czech Rep.	8	-7.5	-32	30.5	-40	1.25	2	-3	48.09
Denmark	35	12	-16	40	28	-44	34	12.5	57.44
DE	39	13.5	-10	36	7	-16.5	21	8.5	55.56
Estonia	40	14	-20	35	-42	28.5	-10	17.5	53.88
Ireland	26	3.5	-47	41	-21	-19.5	3.5	10.5	51.28
EL (Greece)	-17	-20.5	6	35.5	-46.5	11.25	35.75	-4	43.25
ES (Spain)	27	-8	-47	33.5	-40	-8.25	-2	-7.5	44.81
France	14	-24	-49	31	-2.5	-61.5	29.25	-9	45.69
HR (Croatia)	0.5	-6.5	-25	50	4	-48	46	9	53.16
Italy	-8.5	-25	-20	17.5	-42	-1.75	11.5	-18	41.78
Cyprus	4	12	-18	82	-52.5	14.5	34.75	19	49.72
Latvia	4	-11.5	-18	32	-48.5	12	10.25	7	46.06
Lithuania	23.5	6	-20	27	-30.5	13	-4.25	10.5	51.59
Luxembourg	65.5	20	-13	37.5	1.5	-6.75	11.75	17.5	57.75
Hungary	16	-14.5	-27	21.5	-31.5	-7.25	6.75	-5	47.34
Malta	42.5	-0.5	-49	62	9.5	-65.5	42.75	-4	56.66
Netherlands	12.5	2	-23	26.5	10.5	-33.25	18.25	6	51.88
Austria	17.5	10.5	-2	14.5	-11	13.25	-2.5	13	52.25
Poland	38	13	-18	32.5	1	-13.25	11	21.5	58.00
Portugal	8	-18	-38	22	-35.5	-12.5	3.25	-	42.13
Romania	17	-5.5	-48	51.5	-20.5	-34.75	22.75	12	52.00
Slovenia	20	3.5	-25	17.5	-25	7.25	-11	8.5	49.06
Slovakia	30.5	-1.5	-14	48	-21.5	-11	31.75	7.5	53.69
Finland	33.5	21.5	-20	3.5	-4.5	14.25	-30.25	8	52.91
Sweden	35	17.5	-19	46	30	-45	34	28	58.34
UK	-5	-16	-50	5.5	-44	0.25	-25.5	-8	41.81

A – You feel you are a citizen of the EU (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)
B – You know what your rights are as a citizen of the EU (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)
C – When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss the EU? (Frequently, Occasionally, Never)
D – You would like to know more about your rights as a citizen of the EU (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)
E – My voice counts in the EU (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)
F – Are you satisfied the way democracy works in the EU (Very Satisfied – Not at all satisfied)
G – In terms of shared values, are EU Member States (Very Close – Very Distant)
H – I understand how the EU works (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)

Table 2 – Institutional Trust

	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	
State	Diff.	Att	Att	Att	Att	Att	Att	Att	Diff.	Diff.	Score
Belgium	0	33.5	19.5	-19.5	55	6.5	14	33.5	-1	7	50.73
Bulgaria	24	30	14.5	10.5	40	35	22	6.5	36	28	58.68
Czech Rep.	-22	4.5	-3	-25	32.5	-1	1	65	-5	-21	44.35
Denmark	-3	38	-43	-24	33	-56	17	24	10	17	44.45
DE (Germany)	-28	36	-21	-17.5	47.5	14	13	18	2	-15	47.05
Estonia	25	41	-17	-14.5	40.5	-15.5	19	-5	31	22	52.73
Ireland	-19	34.5	-20	-11.5	42	-6.5	21.5	36	13	-15	46.70
EL (Greece)	-63	10	-12	-35.5	34	0.5	-22.5	68.5	-48	-49	36.30
ES (Spain)	-43	28.5	35.5	-30.5	65	17.5	7	54	-16	-42	45.55
France	-35	23	7	-23.5	53	-3.5	-9	25	-35	-24	44.10
HR (Croatia)	-14	8.5	0.5	-7.5	29.5	15.5	21	50	22	-4	50.23
Italy	-50	6.5	3.5	-27	20	21	-8	32	-30	-37	42.70
Cyprus	-52	-8	-6	-20.5	39.5	5	-14	58.5	-30	-27	42.23
Latvia	-13	13.5	-6	-23.5	24	-1	7	8.5	15	-10	48.53
Lithuania	16	38	12	-6.5	46.5	13	22	7.5	29	17	55.18
Luxembourg	-3	43	21.5	-12.5	73	-15.5	20	9.5	8	12	52.55
Hungary	2	20.5	8.5	-17	16	8.5	1.5	34	16	9	49.50
Malta	17	31	-2.5	-2	62	7	30.5	6	31	18	56.20
Netherlands	-9	42	-17.5	-27	41	-30	14.5	18.5	14	-6	45.98
Austria	-17	7	-24.5	-31.5	19.5	11	-0.5	29.5	-17	-11	44.63
Poland	-1	15.5	11	-3	50	7	26.5	22	19	7	53.95
Portugal	-44	12	27.5	-35.5	53	15	-8	58	-9	-37	44.60
Romania	24	30	22.5	10.5	51	40.5	37	14	28	24	59.68
Slovenia	-20	4.5	15.5	-17	30	22.5	10.5	66	9	-18	48.10
Slovakia	-8	23.5	1	-22	41	7	7.5	44.5	-4	-2	47.63
Finland	6	28.5	-37	-25.5	30.5	-58.5	13	-2.5	-9	18	45.58
Sweden	-8	21.5	-41.5	-15	48.5	-55	13	-6	2	10	46.93
UK	-44	-7	-33.5	-27	17.5	-36	-5	32.5	-14	-42	39.53

I – You trust in the European Union (Tend to trust or Tend not to Trust)
J – (COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)
K – More decisions should be taken at EU level (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)
L – What image does the EU conjure up for you (Very positive – Very Negative)
M – We need a united Europe in today's world (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)
N – Some people talk of the idea of forming a "United States of Europe" putting together the Member States of the EU, is this a good idea? (Good Idea, Depends, or Bad Idea)
O – Are you optimistic about the future of the EU (Very Optimistic – Very Pessimistic)
P – The state intervenes too much in our lives (Totally Agree – Totally Disagree)
Q – Would you say that things are going in the right direction or wrong direction in the EU (Right or Wrong)
R – You trust in the European Parliament (Tend to trust or Tend not to Trust)

Table 3 – Economic Trust

	S	T	U	V	
State	Att.	Diff.	Att.	Diff.	Score
Belgium	-17.5	52	22	-2	56.81
Bulgaria	22.5	0	37.5	29	61.13
Czech Rep.	-13	-46	23	-8	44.50
Denmark	-13	-32	22	14	48.88
DE (Germany)	-7.5	41	17	-12	54.81
Estonia	15	57	31.5	14	64.69
Ireland*	-23	43	22.5	13	56.94
EL (Greece)	-26	20	6	-17	47.88
ES (Spain)	-29	23	13.5	22	53.69
France*	-37.5	24	7	-3	48.81
HR (Croatia)	-0.5	12	16	19	55.81
Italy	-45.5	-5	-17.5	-6	40.75
Cyprus	-34	-1	6	-3	46.00
Latvia*	8	8	30	11	57.13
Lithuania	21	-22	34.5	14	55.94
Luxembourg	-21.5	50	14.5	-26	52.13
Hungary	4	10	23	12	56.13
Malta	10.5	44	31	25	63.81
Netherlands	-6.5	51	32.5	17	61.75
Austria	-15.5	37	25.5	-5	55.25
Poland	16	-38	36	2	52.00
Portugal	-41.5	-6	-4	-11	42.19
Romania	12.5	32	24.5	25	61.75
Slovenia	-15	52	7.5	14	57.31
Slovakia	-16	58	20	5	58.38
Finland	-8	60	32	-5	59.88
Sweden	-22	-32	21	7	46.75
UK	-25	-54	13	5	42.38

S – Your feelings on the situation of the European economy (Very Good –Very Bad)
T – You support the Euro (For or Agianst)
U – Your quality of life in the EU (Very Good – Very Bad)
V – Your expectations of the economic situation in the EU in 12 months (Better or Worse)

Table 4 – Final Score & Vote Share

State	EU Confidence	Vote Share	Parties Used
Belgium	52.88	4.26	Vlaams Belang
Bulgaria	56.61	6.01	NSFB, Attack
Czech Republic	45.65	11.67	ODS, Free Citizens' Party
Denmark	50.25	8.1	People's Movement against the EU
DE (Germany)	52.48	7.1	Alternative For Germany
Estonia	57.10	0.2	Estonian Independence Party
Ireland	51.64	1.8	Socialist Party
EL (Greece)	42.48	21.69	GD, KKE, ANEL, Orthodox Rally
ES (Spain)	48.02	4	Republican Left for Catalonia
France	46.20	24.85	National Front
HR (Croatia)	53.06	2.89	A-HSP, HCSP, HSP, Human Shield
Italy	41.74	27.4	M5S, Lega Nord
Cyprus	45.98	2.7	ELAM
Latvia	50.57	0.24	Eurosceptic party of action
Lithuania	54.24	14.25	Order and Justice
Luxembourg	54.14	0	N/A
Hungary	50.99	14.6	Jobbik
Malta	58.89	0	N/A
Netherlands	53.20	13.32	Party for Freedom
Austria	50.71	23.66	FPO, REKOS, EUStop
Poland	54.65	8.55	KNP, RN
Portugal	42.97	17.72	PNR, Left Bloc, PCP
Romania	57.81	2.7	PRM
Slovenia	51.49	7.7	SNS, United Left
Slovakia	53.23	1.73	Our Slovakia
Finland	52.79	12.9	Finnis Party
Sweden	50.67	15.97	Left Party, SD
UK	41.24	28.59	UKIP, BNP

Table 5 – Rational Choice/Contributions to EU

State	Contributions to EU (millions of Euros)	Expenditure (millions of Euros)	Difference (millions of Euros)	Population	Contribution per capita
Belgium	5232.7	7044.3	-1811.6	1180840	-1534.16
Bulgaria	460.5	2255.4	-1794.9	7245677	-247.72
Czech Republic	1506.7	4377.2	-2870.5	10512419	-273.06
Denmark	2507.6	1511.7	995.9	5627235	176.98
DE (Germany)	29143	11484.5	17658.5	80767463	218.63
Estonia	200.4	667.6	-467.2	1315819	-355.06
Ireland	1650.6	1563.1	87.5	4637852	18.87
EL (Greece)	1949.8	7095	-5145.2	10926807	-470.88
ES (Spain)	11111	11538.5	-427.5	46512199	-9.19
France	20967.7	13479.1	7488.6	65942267	113.56
HR (Croatia)	429.8	584.3	-154.5	4246809	-36.38
Italy	15888.6	10695.2	5193.4	60782668	85.44
Cyprus	160.6	272.9	-112.3	858000	-130.89
Latvia	270	1062.2	-792.2	2001468	-395.81
Lithuania	384.7	1885.9	-1501.2	2943472	-510.01
Luxembourg	246.2	1713.9	-1467.7	549680	-2670.10
Hungary	995.8	6620.2	-5624.4	9877365	-569.42
Malta	76.1	254.9	-178.8	429424	-416.37
Netherlands	8372.7	2014.4	6358.3	16829289	377.81
Austria	2869.5	1572.6	1296.9	8507786	152.44
Poland	3954.6	17436.1	-13481.5	38017856	-354.61
Portugal	1747.9	4943	-3195.1	10427301	-306.42
Romania	1458.9	5943.9	-4485	19947311	-224.84
Slovenia	385	1142.5	-757.5	2061085	-367.52
Slovakia	720.2	1668.8	-948.6	5415949	-175.15
Finland	1904.1	1061.9	842.2	5451270	154.50
Sweden	4294.3	1691	2603.3	9644864	269.92
UK	14072.3	6984.7	7087.6	64351155	110.14

Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 5



Figure 6



Findings

The findings were, generally speaking, that states with lower overall confidence in the EU had a higher HEVS. The correlations for each individual category were fair, ranging between -0.593 and -0.533, showing some trend, as seen in figures 1-3. When combined and put into the "Confidence," however, the correlation of -0.690 was far stronger, as seen in figure 4. This means the "Confidence" model explains HEVS well. The findings based on the economic contributions of each country to the EU showed virtually no relation to HEVS or "Economic Trust", as seen in figures 5 and 6. The failure of economic realities to affect HEVS suggests that secession movements are more affected by general perceptions and culture, than financial realities, as previously predicted. Scores in each category ranged from 40 – 60, this tight grouping suggests that smaller issues can manifest greatly in secessionist votes.

Looking at the 2014 data, the United Kingdom has the lowest trust in the EU, with a score of 41.24%. These feelings culminated two years later with Brexit. Italy was a close second to the UK with a score of 41.74%. In the 2018 general election for Italy, the Lega Nord and Five Star Movement were the two parties with the highest percentage of the vote, 37.0% and 32.7%, respectively. Both these parties have at various times declared either a desire to reform or exit the EU. The Five Star Movement was even part of the same coalition as UKIP in the European Parliament. While neither has made any concrete promises, both have brought up the possibility of an EU referendum, meaning Italy is currently the state most likely to exit the EU. Greece scored third with 42.48%. There has been a mounting concern about a possible Grexit, even prior to Brexit, in 2015. In the 2015 Greek general elections many hard and soft Eurosceptic parties took power, accounting for over 50% of the vote. The only reason Greece has not made significant moves to leave the EU is because of the massive debts they owe and their inability to recover economically. Rational choice is what is guiding the Greek government, as unlike Britain they do not have the resources to survive an exit. These three examples are perhaps the best evidence of the potential effectiveness of this forecasting tool. Brexit took place just two years after in 2016, Italy had general elections in May 2018 with Eurosceptic parties gaining ground, and Greece is currently ruled by a Eurosceptic party. While the exact vote share Eurosceptic parties received was off, the three states rifest with Eurosceptic movements were accurately predicted by the model.

Spain was the largest outlier among all the states, with only 4% Hard Eurosceptic vote share, and a "Confidence" score of 48.02. Other states with similar scores ranged from 15-25% Eurosceptic vote. The party that won the 4% vote in the European parliament was the Republican Left for Catalonia, itself a party pushing for secession within Spain as well. This helps to explain the disproportionately low vote share in Spain. When a state is forced to deal with a strong internal secession movement, they are less likely to unify for higher level movements. This is especially true in this case, as the populations in other parts of Spain are unlikely to vote for a Catalonian independence party. This specific case opens up further research in the field, observing how secession movements at the sub-national and national level affect each other.

Discussion

The goal of creating a forecasting tool to see how certain perceptions affect the Eurosceptic vote share has been moderately successful. While there are no hard answers as to what score a state needs to initiate secession, the model does show Britain in 2014 as the state most likely to leave the EU due to certain public attitudes. Furthermore, states that have seen a surge in

secessionist movements have also scored low for Trust on the model. The states where post-Brexit secession movements were a real risk, France, Greece, and Italy all scored below 50 on the Trust. This model is successful overall as it achieves two purposes. First, it allows one to see if there is a risk of secession from the EU based on a state's score. Second, it allows one to see why that risk exists, and how it can be mitigated. For instance, if a state has low trust but high belonging, the focus should be on strengthening institutions, rather than cultural inclusion. If a state is in a position like Britain pre-Brexit, with comparatively low scores throughout, then the risk is high and more drastic measures could be taken pre-emptively. This model does not account for every single factor that can lead to secession movements and their strength. As previously stated, internal movements like the Catalonian independence movement in Spain can affect the actual outcomes.

Further complications can arise when looking at Eastern Europe where the threat of Russia would likely outweigh any secession desires. However, even in both these cases an extremely low score would likely still lead to secession. There is some validity to the Eurosceptic and secessionist literature on the relationship between rational choice and HEVS. Economic perceptions have the strongest correlation to HEVS, showing the importance of economic views. However, these were people's feelings about the economy, meaning that they could have been different from reality. While "Economic Trust" has a fairly strong correlation to secessionist movements, it is made stronger when combined with the other two categories into "Confidence". The data demonstrates that in order for a secession movement to take place, relative dissatisfaction in all three facets or complete dissatisfaction in one could push a state toward secession. The fact that the combined model is stronger significantly advances the hypothesis that all three factors must be present.

The rational choice model, used to dispel the rational approach, was heavily oversimplified but this was done deliberately. The biggest complaint of Eurosceptic parties in the richer countries, such as UKIP, was that they pay more in taxes than they receive. Since UKIP's economic arguments rested largely on the flow of taxes, which is in line with secessionist literature, the simplified model offers answers. The rational choice model showed that contributions did not translate into HEVS or Economic Trust in any meaningful way. This furthers the idea that perceptions must be analyzed, or the rational choice model must be further developed. Unfortunately, this is difficult as there many factors in a system as complex as the EU that affect a state's economy, such as trade and employment. Even then, culture is more applicable as voters need not heed these facts and may vote despite them. The reason rational choice may not be a significant factor is that the states of the EU do not have the same language or a shared history. So, problems that would normally be small in a conventional state are severely aggravated in this highly diverse area. This fits well with secessionist literature and the idea put forth here: that an increased sense of belonging is critical to quelling these movements.

Conclusion

Post-Brexit many other secession movements have gained traction and the EU could be facing an existential crisis if key states leave the Union. Some of these movements, such as those in France and the Netherlands, have been quelled for the time being. Others, such as those in Italy are still a grave concern. By modelling attitudes, and analyzing how they affect secessionist strength, issues could be better addressed before a crisis like Brexit. A forecasting tool such as the one developed here could be beneficial when developing future policy in the EU. If a state is determined to be at risk, the factors causing that risk can then be analyzed and worked on. For instance, if the cultural integration is low due to people not knowing or not wanting to know their

rights, a simple solution would be to run advertisements which give information or say where to get it. Most issues with the EU are significantly more complex than this example, as are any tentative solutions, but that simply underlines the importance of early identification. As seen with Brexit, perceptions carry more weight than facts in a referendum. It therefore stands to reason that those perceptions must be concretely addressed in order to achieve a positive outcome. Rationally, a deal may be perfectly beneficial and profitable to all involved. Realistically, this deal will never be accepted if people do not realize that. Hard Eurosceptic movements have been extremely effective at tapping into fear in order to alter perceptions. Those in support of the EU have had difficulty combatting this. The main fear exploited by Eurosceptic is entrapment both economically and politically. As Sorens points out, different cultures and languages significantly increase the strength of secession movements. The Eurosceptic have tapped into this, latching on to nationalism in each state they operate in, creating fear that a united Europe will destroy individual cultures. By modelling the individual components of this overall fear, it will allow future EU policy makers to more effectively decide which areas to focus on.

Further avenues to improve this model would require looking at factors in the individual countries that cause discrepancies. For instance, how do internal secession movements effect Euroscepticism? Brexit only happened after the referendum for Scotland and Spain has a relatively low amount of Euroscepticism. Another key area for development is how do external fears, such as those caused by Russia felt in Eastern Europe affect secession? Both these were considered as potential avenues of research here, but the decision was made to create a simple model that could be more widely applied. A major avenue of future research also not explored here is how the three factors affect each other or their temporal effects. It may be that "Belonging" is stronger in the long term and is a predictor for general trends. A state with a high score there would be less likely to go with the tide of Euroscepticism as they feel a strong sense of attachment. For this model, every question that could be directly related to the EU from the Eurobarometer was taken in order to not skew data or justify exclusions. Further iterations of the model could exclude or include different questions in order to develop a more accurate model. As further Eurosceptic movements develop, and more polls are taken, this model can be effectively re-used, and re-evaluated in the future. Ideally, the issues each country's population has with the European Union can be addressed more effectively and they would be less susceptible to Eurosceptic rhetoric. This would lead to a more inclusive, effective, and unified European Union.

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Brexit, Secession, and Euroscepticism - Annex A

Belonging Data

A- QC1.1 For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion.

You feel you are a citizen of the EU

Sense of Citizenship					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	30	42	23	5	34.5
Bulgaria	12	34	28	27	-12
Czech Republic	17	40	26	16	8
Denmark	31	41	21	6	35
DE (Germany)	36	39	17	8	39
Estonia	34	42	16	7	40
Ireland	28	38	24	9	26
EL (Greece)	11	31	29	29	-17
ES (Spain)	32	34	22	11	27
France	22	39	21	17	14
HR (Croatia)	17	32	35	15	0.5
Italy	11	32	39	16	-8.5
Cyprus	19	37	21	23	4
Latvia	15	39	31	15	4
Lithuania	23	44	21	11	23.5
Luxembourg	55	34	9	2	65.5
Hungary	17	45	29	9	16
Malta	34	43	16	5	42.5
Netherlands	17	42	31	10	12.5
Austria	15	50	25	10	17.5
Poland	28	52	18	7	38
Portugal	15	41	31	12	8
Romania	19	43	29	9	17
Slovenia	20	44	28	8	20
Slovakia	21	52	21	6	30.5
Finland	25	50	17	8	33.5
Sweden	32	41	19	8	35
UK	18	28	30	22	-5

B- QC1.2 For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion.

You know what your rights are as a citizen of the EU

Understanding of Rights					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	11	39	39	11	0
Bulgaria	6	30	39	23	-21.5
Czech Republic	9	36	39	15	-7.5
Denmark	13	47	31	9	12
DE (Germany)	17	44	27	12	13.5
Estonia	14	47	29	9	14
Ireland	15	37	32	14	3.5
EL (Greece)	5	34	37	24	-20.5
ES (Spain)	11	36	32	21	-8
France	6	29	39	25	-24
HR (Croatia)	8	37	38	14	-6.5
Italy	5	27	47	20	-25
Cyprus	17	44	24	15	12
Latvia	8	35	40	17	-11.5
Lithuania	14	41	31	13	6
Luxembourg	19	45	29	7	20
Hungary	6	35	40	18	-14.5
Malta	12	36	37	12	-0.5
Netherlands	9	44	34	12	2
Austria	9	50	35	6	10.5
Poland	11	50	28	9	13
Portugal	5	34	42	19	-18
Romania	9	36	39	13	-5.5
Slovenia	8	45	38	8	3.5
Slovakia	7	44	37	12	-1.5
Finland	14	53	26	6	21.5
Sweden	11	54	27	7	17.5
UK	7	33	39	20	-16

C- D71.2 When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about...?

European political matters

Discussion of EU				
State	Frequently	Occasionally	Never	Attitude
Belgium	5	42	53	-48
Bulgaria	10	52	37	-27
Czech Republic	5	57	37	-32
Denmark	15	53	31	-16
DE (Germany)	14	61	24	-10
Estonia	11	58	31	-20
Ireland	8	37	55	-47
EL (Greece)	27	52	21	6
ES (Spain)	9	35	56	-47
France	8	35	57	-49
HR (Croatia)	11	52	36	-25
Italy	14	51	34	-20
Cyprus	18	46	36	-18
Latvia	11	60	29	-18
Lithuania	11	58	31	-20
Luxembourg	19	48	32	-13
Hungary	8	57	35	-27
Malta	7	36	56	-49
Netherlands	13	51	36	-23
Austria	14	69	16	-2
Poland	13	55	31	-18
Portugal	8	46	46	-38
Romania	5	40	53	-48
Slovenia	12	51	37	-25
Slovakia	9	68	23	-14
Finland	10	60	30	-20
Sweden	11	59	30	-19
UK	8	34	58	-50

D- QC1.3 For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion.

You would like to know more about your rights as a citizen of the EU

Desire to Understand rights					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	25	43	28	4	28.5
Bulgaria	33	43	13	8	40
Czech Republic	28	41	22	7	30.5
Denmark	36	38	22	4	40
DE (Germany)	34	39	17	9	36
Estonia	34	37	21	7	35
Ireland	39	35	19	6	41
EL (Greece)	36	36	19	9	35.5
ES (Spain)	37	32	21	9	33.5
France	27	45	17	10	31
HR (Croatia)	44	35	15	4	50
Italy	16	47	24	10	17.5
Cyprus	80	13	3	3	82
Latvia	30	40	22	7	32
Lithuania	27	40	24	8	27
Luxembourg	32	41	22	4	37.5
Hungary	20	45	26	8	21.5
Malta	56	29	9	4	62
Netherlands	28	37	30	5	26.5
Austria	17	41	34	6	14.5
Poland	20	54	19	5	32.5
Portugal	22	43	25	9	22
Romania	44	36	13	4	51.5
Slovenia	27	31	32	9	17.5
Slovakia	35	46	14	3	48
Finland	14	37	38	10	3.5
Sweden	41	36	18	4	46
UK	19	32	37	11	5.5

E- D72.1 Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

My voice counts in the EU

Voice counts in EU					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	7	43	34	14	-2.5
Bulgaria	7	30	25	27	-17.5
Czech Republic	3	20	42	32	-40
Denmark	30	36	22	9	28
DE (Germany)	17	36	32	12	7
Estonia	3	19	41	34	-42
Ireland	7	28	34	25	-21
EL (Greece)	3	20	33	43	-46.5
ES (Spain)	5	20	30	40	-40
France	13	35	30	18	-2.5
HR (Croatia)	16	35	27	16	4
Italy	2	19	39	34	-42
Cyprus	3	18	21	54	-52.5
Latvia	1	15	40	37	-48.5
Lithuania	1	24	39	24	-30.5
Luxembourg	19	31	26	20	1.5
Hungary	4	26	35	31	-31.5
Malta	13	40	23	12	9.5
Netherlands	16	40	29	11	10.5
Austria	8	37	29	23	-11
Poland	7	42	34	10	1
Portugal	2	24	43	28	-35.5
Romania	7	28	33	25	-20.5
Slovenia	7	22	36	25	-25
Slovakia	4	32	39	22	-21.5
Finland	14	31	36	16	-4.5
Sweden	28	42	18	10	30
UK	2	17	41	34	-44

F- QA12b On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?

Democratic Satisfaction					
State	Very Satisfied	Fairly Satisfied	Not very Satisfied	Not at all Satisfied	Attitude
Belgium	6	61	26	12	11.5
Bulgaria	16	41	15	5	24
Czech Republic	6	44	35	7	3.5
Denmark	7	54	28	6	14
DE (Germany)	5	44	36	9	0
Estonia	3	52	28	3	12
Ireland	8	42	23	11	6.5
EL (Greece)	2	21	37	35	-41
ES (Spain)	3	27	35	17	-18
France	2	42	30	14	-6
HR (Croatia)	5	46	29	7	6.5
Italy	3	27	39	20	-23
Cyprus	3	25	36	25	-27.5
Latvia	4	49	23	6	11
Lithuania	5	48	25	4	12.5
Luxembourg	7	53	29	4	15
Hungary	4	49	32	8	4.5
Malta	13	48	15	5	24.5
Netherlands	3	45	36	6	1.5
Austria	5	37	36	18	-12.5
Poland	8	56	19	4	22.5
Portugal	0	20	45	21	-33.5
Romania	12	48	19	6	20.5
Slovenia	3	44	34	11	-3
Slovakia	2	41	40	9	-6.5
Finland	5	51	32	8	6.5
Sweden	4	48	35	5	5.5
UK	2	34	29	13	-8.5

G- QD5 In your opinion, in terms of shared values, are EU Member States…?

Shared Values					
State	Very Close	Close	Distant	Very Distant	Attitude
Belgium	2	34	54	8	-16
Bulgaria	8	48	24	6	14
Czech Republic	6	52	32	6	10
Denmark	1	47	38	12	-6.5
DE (Germany)	3	42	42	8	-5
Estonia	5	49	38	5	5.5
Ireland	4	44	34	8	1
EL (Greece)	3	34	41	20	-20.5
ES (Spain)	2	27	47	15	-23
France	1	28	53	12	-23.5
HR (Croatia)	4	57	25	8	12
Italy	2	38	39	14	-12.5
Cyprus	2	30	45	18	-23.5
Latvia	1	20	52	24	-39
Lithuania	2	43	40	7	-3.5
Luxembourg	2	32	50	13	-20
Hungary	3	44	39	12	-6.5
Malta	6	58	17	5	21.5
Netherlands	1	44	42	8	-6
Austria	5	50	32	8	6
Poland	3	60	25	3	17.5
Portugal	2	35	38	14	-13.5
Romania	5	43	29	7	5
Slovenia	3	34	41	11	-11.5
Slovakia	6	59	28	5	16.5
Finland	1	48	44	5	-2
Sweden	1	42	47	8	-9.5
UK	2	39	37	8	-5

H- QA13.1 Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

I understand how the EU works

Understanding of EU					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	8	52	31	9	9.5
Bulgaria	8	43	26	16	0.5
Czech Republic	7	41	39	11	-3
Denmark	11	49	32	7	12.5
DE (Germany)	10	48	31	10	8.5
Estonia	11	54	23	9	17.5
Ireland	16	41	26	13	10.5
EL (Greece)	10	39	35	16	-4
ES (Spain)	8	40	31	20	-7.5
France	8	37	37	17	-9
HR (Croatia)	8	49	27	10	9
Italy	4	34	40	19	-18
Cyprus	18	47	21	12	19
Latvia	8	48	30	10	7
Lithuania	9	50	27	10	10.5
Luxembourg	15	48	27	8	17.5
Hungary	6	42	38	13	-5
Malta	6	42	30	16	-4
Netherlands	9	45	35	8	6
Austria	12	48	30	8	13
Poland	10	57	24	5	21.5
Portugal	3	37	40	19	-17.5
Romania	9	49	29	7	12
Slovenia	11	45	34	8	8.5
Slovakia	8	48	35	7	7.5
Finland	5	54	32	8	8
Sweden	12	63	19	6	28
UK	8	39	31	20	-8

Final Score-

Belonging	
State	Score
Belgium	51.09375
Bulgaria	50.03125
Czech Republic	48.09375
Denmark	57.4375
DE (Germany)	55.5625
Estonia	53.875
Ireland	51.28125
EL (Greece)	43.25
ES (Spain)	44.8125
France	45.6875
HR (Croatia)	53.15625
Italy	41.78125
Cyprus	49.71875
Latvia	46.0625
Lithuania	51.59375
Luxembourg	57.75
Hungary	47.34375
Malta	56.65625
Netherlands	51.875
Austria	52.25
Poland	58
Portugal	42.125
Romania	52
Slovenia	49.0625
Slovakia	53.6875
Finland	52.90625
Sweden	58.34375
UK	41.8125

Institutional Trust Data

I- QA7.4 I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.

The European Union

Trust in EU			
State	Tend to Trust	Tend not to Trust	Diff
Belgium	49	49	0
Bulgaria	55	31	24
Czech Republic	37	59	-22
Denmark	46	49	-3
DE (Germany)	31	59	-28
Estonia	58	33	25
Ireland	34	53	-19
EL (Greece)	18	81	-63
ES (Spain)	24	67	-43
France	28	63	-35
HR (Croatia)	38	52	-14
Italy	19	69	-50
Cyprus	22	74	-52
Latvia	37	50	-13
Lithuania	52	36	16
Luxembourg	45	48	-3
Hungary	48	46	2
Malta	49	32	17
Netherlands	41	50	-9
Austria	37	54	-17
Poland	44	45	-1
Portugal	26	70	-44
Romania	58	34	24
Slovenia	37	57	-20
Slovakia	45	53	-8
Finland	50	44	6
Sweden	44	52	-8
UK	22	66	-44

J- QA13.3 Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

(OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU

Fair better outside					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	7	21	38	32	33.5
Bulgaria	8	14	34	28	30
Czech Republic	12	30	35	14	4.5
Denmark	11	13	35	38	38
DE (Germany)	9	17	33	37	36
Estonia	7	14	38	36	41
Ireland	10	16	25	40	34.5
EL (Greece)	14	26	36	19	10
ES (Spain)	8	17	30	30	28.5
France	10	20	34	26	23
HR (Croatia)	11	28	31	18	8.5
Italy	11	27	30	16	6.5
Cyprus	30	21	21	22	-8
Latvia	12	20	35	18	13.5
Lithuania	6	16	38	33	38
Luxembourg	11	11	35	42	43
Hungary	8	25	34	24	20.5
Malta	7	17	33	30	31
Netherlands	7	14	34	39	42
Austria	16	24	30	20	7
Poland	6	29	38	17	15.5
Portugal	8	29	35	17	12
Romania	7	19	31	31	30
Slovenia	15	27	30	18	4.5
Slovakia	7	21	46	18	23.5
Finland	9	20	39	28	28.5
Sweden	11	24	35	27	21.5
UK	20	27	29	12	-7

K- QA13.4 Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

More decisions should be taken at EU level

More decisions at EU level					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	15	49	28	6	19.5
Bulgaria	16	38	21	10	14.5
Czech Republic	12	33	33	15	-3
Denmark	3	18	42	34	-43
DE (Germany)	9	24	38	23	-21
Estonia	9	27	37	21	-17
Ireland	9	27	29	28	-20
EL (Greece)	10	32	32	22	-12
ES (Spain)	33	33	14	7	35.5
France	14	37	27	12	7
HR (Croatia)	10	37	30	13	0.5
Italy	12	37	26	14	3.5
Cyprus	16	30	24	25	-6
Latvia	9	35	31	17	-6
Lithuania	16	38	30	8	12
Luxembourg	22	40	25	8	21.5
Hungary	13	41	24	13	8.5
Malta	14	28	27	17	-2.5
Netherlands	7	28	41	18	-17.5
Austria	6	26	37	25	-24.5
Poland	11	43	25	9	11
Portugal	18	48	19	5	27.5
Romania	19	41	20	7	22.5
Slovenia	18	39	22	11	15.5
Slovakia	8	41	33	11	1
Finland	4	19	47	27	-37
Sweden	4	19	40	35	-41.5
UK	4	20	37	29	-33.5

L- QA8 In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?

EU Image					
State	Very Positive	Fairly Positive	Fairly Negative	Very Negative	Attitude
Belgium	2	35	40	19	-19.5
Bulgaria	13	42	27	10	10.5
Czech Republic	3	28	40	22	-25
Denmark	3	28	44	19	-24
DE (Germany)	4	33	42	17	-17.5
Estonia	3	34	53	8	-14.5
Ireland	6	35	32	19	-11.5
EL (Greece)	2	16	33	29	-35.5
ES (Spain)	3	22	43	23	-30.5
France	3	28	39	21	-23.5
HR (Croatia)	7	36	35	15	-7.5
Italy	2	27	35	25	-27
Cyprus	2	24	27	21	-20.5
Latvia	2	27	52	13	-23.5
Lithuania	6	37	48	7	-6.5
Luxembourg	4	38	37	17	-12.5
Hungary	3	34	42	16	-17
Malta	10	35	39	10	-2
Netherlands	2	29	41	23	-27
Austria	4	22	41	26	-31.5
Poland	6	42	38	11	-3
Portugal	0	27	34	32	-35.5
Romania	11	46	31	8	10.5
Slovenia	5	31	43	16	-17
Slovakia	2	32	42	19	-22
Finland	2	29	46	19	-25.5
Sweden	5	34	38	18	-15
UK	3	22	38	22	-27

M- QA13.5 Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

We need a united Europe in today's world

United Europe					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	40	46	10	3	55
Bulgaria	28	43	9	5	40
Czech Republic	22	49	20	4	32.5
Denmark	31	41	15	11	33
DE (Germany)	40	40	13	6	47.5
Estonia	28	48	13	5	40.5
Ireland	35	40	12	7	42
EL (Greece)	28	44	16	8	34
ES (Spain)	56	29	5	3	65
France	39	44	8	4	53
HR (Croatia)	21	47	16	7	29.5
Italy	19	41	19	10	20
Cyprus	37	38	7	13	39.5
Latvia	19	45	17	9	24
Lithuania	34	43	12	3	46.5
Luxembourg	61	32	4	2	73
Hungary	18	42	20	13	16
Malta	48	38	6	2	62
Netherlands	34	41	15	6	41
Austria	17	45	22	9	19.5
Poland	31	52	10	2	50
Portugal	35	50	8	3	53
Romania	38	41	9	3	51
Slovenia	25	41	15	8	30
Slovakia	21	59	13	3	41
Finland	26	45	16	10	30.5
Sweden	43	36	13	6	48.5
UK	20	40	19	13	17.5

N- QA14 Some people talk of the idea of forming a "United States of Europe" putting together the Member States of the EU. This means a kind of political union like there is between the states of the USA or the provinces that form Canada. Does this idea of forming a "United States of Europe" someday, including (OUR COUNTRY), seem a good or a bad idea to you?

US of EU				
State	Good Idea	Bad Idea	Depends	Attitude
Belgium	42	42	13	6.5
Bulgaria	43	18	20	35
Czech Republic	41	45	6	-1
Denmark	16	75	6	-56
DE (Germany)	34	33	26	14
Estonia	21	47	21	-15.5
Ireland	28	44	19	-6.5
EL (Greece)	36	43	15	0.5
ES (Spain)	39	29	15	17.5
France	36	44	9	-3.5
HR (Croatia)	45	34	9	15.5
Italy	35	26	24	21
Cyprus	33	37	18	5
Latvia	24	38	26	-1
Lithuania	38	31	12	13
Luxembourg	31	52	11	-15.5
Hungary	44	38	5	8.5
Malta	31	32	16	7
Netherlands	23	60	14	-30
Austria	27	33	34	11
Poland	44	40	6	7
Portugal	34	29	20	15
Romania	53	20	15	40.5
Slovenia	33	25	29	22.5
Slovakia	37	39	18	7
Finland	11	75	11	-58.5
Sweden	16	74	6	-55
UK	24	63	6	-36

O- QA15 Would you say that you are very optimistic, fairly optimistic, fairly pessimistic or very pessimistic about the future of the EU?

EU Optimism					
State	Highly Optimistic	Optimistic	Pessimistic	Highly Pessimistic	Attitude
Belgium	4	59	31	4	14
Bulgaria	15	46	22	5	22
Czech Republic	6	47	35	11	1
Denmark	6	60	26	6	17
DE (Germany)	7	53	29	6	13
Estonia	4	62	28	2	19
Ireland	12	53	20	7	21.5
EL (Greece)	3	34	35	25	-22.5
ES (Spain)	8	43	31	7	7
France	2	40	42	10	-9
HR (Croatia)	13	54	20	9	21
Italy	5	36	40	11	-8
Cyprus	6	37	31	23	-14
Latvia	5	50	32	7	7
Lithuania	12	52	26	3	22
Luxembourg	9	56	26	4	20
Hungary	3	49	34	9	1.5
Malta	11	60	15	3	30.5
Netherlands	2	61	30	3	14.5
Austria	4	44	35	9	-0.5
Poland	10	60	21	3	26.5
Portugal	1	41	47	6	-8
Romania	20	56	16	3	37
Slovenia	8	50	31	7	10.5
Slovakia	4	54	35	6	7.5
Finland	5	57	29	6	13
Sweden	4	58	30	5	13
UK	4	40	34	12	-5

P- QD6.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

The State intervenes too much in our lives

Too much Government					
State	Totally Agree	Agree	Disagree	Totally Disagree	Attitude
Belgium	24	48	25	2	33.5
Bulgaria	19	31	28	14	6.5
Czech Republic	56	46	24	2	65
Denmark	24	41	29	6	24
DE (Germany)	23	36	34	6	18
Estonia	11	34	36	15	-5
Ireland	30	41	23	3	36
EL (Greece)	54	38	7	1	68.5
ES (Spain)	42	40	12	2	54
France	24	40	26	6	25
HR (Croatia)	42	36	16	2	50
Italy	27	42	20	6	32
Cyprus	47	39	8	4	58.5
Latvia	17	35	32	10	8.5
Lithuania	14	35	34	7	7.5
Luxembourg	17	36	37	7	9.5
Hungary	26	46	22	4	34
Malta	11	40	32	9	6
Netherlands	19	41	36	3	18.5
Austria	24	44	27	3	29.5
Poland	19	44	28	5	22
Portugal	45	41	11	2	58
Romania	21	36	26	12	14
Slovenia	55	34	8	2	66
Slovakia	32	46	17	2	44.5
Finland	12	33	44	9	-2.5
Sweden	10	36	38	15	-6
UK	26	42	25	2	32.5

Q- D73.2 At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in…?

The European Union

Direction of EU			
State	Right	Wrong	Difference
Belgium	40	41	-1
Bulgaria	49	13	36
Czech Republic	35	40	-5
Denmark	46	36	10
DE (Germany)	33	31	2
Estonia	49	18	31
Ireland	38	25	13
EL (Greece)	16	64	-48
ES (Spain)	26	42	-16
France	21	56	-35
HR (Croatia)	47	25	22
Italy	15	45	-30
Cyprus	19	49	-30
Latvia	35	20	15
Lithuania	45	16	29
Luxembourg	39	31	8
Hungary	39	23	16
Malta	43	12	31
Netherlands	45	31	14
Austria	25	42	-17
Poland	46	27	19
Portugal	25	34	-9
Romania	48	20	28
Slovenia	32	23	9
Slovakia	35	39	-4
Finland	33	42	-9
Sweden	41	39	2
UK	20	34	-14

R- QA10.1 Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust these institutions.

The European Parliament

Trust in EU Parliament			
State	Tend to Trust	Tend not to Trust	Difference
Belgium	52	45	7
Bulgaria	54	26	28
Czech Republic	36	57	-21
Denmark	54	37	17
DE (Germany)	36	51	-15
Estonia	52	30	22
Ireland	32	47	-15
EL (Greece)	25	74	-49
ES (Spain)	23	65	-42
France	30	54	-24
HR (Croatia)	40	44	-4
Italy	24	61	-37
Cyprus	33	60	-27
Latvia	34	44	-10
Lithuania	48	31	17
Luxembourg	50	38	12
Hungary	51	42	9
Malta	46	28	18
Netherlands	42	48	-6
Austria	40	51	-11
Poland	45	38	7
Portugal	29	66	-37
Romania	57	33	24
Slovenia	36	54	-18
Slovakia	47	49	-2
Finland	54	36	18
Sweden	50	40	10
UK	21	63	-42

Final Score-

Institutional Trust	
State	Score
Belgium	50.725
Bulgaria	58.675
Czech Republic	44.35
Denmark	44.45
DE (Germany)	47.05
Estonia	52.725
Ireland	46.7
EL (Greece)	36.3
ES (Spain)	45.55
France	44.1
HR (Croatia)	50.225
Italy	42.7
Cyprus	42.225
Latvia	48.525
Lithuania	55.175
Luxembourg	52.55
Hungary	49.5
Malta	56.2
Netherlands	45.975
Austria	44.625
Poland	53.95
Portugal	44.6
Romania	59.675
Slovenia	48.1
Slovakia	47.625
Finland	45.575
Sweden	46.925
UK	39.525

Economic Trust

S- QA2.2 How would you judge the current situation in each of the following?

The situation of the European economy

Situation of the European Economy					
State	Very Good	Good	Bad	Very Good	Attitude
Belgium	1	35	54	9	-17.5
Bulgaria	9	53	18	4	22.5
Czech Republic	3	36	46	11	-13
Denmark	2	35	53	6	-13
DE (Germany)	2	39	46	6	-7.5
Estonia	2	57	27	2	15
Ireland	1	27	47	14	-23
EL (Greece)	3	27	27	29	-26
ES (Spain)	1	22	52	15	-29
France	0	16	57	17	-37.5
HR (Croatia)	5	44	33	11	-0.5
Italy	1	15	52	28	-45.5
Cyprus	1	23	43	25	-34
Latvia	2	51	29	5	8
Lithuania	4	60	22	2	21
Luxembourg	0	28	61	5	-21.5
Hungary	4	47	37	5	4
Malta	5	44	27	3	10.5
Netherlands	1	43	44	7	-6.5
Austria	3	34	49	11	-15.5
Poland	4	56	24	4	16
Portugal	0	15	56	21	-41.5
Romania	6	51	24	7	12.5
Slovenia	2	38	42	15	-15
Slovakia	1	35	51	9	-16
Finland	1	42	48	6	-8
Sweden	1	28	60	7	-22
UK	2	22	42	17	-25

T- QA11.1 What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro

Single Currency			
State	For	Against	Difference
Belgium	75	23	52
Bulgaria	41	41	0
Czech Republic	25	71	-46
Denmark	33	65	-32
DE (Germany)	68	27	41
Estonia	77	20	57
Ireland	66	23	43
EL (Greece)	58	38	20
ES (Spain)	58	35	23
France	59	35	24
HR (Croatia)	51	39	12
Italy	41	46	-5
Cyprus	47	48	-1
Latvia	49	41	8
Lithuania	34	56	-22
Luxembourg	74	24	50
Hungary	50	40	10
Malta	69	25	44
Netherlands	74	23	51
Austria	64	27	37
Poland	27	65	-38
Portugal	44	50	-6
Romania	60	28	32
Slovenia	72	20	52
Slovakia	78	20	58
Finland	79	19	60
Sweden	33	65	-32
UK	20	74	-54

U- QA2.7 How would you judge the current situation in each of the following?

The quality of life in the EU

Quality of Life in EU					
State	Very Good	Good	Bad	Very Good	Attitude
Belgium	6	63	27	2	22
Bulgaria	15	59	10	2	37.5
Czech Republic	8	59	23	3	23
Denmark	5	64	26	2	22
DE (Germany)	4	58	26	3	17
Estonia	8	59	12	0	31.5
Ireland	10	52	19	4	22.5
EL (Greece)	7	48	26	12	6
ES (Spain)	5	48	25	3	13.5
France	2	48	28	5	7
HR (Croatia)	6	57	21	8	16
Italy	1	34	37	17	-17.5
Cyprus	6	43	27	8	6
Latvia	6	65	13	2	30
Lithuania	7	69	10	2	34.5
Luxembourg	4	56	31	2	14.5
Hungary	6	63	21	4	23
Malta	10	58	14	1	31
Netherlands	8	68	17	1	32.5
Austria	8	63	22	3	25.5
Poland	12	64	12	2	36
Portugal	3	38	32	10	-4
Romania	7	60	17	4	24.5
Slovenia	4	54	29	9	7.5
Slovakia	4	63	25	3	20
Finland	6	72	18	1	32
Sweden	3	64	26	1	21
UK	4	47	21	4	13

V- QA3.6 What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same,

when it comes to...?

The economic situation in the EU

Improvement over 12 months			
State	Better	Worse	Difference
Belgium	23	25	-2
Bulgaria	36	7	29
Czech Republic	13	21	-8
Denmark	29	15	14
DE (Germany)	18	30	-12
Estonia	26	12	14
Ireland	30	17	13
EL (Greece)	17	34	-17
ES (Spain)	30	8	22
France	19	22	-3
HR (Croatia)	35	16	19
Italy	22	28	-6
Cyprus	22	25	-3
Latvia	23	12	11
Lithuania	26	12	14
Luxembourg	16	42	-26
Hungary	28	16	12
Malta	34	9	25
Netherlands	34	17	17
Austria	25	30	-5
Poland	20	18	2
Portugal	15	26	-11
Romania	37	12	25
Slovenia	32	18	14
Slovakia	23	18	5
Finland	19	24	-5
Sweden	29	22	7
UK	22	17	5

Final Score-

Economic Trust	
State	Score
Belgium	56.8125
Bulgaria	61.125
Czech Republic	44.5
Denmark	48.875
DE (Germany)	54.8125
Estonia	64.6875
Ireland	56.9375
EL (Greece)	47.875
ES (Spain)	53.6875
France	48.8125
HR (Croatia)	55.8125
Italy	40.75
Cyprus	46
Latvia	57.125
Lithuania	55.9375
Luxembourg	52.125
Hungary	56.125
Malta	63.8125
Netherlands	61.75
Austria	55.25
Poland	52
Portugal	42.1875
Romania	61.75
Slovenia	57.3125
Slovakia	58.375
Finland	59.875
Sweden	46.75
UK	42.375

Total Confidence

Confidence	
State	Total Score
Belgium	52.88
Bulgaria	56.61
Czech Republic	45.65
Denmark	50.25
DE (Germany)	52.48
Estonia	57.10
Ireland	51.64
EL (Greece)	42.48
ES (Spain)	48.02
France	46.20
HR (Croatia)	53.06
Italy	41.74
Cyprus	45.98
Latvia	50.57
Lithuania	54.24
Luxembourg	54.14
Hungary	50.99
Malta	58.89
Netherlands	53.20
Austria	50.71
Poland	54.65
Portugal	42.97
Romania	57.81
Slovenia	51.49
Slovakia	53.23
Finland	52.79
Sweden	50.67
UK	41.24