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Mohamed Salah Eddine Madiou

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by Deborah Root

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To be part of *Janus Unbound* is to be exhilarated by the future, to be open to the promise and surprise of difference, and to be steeled to the challenges of resisting fatigue, complacency, and the failure of imagination. Mohamed Salah Eddine Madiou: thank you for planting a seed of bright intellectual promise and hope. I and many others look forward to making that promise become stronger, in ways that will delight and surprise us all.

Your friend and editing shadow,

Dr Peter Trnka, Editor-in-Chief,
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Memorial University of Newfoundland
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The Death of Postcolonialism: The Founder's Foreword

Mohamed Salah Eddine Madiou



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Postcolonialism¹ stands today in flagrant contradiction with its mission. This assertion should scarcely come as a surprise. Come to think of it: what has postcolonialism done to colonization in the past few decades, save passively reflecting on it and its realities that often do not fit the reality of things? How much leeway does postcolonialism give its critic in expressing opposition to colonization? And how does it rate as a field for serious decolonization? As a start toward answering these questions, or coming close to answering them, the following pages offer a commentary on how I feel about postcolonialism. I will confine myself to one particular reason I consider postcolonialism *a dismal failure*, which is incontestable and will hopefully startle the dull reader into alertness. I prefer here simple words with a direct message and no opaque subtleties.

That postcolonialism is a problematic concept, trend, discourse, idea, field of research, theory, condition, study, and what have you is, today, not a debatable question. Many have addressed the various pitfalls of postcolonialism as time (supposedly with a hyphen)² and discourse (supposedly without a hyphen) from Anne McClintock who describes the concept as paradoxical because it runs counter to the “imperial idea of linear time” (1993, 292) to Arif Dirlik (1994), Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge (1993) who all associate it with the abstract realm of postmodernism. While I had a high opinion of Mishra and Hodge’s early view in “What is Post(-)colonialism?”³ I do not adhere to their view in their sequel “What was Post(-)colonialism?” whose title, with the “was,” implies that postcolonialism is dead and buried, but whose content argues that it almost is and is still alive.

Mishra and Hodge, *in nuce*, argue that there are two postcolonialisms: one that dominates the present and another one that once was. Both Mishra and Hodge mostly and most ambivalently side with the once-was postcolonialism which is, for them, the most postcolonial of all the postcolonialisms, one they associate with Edward Said, Frantz Fanon, Chinua Achebe, C.L.R. James, and other like-minded critics and artists. If one pauses here and thinks hard about it, can these critics and artists really be considered postcolonial? In other words, were they really speaking from a postcolonial space/context/discipline? Or was it rather a

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space/context/discipline (or is it indiscipline?) that was not postcolonial but that generations of critics have stubbornly called it that as is the case of Derrida who himself says he is not poststructuralist (1999, 229); still generations of critics insist he be called that? Many call Edward Said “the father of postcolonialism,” a position none of his texts justify, nor does he himself speak to. Said and the above figures of resistance were in reality speaking from a colonial, *not* postcolonial context. And precisely because of their colonized condition, their voices emerged as purporting a *raw, oppositional, confrontational* (never strategic) criticism of colonialism and colonization. In this context of academic gossip and careless labels, even Gayatri Spivak who announced her separation from postcolonialism is still being affiliated with it. Ask any postcolonial critic; they will tell you in a Lord-Jim attitude that she is “one of them.”

Mishra and Hodge are nostalgic about those past days of what they consider to be the *real* postcolonialism, yet they still believe that postcolonialism, today and yesterday, “has been a proactive and radically anticolonial theory of and from margins, an articulation from the position of silence and exclusion, and we do not put that in question” (2005, 395), which I sternly refute. We need only briefly recall the quite stunning acquiescence of postcolonialism to the abstract world of postmodernism, as discussed by Mishra and Hodge themselves in their prequel (1993, 289), to say that it is *only* proactive when it comes to conceptual drama. Since it acquired postmodern characteristics, postcolonialism became abstract, indeed *so* abstract that it lost grasp of reality and can be said to speak today (and yesterday)—to reframe Mishra and Hodge’s view—from the “position of silence and exclusion” in that it *silences, excludes, colonizes* rather than voices, includes, decolonizes.

Then why, one would ask, has postcolonialism become so important in the intellectual sphere if it does not decolonize?⁴ And why does the concept itself still enjoy widespread use and academic clout? The longevity of postcolonialism rests on one particular reason: its problems. It is its problems as a concept and a discourse, and its problematic identity, formation, and referentiality (or what “postcolonialism” refers to) that made it known and fashionable, *not* its “solutions.” The inconsistencies and paradoxes this concept was born with and the *more* inconsistencies and paradoxes it came up with when it brushed past the postmodern advent have seduced critics who find those problems grist for the intellectual mill. The conceptual vulnerability of postcolonialism became *a distraction* and, for some reason, *more* important than the colonial problems it was supposed to study/criticize. Aside from conceptual problems, content problems such as hypocrisy make postcolonialism further dubious; *worse*, a dismal failure as I call it above. Let us take stock.

Questions on the hypocrisy of postcolonialism have long stalked me—and here I felt tempted to give another title to this foreword. I have been stunned, for instance, by the events happening lately in Palestine involving the expulsion of Sheikh Jarrah’s native citizens from their own lands, an issue that did not receive the attention it deserves from the supposedly postcolonial critic—nor did Palestine for that matter. When recently checking out the issues of a few renowned journals that supposedly make postcolonial interventions,⁵ I, to my discontent, found none in favour of Palestine in the context of what happened lately, which is perforce excluded and often *hardly* receives the honor of a name

in the same venues of publication. A postcolonial entity, be it a journal, an institution, a researcher, or a critic, cannot write on colonial matters, reflect on them, and try to “intellectually” study/criticize them without speaking of Palestine; their anticolonialism would otherwise be a lot of hot air. Most importantly, a postcolonial critic cannot be involved in postcolonial studies and disregard a “traditional” and what I call a Warientalist case of colonization that is still present in the 21st century and shows the most flagrant manifestation of power and the crassest form of human greed (Madiou 2021). Yet one thing in particular causes me to react even more fiercely: a postcolonial critic cannot use the works of the so-called “father of postcolonialism” without mentioning where that father is and speaks from, which is a *Palestinian*, colonized context, and without mentioning Palestine wherein all his works are deeply rooted.

Palestine in fact seldom gets the chance to be discussed in postcolonial studies. In “Gaps, Silences and Absences: Palestine and Postcolonial Studies,” Patrick Williams expresses this very reality in a manner that is penetrating; his words deserve all the more attention: “Th[e] absence [of Palestine] is, or should be, deeply embarrassing for a discipline [postcolonialism] that likes to think of itself as critically insightful, politically savvy and the like, but which is incomprehensibly ignoring the most striking contemporary example of brutally enforced colonialism” (2015, 87). But Palestine being ignored is, I argue, more than just “an absence;” it is *avoidance* to which I turn below in more detail.

The resistance of a critic, who is duty-bound to intellectually denounce injustice, should, I believe, be tested on Palestine. Ask any critic what they think of Palestine; their answer will give you a clear view of their position as a human being first and a critic second. Responses will vary: some will show support to Palestinians; many⁶ to Israelis. Many will have nothing to say about Palestine; many others will be cagey about its colonial matter. Many will adopt a neutral, sometimes indifferent point of view that betrays a colonial stance; many others will not even know what Palestine is or where it is located. Many will ahistorically consider Palestine a question; many more almost a dirty word. Some will write on Palestine because of resistance; many will write on it to project, for some reason, a fakely fair and human image of themselves—these critics are to me equivalent to those who write bad cheques against an empty bank account. And there are those many who speak out both sides of their mouth. But the response I consider the most dangerous is *avoidance*.

Avoidance in a “postcolonial” context is that ill-intentioned refusal to confront a colonial issue that can show what injustice and evil truly are. It is that way of making something important unimportant, of putting it aside for fear, of toning it down, of blocking it from view, of not talking about it, of making it non-existent, of unlearning it, of cleansing it off the map of major concerns, of making it disappear in a puff of smoke. Avoidance, in this context, tampers with truth and justice, and is, therefore, ideological: *colonial* even. Jean Paul Sartre got it right—at least on this particular point in his career—when he said: “[T]o allow your mind to be diverted [or to avoid], however slightly, is as good as being the accomplice in crime of colonialism” (1963, 24). Avoidance, however, should not only be understood as not discussing/not confronting an issue; avoidance is practised even when it indisputably seems that the issue is discussed/confronted.

One particular example stands out here: the use of phrases such as “Israel-Palestine war” and “Israel-Palestine conflict” by those very few postcolonial critics who supposedly deal with Palestine. These phrases may seem unavoidable, but they inherently *are* avoidist. They do not put the blame on the one that must be blamed; rather, they pacify,⁷ *neutralize* the situation, which automatically places the practitioners of these phrases on the side of colonialism even though they try to cut a fine figure by showing that they side with resistance.

There is more room for elaboration here. These two phrases (and, by extension, the postcolonial critics who use them) slyly (perhaps sometimes unknowingly) place Israel and Palestine on the same level of horrors, violations, and crimes committed, thus making both Israel and Palestine *evenly* blamable and evenly condemnable, which does not fit the reality of things. The goings-on in Palestine are no “Israel-Palestine war” or “Israel-Palestine conflict,” but a settler-colonization, violation, and war *committed by* Israel in/on Palestine, which is different from what these avoidist phrases suggest. What is surprising is that they are even sometimes unconsciously used by those who are themselves anti-Zionist and side with Palestine heart and soul. Other examples of avoidance-non-avoidance are the use of “Jerusalem” on its own rather than “Jerusalem *in* Palestine.” Another one is “Ramallah” as a supposed capital of Palestine rather than “Jerusalem, *the* capital of Palestine.” I am not saying that those very few postcolonial critics who deal with Palestine always do this with malice and fear; oftentimes, they do this because, despite their studying Palestine, they do not know anything about it, which in many ways makes them unadulterated Orientalists, even re-Orientalists in some cases.

It should not be understood that I am here trying to convince postcolonialism and its critics not to avoid Palestine and to include it in their so-called critical studies. I rather believe that Palestine should *never* be affiliated with this discipline; Palestine has nothing to do with postcolonialism and should not, with justice and respect, be considered part of it simply because associating it with “post” marks, logically, a *very* problematic, disconcerting rupture in its so far continuous colonial reality and struggles. The future of Palestine should not depend on postcolonialism which is not only already not doing much in the present but also bodes ill for the future, but on *resistance* only. I am aware that a pretty extensive selection of colonial cases could be made of which it would be necessary to speak in much the same terms. But I insist on Palestine here because it is what many would call an “international question,” a space where the battle between good and evil is the most clearly pronounced and concentrated. Solely focusing on Palestine, which does not seem to matter two pins to postcolonial studies and its lemmings, I deem it sufficient to say that postcolonialism is all appearance with basically no content; and anyone thinking this untrue has clearly not done much thinking.

Without demur, most have over the years glibly accepted postcolonialism as critical studies of colonialism. I beg to differ. In view of the above avoidance, I see nothing in this discipline that deserves to be called criticism. What I see is academic curtsy, *well-disciplined* criticism, and a modest (read very moderate) form of resistance (if it can be called resistance at all) that is afraid to offend, even when the offender unquestioningly deserves to be offended. Postcolonialism encourages a form of resistance that, I feel, is annoyingly polite, tries desperately

to beautify the ugly, tones down the most noisily horrid of situations, and *avoids* with verve and skill the most serious colonial issues. I see in postcolonialism something that scorns the oppressed and truth, and which a responsible critic cannot endure without losing themselves. This one reason (i.e., avoidance), which many would consider so small a reason for so big an accusation, furnishes quite accurately a sense of how postcolonialism is a dismal failure.

The above sorry state of affairs could have been averted if postcolonial critics⁸ had not shirked their responsibilities and bothered to do their critical homework. Of course, there are many admirable critics, including some who identify as “postcolonial,” among them Williams himself, Tahrir Hamdi (2017), Marc Lamont Hill (2018), Terri Ginsberg (2016), whose brave positionality we ought to take as valuable contributions to our moral, *anticolonial* heritage. And many journals too; one could give the example of the Edward-Said-founded journal of *Arab Studies Quarterly* edited by Ibrahim Aoudé, which gives justice to the oppressed through intellectually voicing their cause and making it heard. But I would not call them “postcolonial,” even though they may insist they be affiliated with it or may show no objection to being called “postcolonial,” because of an *ideological* value I believe to be conferred on the appellation, meaning, and discourse of “postcolonialism.” “Postcolonial” is a name that I associate with avoidance and with something that has problems in terms of both form and content. The name, for instance, refers to something that is not yet here and—as shall be explained—will never be; it has an escapistly, ahistorically, and, to reshape Said’s dearest concept, “[un]worldly” (1983, 4) “post” that (claims to) refer(s) to a *rupture* from colonialism that is not yet seen and experienced in our reality. While the concept claims that colonialism is *past*, the discourse ambivalently insists that it is not (yet), and while the concept claims that we are *out of* the colonial reality and *in* the *postcolonial* one, the discourse ambivalently insists that we are not (yet). Postcolonialism cannot refer, as some would have us believe, to a work or project in progress or a promise in the future to come. To reap future benefits, one has to work in the present and confront the past, which postcolonialism, through its critical lethargy and ideological avoidance, does not do. It has never been clear who coined this concept, but it can be said with certainty that it is deformed, unfinished, delivered before its time.

I would go further to upset the postcolonial critic by saying that a responsible critic, conscious of the very insupportable problematicity of postcolonialism (the name to start with), knowledgeable about colonial matters and about how the world functions power-wise knows, or *should* know that there has never been and will never be a “post,” that we are still *in*, and that the world has been and will always be colonial. What I mean here is that colonialism is *not* escapable,¹⁰ particularly today and more so tomorrow, and “returns at the moment of its disappearance” (McClintock 1993, 293). Colonialism as first power and second the most ideological of ideologies, be it in its crude, hegemonic or any other form, cannot be escaped simply because the world is inescapably made of cut-throat quests for *power*, which are ubiquitous and for which everyone vies. Because of this incontestable power-is-everywhere reality, very much clear for those who do not bury their head in the sand, “regression into ideology [power, and colonization occurs] at the very point where we apparently step out of it”

(Žižek 1994, 13). The minute one decolonizes oneself is the minute one is colonized again or subject to another, *other* forms of colonizations. To the question how one shall ever be able to extricate oneself from the obvious insanity of this eternal colonialism, or this power that is everywhere, one answer, however unoriginal it may sound, is possible: *resistance*, which should be characterized by *resist and resist again* that should never stop. But how can one resist if power is everywhere, as Williams asks in an email response to this foreword? Resistance does not depend on power being everywhere but on the *flaws* of power. It is because the power-system is not *fully* square, infallible, or perfect in its systemic “reasoning” that resistance is feasible.

Let us return to postcolonialism, assuming we have ever left it. Postcolonialism has reneged on its “promise of criticism” (Madiou 2020, 292) and resistance, and engaged in the shady business of avoidance. It neither “speak[s] truth to power” (Said 1994, xvi) nor does it oppose the way opposition should be done. And when it claims to oppose, it is on eggshells and toward *a particular* colonial context that is of interest to its critics and to the status quo, *very rarely* to all the colonial cases that exist in the world and *very much rarely* to those colonial cases that need serious attention, such as Palestine. And here, I would like to ask the following question: how does a stance as passive as the postcolonial one link to resistance? I would rather characterize postcolonialism as the nadir of the long career of and the most shameful moment in the history of resistance. *Worse*, as a charlatan notable for its unconcern about decolonization and its unsubtle endorsement of colonialism.

When it comes to colonization and colonialism, there is admittedly much complexity involved. Still, it is never complex to determine who the colonizer is, who the colonized is, and by whom the colonization is committed. However, agreeing on some sort of “peace” (read “reconciliation” here) after decades of horrors and violence is, albeit necessary, very complex. It is complex not because it involves complex intellectual thinking, but because it involves complex nonsense. Consider the Algerian case (and it is not the most severe case of all): one-and-a-half-million martyrs—a number that does not include those who have not been counted; adding to this a panoply of horrors and violence, and “peace” was agreed upon with the colonizer as if almost nothing happened. You would say that peace was necessary. I flatly agree. But this is precisely what makes it *not* peace.

In this colonial context, the one(s) suggesting “peace” dismiss(es) (sometimes unaware) the colonial horrors committed as past and, by extension, unimportant, and wipes the bloodily dirty slate almost clean, and sometimes *so* clean that one might even think nothing dirty or bloody ever happened. “Peace,” in this context, is a call to focus on the present; it is *avoidance* of the past. Yet, peace—Derrida would call it “a promise” (1994, 111)—is never part of the present and can never be achieved in the present simply because it is too ambitious a project, one that requires constant working on, *confrontation* with the past—which is part of what he calls “exappropriation”¹¹—responsibility, and justice towards the future to come. I feel tempted to say that a starter for peace, in a colonial context,

is meting out punishment for the colonial horrors committed by the colonizer. But this never happens in a real-life context because of *power*¹² and its complex conniving schemes. And when “it happens,” punishment is ambivalent at most and seldom (if ever) resorted to the way it should be—meaning a punishment that fits the crime. I see peace in this context as outright impossible in the present and in the future (if the past is not confronted)—in a long list of all sorts of impossible things in a colonial context—and all the more inconceivable simply because, aside from power, one cannot engage in horrid pursuits and acts and all of a sudden decide to kiss and make up. A peace that is hastily agreed upon in the present without due confrontation of the past should be suspected simply because it is not genuine. Genuine peace requires confrontation, time, honesty, good intentions among other things.

Peace is as seductive as the belief in it, but peace defined by power has nothing of peace or reconciliation in it and is as deadly seductive as a siren can be. A genuine decision to be in peace should come from *oppositional* resistance, not from strategic negotiation with the colonizer, from which crumbs of profit and bourgeois positions can be enjoyed along the way and which in many ways makes both the signee and signer partners in crime. Or as Sartre puts it, “[W]e only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that which others made of us” (1963, 17). Only through *oppositional* resistance can one hope to make good on the promise of peace; it is *not* through negotiating, blindly consenting to strategic agreements with what once played havoc on us, and accepting what has been inherited from the incompetence, sometimes deliberate alteration and avoidance of intermediaries. Resistance—oppositional, *not* strategic—is the first step on the long path of *the* peace; it is that *unbound* and disinterested act that defends the right and the just, *not* what one thinks is right and just. A peace defined by confrontation and resistance is a step to peace indeed; a peace defined by avoidance and power is a peace in word, not in deed.

The above hypocrisy (many would prefer the term avoidance) is one of the reasons I created *Janus Unbound: Journal of Critical Studies*. The project had been dusting on the shelf for two years before I decided to bring together researchers, scholars, and renowned critics of resistance and look for a publisher. I set out on this arduous journey with Ilan Pappé and Tahrir Hamdi who reacted with enthusiasm to the project because they saw *hope* within it. And although the project struggled a great deal against overwhelming publishing odds, mistrust, suspicion, and also academic gossip on the part of publishers, journals, but *mostly* researchers, it survived through *resistance* and perseverance. Thanks to Peter Trnka’s acceptance to serve as editor-in-chief and to his enthusiasm and active engagement, the journal is hosted by Memorial University of Newfoundland and finally saw the light of day. This project has been created in the spirit of friendship, *not* collaboration; collaborations, agreements, and partnerships are too rigid concepts/atmospheres to me as they are about interest and ready-to-pounce hostility *not* about generosity and hospitality on which this journal is *uncompromisingly* based. *Janus Unbound* was also created in the spirit of inclusion *not* exclusion, excellence *not* power, originality *not* received ideas, brains *not* symbolic titles, and so long as this continues, the journal will continue to do what it vows to.

Janus Unbound is, first and foremost, a journal of critical studies that seeks to promote a criticism defined by *truth, confrontation, and resistance*. As has probably

been understood, this journal does not speak postcolonially or from a postcolonial context—by which I mean that stifling place of avoidance, exclusion, and silence—nor does it seek to revise or correct postcolonial studies. It rather emerges as part of a longstanding anticolonial challenge to, first, colonialism, be it crude, hegemonic, “symbolically violent” (Bourdieu, 1990 133) or any other unconventional form, such as the colonialism of received ideas, and, second, to the dominant colonial discourse of postcolonial studies and like-minded disciplines that chain criticism, opposition, and resistance. *Janus Unbound* has a critical, *anticolonial* approach to everything it tackles and seeks *à la* Prometheus (the *un-chained* Prometheus) to unchain the chained, give fire to the oppressed—be it people, narratives, ideas, histories, or other captives—and voice to the avoided, silenced, excluded, and forgotten. It also emerges as part of a long, arduous project of a yet unfulfilled decolonization—in all aspects of life—which so far remains just an idea, an aspiration, and a fettered trial.

Janus Unbound takes a particular interest in World Literature, Cultural Studies, and the Humanities, yet is characterized by a deliberate lack of focus which allows it to go, if the necessity arises, to other fields of research. World Literature and Cultural Studies emerged as a result of a (canonical) colonization, but their effort, as I see it, missed the anticolonial, unfocused, and inclusive mark. Their critical, anticolonial energy has been subverted—worse, *perverted*—and resembles today what was once (and still is) the exclusive, colonial, and canonical energy of the Humanities.¹³ Today, World Literature, Cultural Studies, and the Humanities (and other disciplines, too) share the painful experience of colonial captivity; they have become, as it were, “postcolonial” disciplines by which I mean disciplines that *exclude, silence, avoid* and represent responsibility and justice gone awry. *Janus Unbound* does not seek to revise or correct World Literature, Cultural Studies, and the Humanities; it rather seeks to depart from that point when/where these disciplines went wrong, to pursue what they were supposed to but failed to do, and *begin again*. This is not to be understood as re-inventing the well-worn wheel, but as exploring what has been avoided, excluded, silenced, and forgotten while also being fully open to the new and other horizons. While it chose “the meaning of colonization in the 21st century” for its first issue to articulate clearly its intellectual position on colonization in general, and voice the generally avoided Palestine in particular, colonization as such is not to be understood as the only focus of *Janus Unbound*. By its Janus-ness, the journal can tackle many other faces of colonization, and by its unboundness, can go beyond this area and *in all directions*.

Resistance, the one I call *intellectual sabotage* in “Warientalism, or the Carrier of Firewood,” has been a decisive prompt for the development of this journal. Resistance is an untamed force. It does not avoid; *it confronts*. It does not speak lies; *it speaks truth*. It does not please; *it displeases*. The fear of displeasing ought not in the least to influence one’s intellectual actions. Besides, who said that intellect is to please? Resistance, be it criticism, opposition, or any other form, is, I believe, the cure-all for most of our ills in all aspects of life; it should be characterized by sheer courage, an astounding will to action, and by a no less astounding confidence in the possibility of change. The realization of such an ambitious project requires extraordinary preparation and infinite patience in execution.

In the course of reading this foreword, many would find what has been said bland, at times even tacky, but truth is better consumed bitter than falsely sweet. Others would grumble about the mess and noise it would create, but it is not part of a critic's responsibility to soothe tantrums. Others would require evidence for what has been said, but sometimes suffice it *to observe*. But there is that one reaction that only a few will have: *a smile*, one that says that the nail has been hit on the head and that more is ahead. I am aware that my exposition is of manifest crudities. I made it uncompromising purposely because this is how colonization ought to be confronted. However, I have to acknowledge that, as a young academic and a human being, I have never been able to mince words or call bad things by a good name.

Allow me to conclude this foreword. When I say that postcolonialism is dead, it does not mean that it will not be used from this time on, but that it is dead and will continue to be used, which is *the* problem. It is hoped that the postcolonial critic will grow conscious of the shortcomings of postcolonialism and its ideological trafficking. It is also hoped that, outside the rigidly academic field of this discipline and its so far unnoticed colonial discourse, an inspired resistance that recognizes the trials and tribulations of *all* the colonized of this world and that works toward *inclusively* decolonizing and doing justice to all the colonized without ideologically *avoiding* will someday regain its rightful place. And unless we depart from the postcolonial ways, awaken our mind from the lethargy and colonialism of received, often erroneous ideas, engage in a genuine resistance against everything that calcifies and becomes lethal, and *say no to the oppressor*, there will be no possibility of change. Until this responsibly occurs, *the world is and will remain colonial*; nothing will change in this scenario, only the players. And if you do not like the sound of that, you could always read courteous writings written with ideological tact and caution by well-brought-up academics, writings that will make you believe that everything is fine when everything is not.

Biography

Mohamed Salah Eddine Madiou is a researcher and British Council medal-winning debater. He interned at the Foreign Commonwealth Office on “counter-extremism,” was nominated for 2018 Youth Creativity Award and 2018 Award for Youth Empowerment, and received various government-sponsored grants for youth projects and his first PhD programme at the University of Jordan. He is currently doing his second PhD in English Literature at Memorial University of Newfoundland.

Notes

1. My use of the concept of “postcolonialism” is for convenience only and is not to be understood as support on my part of this concept.
2. In this foreword, I am not following the logic that has it that “postcolonialism” (without a hyphen) refers to the discourse/theory/studies and “post-colonialism” (with a hyphen) refers to the period/time/condition. With or without a hyphen, I argue that postcolonialism is undefinable and problematic.
3. See “*Orientalism*, a Thousand and one Times” (Madiou 2020, 286).
4. In an email response to this foreword, Williams notes, using Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o’s phrase, that postcolonialism succeeded, albeit a teensy bit, in “decolonizing the mind.” I totally share Williams’ view that there was/is a critical, anticolonial energy that succeeded, albeit a teensy bit, in “decolonizing the mind.”

but I would not call this energy “postcolonial.” In the context of 20th century colonization, when/where the Ngũgian phrase of “decolonizing the mind” was most fashionable, “decolonizing the mind” was (thought to be) relatively feasible because colonization was (thought to be) relatively direct and easy to spot. Things, I argue, are different in our intensely globalized, capitalist, colonial context. We are all aware of colonization and its complexity in general, but do we precisely know how we are colonized? Do we fully understand how today’s various forms of colonizations operate on us? And can we really pin them down and keep track of all of them? Decolonization depends on the colonization it seeks to decolonize. And only when seeing, being aware of, and being able to pin down a colonization can one, I believe, *try* to decolonize oneself from it. Today, there are *so* many colonizations (particularly that of the mind), including colonizations that take the form of a smile and others that we are not aware of, that it is not easy to decolonize.

5. I am aware that journals’ issues are planned in advance and that new manuscripts have to wait the publication of those already scheduled for publication, but this I consider to be a problem in the case of issues that require urgent attention. This postponement, I submit, is another form of avoidance. Many journals publish, for instance, on Palestine but they do not do this in a *current* way; they do it at a later date. This maneuver kills two birds with one stone: they show that they “confront,” but, at the same time, they avoid by not publishing on the issue on time. This is not to say that, when these journals confront, they do it the right way; the confrontation is often very suspect.
6. “Many” here is what I believe defines the current state of affairs. Others would say just “a few,” which, although it does not, according to me, describe the current situation, is a possible answer. Qualifiers here depend on who speaks, the context one speaks from, and of whom the question is asked. As noted by a colleague in an email, UK academia, if asked the question, will reply differently, compared to US academia (and others). And academics in the Arab world will reply differently again. It should also be noted that some will qualify *ideologically*, meaning their use of “many,” “few,” “some” will *not* be based on how the situation is in reality, but on avoidance, quietism, caution, fear, anxiety, malice.
7. “Pacify,” here, does not refer to a genuine pacification but to a fake one. The hyphenated “Israel-Palestine war” should be stressed here again as an example. When a postcolonial critic uses the above hyphenated fallacy, they *disengage* themselves and establish a *calm* atmosphere of neutrality, of fake pacification. In our daily life, when one adopts the neutral view that “both (if both) parties are to blame,” they seek in a paradoxical way to establish “peace” between the two conflicting, blamable parties; they do this by attacking whatever war-like state the two (if two) parties are in and dismissing it as nonsensical, even childish. This view is generally expressed from what is thought to be an elevated plane and seeks by its “both (if both) parties are to blame” rhetoric to force a certain peace on a context that is not peaceful at all. This supposedly neutral and peaceful position should not be understood as neutral and peaceful; it is always in favour of the wrongdoer.
8. What I am criticizing in this foreword is the approach of those postcolonial critics who engage criticism with ideological caution, avoid out of fear and sometimes malice, and whose style of writing is so courteous, so characterized by hedging, and so afraid to speak with the right words that they actually end up defending another point of view, (perhaps) different from their initial view that was (perhaps) not as moderate as their final one. Of course, I am conscious

that many factors play a role in attenuating the resistance of a critic, one of which is publishing. Many publishers impose a certain decorum to abide by and a certain style to write with, without which the piece submitted for publication is rejected.

9. Edward Said defines “worldly” or “worldliness” as anything that is “a part of the social world [and] human life,” meaning anything that is situational and historical (1983, 4).
10. There can be a modicum of material escape from, for instance, capitalism as a form of colonialism, but ideological escape from it, particularly today, is, I argue, extremely difficult. See note 4 for a detailed explanation.
11. “Exappropriation” is a combination of “appropriation” and “expropriation;” it is, according to Derrida, to take away *to give away*, to confront *to move on*. Derrida replies to Jean Luc Nancy’s invitation to re-define the concept, saying: “Ce que je voudrais entendre par “exappropriation,” c’est que le geste de s’appropriier, et donc de pouvoir garder en son nom, marquer de son nom, laisser en son nom, comme un testament ou un héritage, il faut l’exproprier, il faut s’en séparer” (Derrida et al. 2006, 94).
12. Discussing “power,” of course, depends on what “power” is, what “power” one speaks about, and one’s definition of “power.” The same goes for “resistance;” discussing it depends on what “resistance” is, what resistance one speaks about, and one’s definition of resistance. Definition is important and necessary here as inside the power-side there is “resistance” and inside the resistance-side there is “power.”
13. See Stuart Hall’s essay “The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis of the Humanities” (1990) for a detailed discussion on how the Humanities were/are colonially exclusive and canonical.

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Precocious Posts, Perpetual Beginnings: Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

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Peter Trnka



Manifesting

Welcome to the collective global expression *Janus Unbound*. There are many taking part, from all over. Multiples of multitudes, cells of groups, in bubbles even. Possessed by no-one. Coming together by chance, struggle, and always, though never equally, by suffering and trauma, in virtual common. Working as shadows in the shadows, collectively, forming and deforming cabinets, as needed. Speaking in poems and riddles, sometimes. In manifestos and research articles, also, and soon becoming-more-multimediac.

A journal of critical studies, to become aware and to stay aware of the power in knowledge and the knowledge in power. Resisting falling into the fascination of spectacle(s).

Unbound, geared for resistance and struggle, oriented to liberation. Opposing any and all laws and practices of domination.

Needs and drives scream to begin again.

Opposing domination by discipline and control in knowledge work and knowledge institutions, from kindergartens, families, and universities to state and global epistemic and communicative infrastructures and access conditions. Opposing arbitrary and oppressive rules and rulings of grammarians, logicians, and other language and thought police. Aware of the ironies of launching a journal of critical studies featuring the anti-colonial and global while operating in the English language.

A desire for combining and cutting across world literature, politics, cultural studies, theory, art, and philosophy, and open to many others. Transdisciplinary. Challenging to read. Full of attitude and spark. An irritant to default operations. A more probable condition for intellectual revolution than any other. Transdisciplinary. Transcritical, transversal, transvaluing.

Logics of addition, affirmative conjunction, thinking with the *and*. *And* binary exclusionary logics of *either/or*. Which is major and which minor?

Cross-cutting transversal, disciplinary matrices extended and transformed, for cosmopolitan collective intelligences. For perpetual emergence, beginning, creation.

Today, here and now, the point of departure, first volume, first issue: *The Meaning of Colonization in the 21st Century*. Begin today again with colonization. Does nothing change? No, colonization, in some form or another, is here to stay. Not “what is a colonialist today” or “what is colonialism today” but specifically “what does it mean today to colonize and to be colonized?”

Significant events in history repeat, or so Marx says, in beginning his critical historical essay, *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, an *au courant* famed analysis of the early 19th century French despot Louis Bonaparte, a pale imitation and echo of Napoleon-Bonaparte. Marx starts his analysis of the rise of despotism by remarking that Hegel, the Prussian state philosopher, omitted the point to his observation “that all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice,” namely “[he] has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce” (594). In history’s double appearance or repetition there is a difference: first there is the common tragedy then, on repetition, ridiculous comedy (Ronald Reagan the tragedy of Make America Great, Donald Trump the insurrectionary global comedy of MAG Again).

History repeats, colonization continues and happens anew, today. In the biosphere, the (to some suddenly by way of Covid-19 pandemic) virtualized and biopoliticized biosphere, people are colonized anew every day, everywhere. Dead stored labour, the zombie apocalypse, continues to reproduce itself, in the biosphere: the paradox is screaming. Dead labour reproduces itself by any and all means necessary, including by so-called primitive accumulation or extraction: theft by conquest, expulsion, and killing. Dead labour perpetually repeats itself, at core and margin, feeding on living labour power in all its times and shapes of expression. Dead labour nonetheless is quick to primitivize and dehumanize that very same living labour, and by implication, to render colonial rule free of any guilt.

Anti-colonial means here in its widest sense resisting any unwanted intrusion, intromission, insertion, invasion, inhabitation or other act. Colonial here includes micro-colonial. Anti-colonial entails, to begin with, anti-imperial, anti-capital, anti-patriarch.

Consider symbolically, epistemically, the body counts of indigenous and racialized youth featured in global media channels in this second year of the post-modern 21st century, 2021. How can you say “postcolonial” in the context of such frequent, putatively legal racialized mass killings? Hundreds, then thousands of corpses of indigenous children located at forced residential Canadian state schools, often managed by Christian church organizations. The count continues. Palestinians again bombed in their own homes by the racist Israeli colonial war machine.

There is no maximum minority body count for those in power: that would be to assume a naïve logic that promotes life rather than the zombie logic of more intense and extended colonization.

Uneven or untimely is the “development” of modes of production, and modes of exchange, and also forms of rule, class, and social group, including gender. Neo-colonial and neo-feudal are extensions of the postmodern into the post-postmodern return of the modern and premodern. Hence very quickly, al-

most instantaneously always way-too-too early, crying with fulfilment, the precociousness of posts: postcolonial, postimperial, postcapitalist, postclass, postgender, postfeminist, postracist, posthuman, and so on.

The perpetual nature of beginnings is shown in the faces of Janus: one visage turned toward the past as the other is turned to the future, both together actualize the present. Shelley's Janus is a spirit of doorways and openings, of initiative, activity, and movement; a sublime spirit, Janus holds destruction and preservation together, and opposes not the sublime to the ordinary, but the terrifying and redeeming life of the sublime to the empty or false life without it, that is, a zombie life or "a walking death" (Bromwich 1-2).

Beginning is what study and scholarship promise, especially in the arts and humanities. In his analysis of intention and method, titled *Beginnings*, Edward Said finishes the work by noting that:

A beginning is what I think scholarship ought to see itself as, for in that light scholarship or criticism revitalizes itself. ... [A] beginning methodologically unites a practical need with a theory, an intention with a method. For the scholar or researcher, a beginning develops when the conditions of his reality become equal to the generosity of his, of everyman's, intellectual potential. To call this a *radical* beginning is to risk repeating a hackneyed expression. Yet a root is always one among many, and I believe the beginning radically to be a method or intention among many, never *the* radical method or intention. (380, emphasis in original)

Said is repeating here with a difference Marx's well-known reflection (from his "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*") on the meaning of radical as root, and the meaning of the root of man (woman or person) in man himself, woman herself, or they themselves, or more properly, all collectively, dead alive and still to be born.

Not all beginning is good. There are false beginnings, or repetitions of the same: restarting colonialism, colonizing, anew. Colonization and capitalization are dynamic systemic activities, constantly reinventing themselves, through variations. Oppression, exploitation, slavery, and killing continue, until we have new beginnings.

How do we begin anew?

Janus opens by doubling, by becoming-two, facing this way and that. The gesture is paradoxical and also, at the same time, quotidian, basic. What does unbinding Janus do? It cuts knots and ties, like those around Pandora's box, making appear all kinds of monsters. Various forces are put on show in a release and multiplication of energies.

I look forward to *Janus Unbound* keeping me on my toes: alert, attentive to the emerging, living, new voices of struggle. I hope you do too.

Doubling

Mohamed Salah Eddine Madiou, the originator and founder of *Janus Unbound*, invited me to join the editorial board in 2020. When a year or so later, in March 2021, he proposed that I take up the position of Editor-in-Chief, it took me some time to appreciate the scope and significance of his gracious offer. Since

then, we have been working closely together as a pair of editors, a body and a shadow, a shadow and a body.

Similar doubling—pairing, dyad forming—spreads through the journal’s network. Each position is duplicated and so protected by a shadow. Shadows are not inferior to bodies nor bodies to shadows. Each is inseparable from the other. Working to grow *Janus Unbound* globally and to establish our home at Memorial University in St. John’s, Newfoundland, it has been a pleasure and an honour.

Two Editors, as Janus has two or more faces. We push and pull each other. Friends and collaborators. Nowhere near the same, we work well together. Three Associate Editors: Danine Farquharson, Memorial, Department of English; Tahrir Hamdi, Arab Open University, Jordan, Department of Literature; and Ilan Pappé, Exeter University, UK, Director of the Center for Palestinian Studies. Our international Editorial Board numbers 19, the international Advisory Board 21; a staff of nine subeditors and assistant editors; a multidisciplinary set of over 140 international referees. Many of the works in this issue and issues to come feature voices from the collective.

The structure of the collective is a two-faced Janus shadow form, with each editorial position shadowed by an assistant. Built-in duplication allows for adjustment to personal needs and particular circumstances, and perpetual training.

Issuing

Thank you to the many people involved in the writing and editing of the whole of this issue Number One. *Janus Unbound* pulled itself together by creating a full, thoroughly thematic, cuttingly critical, and diverse issue. Two letters, six articles, four poems, and three reviews, all on colonization, in one form or another. 15 pieces, seven by women, four of those being poets. Hence the most vivid glimmers of future ways of being, at least here and now, come from women (at the dawn perhaps of becoming-woman).

We splash into existence with Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “How the Heritage of Postcolonial Studies Thinks Colonialism Today.” Thank you always for the challenge, work, and example. Spivak here argues, among other things, for the humanities beyond the disciplines as the hope of criticism. A selective historical analysis of the ongoing resistance to colonialism in India, and many other things, is followed by a historical and contemporary analysis of the continuing *Nakba* in Palestine, Ahmad Qabaha and Bilal Hamamra’s “The Nakba Continues: The Palestinian Crisis from the Past to the Present.” This is the first of three articles on Israeli colonization of Palestine. Each affirms that the *Nakba*, the singular catastrophe of the 1948 Zionist Israeli invasion, continues—or happens again and again—to this day, on this day, and tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow, and so on. Unless.

In Michelle Véronique Switzer’s “Resisting Ideological English: Agency and Valuing Against Reified Abstractions and Erasures” she asks the reader to consider colonization from the point of view of yet again a different colonial history and experience, this time in the contemporary USA. There are few if any spaces free of colonial history or free of colonization. The question appears rather to be “Which colonization do you mean in the 21st century?” Ramzy Baroud and Romana Rubeo take us, in their “Dismantling the Violent Discourse of the State

of Israel: On Zionism, Palestinian Liberation, and the Power of Language,” to a Palestine similar in at least one tragic way to Spivak’s India, namely in the attention given to the repetition of colonizing behaviour by the colonized.

The obfuscations and cover-ups concerning colonial history, imperial aggression, racialized and ethnic cleansing and genocide, make “the meaning of colonization” less than simple and clear: we appear to be caught in a dangerous kind of shadow play where agency is never settled or taken-up, assumed or inhabited responsibly. Today’s colonizer has a more difficult justificatory or public relations problem, but unfortunately that suggests that the more serious obstacles to colonization have somehow been removed, dismantled, or worn down.

If you are able to see, directly, clearly, what is happening in front of you then perhaps there is more hope. The experiment of Ilan Pappé, in his “Everyday Evil in Palestine: The View from Lucifer’s Hill,” is just such a gamble.

We end our scholarly articles with the thought, in Fadi Abou-Rihan’s “On the Micro-Colonial,” that colonization in the 21st century—in the sense of the most general perhaps of colonizations, libidinal colonization, the colonization of desire on desire—is what it has “always” pretty much been and will be, that is, open for business. But that there is always violence does not determine resistance nor the intensity and extent of freedom.

The poems. Thank you Rebecca Salazar, Heather Nolan, Shazia Ramji, Diane Roberts, and *Janus Unbound’s* Poetry Editor, Andreae Callanan, for giving a brilliant answer to the question of why articles and poems in a transdisciplinary, anti-colonial, anti-orientalist, anti-imperial endeavour? Resistance to and by way of grammar brings the poetic, philosophic, and transdisciplinary together in a zone of intensity. Hope, to figure resistance and freedoms, the many as yet impossible faces of freedom.

The journal closes its inaugural issue with three on-theme book reviews. Jay Foster’s critical review of Kenneth E Bauzon’s *Capitalism, The American Empire, and Neoliberal Globalization*, sets a standard for in-house criticism (Bauzon and Foster are both editorial board members): treat friends with as much or more criticism as enemies. Critical attention is a gift, not an insult.

The two end pieces are Syrine Hout’s review of the volume *Post-Millennial Palestine: Literature, Memory, Resistance*, edited by Ahmad Qabaha and Rachel Fox, and Louis Brehony’s review of Nili Belkind’s *Music in Conflict: Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Aesthetic Production*. We end in Palestine, squarely focused on Palestine, showing the breadth of the political in the musical and aesthetic, and pointing to our futures in the multimediac.

In solidarity and collective resistance,
Peter Trnka, Editor-in-Chief
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St. John’s, Newfoundland
11 November 2021

Biography

Peter Trnka is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Memorial University. He has taught at Karlova University, Prague as well as Toronto and York. He has published scholarly philosophical and transdisciplinary articles in various international journals, as well as poetry and a cookbook.

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How the Heritage of Postcolonial Studies Thinks Colonialism Today

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak



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I have been asked to write on the heritage of postcolonial studies. I separated myself from postcolonial studies in *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason*, published in 1999. I am still separated from it. But “separation” is, of course, a relationship; and there are different kinds of separation. Perhaps this relationship constitutes itself by way of the fact that, in the country of my citizenship, the heritage of the postcolonial is dubious.

Can we use India’s example for the general postcolonial predicament? I do not believe so. Yet some details can be shared.

It is well known that Lenin rethought anti-colonialism by emphasizing the role of the bourgeoisie in working out a national liberation. Rosa Luxemburg, like Marx, had emphasized that “the true [*eigentlich*] task of bourgeois society is the establishment of a world market, at least following its outline, and a production resting upon the basis of this world market.”¹ Today, with the globe financialized, we are aware of the truth of this. (We remember of course that for teutophones like Marx and Luxemburg, “bourgeois” is *Bürgerlich*—citizen-ly—and does not carry only a negative connotation.) Competitive nationalisms are still being used to ideologize the self-determination of capital. We are complicit in this.

Lenin suggested that national struggles which were, in part, generated by the development of capitalism, and whose content and goals were bourgeois-democratic, were nevertheless in an important sense anti-capitalist. In fact, it has to be taken into account that sometimes these struggles were led by representatives of decayed feudal cliques. In other words, Lenin did not consider the possibility that the nationalism of even an oppressed country might be in some sense reactionary. At the second meeting of the Communist International [Comintern] Congress in 1920, M.N. Roy (a pseudonym assumed to avoid punishment by the British colonial government of India), attended as a delegate for the newly formed Communist Party of Mexico. Roy was encouraged by Lenin to present his views in the form of theses. The theses Roy drafted urged that the Comintern support the revolutionary movement of workers and peasants in the colonies in preference to the bourgeois nationalist movement. Roy argued that the former movement, which according to him was developing with great rapidity at the

same time that it was separating from the merely bourgeois nationalist movement, would combine the struggle for national independence with a struggle for social transformation. Lenin forced major changes to Roy's theses in the Colonial Commission of the Congress, in particular deleting all those references where the nationalist movement and the revolutionary class movement were counterposed to each other. Lenin then recommended that Roy's theses be adopted in their amended form as "Supplementary Theses" to his own. They were so adopted but were ignored in subsequent discussions of the colonial question.

Roy was no doubt somewhat over enthusiastic about the rapid development of the movement of workers and peasants everywhere. Yet the work of the capitalization of land (the simplest definition of "originary [primitive] accumulation" making way for full-fledged industrial capitalism offered by Marx) now with direct access to the world market is not finished. The Amazon forest is of course the greatest example.² Closer to home, accessible to my activist experience, is the example of Nigeria, and the agriculture of West Bengal.

In the Indian case, the negotiated independence (1947-49) was brought in for the most part by men belonging to the feudal-bureaucratic classes that were out of touch with the underclass, and the peasant, with the subaltern at the bottom. One of them, famously, had to "discover" India, and the India that he discovered did not really represent what was going on in the country. It is a great orientalist dream text (Nehru 1946). Of course, the liberators made sacrifices and spent a lot of time in jail. I am not trying to be mean. But having inherited their legacy, I am proposing that they taught us that national liberation is not a revolution. Khushwant Singh, in his novel *Train to Pakistan*, rather different from his other writings, captures the distance between the mind-set of the liberators and of the general public (1956, 185-90). Gandhi, who was certainly a grand political strategist, took off the suit he had put on when he went to Britain and South Africa, and donned the high dhoti and chador that staged him as a man of the people internationally. A good deal has been said about his prejudice against black Africans, a tendency quite strong in India today and therefore part of our postcolonial heritage in spite of the acceptance and respect of progressive bourgeoisie such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Joseph Appiah, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Kofi Awoonor by the national liberators and their ideological descendants today.³

From a more "traditional" and less westernized upper middle class family from a mid-level caste, living in one or another of the princely states that were ruled by local potentates who acknowledged British suzerainty in return for local sovereignty, Gandhi was thus removed from India as such. The Gandhi family had fairly close contacts with the British administrators, but with no social contact at all. Thus, in the impressionable time of childhood and adolescence, Gandhi's intuition of a relationship with the British might have been described as "strategic." His four years living in Britain and training as a barrister was unaffected by racial prejudice because, outside of his classes, he lived under the auspices of the Vegetarian Society and the Theosophists. He thus developed what may be described as a canny relationship to the upper classes (his fellow students at the Inner Temple) and, outside his classroom, with the socially liberal British, especially how to dress and behave in an acceptable way. His first book, although

unpublished, “was his ‘Guide to London,’ drafted . . . during his first year in South Africa, when he hoped still to make a career as an Anglicized barrister in Bombay. [It] was a paean to English education and English manners, written, appropriately, in English” (Guha 2013, 395).

To this combination—steady strategic behaviour with regard to the ruling British in India and admiration and assimilation to dress code and acceptable behaviour with regard to the British in Britain—was added the experience of the open prejudice and despotism of British policy in a British colony when he went to South Africa to represent Indians living there. This extended combination of his sense of the British was operative in his participation in the national liberation in India. In South Africa immediately before his final arrival in India, however, he operated with the strongly held assumption that Indians and the British, unlike the culturally insufficiently advanced “native[s],” were “different members of the Imperial family in South Africa [and] would be able to live in perfect peace in the near future” (Guha 2013, 175). He fought for the British, as the Sergeant Major of an East Indian Ambulance Corps during the Anglo-Boer War in 1906. As he staged himself in costume as a kind of liberated Hindu saint, wittingly or unwittingly, he was also able to embarrass the British in Britain by breaking the dress code completely and turning up at Buckingham Palace or formal dinners at conferences in dhoti-chador and thick sandals. This embarrassment led to the international moral outrage already stressed by the Americans, speaking of the superiority of their Constitution, that would not outrage an Indian renouncer. So far, the freedom struggle in India had been marked by armed guerrilla attempts, most strikingly taken up in Bengal, by young men and women who had none of the strategic relationships with the ruling British, nor the in-house relationship with the liberal British. They had simply been punished by law and deported or hanged. Gandhi turned it into a different kind of nationalism by “discovering” *ahimsa* or non-violence in the Hindu tradition and shaming the British once again—through passive resistance and spectacular, truth-seeking boycotts—into a negotiated independence that ensured the victory of a Labour government.⁴ His first 20 years in India and his own inclinations after his return from South Africa did not allow him to get to know and gain the support of the common people of India, although he certainly gained a species of cultic devotion. His cohorts were mostly conscientized business folks like the Sarabhais. His politics of shaming and moral embarrassment on the subcontinent often took the form of emotional blackmail, such as hunger strikes against his own cohorts. The most remarkable of these was at the Poona Pact of 1932, which obliged Dr B.R. Ambedkar, who represented the out-castes and tribals on the new Indian constitution, to abandon his motion to establish a separate electorate (already in existence for Muslims and Sikhs) for the out-castes and the tribals, today called the Dalits.⁵

The other leaders of the national liberation movements were from a liberal to traditional background, more or less progressive, but just as certainly out of touch with the peasants and working folks of the country. Because of the lack of connection between the national liberators and the country at large, the old structures slowly re-established themselves.⁶ The largest sector of the electorate is illiterate or semi-literate (I know something first-hand of the production of

statistics in this context) and exists within a structure of feeling that may be described as feudal, looking to be led. Democracy became theocracy. Hindu nationalism easily took hold. But India—with its software growth embracing Silicon Valley, its good, cheap hospitals (way beyond the reach of the Indian poor, of course), its Bollywood and art cinema, the fantastic literature in English produced by Indian diasporics, the many art galleries—is internationally popular. Given the general level of Islamophobia in the world today, the virulence of Islamophobia in India is perhaps underestimated.

There are legalized attempts at restricting citizenship to Hindus only. I am part of the 80% Hindu majority, so this heritage of postcoloniality is particularly difficult for me to bear. I respond with the call to re-imagine secularism, with the imperative to touch the transcendental, what we must assume yet cannot legally prove. We cannot mourn or judge without the intuition of the transcendental, strictly and persistently to be distinguished from the supernatural, into which it can too easily slip. You cannot imagine and broach, persistently, a robust non-Euro-specific secularism without that intuition. This requires the sort of holistic education from elite to subaltern, primary to post-tertiary, everything nestled within the humanities beyond the disciplines that can only be a dream.

My parents sent us to a school where the teachers were mostly so-called lower-caste Hindus and Christianized aboriginals: St. John's Diocesan Girls' High School. The teachers there taught with the passion of the newly liberated. I do often say, "Diocesan made me." As the days go by, Miss Charubala Dass, the principal of the school, becomes my role model. Her affectionate dignity, and her gentle sternness, are not things that I can hope to imitate. That she had a hand in putting in place the openness to the need for ethical reflexes that might be produced can be made clear by the following story, the significance of which I did not recognize at the time.

I have been training teachers among the landless illiterate in western West Bengal for 30 years. I am myself not at all religious, not a believer. In 2012, at one of the meetings where all the rural teachers had come together for training, I gave them a lesson in English prepositions by repeating Miss Dass's school prayer: "be thou, O Lord, before us to lead us, behind us to restrain us, beneath us to sustain us, above us to draw us up, round about us to protect us." I turned this school day prayer for ethical action into a different kind of lesson, translated for people rather far removed from the metropolitan center of Calcutta. Make of it what you wish, but remember, we caste-Hindus treated the direct ancestors of my teachers like animals. It was the missionaries who Christianized them. And, because the national liberators were rather far away from "the people," that contemptuous treatment is creeping back. Sitting in the heritage of postcolonialism, I realize more and more that so-called national liberation is not a revolution because it is not in fact a national liberation. As Marx and Engels warned us in 1872: "The Commune [Paris Commune of 1871] has provided a particular piece of evidence, that 'the working class [read "the national liberators"] cannot simply take possession of the ready-made state-machine and set it in motion for its own goals'" (105; translation modified). And that is what the liberators of India did: take possession of the already existing colonial state-machine and modify it for postcolonial purposes, with a new constitution, whose land reform statutes were quickly suppressed (Bardhan 1984; 2003; 2018).

I work with a group called Radiating Globality. As we visit country after country, we are obliged to conclude that with the simultaneity brought in by globalization, precolonial structures of power and corruption are coming back and beginning to inhabit the polity. This catches the relay of the difference between the national liberators and the masses and becomes part of the difficult burden of the heritage of postcolonialism. In India it is the caste system, which never quite went away and is much older than colonialism. Colonialism was yesterday. This is thousands of years old.

In order to come to grips with the heritage of postcoloniality, the only solution that I have so far proposed has been a holistic education—from elite to subaltern, primary to post-tertiary, everything nestled within the humanities beyond the disciplines—that can only be a dream. By subaltern I mean Gramsci's minimal definition: "social groups in the margins of history" (1975, 2277). At the conference, I mentioned my continuing work with the education of the children of the landless illiterate in western West Bengal. I also mentioned my first proposal of "planetarity" to a Swiss philanthropic organization in 1997, inviting them to think of the asylum seeker in a different way, not as an obligation, not as a white man's burden, but as a human birthright. The difference may not seem to be much in English verbal articulation, but if imagined, say, in the language of the ground-level Islam of my home-state of West Bengal and Bangladesh, it would combine rights and responsibility in the tremendous concept-metaphor of *haq*. It is the para-individual structural responsibility into which we are born that is our true being. Indeed, the word "responsibility" is an approximation for this structural positioning that is only roughly translated as "birth-right." Whether it is a right or responsibility, it is the truth of my being. (As it will be argued later, Talal Asad works the "truth of being" approach in terms of Islamic philosophy, relating it to his repeated use of "translation.") Given this "structure of feeling" in those being "saved," the Swiss philanthropists would be mistaken in perceiving their own task as integrating the underclass immigrants into an economic dynamic, perhaps with some cultural instruction. In order to learn to learn from the below, to learn to mean to say, not just with the required and deliberate non-hierarchicality: I mean to learn from you what you practice. I need it even if you didn't want to share a bit of my pie, but there is something I want to give you which will make our shared practice flourish. You don't know, and indeed I didn't know, that civility requires your practice of responsibility as pre-originary. It should be mentioned here that, like most cultural power institutionalizing responsibility, Islam has historically allowed women to take the other's part within it. Asad makes an intriguing argument, by way of a comparison with Christian monks, that women's submission might be thought of as a willing submission of the will and, if I understand rightly, places it within the context of what early Christianity learned from Islam. If one were to criticize such submission as an ideological determination of the will, Asad would probably dismiss it as a modernist misunderstanding of the internal reality of an earlier dispensation, from which one cannot escape.

This brings us to the point where the heritage of postcoloniality leads to global labour export and migration. Let us look at the most recent version of my response to this, written for the United Nations Mission of the European Public Law Organization:

[L]isten to me as you would to those who bear what you impose and see if that imaginative shift is possible. For ruling is, in actual practice, enforcement. And those of us who think about these things as having human purchase—teaching in the humanities beyond the disciplines—think, perhaps somewhat idealistically, that one must persistently, generation after generation, work towards acceptance of the other as agent rather than victim, so that enforcement is not the main method. The desire for social justice is to want the law—and the goal of the general humanities education is to work at the impossible task of producing a general will for social justice, which can be minimally defined as the willingness to turn capital away from capitalism to diversified social good.

But this is a desire for those who have access to capital outside of the possible practitioners of capitalism. This can translate even into a different attitude toward fiscal policy. And I think here, if we are thinking, as best we can, of the entire world, we must learn how to speak to the largest sectors of the electorate, in terms of what Professor Margaret MacMillan, great granddaughter of the British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George, would think of as a basic affect: “these affects, greed, violence, fear—do, of course, drive capitalism’s dark side, a side that most of us can afford not to notice.”⁷ Language becomes more parabolic to break down enforcement alone. We expand, we repeat with many acknowledgeable instances: one person’s profit brings death to many. Keep what you need but use the rest for greater good. Narrative as instantiations of the ethical is an altogether “universal” method with a millennial history. If some of us do not learn to use it in an intensive and hands-on way of attempting movement from feudal loyalties and convictions to gendered democratic intuitions: namely, autonomy and equality for me and my group as well as other people, other groups, unlike us—then we are at best looking forward to a “democratic” world ruled by tyrants, where democracy is body count disguised as rule of law.

It is this insistence upon accessing the other’s structure of feeling through an imaginative activism that trains for epistemological performance that links to Talal Asad’s understanding of the anthropological experience of fieldwork as living another form of life in order to learn about it. For Asad, this anthropological experience is a unique and perhaps inadequately appreciated way of understanding, to go towards the other, to enter into the other’s space. I connect this idea to the idea of the humanities teaching imaginative activism to train the imagination to be flexible. And indeed I have described my attempt to learn to learn from below how to teach the subaltern a species of fieldwork, without transcoding. To transcode, as in the ethnographic session in the evening when the fieldwork is organized by the anthropologist into academic systematicity, would take my focus away from my masters, the subaltern.

Indeed, this skill of the underclass immigrant has been one of this writer’s themes for many decades. Here let me quote a piece of fiction that I taught in the 1980s at the University of Pittsburgh, as adjunct faculty in the department of philosophy, in a course on ethics. I quote from Peter Dickinson’s *The Poison Oracle* at length to show how fiction stages the argument that I am trying to establish. In the novel, a chimpanzee trained by the visiting British anthropologist on a whim, solves the murder mystery, which is the ostensible subject of the

novel. The potential object of his anthropological investigation, the “native” girl, in a curious subplot that takes over, undoes the boundary between knowing and known and exits the book on a staging of the reader’s uncertain expectation that she will “get back into the machine”—the airplane—with “the pilot...ready to go.” But she has climbed up to the slab that the marshmen (the “natives”) called:

the House of Spirits. Really, [Morris the anthropologist] thought with exasperation, she is worse than Dinah [the chimpanzee]...[N]one of the tribesmen moved, or even looked at the white men. They stared at Peggy, waiting. Morris couldn’t believe that she had climbed up there for anything except adventure, with perhaps an element of scorn for superstitions which she had grown out of. But as soon as she saw that she was a focus of attention she accepted her role,...and at last began to dance. Now the marshmen crept towards her silently, and it seemed unwillingly, like birds or small beasts hypnotized by the coiling and writhing of a snake...she sang in English. She had insisted that Morris should teach her his own language, and what right had he to refuse? What property had he in her marsh mind? As a research tool, if she chose to put it away? Besides, her will was stronger than his. All he could do was tape the learning process, to record whatever problems she faced in adapting to alien modes of thought. The answer had been almost none. ‘You are fools,’ she sang to the marshmen... ‘You do not know cause and effect. Cause and effect.’ It was Morris’s own voice, piping triumphant and scornful through the steamy air.

The fiction makes it deliberately uncertain as to who speaks the final lines, which appear as the shared voice of the rule of law: “Soon all you fools will be dead. Cause and effect. Cause and effect. Cause and effect” (Dickinson 1974, 190-1).

Peggy has transformed the philosophy of the people who had come to her island to know her into a repeatable formula, and here the writer paints in bold strokes the task of the imagination of the host. Peter Dickinson (1927-2015), a white Englishman educated at Eton and Oxford, who worked in British counterintelligence, here shows us through his dramatization of an anthropologist’s experience, the possibility of an author’s creative imagination grasping the peculiarities of the master-slave relationship with the other, whom we feel we are liberating by subjecting to the rule of law.

Indeed, this fiction stages the experience that would be impossible for the subject proposing a universal rule of law. If you succeed in putting it in place, the other would banalize that impossibility, slipping into your space, imitating reason. Accept the invitation to do likewise, and inhabit the banal impossibility together: the rule of law; turning the key that makes the cohabitation possible: redistribution rather than rejection, built by soul-making education, on both sides.⁸

Comparative Literature, my discipline, at its best tries to learn language the child’s way, the impossible way: it attempts to enter the lingual memory, memory of the language in the language. It attempts a private and singular hold on its history, which also requires such deep language learning, suspending itself in it. By so doing, it enlarges the scope and range of ethical practice.

At the beginning of October 2012, I was at a conference on “Ethnicity, Identity, Literature” in upper Assam in northeast India, which informed what I write here. Upon the border between the state of Assam and upper Bangladesh, there is a great deal of ethnic conflict, resembling such conflicts on the US-Mexico border, the Israel-Palestine border, and other well-known international boundaries. Studying some literature from the area, I read the novel *Rupabarir Palas* (1980) by Sayed Abdul Malik, a member of the migrant community. Malik describes the way in which the migrant, especially the underclass migrant, makes the language of the ironically named host state his or her own and how, for the second generation, it becomes a first language. Coupled with this, in the last section of Malik’s novel, there is a lament that, in spite of such an effort, voting rights are denied. I realized through this novel that the model of deep language learning is not just the institutional humanities model of comparative literature, but the practical humanities model of these so-called illegal immigrants—a global phenomenon, a group that I have described as “the new subaltern.” I believe that the sensibility trained in the humanities as I have been describing them, can also begin to see that the border between the new subaltern and disciplinarized humanities teachers and students is an unstable border. Subaltern classes cannot use the state despite the fact that in a democracy, the people supposedly control the state.

In Abdul Malik’s novel, we find the words “those who, thinking to stay alive, have sacrificed the enchantment of the motherland, come to Assam and taken her for mother, forgetting their own language have made Assamese their own language” (Malik 1980, translation mine). In a passage that I often quote, Karl Marx provides a less affective description of this as revolutionary practice: “In the same way, the beginner who has learnt a new language always retranslates it into his mother tongue: he can only be said to have appropriated the spirit of the new language and to produce in it freely when he can move within it without remembrance, and forgets his inherited language within it” (Marx 1852, 147; translation modified).

For the actively translating teacher and student in our classrooms, this practice brings the awareness that the first step in translation is violent, the destruction of the body of the language, the sound that is so deeply tied to the structure of feeling, especially but not only if one is translating from the first language. Perhaps it is a reminder of the setting aside of the interest in the self that must accompany translation as an encompassing model of ethical practice as such, if that can be described. We must imagine that this violence is called for in all efforts at communication. In other words, I am trying to explain the difficult set of ideas that crowd my mind when I try to open up the unexamined conviction that translation can naturally create cultural exchange and global community. Yet, we have no other way of proceeding here.

Let me sum up these words aphoristically: may translating rather than translation be the future of the humanities. We will be a global community, each one of us globalizable, upstream from politics, an island of languaging in a field of traces. The trace of an “unknown” language is where we know meaningfulness is operating, but we don’t know how. Our task as teachers and translators calls us into this challenge, the recognition that a fully translated globe is nothing that we should desire.

May translating rather than translation be the future of the humanities. And the final project of translating is an epistemological project upon ourselves that is, like all translation, necessary but impossible. Postcolonialism was focused on the nation state. To supplement globalization, we need archipelago-thought. Édouard Glissant, the thinker of creolity, has said: “Translation is therefore one of the most important kinds of this new archipelagic thinking” (1996, 27). We must displace the heritage of postcoloniality into island-thinking. Japan can move into this with brilliance.

We are all islanders. I am from the island of Eurasia. And I have lived for sixty years on the island of the Americas, called the Greater Caribbean by Jack D. Forbes (1993, 270). These are big islands.

In 2001, I taught for a semester at the University of Hawai‘i and fell in fascination, as one falls in love, with the idea of Oceania. I began to think, then, that neither “Europe” nor the “United States of America” could think of itself as an island, and therefore, they were out of touch with the reality of the world—not only that “no man is an island,” but that we are all islanders.

In 2004, Maryse Condé invited me to speak to the descendants of indentured Indian laborers on the island of Guadalupe. I sang to them an island-dream song by Rabindranath Tagore and demonstrated to them how distanced we mainlanders had been, in our island fantasies, from the reality of their lives. India could not think of itself as an island, a corner of an island. I began to think, then, that the idea of nations, older than nationalisms—something like “born same-s,” men harnessing reproductive heteronormativity to push away the bigger heterogeneity of the island—was ever in a double bind with our islanded-ness. History nestles in that denial of the impossible truth of space.

I now think of Oceania as a heterogeneous place, a model for the world-island, an invitation to develop island-consciousness beyond continentality. There is no mainland.

In today’s world everything is modern. The promise is of a level playing field. If we develop island-consciousness, know that the globe is a cluster of islands in a sea of traces, and approach the heterogeneity of the ocean-world with patience, collectively, and bit by bit, rather than all at once, it’s maybe the only way to find out why that field, that cluster, floating in the world-ocean, is so uneven a relief-map.

Postcoloniality celebrates a national liberation based on an orientalist nationalism, I have argued. Creolity as history celebrates archipelagic thinking.

Think creolity as history, then, rather than the bounded nation upon a bounded continent which was colonialism and its heritage.

A hard task, to save a world.

Biography

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is University Professor at Columbia University. She has written many books and holds honorary degrees from the Universities of Toronto, London, Rovira I Virgili, Rabindra Bharati, San Martín, St. Andrews, Chile, Vincennes Saint-Denis, Yale, Ghana-Legon, Presidency University, and Oberlin College. Humanities for social justice is her obsession.

Notes

1. Marx to Engels (8 October 1858), in *Karl Marx on Colonialism* (1950); cited in Seth (1992, 109; translation modified). The description of Lenin's position combines my non-specialist knowledge from many sources, including Lenin's own interventions, and Seth (1992, 121-3), which summarize well. The description of M.N. Roy's predicament at the Comintern meeting (of which I was of course well aware, since M.N. Roy, a person who worked an office in my hometown, was part of my childhood mythology), is a direct quotation from Seth (1992, 123). Lenin's "Supplement" can be located in Lenin (1961).
2. Karl Marx, "So-Called Primitive Accumulation," (873-940). This is an entire section. The title of the chapters included in it spell out the sequential narrative that is implicit in my argument: "The Secret of Primitive Accumulation," "The Expropriation of the Agricultural Population from the Land," "Bloody Legislation against the Expropriated since the End of the Fifteenth Century. The Forcing Down of Wages by Act of Parliament," "The Genesis of the Capitalist Farmer," "Impact of the Agricultural Revolution on Industry. The Creation of a Home Market for Industrial Capital," "The Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist," "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation," "The Modern Theory of Colonization."
3. Desai and Vahed (2015). For bourgeois interaction I recommend a critical reading of Slate (2012) and Wilkerson (2020).
4. In his agonized letter to C.S. Andrews on 6 July 1918 (Gandhi 1969, vol. XIV, 474-8) on the eve of his call to satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act of preventive detention, we can read that he had not in fact discovered any proof of non-violence in the Indian tradition.
5. The Sikhs refused the separate electorate in 1947. The inequities spawned by the refusal of a separate electorate are spelled out in Teltumbde (2018). As a result of the publication of this book, Teltumbde was thrown into prison as a spy and the book was banned in the postcolonial state. It is interesting that Ambedkar (2014) more than often gave an epistemological reason for this separation: "[T]he emancipation of the mind and the soul [for the Hindus], is a necessary preliminary for the political expansion of the people" (226); "Caste is a notion, it is a state of the mind. The destruction of Caste does not therefore mean the destruction of a physical barrier. It means a *notional* change" (286). There are multiple examples. I hope to argue the importance of this later in this essay. And indeed, given Gandhi's peculiar shift into a self-representative saintly temperament in his Indian nationalist form of appearance, it is arguable that he was also envious of the fact that the British Prime Minister's granting of the "Communal Award" that seemed to support Ambedkar's appearances at the Roundtable Conferences rather than his own. The abundant available scholarship on the Award points to the deep-rooted divisions within the Indian polity which, as I will argue in the body of the text, have emerged in full force today.
6. This lack of connection is brilliantly described in Ahmed (2021).
7. See MacMillan (2010), her Reith lectures in book form. The actual words were spoken in an interview discussing the Reith lectures in October 2019 with Christiane Amanpour on the US Public Broadcasting System.
8. The last five paragraphs are cited from Spivak (2021).

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The Nakba Continues: The Palestinian Crisis from the Past to the Present

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Introduction

Since 1948, which marks the birth of the expulsion of Palestinians from their native land, Palestinians have been cut from their roots, and displaced inside and outside their country. The 1948 exodus occurred when more than 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were uprooted from their homes and expelled outside Palestine and others were relocated inside it. The exodus has been a central element of the displacement and dispossession of Palestinians known as the Nakba, during which hundreds of Palestinian villages have been destroyed and others subjected to the ongoing process of ethnic cleansing. The bitter trauma of the Nakba remains raw and is a pivotal component in the shaping of Palestinian identity, collective memory, and resistance to the efforts of Israeli settler-colonialism to silence the Nakba for the past seven decades (Qabaha 2018). This article illustrates the resilience of the Nakba as a memory and experience in the life of Palestinians. Like the authors of *An Oral History of the Palestinian Nakba* (Abdo and Masalha 2019), we see the Nakba not only as an event, but as a process. Today's Israeli war against Palestinians takes the same shape that it took when it established itself in 1948. As this article shows, Israel continues its practices of expelling Palestinians and destroying their homes.

This article further argues that the Zionist domination over Palestine and Palestinians is reinforced by the Palestinian Authority (PA), which adopts the defeatist strategy of normalizing relations with the Israelis. In other words, Palestinians are facing double colonial systems—the Israeli occupation and the PA—which reinforce each other's dynamics. Double colonization is a phrase used by postcolonial and feminist theories to refer to the oppression of women in the postcolonial world by both the colonial power and patriarchy (Ashcroft et al. 1989). In this article, we use this phrase to argue that people, not only women, in the colonial/postcolonial world are oppressed by both the imperial/colonial power and the ruling system of their nation or quasi-nation. Drawing on Frantz Fanon's insights into the subtle similarities between nationalism and colonialism and Maurizio Viroli's discussion of nationalism and patriotism, we contend that nationalism, which is a duplication of colonialism, is employed by the PA to nurture factional conflict and political turmoil. In other words, Palestinians are

subjected to an internal mode of colonization practiced by the PA, which enables the Zionists to fulfill their plans of annexing the West Bank.

Academics have debated for decades whether Israel should be considered a settler-colonial state. Leading scholars, including Ilan Pappé, Joseph Massad, Rashid Khalidi, Noura Erakat, and Anna Ball, have convincingly argued that Israel is a manifestation of a national settler-colonial project. Ball, for example, points out that Zionism can be seen as a “new form of colonialism” (2012, 4). Ball explains how the aims of Zionism resemble those of the “settler colonies” established in various regions in the world like North and South America and South Africa. Therefore, “Palestinian scholars,” Ball notes, “have long advocated the colonial paradigm as a means” to understanding the Israeli rule of the Palestinian territories (Ball 2012, 4). Similarly, Erakat maintains that Palestinian intellectuals and organizations “have understood Zionism as a settler-colonial project predicated on Palestinian elimination” (2021, para.1). Israel is a settler-colonial state because it practices land annexation, removing native inhabitants, and accommodating Jewish Israelis in their place.

In his allegorical novel, *Theodor Herzl*, the founding father of Zionism, shows that colonialism is based on destruction and replacement: “If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct” (1902, 38). Zionist leaders told narratives that negated the existence of Arab Palestinians on their native land and described Jewish emigration to Palestine as a civilizing mission. Edward Said argues that “the early Jewish settlers in Palestine ignored the Arabs in exactly the same way that white Europeans in Africa, Asia, and the Americas believed the natives of these places to be non-existent and their lands uninhabited, ‘neglected’ and barren” (1980, 150). Although Said represses the nuances between various colonial powers, he is right to think that Israel is the heir of the legacy of colonialism. While other colonial countries, such as Britain and France, have ended some of their military occupations and kept their colonial structures of domination and human exploitation intact, Israel continues its sovereignty by immediate subjugation of the natives, that is, Palestinians, and control of Palestinians’ resources, entrenching and institutionalizing Israel’s direct military yoke, while blighting Palestinian lives and eradicating Palestinians’ dreams and aspirations of an independent state.

Colonialism never ends; it instead reproduces itself and finds new methods to sustain its presence. Israeli settler-colonialism reproduces itself by subverting Palestinians’ sovereignty over their land. Daniel Avelar and Bianca Ferrari argue that “the foundations of Israel are rooted in a colonial project that has modernized its face but continues to subject Palestinians to military occupation, land dispossession and unequal rights” (2018, para. 5). The establishment of Israel was at the expense of depopulating and destroying Palestinian villages and towns (and renaming others). In other words, the presence and the establishment of Israeli settlements are based on the absence and eradication of Palestinian existence. The wounds of the Nakba are still open, and they are getting deeper, not only because Israel is not allowing refugees to return, but because the Israeli military occupation continues to expel and relocate Palestinians to build its own settlements and populate them with Jewish migrants and settlers. Israeli domination obliges Palestinians to dwell in their memories of loss and to “re-live and re-imagine the *Nakba*, a memory that is more than a memory as it is lived and

re-lived in the daily nakbas of the Palestinian people” (Hamdi 2021, 33). The Palestinian Nakba is a living presence that is communicated and enacted through the ongoing Israeli displacement and expulsion of Palestinians who share the scars of collective trauma.

The Palestinian story is a story of forced displacement and uprootedness. As the Israeli historian Ilan Pappé argues, “the tale of Palestine from the beginning until today is a simple story of colonialism and dispossession, yet the world treats it as a multifaceted and complex story—hard to understand and even harder to solve” (Chomsky and Pappé 2015, 12). Zionism won the rhetorical battle over Palestine in the international community thanks to the rhetoric, images, and presentation attached to the conditions of European Jews. The physical displacement of Palestinians is punctuated by the annihilation of Palestinian wills and voices. The Israeli military occupation has been striving to wrest control from Palestinians over Palestine physically and linguistically. Israel has the advantage of controlling narratives, narratives which cast Palestinians outside public discourse and history.

Israel increasingly and ruthlessly confiscates Palestinian land to achieve its primary goal: annexing Palestine entirely and establishing a Jewish state. As Benny Morris puts it in his famous book *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, “Zionist leader David Ben-Gurion, a pragmatist, from 1937 on, was willing (at least outwardly) to accept partition and the establishment of a Jewish state in only part of the country” (2004, 15). Morris continues, “in effect, he remained committed to a vision of Jewish sovereignty over all of Palestine as the ultimate goal of Zionism, to be attained by stages.” Since the beginning, Israel’s ultimate goal has been the destruction and eradication of a viable Palestinian state. Israel would, accordingly, become entirely populated by Jewish citizens: a state only for Jewish people. Benjamin Netanyahu, the previous prime minister of Israel, said it best when he explained that Israel is “the national state, not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people” (ctd in Chappell and Estrin 2019, para. 1). These words reflect the core of the Zionist project: it strives to suppress the Palestinian-ness of Palestine and impose on it a Jewish identity.

The strategic plan of ethnic cleansing is demonstrated in Israel’s insistent refusal to allow the Palestinian refugees (scattered all over the world) to return to Palestine and in its continuous practices of arresting and expelling Palestinians and demolishing Palestinians’ houses and properties. While Israel casts Palestinians to a permanent exile without any possibility of physical return, it has long implemented The Law of Return (1950), which grants exclusive rights to those born of a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism to obtain Israeli citizenship and settle anywhere within Israel’s jurisdiction, including the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In other words, the affirmation of the Jewish identity and home is based on the negation of the Palestinian identity, an identity deemed the other to the Israeli and Jewish one. This Zionist law has therefore given rights of residence in Palestine to Jewish people while depriving indigenous inhabitants, who had lived on this land long before the establishment of the state of Israel, of these rights. As Noura Erakat argues, “it [Israel] wants the land without the people and seeks to remain the sole source of authority from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea” (2021, para. 1). This law was further supported

by the Nationality Law (1952), or the Citizenship Law, which affords automatic citizenship to Jewish nationals, and denies citizenship and residency rights to Palestinians who were driven out and were rendered stateless after the 1948 War. In contrast to these laws which grant Jews the right of return and citizenship, the Israel Absentee Property Law of 1950 brands Palestinians who were absent from their villages after the establishment of Israel in 1984 as “present-absentees.” This ambivalent state of presence and absence resonates with Giorgio Agamben’s description of the state of exception: “Being outside, and yet belonging” (2005, 35). Israeli illegal practices have suspended the rights of Palestinian individuals, especially those living in refugee camps, to live on their land and granted Jewish immigrants full rights of belonging to the land of Palestine. The Israeli practices of dehumanization and humiliation of Palestinians can be explained by way of Agamben’s state of exception. Israelis are negating the Palestinian identity as it poses a threat to the Zionist one (Hamamra et al. 2021). Israel violates basic human laws while attempting to secure the Jewish character of its state. In *Journal of an Ordinary Grief*, Mahmoud Darwish is perplexed by the fact that he was no longer a citizen upon his return to his village Barwa in 1948:

You find out you’re not a resident of Israel because you have no certificate of residence. You think it’s a joke and rush to tell it to your lawyer friend: “Here I’m not a citizen, and I’m not a resident. Then where and who am I?” You’re surprised to find the law is on their side, and you must prove you exist. You ask the Ministry of the Interior, “Am I here, or am I absent? Give me an expert in philosophy, so that I can prove to him I exist.” Then you realize that philosophically you exist but legally you do not. (ctd in Muhawi 2010, xiii)

In brief, the Israeli state privileges Jewish citizens, especially European Jews, and discriminates against Palestinians. Those Palestinians who stayed in Israel in 1948 are referred to as “1948 Arabs” and “Arabs of the Green Line,” terms of address that suppress the belonging of Palestinians to their homeland and their Palestinian-ness. Furthermore, such terms of address show that Palestinians living in what now is Israel have been racialized by the Zionists so as to reflect their exclusion from Israeli society. To maintain Jewish privileges, the Israeli military occupation has dispossessed, incarcerated, separated, and subjugated Palestinians, shattering their right to self-determination and their dreams of return and independence.

Israel as a Racist and an Apartheid State

Israel’s practices in the 21st century illustrate its apartheid nature, which is best evidenced by its repeated refusal to withdraw to the 1967 borders and its building of the Separation Wall in 2002. Israel has built an annexation wall that runs primarily through the West Bank and confiscates another 13% of Palestinian territory. The Separation Wall can be explained by Said’s conception of identity as a complex structure that depends on the other that it negates for its definition and assertion. Said points out that the “Orient” is the other to the Anglo-European world:

The construction of identity—for identity, whether of Orient or Occident, France or Britain, while obviously a repository of distinct collective experiences, is finally a construction in my opinion—involves the construction of opposites and ‘others’ whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from ‘us.’ Each age and society re-creates its ‘Others.’ (Said 1978, 332)

Israeli settler-colonialism has conceived the Palestinians as the other to be negated. This mechanism of othering is illuminated in the construction of the Separation Wall which separates us from them, the humans, Israelis, from the animals, Palestinians (Hamamra et al. 2021).

Dehumanization is a literary trope Palestinian authors employ often to emphasize the Israeli humiliation. For example, Raja Shehadeh, a Palestinian lawyer and novelist, highlights the Israeli dehumanization of Palestinians in his memoir *When the Bulbul Stopped Singing* (2002), documenting the Israeli siege of Ramallah in 2002. Shehadeh documents the words of a Palestinian man who asks an Israeli soldier demolishing his house: “do you consider me a human being? If not, then I crawl on all fours and lick your boots” (2020, 134). The rhetorical question posed here reveals the dehumanization of the Palestinian man and by extension all Palestinians who are pushed down to the level of crawling animals to be restrained, expelled, displaced, and killed.

Palestinian writers often reflect on the repetitive dehumanizing rhetoric used by Israeli politicians and leaders. For example, the Israeli orthodox rabbi and politician Eliyahu Michael Ben-Dahan, who served as a member of the Knesset and as deputy minister of defense, said about the Palestinians, “to me, they are like animals, they aren’t human” (ctd in Pileggi 2015, para. 3). The examples could easily be multiplied, with various contexts and for various motives. Ben-Dahan was showing his disagreement with the resumption of peace talks with the Palestinians. Such statements negate the humanity of Palestinians. Israeli political discourse dehumanizes Palestinians and suppresses their identity and presence.

The erection of the Separation Wall signifies the racist ideology of Zionism, which is based on the elimination of Palestinian identity. Erakat argues that “Israel now oversees a discriminatory regime tantamount to apartheid,” an attitude that has propelled Palestinian intellectuals and organizations to understand “Zionism as a settler-colonial project predicated on Palestinian elimination, and thus as a racist structure since its inception” (2021, para. 2). Palestinian scholar Fayez Sayegh argued that Zionist settler-colonization is a racist regime that aims to erase the Palestinian people on a racial basis. He argued that while European colonial projects aimed at racial domination, Zionist settler-colonialism aimed at “racial elimination” (1965). The presence of Palestinians inside Israel is perceived by Zionist Israelis as a threat to the sovereignty of the state of Israel. It acts as a constant reminder of how Israel has come into existence: an illegitimate state built on the illegitimate expulsion and oppression of the natives. The legitimate presence of Palestinians inside Israel functions as a lurking threat to the illegitimate existence of what is now Israel.

Israel stands alongside apartheid states around the world, most notably South Africa. The term apartheid was originally applied in the South African context.

However, it is applied nowadays to “all forms of segregation in all countries” (Erakat 2021, para. 10). As demonstrated throughout this article, Palestinians are subjected to segregations based on racial identity in perhaps even more severe and brutal ways than what happened in South Africa. The current political reality in Palestine amounts to apartheid (Thrall 2021). Palestine has recently been exposed to colonial atrocities that have further illustrated the apartheid nature of the State of Israel. Fox and Qabaha argue that “underpinned by the historical socio-political paradigms of settler-colonialism [...] the post-millennial period has given rise to continuing, increasingly visible, violence by the Israeli occupation” (2021, 17). They give the example of the West Bank Separation Wall, which aims to restrict Palestinian movement, displace the Palestinian population, and annex a large amount of what remains of the Palestinian land. This wall illustrates how “the mundane elements of planning and architecture have become tactical tools and the means of dispossession” (Weizman 2007, 5). The Separation Wall has been a site of dispossession: Palestinians living near it are threatened with dislocation for security reasons; it is also a site of racial segregation in the sense that it has restricted the Palestinians’, but not Jews’, access to their land, and their right to move and build houses. The Separation Wall mirrors the discriminatory nature of the state of Israel: “from the demarcation of the Green Line to the construction of the Separation Wall, the map of Palestine has been continually re-drawn and the country does not resemble what it was at the eve of the *Nakba* in 1948” (Fox and Qabaha 2021, 18). The apartheid practices of Israel seek to turn Palestine irrevocably into a new state called Israel.

This (re-)construction of space and architecture in Palestine constitutes what Derek Gregory calls a “landscape of colonial modernity” (2004, 101). Such colonial modernity manifests itself in Israel’s recent construction of new roads and highways, and the widening of the existing ones in the West Bank, which have the goal of annexation and expansion of the settlements. While Israel claims this expansion of roads will benefit both Palestinian and Jewish residents of the West Bank, it will turn the West Bank into an integral part of the state of Israel. The ultimate result will be that the number of settlers will double, and the West Bank will be of more Jewish character, which, in turn, will further limit the development of Palestinian communities (Qabaha 2019). For example, Israel is now involved in constructing projects that bypass many Palestinian regions in the West Bank such as the refugee camp Al-Aroub located in the north of Hebron and Hawara village located in the south of Nablus. These projects will expropriate native inhabitants of large portions of their land, causing substantial economic loss, to begin with. While Israel publicizes the fact that these roads will be used by both Palestinians and Israelis, Israel’s real aim is to find alternative roads for its settlers that will be used by them exclusively; thus, it provides security for its settlers and saves them from potential Palestinian attacks.

“If I don’t steal your house, somebody else is going to steal it”: Israeli Settlers’ Rhetoric and the State Apparatus

The Palestinian political cause proves that colonialism is a powerful force that seeks to legalize its illegality through its illegal power and narrative. The settlers of the colonizing state, protected by the army, reveal the hidden intentions of

this colonial state. As Mark Ayyash argues, such discourse shows that these settlers are “a mirror for the foundation of the Israeli state revealed in its naked form” (2020, para. 15). In spite of the efforts of the colonial state to inform their settlers ideologically with rhetoric that justifies their illegal practices, “these settlers act without the sophisticated rhetoric that hides and conceals the violence of the settler colony. They do not hide their intention to remove Palestinians and expand the state that is to come, the state of Greater Israel” (Ayyash 2020, para. 16). Such rhetoric covers a brutal colonial imagination, which aims to claim its sovereignty over what has already been claimed as its own again and again. Israel facilitates the annexation of homes through its military force. Settlers’ atrocities nurture the state’s colonial project, and the state then imposes its own authority and initiative, claiming its right to protect its citizens.

The epigraph above was spoken by one of the Israeli settlers who sought to steal a home in Sheikh Jarrah, a famous Palestinian neighbourhood in East Jerusalem. While Zionism employs legal power to protect Jews by bringing them to the state established on the ruins of Palestine, the discourse of theft employed shows that the enactment and implementation of such illegal laws are possible only through the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians. The Israeli government, to demonstrate its settler-colonial power, has supported far-right settlers taking over Palestinian homes in this neighbourhood and issued a court eviction decision. This action further violates international law and reveals that Israel is an illegitimate entity that sustains its existence with illegal practices. Independent journalist, filmmaker, and author Antony Loewenstein states that “what’s happening there [Palestine] fits the exact definition of settler-colonialism” (ctd in Sofuoglu 2021, para. 7). A far-right Jewish campaign to forcibly replace Palestinian citizens with Jewish settlers shows that Israel is a settler-colonial state. Loewenstein continues, “simply put: all settler colonies constitute a continuous process of land annexation, whereby native inhabitants are removed and settlers from elsewhere are brought to occupy the land” (ctd in Sofuoglu 2021, para. 8). Although many colonial states have expropriated lands from others in various contexts, “the settler-colonial state’s distinguishing feature is that it does not come into being and cannot continue to exist without claiming sovereignty over land that is forcefully taken from its native inhabitants” (Ayyash 2020, para. 8). The survival of Israel’s colonial structure is directly related to its continuous encroachment over the land to reinforce its existence as a sovereign state.

Israel attempted to annex Sheikh Jarrah, and to suppress its Muslim character, a character which is taken from a 12th century Arab physician Saladin, the Muslim conqueror of Jerusalem and the Holy Land; Israel so seeks to eradicate the Palestinian identity and impose its Jewish character. Herzl proposed in his book *The Jewish State* that Jewish emigration to Palestine should be organized in a gradual way that culminates with the replacement of the Palestinian population. Mainstream Zionism advocates that Jews should settle the entirety of Palestine and that Israel should cleanse Palestinians or render Palestinian lives unbearable. Colonialism thus becomes a tale of annexation and expropriation, manifested in a history of a state extended over 70 years.

In Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine and the birthplace of religions, Palestinians are facing a systematic annexation that threatens to eradicate the Palestinian identity of the city, a holy site for three monotheistic religions. Israel developed

a master plan for the holy and ancient city of Jerusalem, employing tactics and laws that serve its settler-colonial practices. After the 1967 War, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, and used all its means to change Jerusalem's Palestinian character. What is happening now in Sheikh Jarrah is the result of this master plan, which, in essence, aims at decreasing the number of Palestinians by replacing them with Jewish settlers, making the majority Jewish inhabitants. "We firmly reject the pressure not to build in Jerusalem. To my regret, this pressure has been increasing of late," said the right-wing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, openly giving his support to the settler movement (ctd in Sofuoglu 2021, para. 20). In this statement, Netanyahu underscores the Zionist plan to irrevocably transform Jerusalem from the capital of Palestine into the capital of Israel; he undermines the sovereignty of the PA over Jerusalem in particular. He aims to destroy the national aspirations of Palestinians because Jerusalem denotes for them their future state. This support of Israeli political leadership for settlers "signals an acceptance of the legitimacy of the settler efforts to push for further ethnic cleansing of the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem through eviction notices based on discriminatory Israeli laws as to Palestinian residency and property rights," says Richard Falk, a prominent international law professor (ctd in Sofuoglu 2021, para. 22).

Palestinian Choices after the Oslo Accords Failure

Many of these Israeli practices have been institutionalized by the Oslo Accords, proving the failure of these Accords. The failure of the apparent "peace process" served as one of the underlying roots for the recent escalation of colonial violence. The concessions made by the Palestinian leadership via the Oslo Accords have postponed ending the Israeli occupation, and thus resulted in a prolonged occupation. As Sara Roy argues:

The Oslo process, therefore, did not represent the end of Israeli occupation but its continuation, albeit in a less direct form. The structural relationship between occupier and occupied, and the gross asymmetries in power that attend it, were not dismantled by the accords but reinforced and strengthened. The Oslo agreements formalized and institutionalized the occupation in a manner that was altogether new. (2002, 9)

The Oslo Accords meet the Israeli plan of dividing, fragmenting, and mutilating Palestine and Palestinians. In dividing Palestinians and Palestine into new categories and zones, the Accords reinforced the division and displacement of Palestinians in the catastrophes of 1948 and 1967. Instead of putting an end to the bitter suffering of the Palestinians, the Oslo agreement formalized and normalized the Israeli occupation of Palestine. The PA has proved to be powerless and ineffective against the enforcement of increasingly encroaching borders and checkpoints by Israel; it has instructed Palestinians, especially in the West Bank, that they have no power to resist the atrocities of the Israeli army, and that it would be less harmful if they submit to its military power. The current political discourse of the PA leadership subscribes to passive resistance, and even defeatism. The Oslo Accords have acted as a nullifying force for the Palestinian national struggle for self-determination and autonomy. Indeed, the Palestinian

demonstrations against the PA show that many Palestinians have become disillusioned with this dysfunctional authority. The PA is viewed as misrepresenting Palestinian national aspirations and the interests of independence and liberation. The leaders of the PA cling to the role of security liaison and hence hinder Palestinian armed resistance against the Israeli occupation. While patriotism promotes liberty, solidarity, and the realization of the common good, nationalism creates aggression, exclusion, and violence. In his book *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*, Viroli links patriotism to “claims for liberty based on respect for the rights of other peoples,” while he represents nationalism as the “politics of aggrandizement pursued by reactionary regimes” (1995, 162). Viroli’s distinction between patriotism and nationalism reflects the pre and post Oslo Accords. While pre-Oslo can be perceived as the era of patriotism, where all Palestinians, regardless of their political affiliations, stood together against the Israeli occupation, the post-Oslo era is one of nationalism where Palestine is plagued by factional conflicts (Hamamra 2021). The PA, lacking autonomy, is a servant to the Israeli occupation. The Israeli State consolidates the existence of the PA, which, turning against the interests of Palestinians, becomes a replica of colonialism, that is, the Israeli occupation.

In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Frantz Fanon highlights subtle similarities between colonialism and nationalism, which, we propose, cut deep to the bone within the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. Fanon explains how the nation could turn into a “masque of neo-colonialism” by privileging the interests of nationalist leaders and the “national bourgeoisie” over the majority of the citizens (1961, 122). The PA is a reworking of the colonialist politics of “divide and rule,” which puts Palestinians into conflicts and clashes amongst themselves while the PA maintains its own interests. Writing about Arab nationalism, Said points out that:

Lodged at its heart, so to speak, is a complex of hope, betrayal, and bitter disappointment; the discourse of Arab nationalism today carries this complex along with it. The result is an unfulfilled and incomplete culture, expressing itself in a fragmented language of torment, angry resistance, of uncritical condemnation of outside (usually Western) enemies. (1994, 252)

Lack of critical awareness, absolute authority, and the inability to connect with the citizens except through the language of violence are symptomatic of Palestinian nationalism post-Oslo. The PA controls every aspect of Palestinians’ lives: employment, political activism, education, and social media. It also threatens punishment for those who oppose its policy.

Post-Oslo and “The Deal of the Century”

Palestinians have continually struggled against the injustices that have befallen them since 1948. However, their attempts to reclaim their national rights have repeatedly been thwarted by misleading, ambiguous “peace” interventions. The First Intifada, an uprising by the Palestinians against Israeli occupation that began in 1987, was concluded in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords created the PA and granted it the limited responsibility of self-governing some areas of Gaza and the West Bank. Issues such as sovereignty,

the rights of refugees, and the status of Jerusalem were, however, postponed. Joseph Massad argues that the signing of the Oslo Accords served to make the different interests of the Palestinians—living, variously, in what is now Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, and the diaspora—incompatible, if not contradictory: “Although the Palestinian people remain one spiritually, their material interests are different” (2006, 114; 127-28). In the lead-up to the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian leadership began preparations to establish an independent state, promised as part of the peace process, while marginalizing their main national and collective rights, including the rights of refugees to return to their homeland. By only agreeing to negotiate with the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza in Madrid in 1991, Israel effectively “succeeded in destroying the political unity of the Palestinian people,” leaving Palestinian refugees living in the diaspora “bereft of leadership and with no identifiable goals” (Massad 2006, 114; 127). The supposed “peace process” instigated by the Oslo Accords, proved to be a false promise for an unrealized future; it totally failed to realize the national aspirations of Palestinian people, and it increased the disunity between their various communities.

The 21st century has witnessed Donald Trump’s “Deal of the Century,” which is no more than a replica of the Oslo Accords or, worse, creates post-Oslo conditions that facilitate the annexation of what remains of Palestine. The pressure on the PA is to concede what remains of Palestinian national rights. Massad argues that the Oslo agreement “amounted to the final legitimation of the Jewish state as having the ‘right’ to be a racist apartheid state by the very people against whom its racist policies have been/are practiced, with the Israelis committing to nothing substantively new” (2018, para. 5). Instead of fighting against the deterioration of the political situation in Palestine and resisting the process of the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, the PA retreats behind defeatist rhetoric that causes further harm to Palestinian rights. Massad is right to argue that

Now that Israel’s right to be a racist state was guaranteed by the Palestinian leadership, wherein its racist demographic concerns would no longer be threatened either by the demand for equality for Palestinian citizens or by the return of the Palestinian refugees it expelled, attention was focused on East Jerusalem and West Bank colonization, as precursors to the final liquidation of the Palestinian national struggle. (2018, para. 15)

The new US-led peace initiative increased the disappointments of Palestinians. While Oslo made them have high expectations, this new initiative destroyed their ambitions. This initiative seems like a call for the Palestinians to mourn the loss of the rights of the refugees to return home, and to accept the reality of the expansion of settlements on their land and their lack of sovereignty over borders and Jerusalem. This initiative undermines the rights of Palestinians to live in peace and security, and it further destabilizes the already fragile situation.

Supported by the US, Israel invests in every crisis to further dominate and expropriate Palestinian land. Hamamra et al., drawing on Judith Butler’s concepts of precarity, precariousness, and vulnerability, point out that the Israeli military occupation uses the outbreak of the pandemic as a cover to fulfill its

plan of annexing parts of the West Bank: “the occupation mobilizes the lockdown as one way to advance the mission of ghettoizing Palestinians” (2021, 9). Hamamra et al. bring to the fore the Israeli dehumanization of Palestinian workers, their mistreatment of prisoners, their attack on health centers, and their arresting of Palestinians and demolishing and confiscating their properties during the outbreak of the pandemic (2021). Prime Minister Shtayyeh asserts that: “The formation of an Israeli annexation government means ending the two-state solution and the dismantling of the rights of the people of Palestine as established under international law and resolutions” (@DrShtayyeh, 20 April 2020). The prime minister views this annexing of Palestinian land as an “existential threat” to the international efforts to achieve a two-state solution (Holms 2020). However, as pointed out earlier, such a discourse of patriotism is not compatible with the lived experience of Palestinians, oppressed by the PA and its violent discourse and actions channeled towards their citizens.

Conclusion

The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 was on the verge of an apparent decolonization in some countries around the world. Israel continued the tradition of other colonial powers, and it demonstrated unethical domination and exploitation of Palestinian land and resources. Israel has modernized the face of colonialism, pledging to make its atrocities everlasting. Israel is a colonialist state that understands its existence on the Palestinian land as the antithesis of the presence of Palestinians on this land. Israeli practices since the Nakba until now aim to eliminate Palestinians and take over their land. The recent construction of the Separation Wall, the expansion of Israeli settlements, and the construction of roads exclusively used by Israeli settlers, as well as the continuation of the expulsion of Palestinians from their homes, such as what is happening now in Sheikh Jarrah, illustrates not only the racist face of this settler-colonial state, but also its criminality.

Palestinians have long struggled to end the Israeli military occupation. The PA has compromised many Palestinian rights, hoping that the world will sympathize with the victim’s surrender and plea for justice. However, this compromise has further increased the suffering of Palestinians and the vanishing of their landscape and imagined state. Instead of securing Palestinian national rights, the PA has granted Israel full sovereignty over Palestinian territory; it publicly declared its inability, and to a certain extent its unwillingness, to resist Israeli criminality. Although it publicizes the success of its international endeavors to unmask the seemingly civilized face of Israeli settler-colonialism, the PA’s policy facilitates the Israeli annexation of all of Palestine.

Biography

Ahmad Qabaha is an Assistant Professor in Postcolonial, Comparative, and American Studies and the head of the English department at An-Najah National University in Palestine. He is highly interested in teaching and conducting research on literature and art as well as examining the various modes and paradigms of literary, historical, socio-political, and cultural displacements in the 21st century. He is the author of *Exile and Expatriation in Modern American and Palestinian Writing* (Palgrave, 2018), and the co-editor of *Post-millennial Palestine: Memory, Writing, Resistance* (Liverpool University Press, 2021). He has also published several articles and book chapters in highly reputable publication companies and journals.

Bilal Hamamra has a PhD in Early Modern Drama from the University of Lancaster, UK and is currently an Associate Professor of English literature in the Department of English Language and Literature, An-Najah National University, Nablus, Palestine. His research interests are in Early Modern Drama, Shakespeare, Palestinian literature, women's writing and gender studies. His articles on language, gender politics, martyrdom, and diaspora have appeared in *Early Modern Literary Studies*, *Critical Survey*, *ANQ*, *The Explicator*, *Journal for Cultural Research*, *Journal of Gender Studies*, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *Anglia*, *Middle East Critique*, *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, *Interventions*, *Psychodynamic Practice*, and *Changing English*, among others.

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Resisting Ideological English: Agency and Valuing Against Reified Abstractions and Erasures

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By preserving the intent of the original French title of Franz Fanon’s great work, *Les Damnés de la Terre* as *The Damned of the Earth*, Lewis Gordon makes a critical contribution beyond his already notable contribution to Fanon Studies. At the start of *What Fanon Said*, Gordon says in the notes, “The title of [*The Wretched of the Earth*] is one with which I have much disagreement, so in this book it will be referred to in its proper translation as *The Damned of the Earth*” (2015, 151). Hearing in Gordon’s point here a philosophy of translation, I will explain how the proper translation of “les damnés” as “the damned” serves our understanding of resisting ideological language such as “the wretched” or connotations of wretchedness in daily language, which erase being, agency, and the value of living beings. “The damned,” a noun born of and still a verb, connotes the active colonial *damning* as a historical process driven by culpable agents.¹ Put differently, “the damned” “preserves” in the meaning of the words, the reality or fact of active colonial *damning* as a historical process driven by culpable agents; it does so in naming that action is done upon peoples, who are by that fact, *colonized* peoples. Gordon thus provides remedy to the ideological consequences of the better-known translation of the title of the work that would have the reader or listener more readily call up the sense of “unfortunate or unhappy people,” which the “wretched” “translation” connotes.² I develop and defend the theoretical and socio-political centrality of Gordon rejecting “the wretched” in favor of “the damned,” preserving in translation the essential agency of those doing the *damning* on the condition of the *damned*.

The latter more widely-known “translation” of “les damnés” as “the wretched” emanates from an outsider perspective critiqued and resisted by many philosophers.³ In connotations of “wretchedness,” that outsider perspective apparently “naturalizes” or makes it appear natural that some peoples, and thus people, may be wretched—those unfeelingly assumed to be in, to *be*, an abstract disconnected category—abstracted and disconnected from the agency doing the *damning*, from those who are agents in the process of *damning*. The ideological feat of apparent naturalization in turn inevitabilizes, by making the way for, the condition of “wretchedness.”

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I understand this outsider conception to exist dynamically within complex spectrums. It is characteristic of living distant from being the object of subjugation to all kinds of violence including poverty. Such outsider a-relationality is conceiving and acting as privileged.⁴ Its values and norms may be internalized in what W.E.B. Du Bois terms “double consciousness,” where Blacks and African-Americans experience a “twoness” due to being disvalued by white-dominant values characteristic of racialized oppression (Du Bois 1903, 3). I employ Marilyn Frye’s term “whitely” to name whiteness assuming away structural racial subordination, thereby taking it as natural (Frye 1992, 160; Mills 2018). The whitely outsider conception may also be internalized by non-Blacks and non-Whites. The made-to-be/as-if-passive adjective-as-noun-name “wretched,” an ideological outsider projection, would have it that its object is abstracted from the settler-colonial relationship of blood and violence. This includes psychological, emotional, cultural and intellectual violence perpetrated upon diverse peoples by European colonizers and colonialism, and diverse and daily resistance to such. Acutely distressing are connotations of “wretchedness” from this outsider conceiving and valuing figuring in contemporary mentalities and discourses. My moral responsibility here is to call attention to their proliferation disseminated in whitely knowing spaces, appealing to Gordon’s translation analysis as a means of resisting.

Ideologies are harmful ways of valuing and conceiving, including dispositions and behaviours, ways of being, shaping, facilitating, and sustaining oppressions and their practices and institutions. As a bilingual Francophone and Anglophone who thinks about ideology, my contribution is to explain what makes Gordon’s lesson on the importance of translation true to Fanon’s philosophy critical in the contemporary English-speaking context, at least in the United States. In this paper I direct our notice to the fact that this particular outsider perspective must necessarily be facilitated by and characteristic of modern English in its so-called “mainstream” or whitely corporate and academic vernaculars. For I take as a given, respect for linguistics and appreciation that features of language are essential to culture. Though I am a not myself a linguist, I hear the importance of noticing and considering how certain features of Indigenous and Aboriginal languages differ from English. “The wretched” exemplifies existence being erased in colonial Anglo conceptual schemes. I bring to Gordon’s lesson a historically grounded philosophical account of such. The being of “human *being*,” the perception of being in conceiving “human being,” and the value of “human being” are ideologically voided. This philosophy of translation lesson is thus essential to appreciation of conceptual schemes of language that connote valuing the *being* in “human being,” and relationality in life more generally.

My purpose is an urgent call to attention to contemporary racist colonialism in the 21st century in the form of an ideological use of language that insidiously erases agency, being, and relationality in its connotations or implications of “wretchedness.” I appeal to Ian Baucom’s work to situate us historically in the long 20th century of the Atlantic slave trade, where insurance value eradicates the value of human beings in the way it treats African peoples. I connect this to G.A. Cohen’s noticing how the existence of valuable things themselves, the being itself of valuable things, is eclipsed in contemporary “valuing,” including of human beings themselves. I bring the philosophy of *resisting* of María Lugones,

resisting “always in the gerund,” to claim that conceptions of “wretchedness” are a colonial logic of and desire for purity, a desire to be distant from “the wretched” (Lugones 2003, 208). With these I engage in the moral act of listening to Robin Wall Kimmerer’s grammar of animacy in her analysis of the contrast between *Bodéwadmimwen*, her ancestor’s language, a language indigenous to “the Americas,” and English; and to Carolyn Coleman’s research on *Gungbarlang*, an “Australian” Aboriginal language, where body parts are not grammatically expressible separable from their person, nor mothers from their children. I attempt to show that their work allows non-native speakers to appreciate how these languages stand in stark contrast to the accounting ledgers of the insurance claim adjuster (Baucom 2005, 7).

My purpose then is to target and to refuse whitely connotations of wretchedness that erase the being and agency of ethno-racially diverse peoples in language whose conceptual schemes are those of the era of the Atlantic slave trade, where insurance industry “valuing” of African persons and their bodies at their extinction makes for perpetual deadening of the very existence itself of valuable living beings once racialized, driven in part by the desire for purity, safety from wretchedness, on the part of the whitely.

As one who studies ideology, my role is to disrupt the violence of and due to this ideological erasure that passes in daily life, a self-perpetuating process of damning.

Following Gordon, Cohen, and Lugones as our philosophical guides in feeling and conceiving the vitality of being and agency in thinking, valuing, and resisting, multiple audiences are better attuned to feeling and hearing contemporary languages resisting ideological English such as Latinx and Black Lives Matter.

I offer the above with the purpose of resisting assumptions of inevitabilized “wretchedness” that figure in contemporary whitely creation and consumption of ideological discourses. This simultaneous creation and consumption can be characterized as a kind of solipsism where “the wretched” are created as abstractions and then consumed in public perceptions. In particular, I have in mind two moral crises. Institutions in the United States including those of higher learning began approaching anti-Black racism in response to anti-Black racism protests and social justice uprisings in 2020. The on-going COVID-19 pandemic gravely impacts the health and well-being, life and death of people and communities of color.

I

There is a powerful ideological tendency to containment-protecting-privilege in the contemporary context in the United States regarding new public facts about racialized oppressions manifest in this context. By “containment” here I mean an ideological tendency that preserves solipsistic race privilege of whitely classes, and workings on would-be evidence that threatens illusions. By “would-be evidence” I intend the valuing and knowledge of ethno-racially diverse peoples perceiving the whitely as such.⁵ Evidence is pacified before it can be taken as contradictory evidence, so that it will not be perceived as evidence at all. Regarding

public facts about racialized oppressions, the manner of their presentation in statistics, for example, lends itself in the context of English-speaking, to whitely neutralization. This happens by an ideological feat of privileged “othering” perspectives as connoted in the term “the wretched” read or heard by whiteness, importing a sense of inevitability and distance from whitely responsibility. My point is not limited to the term “wretched” or “wretchedness.” It is the following. Rather than appreciating that one’s own and one’s institution’s own decision-making are the agency making the reality, there is a perpetual risk, indeed a perpetual element of creating precisely the conditions one claims to address by the ideological importation of implicit inevitability content of the kind “wretchedness” exemplifies.

Consider treatments of, and whitely perceptions of “facts” regarding phrases such as “the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on Black and brown people.” By omitting the complex whitely agencies of structural racism that constitute the impact, the phrasing may import an implicit sense of the “wretchedness” of “Black and brown people” succumbing to COVID-19, naturalized and inevitabilized. Once it is from the ideological point of view an “outside fact,” the impetus to address one’s own participation in policies that impact the susceptibility of Black and brown people to COVID-19, is neutralized. For those concerned have been conceptually made distant from those exerting oppressive agency towards them. Hence, the agency making the impact on the lives, well-being, health, and deaths of ethno-racially diverse peoples, now isolated from self-awareness, self-criticism, and self-sanction, is free to operate, cloaking its self-fulfilling prophecy.

Institutional contexts that are bureaucratic and non-spontaneous, when responding to spontaneous organized social justice upheaval, will tend to mirror the very racist ideological logic they purport to aim to address. Particularly given the background context of instantaneous corporate and social media appropriation of anti-Black racism racial justice protests, this weakens resistance to whitely perceptions of connotations of naturalized and inevitabilized “wretchedness.” Academic institutions, mirroring corporate institutions, address anti-Black racism by engaging, for example, in statistical information gathering. This happens in the context of social media popularizing acronyms popular among many students where well-intentioned attempts at moral inclusivity in language are inattentive to their own simplifying ideological logic characteristic of whitely English-speaking.⁶ The problem I want to point to is this. Both kinds of “strategy”—whether collecting statistics in the name of anti-racism, or adopting acronyms readily repeated on various social media and in spoken language—use language and methodologies characteristic of coloniality. Rather than wholly rejecting the insurance industry logic, which ultimately leaves no room for engaging relationality in extended commitments, for learning peoples’ stories, for learning and being moved by their particular experiences, ways of valuing and perceiving and being in the world, they still conform to its terms. The unquestioned methodology of statistical information gathering is inherently incapable of combatting “exclusionary inclusion,” where, for example, Latino/as are “included” in an institution by physical presence but excluded from voice and agency in shaping the values and features of that institution.⁷ Capturing erasures of being and agency can only be accomplished through linguistic content that conveys

relationality and resisting agencies of colonized peoples, by their own voices and modes of expression and communication. Likewise, purportedly inclusive acronyms erase, for example, Hispanics and Cubanos, Guatamaltecós and Black trans identity; they erase cultural, linguistic, geographic, and myriad other place-specific ways of belonging to and with a people.⁸

My moral aim is to ground our attention to language usage in this contemporary colonial context, to resisting distancing and thus objectifying and pacifying the object in English.

“Latinx” is a model meaningful term and movement of resistance. “Latinx” is embracing with the “x” Indigenous languages, ancestry, and being, thereby resisting the coloniality of gender relations.⁹ “Black” is a claim of belonging to a particular culture, language, and history.¹⁰ Black Lives Matter are specifically gendered voices publicly resisting the coloniality of gender, speaking to specifically colonial agents of racialized gendered violence.¹¹ My aim here is to draw audiences in their multiplicity to attend to the need for listening against ideological noise that erases being and agency; this, in the service of echoing supporting calls for listening for agency and being, hearing such resisting.

II

We know that the destruction of languages and cultures is not incidental to colonization. It is essential to the colonial project that peoples cease to speak languages that value life, and that they assimilate to languages that objectify it.

Linguistic context tells the conceptual and valuing difference in languages that preserve agency when speaking of the living. Robin Wall Kimmerer, an enrolled member of the Citizen Band Potawatomi, contrasts her experiences of Indigenous ways of knowing and scientific ways of knowing, demonstrating the difference a verb makes¹² in “Learning the Grammar of Animacy” (Kimmerer 2011). English is a noun-based language, she says, “somehow appropriate to a culture obsessed with things” (2011, 172). Hearing Kimmerer, I appreciate that modern English is fit to treating living things as objectified objects, for it fails in its conceptual value scheme to sufficiently conceive of living being as such, as *being*. Kimmerer explains, “[h]ad history been different, I would likely speak *Bo-déwadmimwen* or Potawatomi, an Anishinaabe dialect,” of which nine speakers remain, a language in which about 70% of words are verbs, as compared to English where only 30% of words are verbs (2011, 168-9). In Potawatomi “we have different ways of speaking of the living world and of the lifeless” and “all kinds of things seemed to be verbs [...] ‘to be a hill,’ ‘to be red,’ ‘to be a long sandy stretch of the beach,’ ‘to be a bay.’” Listen again: “English is a noun-based language, somehow appropriate to a culture so obsessed with things” (2011, 172-3).

Since I am a non-specialist, I simply draw the readers’ attention briefly to what non-Anglos may have appreciable experience with.¹³ Many of the world’s languages are inflected languages, meaning that they have declensions, like Old English. By contrast, modern English is a subject-verb-object language, or a verb “medial” language where the verb must come in the middle between the subject and the object. There is no essential relationality, no subject-object relationality,

built into the grammar of modern English. There is no marking system where the subject of a verb without an object is “marked,” no structure to show the relationality of subject and object, nothing showing agreement between words in a phrase to indicate who is doing what to whom. Thus, as an analytic language rather than an inflected language, the subject-verb-object word order in English is what tells who is doing what to whom.

This linguistic feature of modern English seems to support Kimmerer’s suggestion that there is something about the preponderance of nouns in the particular context of the English language that is related to cultural obsessions with property accumulation over respect for the dignity of human and other life.¹⁴ Verb final languages are common world-wide but especially common in Indigenous languages in the Americas. Hearing Kimmerer, I wonder how this relates to her noticing that in *Bodéwadmimwen* the majority of the words are verbs.

It strikes me as an interesting conjecture, or at a minimum imaginatively fruitful, to consider how the relative lack of verbs in modern English, and perhaps even the fact of being verb medial, lends itself to a property-owning subject distanced from the object, and how this may relate to the language’s development during the context of early colonial violence.¹⁵ If linguists or historians have addressed this, I would be very interested to learn.¹⁶

“The wretched,” distanced from property-owning subjects, is an objectified object. It is a noun denuded of the agency of the verb “to damn” that causes the condition it connotes. As such, it reifies a detached free-floating “wretchedness” as it turns into abstraction and then nothingness, the long process of damning a people. “The wretched” as presumed “translation” of “les damnés” abstracts off of the colonial agents of damning peoples, abstracts into nothingness their agency in damning other people, creates a concept that is an abstraction from the violent relationship; hence, an ideological abstraction as double or even triple erasure process. For that abstraction permits the voiding of value, the value of living beings, from the concept of “les damnés.” How? The abstraction effected in the replacement of the verb-indicating-agency built into the noun-name “damnés” to the pacified noun “wretched,” is that “wretched” erases the cause or the condition of such a state, now made static and therefore imbued with permanence, leaving the agency void created by this erasure to be filled by the sense of inevitability, however regrettable, that some people are “wretched.”

Gordon develops our understanding of Fanon’s place as a revolutionary thinker not “a subordinated theoretical identity” ideologically “contained.” “The problem of subordinated theoretical identity is a theme against which Fanon argued. It is connected to another problem—the tendency to reduce Black intellectuals to their biographies.” This containment of Black intellectuals is effected by reducing “their thought to the thinkers they study,” or to only speaking to their biographies, to “[Black] experience.” “It is as if to say that white thinkers provide theory and Black thinkers provide *experience* for which all seek explanatory force from the former” (Gordon 2015, 5). Subordinated theoretical identity reasserts itself, I am suggesting, in the translation of “les damnés” to “the wretched.” The ideological “translation” subordinates to a pacified, derivative kind of non-existence. This is due at least in part, to the deadening effect of pacifiable noun-adjectives in English separated from verb-agency. “Wretched” does the ideological containment work on a thinker who “scratched through the

morass of banal rationalizations of political complicity and unveiled a world governed by norms of the living dead” (Gordon 2015, 2).

Subordinating the theoretical identity of Black intellectuals either to being derivative of white intellectuals or limited to the Black experience, is a form of what Lugones terms a colonial desire for and logic of purity, keeping thought pure of (Black) thought. I discuss this in Section V.

III

I now turn our attention to thinking about English in the historical context of insurance industry erasure of existence, erasure of the being in “human being.” Historical context places our contemporary era in what Ian Baucom argues is the long 20th century of the Atlantic slave trade. It is the ideological feat of insurance industry driven “valuing” of human beings as what they are worth when they are maimed, injured, or dead that defines the contemporary conception of valuing in the Anglo whitely context. Baucom’s argument that we are in what he terms the long 20th century, not 21st, situates the kind ideological feat of pacification and of naturalization of colonial oppression in the particularity of our historical context. Our era is best characterized by the insurance industry’s development in the Atlantic slave trade where, Baucom argues, the value of living beings is eradicated and replaced by “value” at the extinguishing of their body parts and their lives. The second chapter of *Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History*, “‘Subject \$; or the ‘Type’ of the Modern,” shows how body parts come to have a value irrespective of whose body part they belong to, whose body part they are (Baucom 2005).

First, “value” now abstracted and detached from life, is determined at the extinction of what had value. Second, body parts are “valued” or rather classified irrespective of whose body parts they are. A language that does not have terms for living beings as verbs, Kimmerer suggests, is fit to value things over life. It is conceptually fit, ideologically fit, to containing whiteness experiencing its own violence. “Wretchedness,” I am arguing, does this. For on the white side of coloniality,¹⁷ those on whom the violence is subjected have been pacified by being made noun-objects in the conceptual scheme.

Consider the very fact that in English we can conceive of body parts as distinct from those whose bodies they are, or of mothers as distinct from those to whom they are mothers. The Australian Aboriginal language of the Gunbarlang people cannot name a body “part” distinct from the person, nor a mother distinct from her children (Coleman 1982). This strikes me as a telling story about the relationship between English, colonization, and contemporary corporate imperialism. “The wretched” have been cast out of agency, made mere expendable body parts. “The wretched” becomes a trope used for the whitely to feel better about their complicity in reproducing “wretchedness,” choosing however consciously or unconsciously to conceive, think, value, and behave in “regrettable” inevitability language. Body parts are abstracted off of bodies in vocabulary. Lives are abstracted off human beings in vocabulary. “Race gaps in COVID-19 deaths.” In an economic system that trades in human beings, abstracting off respect and value for the dignity of human life, the insurance industry abstracts

off “value” as disconnected from life itself. “Value” is now literally confined to the living dead, distant solipsistic whitely being, conceiving, and valuing.

IV

A philosopher of ideology, G.A. Cohen centers our attention on the primacy of existence of valuable things themselves, and a bias in favor of that existing value. In “Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value” he defends a small-c conservatism against capitalist ideology that sells abstract or potential value while it destroys all valuable things (Cohen 2011, 211). I have argued elsewhere that the contemporary colonial valuing Cohen is resisting—in his terms, capitalist valuing—is a solipsistic “valuing” (Switzer 2023). Ideological pacification of “the wretched” to an inevitable condition is such solipsism. Cohen’s and Baucom’s arguments each diagnose what has happened to valuing: a capitalist-colonial would-be eclipsing of the whitely’s very capacity for valuing living beings. Taken together with Kimmerer’s and Gordon’s arguments, we may appreciate the deathly consequences of treating living beings in whitely conceptual schemes as other than verbs in process, as other than lived existing in particularity.

We perceive through our concepts. “The wretched” deadens the world, thingifies “the damned.” Independently of each other, Cohen appreciated and identified the same kind of ideological process of “devaluing” the concept of what he termed existing value, as Baucom. It is not only that persons are treated as violable, interchangeable, and disposable objects, which is already a moral tragedy (Nussbaum 1995, 257). Rather, Baucom and Cohen are each essentially arguing that capitalist-colonial valuing systems, “valuing” itself on the colonial side of agency, is eclipsing life. For Baucom, valuing is replaced by ideological insurance “values.” Enslaved people are “valued”/classified in terms of body parts and lives whose worth is determined by what monetary value their being extinguished costs in capitalist market terms. Value is loss. For Cohen, valuing is replaced by speculative abstraction “measuring” “possibilities,” a failure to recognize and detachment from, a bias in favor of existence, of existing value. Values, Cohen reminds us, are always *valu-ings* of *beings*. Understanding Baucom together with Cohen, we may understand that the insurance industry has disconnected valuing “on the whitely side,” from existence itself.

V

Finally, I appeal to decolonial feminist philosopher María Lugones’ diagnosing a “logic of purity” to explain what is at work in whitely Anglo understandings of “wretchedness”:

According to the logic of purity, the social world is both unified and fragmented, homogenous, hierarchically ordered. Each person is either fragmented, composite, or abstract and unified—not exclusive alternatives. Unification and homogeneity are related principles of ordering the social world. Unification requires a fragmented and hierarchical ordering. (Lugones 2003, 127)

To conceive a Black “other” as “wretched” or with connotations of “wretchedness” is to keep whitely perceiving essentially disconnected from human wretchedness, from the common possibility that one might be wretched too, from the situation of human wretchedness. Like the subordinated theoretical identity of Black intellectuals, such ideology is a containment mechanism for the illusion of homogeneity of whitely value and conceptual systems. It is a whitely pretending to be keeping oneself pure of the possibility of being wretched, of being connected to fragmented, composite wretchedness, of being *complicit in* creating wretchedness. The lover of purity may be facilitated, I have suggested following Kimmerer, by the preponderance of nouns not made into verbs, and, by the particular subject-verb-object non-relationality of grammatical form in English. The whitely “subject,” in this case the perceiver of the “pacified other” as “wretched,” is distanced from the object of his perception-projection. Indeed, “wretched” sets off its object as in a different realm from the “non-wretched” whose colonial agency is perpetually “pure.” The “lover of purity himself, the modern subject, the impartial reasoner,” Lugones says, is “the measure of all things” (2003, 143).

VI

María Lugones’ decolonial feminist philosophy requires that a theory of oppression both account for the reality that resistance is possible, and the apparently contradictory reality that oppression is inevitable (Lugones 2003, 55). My appeal here, my claim that our words must capture agency, being, and the value of human beings subjected to damnation by colonialism, respects I trust, Lugones’ logic of curdling, a practice of resisting a logic of purity.¹⁸

There is a world of difference between naming a “river” as a noun as opposed to as a verb; the former makes abstract “river” (Kimmerer 2011, 173). There are different ways of naming. I have defended Gordon’s philosophy of translation as I call it, true to Fanon’s original intent in naming “les damnés” “the damned,” preserving the agency imbedded in the verb form connotation of the colonizers’ agency-in-colonizing. In the contemporary context in the United States, many whitely ways of consciousness, including aspiring anti-racists, fail to identify how expectations of those constructed as racialized others, those constructed as “wretched” or the equivalent, reproduce precisely the phenomena they may “believe” they aim to undo. The logic itself of colonial pacification of the colonized object, the voiding of being, of existence, of valuing existence, its logic of purity, can only be met with resisting with a logic of curdling, logics of contestation and multiplicity. Notice how nicknames are different from names that separate abstract body organs. Nicknames are inherently relational; in loving relationships and community they may affirm and recreate a relationality based in memory and shared experience, the act of nicknaming in relationship to understanding the other’s character, person.

Kimberlé Crenshaw, a legal theorist and founder of Critical Race theory, developed the concept of intersectionality to address multiplicity especially before the law: the multiplicity of social forces and social identities as they intersect with ideological power. Crenshaw launched a SayHerName campaign in 2014. This

demands of us that we learn a human story about each Black woman's life who has been extinguished, and that we learn the circumstances of her experience of contemporary colonial violence (Crenshaw 2016). Black Lives Matter demands of us that we SayTheirNames. These are logics of curdling, as they require conceiving and valuing that takes commitment in time, energy, consciousness, and being against the ideological tides to the contrary. Musical artist Skipp Coon's music video "Assata Taught Me (page 181)" takes us to the embodiment of each life (Skipp Coon, nd). These are logics of curdling in requiring that we experience in feeling, in conceiving, Black experience of colonial violence in the particular stories of each of these human beings. Names connected to stories, memories, shared histories are not readily objectifiable as are people treated as informational statistics on a ledger. "Latinx" is a logic of curdling. The "x" beckons the history of coloniality of gender that is our present; the "x" beckons the being, the existence of languages indigenous to the Americas.

Baucom's cultural and literary history of the Black Atlantic takes the reader through each of the 133 enslaved people thrown overboard off the *Zong*, a British slaving ship. Baucom brings to life that each killing is an event, resisting the colonial ideological would-be illusion of a singular *Zong* incident (2005, 124-30). Colonial historian of the Black Atlantic José-Guadalupe Ortega tells students who immediately understand why, that we can only use the term "enslaved," and not the term much more familiar, a pacified noun imbued with wretchedness that whitely logics of purity have engrained in our speaking and conceiving habits.

My praxis purpose is to have us consider how dangerous it is to consume statistics and other pacified nouns regarding the persons described in ethno-racial categorizations uncritically: "Race gaps in COVID-19 deaths," "Blacks and Latinos are more likely." The saying or reading or thinking is connected to present doing, and thus to the accuracy of the claim itself, now turned self-fulfilling prediction. For the recognition is part of the action. While linguists may explain how it came to be and how it works, Gordon's translation philosophy provides a persuasive demonstration of a contemporary ideological situation, and significant reasons for us to exercise great caution in language that erases colonial relationality. We ought to resist the pressure to use statistical information about peoples' experiences of racialized oppressions, the same deathly and death-world language of insurance accounting. Resistance movements to contemporary historical processes of dehumanization, create possibilities, curdling possibilities as Lugones calls them, against the destruction of the very space, in Herbert Marcuse's sense in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), for valuing.

Biography

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Notes

1. I am setting aside the fact that whereas in French “les damnés” is plural, in English it must be singular.
2. I am not concerned here with the intention of the translator Constance Farrington.
3. A vast range of very important decolonial feminist work does this. Black feminist epistemology resisting logical positivist standards of knowledge is critical for appreciating erasures of agency and being of Black women knowing. See, in particular, Patricia Hill Collins (2000). Additionally, and in many tongues, María Lugones compels the reader to the importance of the “devotion (of friendship) that makes empathetic and sympathetic thinking possible,” critiquing and resisting whitely Anglo participation in ethnocentric racism understood as “a two-party affair, an interactive phenomenon” (2003, 41-51).
4. The reader will notice that I use the verb form wherever possible. I do this intentionally to connote the in-process agency that is the subject of the paper. I am resisting in my use of language, the strain it puts on English to do so.
5. See Lugones’ discussion of resisting arrogant knowing in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions*, pp. 55-58.
6. I allude to these two kinds of examples only in general terms to avoid getting lost in their logic.
7. See Rocco (2014).
8. See Snorton (2017) with thanks to Arlo Sandoval, Whittier College 2022 Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellow, whose research pointed me to this text.
9. For philosophical analyses of the coloniality of gender see Oyěwùmí (1997) and Lugones (2020). For historical analyses of the coloniality of gender see Sigal (2020).
10. For analysis of belonging to a particular African ethnic identity, *Carabali-Oru*, and the use of historical memory in the Americas to reestablish cultural connections, see José-Guadalupe Ortega (2014). For analysis of Black Americans’ accumulated folk knowledge in leveraging cultural memory, see Kazembe (2018), and for a philosophical argument that “one of the roles of black philosophy is to demonstrate radical love for black people by performing acts of inheritance of theoretical production created and maintained by black peoples,” see Dotson, (2013): 38-45.
11. See Angela Flournoy’s interview with Melina Abdullah on Black Lives Matter, womanist mothering, and abolition (2021) and Abdullah (2012).
12. The original “what a difference a day makes” is a translation of Mexican composer María Grever’s “Cuando vuelva a tu lado,” popularized in English by Dinah Washington.
13. It is to my linguist friend Galust Madrussian, Los Angeles City College retired faculty, that I owe much of the discussion of linguistics.
14. Galust Madrussian explains to me that Persian seems to have only nouns, but nouns that may commonly be changed to verbs. I do not think we need to interpret Kimmerer as offering a general account of languages with a high proportion of nouns. Rather, I interpret her point to refer to English where nouns do not connote animacy. That is, I interpret Kimmerer as making a claim particular to English.
15. Notice for example, that George Orwell’s analysis of the degradation of English due to political context identifies a tendency away from simple verbs; he advises choosing the active always over the passive voice. See Orwell (1946).
16. For a related discussion, see Motha (2020).
17. I borrow and honor María Lugones’ language here.

18. See Lugones, “Purity, Impurity, and Separation” in *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes Theorizing Coalition Against Multiple Oppressions*, 2003: 121-148.

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Dismantling the Violent Discourse of the State of Israel: On Zionism, Palestinian Liberation, and the Power of Language

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Selective Histories of Colonialism

When European powers held their infamous Berlin Conference in 1885, during which they agreed to divide the African continent among themselves, they did not employ such terms as enslavement, illegal seizure, exploitation, or genocide. Instead, they made references to “instructing the natives,” “bringing home to them the blessings of civilization,” and encouraging “the maintenance of peace (and) the development of civilization” (General Act 1885). Similarly, when Britain and France received Mandates from the League of Nations in the 1920s to serve as the supposed caretakers of their colonies in Africa and the Middle East, there was hardly any reference in the language of these Mandates to British and French geopolitical interests in serving this role; instead, many positive references asserted the need for allowing colonized countries access to their “own schools for the education of (their) own members in (their) own language,” among many other misleading claims (League of Nations 1922).

Utilizing positive language to frame horrific historical events is a core element in the historical discourses of colonialism and neocolonialism. According to this twisted but instrumental language, the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to, allegedly, eradicate terrorism and then invaded Iraq in 2003, to export democracy to the Arabs (Encarnación 2005). The same logic has been applied to many other geographic spaces before and after the genocidal wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Every war, so it seemed, was motivated by pure intentions—democracy, human rights, women’s liberation, freedom of speech, global security, and so on.

Similar to its main benefactor, the United States, Israel, too, has proven particularly efficient in the application of language to justify its protracted siege and bloody onslaughts in the Gaza Strip, military occupation, and apartheid in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Human Rights Watch 2021). Not once since its creation on the ruins of Palestinian villages in 1948—a catastrophic event known by Palestinians as the *Nakba*—has Israel ever accepted any moral responsibility for its actions. According to Israel, every act of ethnic cleansing,

every war, every massacre, and every expression of racism and apartheid had some kind of logical, legal, and even moral justification (Pappé 2006).

This article focuses mainly on the use of language in the case of Israeli colonialism and occupation of Palestine, with a particular emphasis on how Israel's Zionist ideology has invented its unique phraseology to ensure the story of its founding is always told from a political and historical discourse that is sympathetic to the Israeli cause. Finally, the article argues for the need of Palestinians to challenge the Zionist discourse and eventually claim their own narrative as part of their ongoing struggle for liberation and, ultimately, decolonization.

In May 2013, the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* obtained a document from the Israeli State Archives: GL-18/17028. The document is a rare primary source that testifies to the logic through which the post-*Nakba* Israeli political and historical modus operandi was formed. Explaining the significance of its find, *Haaretz* reported:

The Israeli censor's observant eye had missed file number GL-18/17028 in the State Archives. Most files relating to the 1948 Palestinian exodus remain sealed in the Israeli archives, despite the fact that their period as classified files—according to Israeli law—expired long ago. (Hazkani 2013)

Most official State documents concerning the massacres, rapes, and wanton destruction continue to be classified as Top Secret, making it extremely difficult for Israel's own historians to unveil the truth—of which Palestinians are already aware—to the Israeli public (Morris 2019). This particular file was an exception:

By the end of the 1950s, Ben-Gurion had reached the conclusion that the events of 1948 would be at the forefront of Israel's diplomatic struggle, in particular the struggle against the Palestinian national movement. If the Palestinians had been expelled from their land, as they had maintained already in 1948, the international community would view their claim to return to their homeland as justified. However, Ben-Gurion believed, if it turned out that they had left 'by choice,' having been persuaded by their leaders that it was best to depart temporarily and return after the Arab victory, the world community would be less supportive of their claim. (Hazkani 2013)

The story goes on to explain how Ben Gurion, with the help of Israel's top historians and researchers, fabricated a narrative that would eventually serve as Israel's everlasting retort to the accusation that Israel was founded upon ethnically cleansed Palestinian land. Only one example, GL-18/17028, shows how Israel's official language concerning political and historical contexts is the culmination of a centralized strategy—and, also tellingly, how the "Middle East's only democracy" is, in fact, one of the most controlled societies regarding freedom of information and speech in the region, particularly when such freedoms contradict the official censor's narrative on Palestine and Israel.

Little has changed since those early days when Israel laboured to concoct a romanticized, albeit fabricated, story of its own birth. The historical forgery persists, and will continue for as long as Israel remains a racially structured apartheid state, and as long as the Israeli military occupation remains in place.

Following in Ben Gurion's footsteps, Israel's longest-serving Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, excelled in the field of rhetorical manipulation and historical forgery as well. In June 2017, Netanyahu participated in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held in the Liberian capital of Monrovia. There, too, the Israeli leader found it critical to rewrite history. He had no choice, as Israel is the representation of the very enemy in Africa's anti-colonial past and present. "Africa and Israel share a natural affinity," Netanyahu claimed in his speech, explaining: "We have, in many ways, similar histories. Your nations toiled under foreign rule. You experienced horrific wars and slaughters. This is very much our history" (Benjamin Netanyahu Official Site 2017).

In this ahistorical Israeli discourse, the Israelis replace the Palestinian natives as the indigenous people of Palestine; Zionism becomes an anti-colonial national movement; and, the colonial power becomes the oppressed colonized people. Following this rationale, it would be safe to argue that, in essence, the entirety of Israel's official historical trajectory follows the same historical falsehood: a self-tailored and convenient logic.

The Dominant Israeli-Zionist Narrative

Israeli colonialism is not unique in history, and the Palestinian anti-colonial struggle is an essential part of complex, costly, and inspiring historical battles for liberation and collective self-assertion. Colonial wars of exploitation and anti-colonial wars of liberation are also, themselves, situated in a larger historical context of class struggle that is relevant to each and every society, regardless of time and place.

In socio-economic struggles, too, language use is paramount to the control of power. In "The German Ideology," Marx and Engels write that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force." They go on to assert that "the class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production" and conclude with "the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it" (Marx and Engels 1998, 67). These ideas inform the concept of cultural hegemony, which originated with Antonio Gramsci and "refers to domination or rule maintained through ideological or cultural means. It is usually achieved through social institutions, which allow those in power to strongly influence the values, norms, ideas, expectations, worldview and behavior of the rest of society" (Cole 2020).

One of the main fields where this hegemony is directly observed is the domain of political and state discourse, whether in general (as in the degree of importance that certain words or phrases are assigned and given power over others), or in the particular (as in the choice of words and expressions that become instrumental to the dissemination of the political perspective of dominant powers). For example, the US war on Iraq was almost entirely discussed in mainstream media and society using specific parameters and keywords imposed by the official US discourse. Thus the constant emphasis on the "war on terror," the "spreading of democracy," the "protection of human rights," and so on (Harmon, Muenchen 2009). Guided by the same reasoning

and intentions, in the Israeli case, we tend to use Israeli military code names when referring to the various wars on Gaza. We speak of Operation Protective Edge to refer to the Israeli war on Gaza in 2014 (IDF.il 2021), while largely unaware of the fact that Palestinians, too, had names of their own to delineate such violent events. Protective Edge, for Palestinians, is “Eaten Straw” (Al-Zaytouna 2014): in Arabic, *al-ʿAsf al-Maʿkool*. The Israeli code name used the adjective “Protective” to accentuate its habitual emphasis on its own “security;” Palestinians used a Quranic reference from the short *surah*, or chapter, called “The Elephant” (Quran). The Palestinian Arabic reference highlights that their resistance carries a deep historical and spiritual meaning, which also helps appeal to a larger global Arab and Muslim audience. By embracing the first term and ignoring the other, we, though often unwittingly, accept the Israeli logic and reject the Palestinian one.

This controlling rhetoric is particularly pronounced in the so-called “Palestinian-Israeli conflict.” The Zionist movement has, undoubtedly, succeeded in penetrating mainstream political discourse in the West, offering its own colonial discourse as the dominant one for the ongoing, so-called “conflict.” Indeed, even before the creation of Israel atop the ruins of Palestinian towns and villages, Zionism has relied on two fundamental elements to sustain and expand its colonial ambitions: first, the material (the systematic violence, land grab, ethnic cleansing, construction of “Jewish-only” roads and settlements, etc.), and second, the intangible (mostly concerned with the construction of narratives, linking, as a matter of course, the Jewish people to the “land of Israel,” while erasing Palestinians as, at best, nomadic people with no past, no identity, and no roots in their own historic homeland). The famous statement by former Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, in June 1969, that “there was no such thing as Palestinians,” remains one of the most glaring examples of the above assertion. Meir brazenly asserts: “It was not as if there was a Palestinian people in Palestine and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist” (Meir 1969).

Language matters and it matters most in this particular “conflict” because, without appropriate definitions, colonizers often evade accountability, as Israel has, thus far. Thanks to its allies and supporters in western capitals, mainstream media, and academia, Tel Aviv has, to some extent, succeeded in rebranding itself from being a military occupier and an apartheid regime to an “oasis of democracy” (Handlin 2021), if not, supposedly, “the only democracy in the Middle East” (Yinon 2020). Concurrently, it has always rebranded its enemies, the Palestinians, from being a nation fighting for its freedom, to an anti-Semitic people determined to destroy Israel.

In his essay, “Permission to Narrate,” the late Palestinian historian Edward Said highlights the unconditional mainstream embrace of the Zionist narrative and the demonization, or erasure, of the Palestinian version of history altogether. His essay, published in February 1984, was written within the context of the post-Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the horrific massacre of Sabra and Shatila two years earlier:

The political question of moment is why, rather than fundamentally altering the Western view of Israel, the events of the summer of 1982 have been

accommodated in all but a few places in the public realm to the view that prevailed before those events: that since Israel is in effect a civilized, democratic country constitutively incapable of barbaric practices against Palestinians and other non-Jews, its invasion of Lebanon was *ipso facto* justified. (Said 1984, 28)

And by that same erroneous logic, the Palestinian perspective is also shunned as if irrelevant, immaterial, and an infringement on Israeli and, by extension, Western political and historical sensibilities:

The Palestinian narrative has never been officially admitted to Israeli history, except as that of ‘non-Jews,’ whose inert presence in Palestine was a nuisance to be ignored or expelled. With the exception of a small and marginal group of Israelis, most of Israel has, as a result, not found it difficult to get over the story of the Lebanese war and its subsequent horrors. (Said 1984, 33)

The obvious inequity between the Zionist and Palestinian discourses in mainstream western media is often highlighted by US intellectual Noam Chomsky, with reference to the narratives and rhetoric used by Western media to present—or, rather, misrepresent—its perception of “facts” related to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

When a PLO terrorist group took Israeli teen-age members of a paramilitary (*Gadna*) group hostage at Ma’alot, that was rightly denounced as a vicious criminal act. Since then, it has become virtually the symbol of the inhuman barbarism of the ‘two-legged beasts.’ But when Israeli troops cart off the Palestinian male population from 15 to 60 (along with many thousands of Lebanese) to concentration camps, treating them in a manner to which we return, that is ignored, and the few timid queries are almost drowned in the applause—to which we also return—for Israel’s display of humanitarian zeal and moral perfection, while aid is increased in honor of this achievement. It is a scene that should give Americans pause, and lead them to raise some questions about themselves. (Chomsky 1999, 382)

Still, this is not a discussion that is concerned with journalistic integrity, per se, or the need for greater “balance” in reporting, but in the unconditional embrace of Israel’s own colonialism in Palestine by former colonial and current neocolonial powers in the West, and the accompanying discourse that is used to rationalize, justify, and defend this ongoing colonialism. Identifying the issue as such would render the platitudes moot, however sincere, of the need for more journalistic “balance” in understanding the “Palestinian-Israeli conflict.” Even if that coveted balance is finally achieved, the rapport between Western and Israeli colonialism is unlikely to be entirely severed, as the language used by Israel to describe its military occupation and justify its colonialism, military occupation, and apartheid in Palestine is akin to the very language used by the US in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the language scrupulously chosen by colonial Britain, France, and other European powers to explain their colonial intrigues in much of the southern hemisphere.

Alas, our understanding of history is not shaped by mere demonstrable facts or truths, but largely by our own emphasis of what “facts” matter most and, as

in the case of Israel, the creation and fabrication of new “facts.” The colonized, too, have their own “facts” and unique interpretation of their history, but when their voices are completely removed from any discussion, the only “side” (thus, “facts”) that matter is the self-serving narrative of the colonizer. Said is once again on point:

Facts do not at all speak for themselves, but require a socially acceptable narrative to absorb, sustain and circulate them. Such a narrative has to have a beginning and an end: in the Palestinian case, a homeland for the resolution of its exile since 1948. (Said 1984, 34)

For Palestinians to assert their own truths, facts, and interpretation, they must rationally carry out two simultaneous acts: first, dismantle the system of hegemonic discourse established by settler-colonial Zionist ideology and sustained by Israel’s Western benefactors; and, second, offer their own narratives situated in their own history, culture, and political priorities as the only alternative to the ever hegemonic, dominant, and, ultimately, fallacious Israeli colonial discourse.

Language and Its Discontents

On 25 May 2021 famous American actor, Mark Ruffalo, tweeted an apology for suggesting, in an earlier post, that Israel is committing “genocide” in Gaza:

I have reflected & wanted to apologize for posts during the recent Israel/Hamas fighting that suggested Israel is committing ‘genocide.’ It’s not accurate, it’s inflammatory, disrespectful & is being used to justify antisemitism here & abroad. Now is the time to avoid hyperbole. (@Ruffalo 2021)

But were Ruffalo’s earlier assessments, indeed, “not accurate” or “inflammatory and disrespectful”? And, does equating Israel’s war on besieged, impoverished Gaza with genocide fit into the classification of “hyperbole”? To address these questions is to delve into the very heart of the language politics of the anti-colonial Palestinian struggle.

Ruffalo’s apology was unnecessary, since his earlier, accurate depiction of the nature of Israel’s behavior in occupied Palestine was consistent with the demonstrable, often tragic, reality on the ground, and the legal framework that has, with equal consistency, depicted this reality. The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Article 2, for example, offers what has, since then, become the internationally-accepted legal definition of genocide:

Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part. (UN Convention 1948)

But does this apply to Israel? In its description of Israel’s 10-21 May 2021 war on Gaza, the Geneva-based human rights group, Euro-Med Monitor, reported:

The Israeli forces directly targeted 31 extended families. In 21 cases, the homes of these families were bombed while their residents were inside. These raids resulted in the killing of 98 civilians, including 44 children and 28 women. Among the victims were a man and his wife and children, mothers and their children, or child siblings. There were seven mothers who were killed along with four or three of their children. The bombing of these homes and buildings came without any warning despite the Israeli forces' knowledge that civilians were inside. (Euro-Mediterranean 2021)

According to estimates by the Palestinian Ministry of Health, by the end of the war over 250 Palestinians had been killed and nearly 2,000 were wounded (Euro-Mediterranean 2021). Though tragic, this number is relatively small compared to the casualties of previous wars. For example, in the 51-day Israeli war on Gaza in the summer of 2014, over 2,200 Palestinians were killed and over 17,000 were wounded (Baroud 2017). Similarly, entire families, like the 25-member Abu Jame family in Khan Younis, also perished (Amnesty International 2021). The same logic can be applied to the killing of over 300 unarmed protesters at the fence separating besieged Gaza from Israel, between March 2018 and December 2019. Moreover, the siege and utter isolation of over two million Palestinians in Gaza since 2006-07, which has resulted in numerous tragedies, is an act of collective punishment that also deserves the designation of genocide (UN 2018).

But one need not be a legal expert to point at evidence of a strong case of Israeli genocide in Palestine. Equally damning is the language of violence and genocide that inundates past and current Israeli discourse. For example, current Israeli Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, who has also served in the role of Defense Minister in past governments, stated: "I've killed lots of Arabs in my life—and there's no problem with that" (Bennett 2013). The ease with which Palestinians can be killed without consequences for their killers has preceded the foundation of Israel itself, and continues to mar the country's political discourse to this day. Indeed, the language of genocide has always been a major facet accompanying Zionist colonialism. Palestine, according to early Zionist ideologues, was "a land with no people" for "a people with no land" (Nashef 2016). These colonists, in their own understanding of history, were never "illegal settlers" but "Jewish returnees" to their "ancestral homeland" who, through hard work and perseverance, managed to "make the desert bloom" and, in order to defend themselves against the "hordes of Arabs" they needed to build an "invincible army" as they, supposedly, did (Roberts et al. 2021).

"Conflict" and its inaccurate insinuations, like the term "dispute"—as in the "disputed East Jerusalem"—are equally problematic. It should be obvious that besieged, occupied, and colonized people do not engage in a "conflict" with their occupiers and that their ancestral homeland should not be a subject of "dispute" (France 2017). Moreover, a "dispute" happens when two parties have possibly compelling claims to an issue. When Palestinian families of East Jerusalem are being forced out of their homes, which are, in turn, handed over to Jewish extremists, the term "dispute" cannot be applicable in any way (Action Aid 2021). The extremists are violent colonists and the Palestinians are colonized victims who are fighting to retain their legal and moral rights to their homes and

land. The international community, despite its failure at aiding the rightful Palestinian struggle for justice, says so (UN, 2021).

“Conflict” is not just a generic term but a dangerous one, too. Aside from absolving the aggressor—in this case, Israel—it leaves all matters open to interpretation. Since US audiences, for example, are indoctrinated to love Israel and to have a negative view of Arabs and Muslims, allying with Israel in its “conflict” with the Palestinians, who are Arab and Muslim in the majority, becomes the only rational option (Khan et al. 2012).

Approximately 78% of the total size of historic Palestine was colonized by Zionist militias, later Israel, in 1947-48. The remainder, approximately 22%, was militarily occupied and colonized by Israel in 1967. Since then, a slow but decisive process of colonization—what Israel refers to as “annexation”—has taken place. The process of usurping Palestine required the use of extreme violence, state-sanctioned apartheid, and what Israeli historian, Ilan Pappé (2014), calls “incremental genocide.” From the perspective of international law, these processes of colonization, occupation, and violence are the pillars of what the United Nations insists on framing as an “illegal Israeli occupation” (UN 1999). The UN does not use such terms as “dispute” to condemn the illegal settlements in occupied Palestine. However, the insistence of mainstream media and academia to make such noncommittal and often confusing references (to conflict, dispute, etc.) serves the Israeli narrative well, as it allows Tel Aviv to mask its violent colonial action as if it is something else entirely: something to be disputed, argued, and even justified.

The discussion can be expanded to include a plethora of other misleading terms. For example, the phrase “peace process” was coined by American diplomats decades ago. It was put to use throughout the mid- and late 1970s when then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger laboured to broker a deal between Egypt and Israel in the hope of fragmenting the Arab political front and, eventually, sidelining Cairo entirely from the “Arab-Israeli conflict.” Alas, he succeeded (Satloff 2018).

Kissinger’s logic proved vital for Israel as the “process” did not aim at achieving justice according to the fixed criterion that had been delineated by the UN for years. There were no frames of reference any more. If any existed, they were Washington’s political priorities which, historically, almost entirely mirrored Israel’s priorities. Despite the obvious American bias, the US bestowed upon itself the undeserved title of “the honest peace broker” (Hatuqa 2018). This approach was used successfully in the run-up to the Camp David Accords in 1978 (Carter 2020). One of the Accords’ greatest achievements is that the so-called “Arab-Israeli conflict” was then replaced with the so-called “Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”

Tried and true, the “peace process” was used again in 1993, resulting in the Oslo Accords between Israel and the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). For nearly three decades, the US continued to tout its self-proclaimed credentials as a peacemaker despite the fact that it pumped three to four billion dollars of annual aid to Israel, most of it military (and continues to do so) (Baker et al. 2016).

As far as Palestinians are concerned, they have little to show. No actual peace was ever achieved; no justice was obtained; not an inch of Palestinian land was

returned; and, not a single Palestinian refugee was allowed home. However, US and European officials and a massive corporate media apparatus continued to talk of a “peace process” with little regard to the fact that the “peace process” brought nothing but war and destruction for Palestine, and allowed Israel to continue its illegal appropriation and colonization of Palestinian land.

But the “peace process” introduced more than death, mayhem, and normalization of land theft in Palestine. It also wrought its own register of linguistic phrases and terms, which remains in effect to this day. Practically speaking, the “peace process” lexicon divided Palestinians into “moderates” and “extremists.” The “moderates” believe in the US-led “peace process,” “peace negotiations,” and are ready to make “painful compromises” in order to obtain that coveted “peace.” On the other hand, the “extremists” are “Iran-backed,” a politically “radical” bunch that use violent “terrorism” to satisfy their “dark” political agendas (*Times of Israel* 2021).

But is this the case? Since the signing of the Oslo Accords, many sectors of Palestinian society, including Muslims and Christians, Islamists and secularists, and notably socialists, resisted the unwarranted political “compromises” undertaken by their leadership, which they perceived to be a betrayal of Palestinians’ basic rights. Meanwhile, the “moderates” have largely ruled over Palestinians with no democratic mandate. This small, but well-funded group introduced a culture of political and financial corruption (Simons 2021), arguably unprecedented in Palestine’s modern history. They applied torture against Palestinian political dissidents as a matter of course (Human Rights Watch, Palestine 2019). Not only did Washington say little to criticize the “moderate” Palestinian Authority (PA)’s dismal human rights record, but it also urged the PA to carry out more crackdowns on those who “incite violence” and their “terrorist infrastructure.”

Correspondingly, terms such as “resistance”—*muqawama*—were slowly but carefully extricated from the Palestinian national discourse. The term “liberation,” too, was perceived to be confrontational and hostile. Instead, such concepts as “state-building”—championed by a Washington favorite, former Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, and others—began taking hold in the post-Oslo-years (UN 2019). The fact that Palestine was still an occupied country and that “state-building” can only be achieved once “liberation” was first secured, did not seem to matter to the “donor countries.” The priority of these countries—mainly US allies who adhered to American political maxims in the Middle East—was to maintain the illusion of the “peace process” and to ensure “security coordination” between PA police and the Israeli army carried on uninterrupted (I24 News 2020). The so-called “security coordination,” of course, refers to the US-funded joint Israeli-PA efforts at cracking down on Palestinian resistance, apprehending Palestinian political dissidents and ensuring the safety of the illegal Jewish settlements, or colonies, in the occupied West Bank (Rahman 2021).

Other terms that can be constructive and positive within certain contexts, were also applied to the Palestinian situation, but in erroneous and misleading ways. The word “democracy,” for example, was constantly featured in the new Oslo language. Of course, it was not intended to serve its actual meaning. Instead, it was the embellishment of making the illusion of the “peace process”

complete. This became obvious in January 2006, when the Palestinian party Fatah, which has monopolized the PA since its inception in 1994, lost the popular vote to the Islamic party, Hamas (Jeffery 2006). The latter is one of several other Palestinian groups that have rejected the Oslo Accords. Their participation in the legislative elections in 2006 took many by surprise, as the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was itself a product of Oslo. Their victory in the elections, which was classified as democratic and transparent by international monitoring groups (Gov.info 2006), threw a wrench in the US-Israeli-PA political calculations.

Amazingly, the group that has long been perceived by Israel and its allies as “extremist” and “terrorist” became the elected leaders of Palestine. The Oslo language spin doctors had to go to work fast in order for them to thwart the first genuine exercise of Palestinian democracy and to ensure a successful return to the status quo, even if this meant that the fate of the Palestinian people remains in the hands of unelected, undemocratic leaders.

Meanwhile, Hamas’ stronghold, the Gaza Strip, had to be taught a lesson. Thus, the siege imposed on the impoverished region since the revelation of the 2006 elections results (OCHA 2020). The siege on Gaza has little to do with Hamas’ rockets or Israel’s “security” needs, Israel’s right to “defend itself,” or its well-intentioned attempt at destroying Gaza’s “terrorist infrastructure.” While, indeed, Hamas’ popularity in Gaza is unmatched anywhere else in Palestine, Fatah, too, has a powerful constituency there. Moreover, the Palestinian resistance in the Strip is not championed by Hamas alone, but also by other ideologically different political groups, including the Islamic Jihad, the socialist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and other socialist and secular parties (TRT 2021).

Yet, misrepresenting the “conflict” as a “war” between Israel and Hamas is crucial to Israeli propaganda, which has managed to equate Hamas with militant groups throughout the Middle East even as far as Afghanistan. However, Hamas is not ISIS, Al-Qaeda, or the Taliban. In fact, none of these groups are similar in any way. Hamas is a political actor that operates within a largely Palestinian political context. But what does Israel have to gain from mischaracterizing the Palestinian resistance in Gaza? Aside from satisfying its propaganda campaign of erroneously linking Hamas to anti-American Islamic groups, it also dehumanizes the Palestinian people entirely and presents Israel as a partner in the US-led global “war on terror.” In this manufactured reality, Israel’s rightwing, religious, and ultranationalist politicians assume the role of the dedicated US allies, the defenders of western civilization, and the saviors of humanity itself. Considering these supposed great moral challenges at hand, the violent language and action of Israeli leaders can then be discreetly swept under the rug where all is forgiven or forgotten. This is precisely how “genocide” can be twisted and rebranded as “self-defense.” Within this carefully molded discourse the term “colonialism,” the most relevant and accurate of all terms, is, unsurprisingly, nowhere to be found.

Reclamation

Discourses of Palestine and Israel—the selection of terminology, phrases, historical references—are part of a larger narrative war resulting from Israeli colonialism, military occupation, and apartheid in Palestine. Whereas the Israeli and pro-Israeli narratives constantly attempt to whitewash and apologize for colonialism, the Palestinian narrative is a direct expression of an ongoing attempt at confronting and exposing Zionist settler-colonialism.

The historical support of Israel by mainstream media, which is a direct expression of official Western support of Israel and its Zionist ideology, has, over time, created a suite of hegemonic rhetorical flourishes that facilitate the domination of Zionist culture and politics over all matters concerning Palestine and the Palestinian people. To counter and to, ultimately, end the Israeli dominance over the Palestine/Israel discourse, Palestinians are left with the massive task of presenting their own unified, cohesive, and comprehensive narrative, not as a counter-narrative but as a self-possessed and independent narrative of its own. Only by defeating the Zionist hegemony over what is essentially a colonial discourse, will Palestinians finally be able to free language from the confines of intentional misrepresentation and manipulation and, ultimately, free their own land as well.

Biography

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Everyday Evil in Palestine: The View from Lucifer's Hill

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Introduction

The incremental colonization, ethnic cleansing, and oppression occurring daily in historical Palestine is usually ignored by the world media. These daily occurrences stand very little chance of being properly reported on and, therefore, fail to make it onto any politician's agenda. This is not surprising; even dramatic manifestations of Israel's brutal policies do not receive their due attention and reaction, but at least they are noted. The Palestinian tragedy is not made only of relatively known landmarks of this brutality, such as the 1948 catastrophe, the 1956 Kafr Qassim massacre, the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres in Lebanon, the 1999 Kafr Qana massacre, the 2002 Jenin massacre, or the assaults on Gaza. Everyday oppression becomes a significant landmark in this callous genealogical territory.

The Palestinian experience should be highlighted not because it differs from other locations of brutality in the world, but because it is one of the few cases that is still widely denied.

This article offers a glimpse into the daily evil of Israeli settler-colonialism through the window of one hour on a hill in the West Bank. I use the term "evil" advisedly and in connection to the daily experiences of Palestinians. "Everyday history of evil" is used in psychohistories of the Holocaust and other genocides as part of a quest to understand how "ordinary" people could commit evil (Ludtke 1995). More recently, such a quest has also focused on the Islamic State (Covington 2016). Hannah Arendt argued that evil seems to be intrinsic to humanity (Whitefield 1981), while the psychoanalyst Coline Covington (2016) and the anthropologist Monique Layton (2021), each in their own way, explain how everyday evil is justified and enhanced by indoctrination and ideology and can therefore be controlled by such forces.

Although the term "evil" might sound metaphysical or imaginary, Freud, Girard, and Arendt among others give it a psychological and clinical definition (Aragno 2014; Dadosky 2010; Whitefield 1981). As Coline Covington (2016, 1) argues, it is "an action that is intended to dehumanize another and to use the other as means to an end." Covington shows how organized political systems and group psychology perpetuate the cycle of evil and destruction. Covington's examples, like all works on the subject, exclude Israeli brutality in Palestine, even

while scholars who depict Israel as a settler-colonial project insist that at the heart of such a project is the need to dehumanize the native, the other, the Palestinian.¹ In genocide studies, it seems there is still a taboo on discussing Palestinians.

Recently, the research on everyday evil has moved outside the Western world and includes the horrors experienced by indigenous people. This approach introduced the concept of “historical oppression” without excluding contemporary oppression, as well as expanding the boundaries of resilience theory to contain the indigenous struggle. These developments open the way for a better understanding of the Palestine case (Brunette and Figley 2017; Salter, Adams et al. 2018).

The purpose of almost all these general inquiries is to understand the essence and meaning of evil. In this piece, I would like to offer a glimpse into the everyday evil under Israeli settler-colonialism, less as a way to better understand evil, than to provide a concrete description of its existence and machinations. This is less an exercise in understanding than an effort to disseminate information and alert readers to an ongoing catastrophe. While the mechanism and matrix of callousness is more obvious in dramatic events such as the assault on Gaza, choosing a largely random time and a place can also make this clear. In my case, this was a hill—the Lucifer Hill, overlooking an area south of Mount Hebron called Masafer Yatta. From that vantage point, both the oppression and the resistance to it are visible. This is but one of the places in the West Bank that constitute what Ariel Handel (2009) called “a map of disaster.”

Though several locations in occupied Palestine gain brief international attention, the span of this attention is both very short and often lacks the necessary historical and moral context. The body of research currently available gives the impression that one must digest a mountain of information to grasp the full horror of Israeli settler-colonization. I will show that all anyone needs to grasp the realities of this ongoing oppression is one hill, and one hour.

Lucifer’s Hill

It is mid-August, the hottest month in Palestine, and it is noontime, which should be unbearable. But where I am standing, on top of Lucifer’s Hill, on the southern tip of the occupied West Bank, the climate is exceptionally pleasant. The cool breeze from the sea on the west and the dry air from the Judean Desert are particularly pleasant for someone like me who usually spends his summers in the humidity of Haifa, on the Mediterranean. On this particular day, I am also thinking about my friends back home in London melting in the sweltering temperatures of the recent heatwave.

The hill had no particular name for a long while. It was an important outpost for whoever ruled the border between Palestine and (Trans)Jordan. Local people told me it was named in Arabic *Tel al-‘Asafir* (the Birds’ Hill), which makes sense as it was and still is an ideal spot for watching birds of prey migrating in the summer to Europe and returning in the winter to Africa. The British had built a police station there but did not give the hill a name. The Israeli army distorted the Arabic name and turned it into the more ominous one: Lucifer’s Hill.

The original British police station is still there, nicknamed at the time “the Mickey Mouse building” as its two annexes on the side resembled Mickey’s ears. It was built to guard Mandatory Palestine first against smugglers, and later against young volunteers from the Arab world who crossed the river Jordan to join the Palestinian guerrillas in their struggle for independence during the years 1918-1948. The Jordanians also used it as a police station. After the Israeli occupation in 1967, it was deserted for a time. In 1991, the Israeli army opened a pre-military boarding school in the main building of the police station to house young settlers and turn them into fanatic religious nationalists. In 2016, some in the international community became aware that this cadre was now running the Israeli army and security services (Lubell, 2016).

In 1981, 4,000 dunams (988 acres) around the post, which included the hill and its surroundings, were given by Israel to the World Zionist Organization (WZO); the state itself illegally acquired this space by expropriating private Palestinian land. The WZO is an anachronist body from the pre-state days. During the period of British rule (1918-1948) it recruited funds and political support for the colonization of Palestine. After the establishment of Israel, it was redefined as a Zionist non-governmental organization (NGO), as was the other colonialist arm of the movement in the mandatory time, the Jewish National Fund (JNF).

These two bodies proved useful in pushing for further colonization after 1948. Since its inception, the state of Israel was aware that taking over the land of Palestinians, be they the refugees of 1948 or the residents of the 1967 occupied territories, was an illegal act according to international law. So they devised an internal legal process by which these lands were nationalized not by the state (which would be a stark violation of international law) but by the JNF and WZO as external non-governmental “Jewish” bodies, committed to obtaining land exclusively for the Jewish nation.

Moreover, the funding for this elaborate act of theft did not come directly from the state, at least at first. The money came from Jewish communities around the world, which had been asked to donate to ecological NGOs that would keep Israel green and sustainable. After the right-wing Likud party came to power in 1977, the funding began to arrive directly from the state as well, and some of the NGOs’ departments were incorporated in new ministries sometimes named “the ministry of infrastructure” or in the recent government’s “the ministry for settlement.”

The lands I was watching from Lucifer’s Hill were expropriated by the WZO and defined at first as grazing grounds, namely lands forbidden for human settlement. The dozen Palestinian villages on this land were thereby declared illegal. This by itself, however, was not enough to intimidate the Palestinians into leaving this land which they had cultivated for centuries. The next move was to change the category of the land and encourage Jewish settlers to build large farms on the land.

One person who heeded the call for building a big farm on this land was Yaacov Yohannes. He was a South African Jew and an ideal choice for one of the first of many to become a farm owner in the area surrounding the hill. He detested post-Apartheid South Africa and thought the West Bank to be a place where time had frozen and racialization was still legitimate and even welcomed (Shulman 2013, 22-37).

He had already settled in the area without permit. The WZO had to plead with him to settle on the hill, which he found unattractive, but he was finally persuaded. He received more than 3,600 dunams (889 acres) of land. In the process, he Hebrewized his family name to Talia and named the land expropriated by the Israeli army from a Palestinian family the Talia Farm. The original Palestinian owners proved in court that the land was theirs, but he was never evicted. His family still owns the farm today. I will come back to them later.

Masafer Yatta: In the Shadow of Area C

The hill lies in the midst of an area called Masafer Yatta. This is an old name, and it seems that it means the distance it took to travel from the town of Yatta (south of Hebron) to this hilly area, where for centuries farmers built hamlets to keep an eye over their cultivated plots and herds. The hamlets became villages and nowadays there are 19 in this area.

The scenery of the Masafer Yatta area from the hill is breath-taking even today. It is a beautiful panorama that reminds one of the magical views one can revel in when visiting the lands bordering on the desert-like and arid areas of southern Palestine. To the east, one can see the southern Jordan valley well into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan through yellow hills. To the north, the view is open all the way to Hebron, a space dotted with small picturesque Palestinian villages but marred by the dozen or so fortress-like Jewish settlements. Much closer to the west, you can see the Tarkumiyya checkpoint, a privatized and notorious crossing between Israel and Area C.

In 1995, Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo II agreement which divided the occupied West Bank into three areas. Area A under direct control of the Palestinian Authority, the new body established by the Oslo Accords, would later be declared the state of Palestine. Area A is 18% of the West Bank, which itself is 20% of historical Palestine. The State of Palestine is therefore 3.6% of historical Palestine, and even this tiny land is dependent on Israel's goodwill and say-so.

Area B (roughly 22% of the West Bank) is under joint control in theory, but is totally governed by the Israeli army and security forces. Area C consists of nearly 60% of the West Bank and is under direct Israeli rule. Tarkumiyya is one of the connecting points between Area C and Israel proper (Israel before the June 1967 war). It is run by a private security company which granted this prison gate the appearance of an international terminal, part of the disguise Israel employs to cover up this project of inhumanity it has maintained now for more than 50 years. The lucky few who are allowed to work in Israel, and who are therefore vulnerable to demands by the secret service to serve as informers and collaborators—must arrive there at 0345 in the morning and return before dusk—a routine reminiscent of the permit of stay for Africans in apartheid South Africa. Palestinians are not allowed to cross by cars, and they have to walk and be picked up on both sides. Settlers and other Israeli citizens have a normal crossing through a barrier, while Palestinians are pushed into covered tunnels, guided by robotic voices that direct them on their way in or out of Area C.

The whole area from the barrier to the border with Jordan and the very southern tip of the West Bank is then part of Area C. This should have satisfied the Israelis, but they want more. Israel has coveted this tip of the West Bank from

the first day of the occupation in June 1967. In their vision it should have been part of the West Bank as a whole since it was devoid of any Palestinians and thus ideal for an uninterrupted Jewish colonization and de-jure annexation to Israel. Since 1967, successive Israeli governments experimented and perfected the vision of having the land without the people living on it. The first step was to decide that Palestinians had no need to live in spacious areas and should cling to densely populated spaces—open and green spaces were to be only occupied by Jewish settlers.

The first step in this direction was to partition the West Bank between Jewish and Palestinian spaces. This new partition was authored and supervised by Yigal Alon, one of the leaders of the Labour Party that dominated Israeli politics since its inception until 1977. He devised a detailed plan, the Alon Plan, and although successive Israeli governments never adopted it officially as a governmental plan, it served as a blueprint for the policies of the Judaization of the West Bank since 1967. Masafer Yatta was located within the Jewish West Bank in the Alon plan.

The “Jewish West Bank” became Area C under the Oslo II agreement. Naph-tali Benet, who became Israel’s Prime Minister in June 2021 after 11 years of Benjamin Netanyahu’s rule, led since the beginning of this century the informal lobby calling upon Israel to annex Area C to the Jewish State. In his various ministerial positions under Netanyahu, Benet talked about the annexation of the area to Israel, but in essence did very little. Like others he was content, and maybe will still be content in the future, with figuring out how to Judaize or ethnically cleanse it fully, before annexing it.

The current Israeli methods in Masafer Yatta are the admixture that would be used in the future to cleanse Area C. When standing on Lucifer’s Hill, you can vividly see this brutal methodology in action. Let’s view some of them beginning with the weaponization of archaeology as a pretext for the ethnic cleansing of local people.

Susya: Archaeology in the Service of the Colonizer

If you look towards the West, you see a bizarre sight: an archaeological site with settlers’ huts and small Palestinian homes in its midst. This is Susya. In 1986, Israeli archaeologists declared it a biblical site and it was doomed. The archaeologists who made this declaration were employed by an outfit called The Civil Administration. This was the new guise Israel gave to the previous Military governance. So in 1981 the organization changed its name but not its methods or purpose.

The designation of the village as an archaeological site led to the expulsion of all its inhabitants. For a moment this generated an international outcry. The insidious official response of Israel was that since there was no original village there in the more distant but undefined past, it was legal to move it for the sake of archaeological excavations. Susya is an old village, known in the past as Khirbet Susya, meaning the “Ruins of the Licorice Plant,” an herbal vegetation Palestinian farmers can still find nearby. Built in the early 19th century by farmers and shepherds from the nearby towns of Yatta and Dura, Susya was used at first as a satellite village to the towns where modernization had limited the cultivated land available and what land that was available was too dear to be purchased.

The farmers first built in caves, making them the base for their homes (a method quite well known all over the Mediterranean); it was a permanent abode for some and an additional one to others. No one had the right to destroy and expel them. Susya was expanded in 1948 and absorbed the Palestinians expelled by Israel's 1948 ethnic cleansing of the southern parts of the country (which also included tens of thousands of Bedouins and until 1950 the Negev from the Naqab. From Lucifer's Hill you are also reminded of the Nakba, on top of everything else.

Plia Albeck, the mistress of land expropriation in the West Bank and right-wing civil servant, even recognized that the people of Khirbet Susya were the rightful owners of the land. She wrote to the government:

The [ancient] synagogue is located in an area that is known as the lands of Khirbet Susya, and around an Arab village between the ancient ruins. There is a formal registration on the land of Khirbet Susya with the Land Registry, according to which this land, amounting to approximately 3,000 dunam [approximately 741 acres], is privately held by many Arab owners. Therefore, the area proximal to the [ancient] synagogue is in all regards privately owned.²

And yet, apart from one family, they were all expelled. This unique family's steadfastness and courage are visible on a clear day from Lucifer's Hill. The family is totally isolated because of the checkpoint, nobody can visit them, so they are deprived of any social life, and their children have to walk a long way to school. This journey depends on the goodwill, which is hardly in abundance, of the Israeli army that opens the checkpoint for them and escorts them as they are daily harassed and even assaulted by the settlers.

The use of archaeology for dispossession in Palestine is not new as is evident from the seminal research done by Nadia Abu El-Haj (2001) and others. It began in 1948, when a group of archaeologists were appointed by the Israeli government as members of an outfit called the "Naming Committee," which was assigned the task of finding archaeological justification for taking over destroyed or occupied Palestinian villages and giving them biblical names. The purpose was to portray an act of destruction as a redemption of ancient, indeed biblical, Jewish villages. Similar practices were enacted in the occupied West Bank. But archaeology was not the only means to depopulate Masafer Yatta. No less important was allowing the settlers to continue harassing the locals.

Vandalism and Thuggery in the Service of the Jewish State

The settlers' farms and small colonies are usually located on top of hills, such as Lucifer's Hill. The settlers in these areas are effectively vigilantes and vandals enjoying the full protection of the army. The burning of fields, houses, and orchards, and the physical assault of Palestinian farmers and even their children, was intended to show the Palestinians who was the boss in Masafer Yatta. The Association of Civil Rights in Israel (2020) estimated that the inhabitants of two villages in Masafer Yatta had to leave in the midst of 2000 because of such harassment. By 2005, the Israeli human rights organization, Btselem, estimated that within two years, 88% of the Palestinians living in Masafer Yatta had experienced attacks by settlers. The attacks also included blocking roads to Palestinian villages and fields (Ashkar 2005).

On almost every day of the year you can find a report with forensic description of such harassment. One such day, 23 October 2012, began with the settlers identifying a plot of land they desired, this time within the village of Susya. They then stuck up a pole with a sign on it—claiming it as theirs. On the note they declared the new name for the plot that they had chosen: “The Hill of God’s Grace” together with a quote from the Bible.

And here begins a charade. The Palestinian owners are encouraged by Israeli human rights organizations to complain to the Civil Administration. But this body had already closed the “disputed” area for two weeks and designated it as a closed military zone. In the meantime, the settlers remained on the land, brought caravans, and planted vine stems to show the cultivation that is required in court as a proof of their right to stay on the land. I will explain this particular charade in more detail shortly. These stems are visible from the hill, dotting the Palestinian land coveted by the settlers like evil spots. Such a presence is visible from the hill at the midst of the Hazar family’s plot of land in the village of Susya.

Two years later, this method—of planting a vine grove as the first step in the takeover—was used on other lands belonging to Palestinians in the Susya area. With the help of NGOs and lawyers, the Palestinians grouped together and went to the Israeli Supreme Court, inadvertently playing a part in a process that would repeat itself. The Court almost always legalizes such takeovers and only interferes when it is called to do so by the appeal of Palestinians. Would it be better to not appeal? A similar question is raised by Nadine El-Enany (2021) in her brilliant book, *(B)Ordering Britain*, where she engages critically with the human rights lawyers working on behalf of immigrants and refugees in Britain who might, if successful, elevate them one rung up the racist ladder of Britain without challenging its very existence.

Dehydrating the Palestinians out of Masafer Yatta

Another method of driving Palestinians out is to dehydrate them. Water is scarce in this part of Palestine, but for centuries the Palestinians knew how to gather the winter rain for irrigation. Now the army and the settlers systematically sabotage Palestinian wells, divert water to cattle farms that are an ecological disaster in this part of the world, and force Palestinians to buy the water at a much higher price than it is sold to the settlers. As one Palestinian pointed out:

Water is life; without water we can’t live; not us, not the animals, or the plants. Before we had some water, but after the army destroyed everything we have to bring water from far away; it’s very difficult and expensive. They make our life very difficult, to make us leave. The soldiers first destroyed our homes and the shelters with our flocks, uprooted all our trees, and then they wrecked our water cisterns. These were old water cisterns, from the time of our ancestors. Isn’t this a crime? Water is precious. We struggle every day because we don’t have water. (Amnesty International 2017, para. 11)

These words are Fatima al-Nawajah’s, a resident of Susya who gave her testimony to Amnesty International in April 2008. This report focused on the way the denial of access to water and the damage to wells and reservoirs play an

important role in chasing out the people of Susya and other villages in the Masafer Yatta area. It began with the army destroying water facilities for the villagers in the Masafer area. The army claimed that the wells and the water systems built around them had no permit. The real reason can be established clearly from Lucifer's Hill. The settlers needed the water for their swimming pools and vineyards.

The report noted that in 2008, some 180,000 to 200,000 Palestinians already lived in rural communities without any access to running water or in towns and villages which are connected to the water network but whose taps often run dry. Water rationing was common, especially but not exclusively in the summer months, with residents of different neighbourhoods and villages receiving piped water only one day every week or every few weeks. Consequently, many Palestinians have no choice but to purchase additional supplies from mobile water tankers, which deliver water at a much higher price and of often dubious quality (Amnesty International 2017).

Today in 2021, the situation is worse. Unemployment and poverty have increased in recent years and disposable income has fallen; Palestinian families in Masafer Yatta and in Area C in general must spend an increasingly high percentage of their income—as much as a quarter or more in some cases—on water.

When you look to the West from Lucifer's Hill, you see the effect of water theft on the Palestinians; when you look to the east, you see the impact of another method used to ethnically cleanse the people of Masafer Yatta: firing zones.

Militarizing the Living Space

Declaring the area a military firing zone is another method affecting more than a dozen Palestinian villages in this region. During military training exercises, the army's heavy vehicles knock down huts, run over cultivated fields, and demolish water wells. According to the military law one cannot reside inside a firing zone area, hence all the villages are living with an expulsion order hanging over their heads. Some orders are executed, but in most cases they are used as means of coercing Palestinians to become informers and collaborators.

Already by 1977, much of Masafer Yatta had been declared a firing zone, codenamed Firing Zone 918. It meant that at any given moment the army could demolish your house, burn your crops, block access to your fields, and stopper wells, as you would be deemed henceforth an illegal resident. This method has been used more extensively since 1999 (Btselem 2013).

In contrast, in the very same firing zone stands Avigayil, an illegal outpost founded in 2001 on more than 1,000 dunams (250 acres) of land near Susya and visible from Lucifer's Hill. 11 years later, Palestinians, who owned part of the land on which the outpost was erected, appealed to the Supreme Court, asking it to require the state to implement demolition orders standing against the outpost. The response was cynical and cruel. There was no point in returning the lands on which Avigayil was founded as it would return the Palestinians to a firing zone. At the same time, the government legalized the outpost which lies inside the firing zone. Jewish settlements were allowed to stay in a firing zone while the real owners of the land are barred from it.

From Lucifer's Hill you can see the land belonging to Abu Jundaya. In 2000, his land was targeted by the Israeli army. The army issued a demolition order to his two houses and an animal shelter. Since then, he has lived in a tent.

In 2013, Ali Awad owned a herd of over 1,000 sheep. Despite being wealthy, he has lived since then in a cave within the firing zone, and every morning crosses it with his animals. When the army exercises, almost every day, it closes the road, forcing him to make a 15 kilometre detour, instead of his preferred two kilometre route. He complains of helicopters practicing emergency landings near his wheat fields: "The wind generated from a single landing destroys an entire field" (Awad 2021, para. 10). Since the area is ruled by the Israel Defense Forces, there is no point in complaining to the authorities. But he still epitomizes the Palestinian resistance in this impossible reality. Trapped between Lucifer's Hill and Firing Zone 918, Ali Awad impressed a visitor who described him as a good shepherd, "daily refusing to give Lucifer, who turned out being Zionist, the violent victory it so desires" (Tov 2013, para. 14).

In 2013, the Israeli daily *Haaretz* looked more forensically at this particular firing zone at the heart of Masafer Yatta. The 28 September headline read: "The Government won't vomit [in disgust, an idiom meaning that they will commit any crime] at any dirty bureaucratic trick aimed at keeping Bedouin and Palestinian shepherds away from their homes." Declaring their homes and fields firing zones and training grounds became the main methods.

On 12 May 2019, Amira Hass revealed in *Haaretz*, on the basis of a classified document she managed to lay her hands on, that the army admitted to using training grounds in places such as Masafer Yatta in order to force the population to leave. The army officers refer to the villages as "weeds" that will return unless the army persists with its military exercises to "pesticide" them (Hass 2019).

All is Legal in the Eyes of the Colonizer

One might rightly ask, could not the occupying army just do what it wants and expel the people at will and confiscate their lands? Well, until 1974 it did, but then the more conscientious sections of Jewish society began to take the army to the Supreme Court, where the Judges demanded that the government have a good explanation for such acts of displacement and replacement.

In a famous 1974 court case, known as the Elon Moreh ruling, the Supreme Court asserted that the army could not confiscate private Palestinian land (and thus expel its owners and transfer the land to the settlers) on the basis of security considerations. This was welcomed by the newly founded settler movement, *Gush Emunim*, which wished the government to de-Arabize the West Bank in the name of Zionism and not under the disguise of security needs.

In 1981, Ariel Sharon found a way of legalizing this theft. He used an ancient Ottoman category of land, called *Mawat*, or "squatter's rights" or "adverse possession," whereby land that has not been cultivated for three years reverts to the state to expropriate further land for Jewish settlement. The climatic and topographical conditions in Masafer Yatta are such that cultivation can be partial because the fields are also used for grazing, but the ownership is complete. This did not help the people of the area and their land was reclassified as *Mawat*. The

state took their land and gave it to the settlers. The Occupation likes to legalize its crimes.

When you look closely from the Hill to the land confiscated in such a manner, you observe a bizarre scene: barrels spread over the land and in them twigs and very young trees. This is the second part of the charade previously mentioned: according to that same Ottoman Law, if you cultivate a deserted land for ten years, it is yours. The state and the settlers, knowing that you cannot cultivate these lands properly, regard the barrel vegetation as proof of cultivation.

Sumud (Steadfastness) on a Daily Basis

From Lucifer's Hill this colonization and oppression is quite visible, but the unique steadfastness of the Palestinians is also evident. Here and there a small Palestinian flag on a location coveted by the occupiers can be seen flying from indefinable Palestinian homes in the midst of a Jewish colony, and one can see young men and women accompanying schoolchildren on their long journey to school to protect them from the settlers' harassment.

The mix of Palestinian and Jewish buildings within what is now called Susya tells you the struggle is not over. The people of Susya kept returning from the places into which the army threw them. At first, they even succeeded in attracting international interest and support, including that of the British government, whose Department for International Aid was deeply involved in building cess-pools and cisterns for the Palestinian deportees all over Masafer Yatta, many of which were subsequently destroyed by the Israeli army.³

However, in recent years, international attention waned and Israel has exploited this lack of interest to justify another expulsion when an ancient synagogue was allegedly discovered. But the villagers fight back and more importantly as elsewhere in Area C their biggest achievement is steadfastness, that they are still there. From the air, Masafer Yatta looks full of hamlets, though in Zionist eyes it is terra nullius. On the ground you can see that it is full of life that comes from centuries of sedentary and semi-nomadic communities living in the Hebron and Yatta regions. The Bedouins, who were expelled from Israel during the Nakba, increased the number of villages but they face a policy of ethnic cleansing on both sides of the Green Line: the demolition of unrecognized Palestinian villages in the Naqab (the Negev) and the destruction of life in Masafer Yatta.

After my visit to Lucifer's Hill, I joined those who daily carryout one of the least reported anti-colonialist struggles in the world. We were accompanied by a youth group called *Youth Sumud*, "the steadfast young people," who are struggling against the expulsion of Palestinian villagers.⁴ They are rebuilding deserted villages such as Zarura, where the villagers used to live in renovated caves that had been connected to electricity and water by these amazing youngsters who come from surrounding villages. Most of them are academics with excellent English, and believe that non-violence is the best way of defending their future.

They are still active in 2021. One of their main activities this summer is to try to defend the village of al-Tuwani in Masafer Yatta, which is clearly visible from Lucifer's Hill. The group stays the night with this particular community; though

exposed to endless harassment by the army and the settlers, they remain steadfast.

The village of al-Tuwani is this year's focus of the struggle between the brave young people of Masafer Yatta and the colonization. It is led by Sami Hourani who was arrested several times for his nonviolent protests in this village and the nearby village of al-Rakez. His friend, 24-year-old Harun Abu Aram, was less fortunate. He was shot by the army in the neck while trying to prevent the soldiers from confiscating his neighbour's generator.⁵

Sami was arrested because of that particular incident, but he has long been targeted by the occupation since he is a leading organiser and activist in the area, a founding member of the *Youth of Sumud*, and a board member of the overall organization coordinating the popular resistance in the West Bank, the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee.⁶

In May 2021, Hourani was brought west of Jerusalem to the notorious military court Camp Offer. The session was held in Hebrew so that the cynical Israeli concession to allow international observers to sit in would be futile, as on-the-spot translation was not allowed by the court.

After visiting the brave young people in Zarura and returning to the car, I noticed a flock of birds of prey watching us with interest. Palestinians are barred from birdwatching from Tel-Asafir, now Lucifer's Hill. But with our help they might be able to do it one day, when the West is less obsessed with a non-existent anti-Semitic scare and remembers its original responsibility for the ongoing catastrophe of the Palestinians.

Conclusion

In 2015, Yaacov Talia died in an accident, but his ilk continues to terrorize the Palestinians in outposts with benign names such as Maon (home) and Avigayil (Abigail). His siblings are now approaching me and my friends on the hill. They do not utter a word but cast unfriendly gazes at us and leave a cloud of dust that covers us as they drive on their way to Lucifer's farm.

The Palestinians refer to their current situation quite often as *al-Nakba al-Mustamera*, the ongoing Nakba. The original Nakba or catastrophe occurred in 1948, when Israel ethnically cleansed half of the Palestinian population and demolished half of their villages and most of their towns. The world ignored that crime and absolved Israel from any responsibility. Since then, the settler-colonial state of Israel has attempted to complete the ethnic cleansing of 1948. From Lucifer's Hill one can see both the past and present of this project, as well as one of the principal reasons for its incompleteness, the Palestinian resistance.

Biography

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Notes

1. Depicting Israel as a settler-colonial state is now accepted by many scholars as can be seen from the large number of articles on it in the *Journal of Settler Colonial Studies*. See <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rset20>.
2. This report by Albeck was sent to the government in 1982 and is quoted in full in Btselem's website (in Hebrew). See https://www.btselem.org/hebrew/southhebron_hills/201507_facts_on_susiya
3. On the British role read Medical Aid for Palestine's (MAP) report: "Britain and Palestine: A Parliamentary Focus, 2010-2015" <https://www.map.org.uk/downloads/map--caabu-parliamentary-report.pdf>.
4. See their Facebook page: <https://www.facebook.com/youthofsumud/>.
5. This was chillingly captured by Btselem see: https://www.btselem.org/video/20210215_israeli_soldier_shoots_harun_abu_aram_during_attempt_to_confiscate_generator_khirbet_a_rakeez_1_jan_2021.
6. See their website: <https://www.facebook.com/PopularStruggle>.

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On the Micro-Colonial

Fadi Abou-Rihan



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I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know
the limits of my understanding.

— D. W. Winnicott (1969, 87)

I want to give him a name, one that extends beyond the clinical conventions of the arbitrary and anonymizing initial, a name that safeguards the confidentiality of the analytic space as it sheds light on the why and the what spoken within.

I will call him David, in reference to the biblical figure of the humble shepherd who slays Goliath with a slingshot, of, in another version of the story, the child that defeats the aggressor while the adult tasked with that same responsibility stands helplessly by, of, according to yet a third of the story's versions, a defender that fights a foreign enemy who, as it turns out, is a blood relative.

In his younger years, David also went by a name chosen for him by his maternal grandfather, and used solely by the beloved forebear: Jake. David has chosen that same name for the dog he recently adopted. He now welcomes canine Jake to share his bed for a couple of hours every night in a small room in the basement while Amelie, David's exceptionally light sleeper wife, spends her nights alone in the main bedroom up the stairs. Thirty years prior, David/Jake had his bedroom in the basement of his parents' house. Back then, it was mother who slept seemingly unawares in the matrimonial bedroom on the second floor while, two levels below, father sexually assaulted his son on regular nocturnal visits.

This chapter in David's life started when he was eight and lasted till he reached puberty five years later, by which time his father lost all sexual interest in him. Throughout that period and the decade that followed, David maintained a silence around the assaults, a silence he wore as a badge of honour and a testament to his resilience. "*The baby that never cried*,"² the one that "*never really needed any attention*," as he was already cast in the family story, the baby that most likely recognized the futility of crying as a means of getting any attention, grew into a self-reliant recluse.

In his late teens, David accepted at face value his father's confessed remorse for the assaults; he believed he could now put his history behind him as he prepared for a university education away from home. On his own, he sank instead

DEDICATION

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into a depression for which he initially sought professional help but eventually medicated with the heavy use of alcohol. He endured his suffering through active isolation: he lived alone, worked the late-night shift, preferred pornography to actual sexual relations, and spent most of his free time immersed in video games. He also reclaimed his isolation as a point of pride, as proof of self-sufficiency, even superiority, as much as a preemptive strategy against unwelcome intrusion. In time, he went to graduate school, travelled a fair bit, and eventually returned to his home city to complete specialized, professional training.

Fast forward to when, in his mid 30s, David's world fell apart, again, when his father committed suicide with a gun to the head a day after he was arrested for sexually assaulting the neighbours' grandson. For David, the basement could not have been any more welcoming. You see, in this version of the biblical confrontation, the enemy was never vanquished; the punctuation that is the slingshot, or bullet, to the head simply marks the end of one iteration as it makes way for another. It may then be more useful to understand David's struggle as less with isolation *per se* as with the company he must keep. Goliath has not been slain and David is no hero. Each is a "man of the in-between"³³ and has no one other than his enemy for company. "*I am not my father; I will not repeat his ugly deeds.*" "*No, no. I am very much like my father; I am as guilty as he is.*" "*I am as broken; I must redeem us both by resisting the impulse that prolongs the tragedy.*" David feels alone with his desire. What he hopes for from me, his analyst, and what he has consistently identified as his aim for his analysis, is that I not stand idly by but sustain him as he occupies the "in-between" so that he may take charge over his desire and keep it confined to the realm of fantasy.

In one respect, it makes a lot of sense to attribute much of the suffering and struggles he went on to experience to the abuse David endured at the hands of his father. The depression, isolation, and substance use, to name but a few of the components of his adult life, fall in line with a seemingly uncomplicated chronology of causes and effects. This chronology recalls Freud's formulations of psychopathology in terms of a theory of seduction whose clinical and political failings have impeded many a study of childhood sexual abuse. In order to sustain a theory initially grounded on a presumed event, though ultimately formalized around an unconscious fantasy, Freud adapted Ernst Haeckel's famed "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" principle and advanced the view that sexuality's vicissitudes in the life of the individual replicate an evolutionary path leading back to an all-powerful primal father (a Goliath in David's case), who is "killed, eaten, resuscitated, and retroactively reigns over everyone" (Lepoutre 2016, 63).

On the one hand, the scientific foundations for Freud's overarching parallel between species and individual have been shown to be erroneous and misleading (Gould 1985). On the other hand, we would do well to remember Foucault's lesson that the agencies of domination and the systems that constitute the subject across different contexts are not homologous (1976, 121-35), that power is not exercised uniformly no matter the relationship (parent/child, state/citizen, ruler/ruled) and that neither is the father a mere representative of the state nor is the latter an extrapolation of a father figure on a scale larger than the family's.

Recognizing that the passage from one context to another is hardly ever frictionless, I want to explore the structure that makes it possible for a desire to co-opt and redraw the psyche of one individual in the service of another—as per a

parent's abuse of a child for instance—the structure on the basis of which a micro-colonizing relationship is built. I want to elaborate a dynamic that is neither the miniature nor the outcome observed against the background of pre-existing social and economic formations, even as these latter have often configured the colonizer/colonized relationship in familial and sexualizing terms. Rather than focus on sexuality as fashioned by overarching structures (be they moral, legal, economic, reproductive), I want to address sexuality as producing and sustaining of such structures, sexuality as not simply an effect or a target but a bedrock and a driving force.

Thinking sexuality as installing rather than merely instantiating or submitting to a broader colonial dynamic calls for a reassessment of Freud's theorizing of seduction even though his developmental account of libido, both intra- and inter-psychically, is suffused with the colonial logic of conquest and discipline, efficiency and return. The reformulation proposed by Jean Laplanche under the heading of a "general theory of seduction" (1987, 89-148) seems to me to be more explanatory and more useful in this context. Ever the winemaker,⁴ Laplanche the psychoanalyst recast seduction as an "implantation" of sexuality and thus a foundational stage in the formation of the unconscious. In so doing, Laplanche shifted the register of the inquiry into seduction from a "whether or not" to a "how and when" hence further complicating some of the polarities dear to the heart of psychoanalysis and, indeed, the larger culture: activity/passivity, source/aim, nurture/nature, perpetrator/victim.

As Laplanche saw it, the infant does not come into the world with a pre-formed unconscious replete with drives and fantasies. Rather, it is in the general seduction that takes place in the asymmetrical relationship between adult (parent, sibling, and/or caregiver) and infant that a psychic structure is set up. While it tries to make sense of relatively clear dynamics of preservation, adaptation, and attunement, the infant must also reconcile with signifiers originating in the adult yet "enigmatic" to both sender and receiver. These signifiers pertain to the repressed components of the adult's own sexuality as they are triggered by the interaction with the infant; the implantation they precipitate occurs unbeknownst to the adult and is therefore beyond their choice. Hence, the breast—actual, displaced or fantasized—is not just nourishing, stimulating or withholding for baby, it is more than simply good or bad; it is shot through with the adult's own often unconscious excitement and desire; ditto, among others, the gentle caress, the melodic coo, and the soft sway. Each exceeds its intended function and communicates beyond its manifest meaning.

Both infant and adult are thus actively, albeit differently, involved in an implantation that is neither deliberate nor necessarily malevolent. As they impact the infant, the adult's subtle pleasures do not run counter to, or at the expense of, a fledgling libidinal essence. Instead, and herein lies Laplanche's radical contribution to the classic metapsychological position, it is the impact of the unacknowledged and baffling signifier originating in the adult that constitutes the foundation upon which an infant's psychic apparatus is built. Thus, what sustains the infant's ability to make sense of that signifier and integrate it after its own fashion is a budding ego; the effect of the infant's failure to develop a full mastery and symbolization of this signifier denotes a process of repression and an incipient unconscious; and, finally, whatever exceeds the infant's ability

to fully “translate” the sexually imbued signifier, the residue that gets repressed, is the source-object of the drive, a permanent feature and a constant source of excitement and frustration. As a “generalized” theory of seduction, implantation describes a structuring process rather than a pathologizing dynamic: though forever translating and forever symbolizing, a human being does not always already belong in the world of the unconscious; it erects that world in its infancy as a dynamic solution to a surround it does not always comprehend.

Some may find it reassuring to think Laplanche’s reformulation of seduction in terms of a care that, at times, may go awry, a care that, given the proper resources, is teachable, trackable, correctable. Two aspects of implantation must remain unsettling. First, since, at bottom, it is a confrontation with the fact of an enigma, implantation is fodder for, on the one hand, an Aristotelian sense of amazement and wonder in the face of a world to be discovered and enjoyed and, on the other hand, an unavoidable experience of doubt, of incompleteness, of a limit as to what can be understood and metabolized. As products of implantation, the formation of the unconscious and the subsequent structuring of the psyche are hence possible only on the condition of failure as well as success, of injury, as some would say, as well as growth. Second, implantation recruits more than what is supposedly healthy or pleasurable of the adult’s unconscious and its desires. The sincerest of intentions and the most responsible of child-rearing practices notwithstanding, the interaction with the infant recruits as much of the adult’s ambivalence, narcissistic gratification, and toxic projection as it does his or her benign eroticism. Before us are not mutually exclusive best-and-worst-case scenarios but the most common, indeed inevitable, and co-extensive components of the interaction between one unconscious and another. What the infant translates into its ego and what remains untranslatable in its unconscious are never exclusively wondrous and/or innocuous. Garden variety implantation, which lends the psyche its dynamic topography, is invariably accompanied by “intromission” as the violent variant that stymies growth and installs elements that short-circuit differentiation and resist metabolization (Laplanche 1992, 358).⁵ At stake, then, are an invitation, an encouragement, a welcome into a world of pleasure and care as well as an unyielding territorialization and a hindering implantation for the benefit of one unconscious at the expense of another. As both dynamics unfold, we witness a conflictual acculturation, an installation of divided identities, and prescriptions regarding objects, aims, and means.⁶

The simultaneity of implantation with intromission calls up the classic psychoanalytic recognition of a quasi-ubiquitous co-occurrence of opposites in terms more foundational than complementarity, compromise or ambivalence. Thought processes (primary, a-rational, unconscious/secondary, common sensical, conscious), drives (binding and life-affirming Eros/destructive and de-linking Thanatos) and principles (pleasure, as minimization of tension/reality, as liberation and deferral) are among the building blocks of a complex and ever-active psychological apparatus that exceeds the familiar patterns of oppositionality and resolution. At the end of the day, Laplanche’s reformulation of seduction as the origin story of an unconscious grounded in implantation and intromission further extends this co-occurrence and helps reveal the extent to which

we are colonized in the most elemental of gestures at our most basic, most structural of cores: we are libidinal in so far as we are colonized and colonized so as to be libidinal.

The fact that, presumably, seduction may start out in the most caring of implantations does not shield it from intromission; nor does that fact exclude it from colonization. Instead, it is colonization itself that is opened up beyond the logic of presence and absence and onto a spectrum of timelines, modes, and intensities. We may now rethink what we typically understand by colonization as a re-colonization; rather than the infliction of a traumatic injustice on an otherwise innocent and unblemished organism, we witness a driving of wedges into pre-existing splits (the enigmatic, the un-metabolizable) and a harnessing of certain components intrinsic to, in this particular context, the child's psychosexual structure and dynamics in order to make way for a new re-colonizing intromission in the service of the colonizer.

If sexual assault is a re-colonization, then one can only guess at the complex chain of past seductions that paved the way for a scenario where a father abuses his child while mother does not or cannot recognize what is taking place under her own roof. David's early history must be placed in a context that incorporates the conditions that produced "*the baby that never cried*" as well as the ends to which it was, and continues to be, deployed. No matter how thorough or earnest the retrograde analysis, elements of this history that belong both to David and to his parents—separately as well as a couple—shall remain forever inaccessible, untranslatable. By that same token, no matter how competent or responsible, the clinician must contend with a factor of the enigmatic (endemic as well as inherited) as it permeates the analytic relationship and shapes it as yet another link in the chain of seductions.

Of one thing we can be certain: the more insidious an intromission, the deeper the reach of the subsequent colonization. After many years of analysis, David can conjure only the vaguest of terms to express his feelings regarding what transpired in that childhood basement bedroom. "*Maybe paedophilia is an orientation and father couldn't help himself.*" "*After all, he was married to a narcissist; she chose not to take care of him.*" "*Come to think of it, neither of them could be trusted with anything; they put down both of my dogs while I was away on a school trip; they couldn't bother to give them their meds.*" There is sorrow when David speaks of his dogs, anger at the mention of mother, yet hardly anything beyond a most tepid disappointment with father. Aside from certain classic defences (displacement, intellectualization, splitting) and the dissociative tenor typical of a victim of repeated trauma, David's reticence may be attributed to a number of factors: while he does not share his father's choice of sexual object, he recognizes his is not altogether within the realm of the "normal" either; as far as he's concerned, maintaining a two-decade silence over the abuse he endured burdens him with the lion's share of the responsibility for the pain suffered by his father's other victim(s). As the shame and guilt generate more silence, the reenactment in the clinical setting of a formative mistrust, the resourceful self-reliance and the wish to protect the other from possible harm mean that, again, David must confront his Goliath on his own, often outside the analytic space. I may provide him all manner of valued support; I, however, may not take part in his struggle.

Much as these concerns complicate the relationship David and I have, they remain, in principle at least, more or less grist for the analytic mill, potentially given their due and perhaps even surmounted. And yet, Recognizing the extent of our work and its enduring positive effects for him and acknowledging, with the requisite humility, that another clinician may very well do better as well as otherwise, my sense is that part of David's re-colonization is enclosed within an intractable intromission and may remain forever unspoken, if not indeed unspeakable—which, of course, is not to say un-lived. Over and above what grooming, collaboration, and guilt typically produce in such scenarios, David's silence points to a limit beyond which it seems to me his analysis may not venture. There is, however, something that can be said as to the ways in which this limit keeps David company, the uses it serves him and, curiously, the utterances it affords him.

With roots in both implantation and intromission, David's "being with" his limit structures his sense of self and his sexuality; it speaks to his way of "being with" himself, an other or a group—of belonging, failing or refusing belonging. While there is much that may be said of the affective qualities to each of these modes, I, at this point, would like to concentrate specifically on the mechanisms of fantasizing and "fantasying" as elaborated by Winnicott (1971), on how they engage implantation and intromission and, in the process, make way for particular styles of "being with"—namely, solitude and loneliness.

Implantation is the course of a signifier translated, repressed, recovered, re-translated, dismantled, and rebuilt anew; it is the polysemy of symbolization where meaning and possibility are created. This is what Winnicott (1971, 35) identified as fantasizing in all its manifestations (e.g., dreaming, playing, finding), as a poetry that builds layer upon layer of meaning and an imaginative planning that precipitates and looks forward to action as much as it is shaped by it. In contrast, recognizing in the individual what Marx had identified in group ideology and Nietzsche in nihilism, and echoing "phantasying" from the English rendition of Freud's reference to a split-off thought activity (1911, 222), Winnicott described "fantasying" as lacking in poetry, as the dead end of a stark scene where little, if anything, happens, or rather where the thing that does happen is the prevention of anything of substance from ever happening. This is what Deleuze (1962) once called the reactive. Fantasying is an isolating activity that drains objects and relations of meaning and reduces them to ossifying procedures—think the idle daydreaming of the perfect and perfectly satisfying life (talents, careers, partners, finances) in the face of a painful, disorganized, and/or fleeting reality. As a counter to the diverse and unpredictable, fantasying installs a numbing and repetitive dissociation (Winnicott 1971, 27) that is a paradigmatic precursor to intromission.⁷

The distinction between fantasizing and fantasying is a distinction between solitude, aka the capacity to be alone (Winnicott 1958), and loneliness, between an openness to the generative and unfamiliar and the seemingly self-sufficient yet ostensibly deadening. Sense, theoretical and practical, would rather such categories stand apart from one another. Experience tells a different story.

Fantasying is no mere resistance or malady. David's loneliness revolves around an endlessly repetitive confrontation with a Goliath that will not die, indeed a Goliath that must not die since his death can only be the outcome of a

violent act of self-mutilation. When colonizer and colonized are entrenched in the same psychic space, the cost of their conflict is borne primarily by the colonized. Of porn and video games, each is an engagement with someone else's fantasy and, in David's case, evidence of his reluctance to nurture his own inner world. In conjunction with the bouts of excessive drinking, these are also his ways of placating and numbing his nemesis, of keeping him confined to the basement. As at once toxin and remedy (*pharmakon*),⁸ each reinforces the walls of Goliath's prison, secures his confinement, and guarantees that the enemy shall remain caught in a consuming struggle to an ever-deferrable death.

Taxing as it may be, Goliath's confinement and the fantasizing it requires make it possible for David to engage in a world other than his enemy's, to fantasize outside the constraints of monotony and futility, abuse and mistrust. And, with the help of Jake, fantasize he does. Lest we forget, the basement belongs to the child beloved by his grandfather and to the cared-for-canine as much as it does to the abuser and victim in this story. To Jake belong the responsibility and the relish to sustain a playful solitude that Winnicott understood as a "freedom from withdrawal" and an ability to "relax" whereby an impulse and a sensation "will feel real and be truly a personal experience" (1958, 34).

David's version of this experience is an elaborate construction project. While a quintessential metaphor for the unconscious, the basement is also where he has set up "*mission central*" for a complete renovation of his house. Here, he is guided by both creature comforts and "*Russian engineering*," that other construction paradigm by whose standards impermeable boundaries are paramount. Still, David is at his most comfortable as he fantasizes and plays, somewhere between illusion and utility. He delights in formulating ever-changing plans, he thrives in the searches and researches for tools and materials, often with little regard for timelines or practical ends. He takes pride in pursuing his project with as little help as possible from the outside, without, however, entirely retreating from his relations with others. It is in the context of these relations that his solitude thrives; this is evident in both the analysis and his daily life where separations and extended breaks from those he now considers standard fixtures (e.g., wife and analyst) are triggers for the most intense and most debilitating of symptoms.

Recall that, metapsychologically, we are in the realm of relational implantation/intromission—rather than Freudian one-person psychology—and in the realm of fantasizing, emblematic of the capacity to be alone, itself possible only within a dyadic relationship. After all, an infant and an analysand can enjoy being alone because parent and analyst are reliably yet unobtrusively present somewhere in the background. Tellingly, the capacity to be alone in one party in any given relationship flourishes when it is met with the other's capacity to leave alone, to accompany without intrusion or meddling. Since we are considering parents who were once children and analysts who were once analysands, their present capacity to leave the other alone is an outcome of earlier experiences of having been alone in the presence of a preceding other (parent and/or analyst), of having been left alone by that other and, most critically, of having left that other and disconnected from them, of having done so in, hopefully, the healthiest of ways, of, in other words, parents who, as children, snuck away from their parents' gazes, of analysts who, as analysands, left their analysts alone as well as behind where they belonged.

Solitude in the one is hence contingent on an attitude that is slightly more nuanced and a bit less innocuous than caring unobtrusiveness in the other. The aetiology of the capacity to leave alone incorporates an inevitable, though at times ethically and clinically troubling, element of disconnection, escape or neglect. This element is often overlooked or explained away as a mere foible or failure. Supposedly, the analyst who nods off, double books, forgets or mis-speaks, the analyst who, in a nutshell, slips, hasn't been trained enough or analyzed enough. Perhaps. Equally likely however is the possibility that such an analyst, and indeed every analyst, does not simply leave alone, let be, make room or give room for the other to grow but indeed abandons, avoids, neglects, idiosyncratically, purposefully or indifferently, as they had done in at least two of their most formative relationships.

In David's case, and perhaps in all of our cases, the other whose unobtrusive presence makes fantasizing possible is not exclusively a so-called "good" other. Drunk and distracted, Goliath remains at bay; sober, he may neglect his victim and leave him alone every so often. As with any colonizer, his longevity is premised on the colonizer's fantasy of separateness and superiority, the same fantasy that, perhaps unintentionally but no less critically, opens for the colonized some room beyond pain and duress.

Biography

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Notes

1. Unless otherwise stated, the italicized text is David's.
2. This, as suggested by certain versions of the Goliath account, is where the warrior came forward to bring to a close the battle between Israelites and Philistines as the two armies encamped across from one another (Yadin 2004, 380-81).
3. The Laplanche family owned Chateau de Pommard (Burgundy) from the 1930s onward. Along with his wife Nadine, Jean Laplanche managed the winery for decades, until the couple sold the property in the early 2000s.
4. The decision to render the French "*intromission*"—dating back to the 15th century and meaning the introduction of one object into another—as its English cognate is unfortunate; the latter is nowadays associated with penile vaginal penetration and leads the reader of the translation to the conclusion that Laplanche was specifically referencing a sexual scenario (see Zeuthen and Hagelskjær 2015; Harris 2018). Laplanche was rather addressing the broader phenomenon of an intrusion that stands in the way of growth, the same one that plays a role in the formation of the super ego as a "foreign body that cannot be metabolized" (Laplanche 1992, 358).
5. Cf. Butler 2014.
6. Cf. Scarfone 2005.
7. See Derrida 1975.

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Amazonia

Rebecca Salazar



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is there a word for grieving
the destruction of an ecosystem
that has kept you breathing
that has stood for untold generations
of the ancestors you wish you got to know

*it seems foolish to discuss nature w/o talking about endemic poverty which seems foolish to
discuss w/o talking about corporations given human agency which seems foolish to discuss w/o
talking about colonialism which seems foolish to discuss w/o talking about misogyny*

the cure for my traumatic sexual dysfunction
is medicine that causes sexual dysfunction
and my rapist just became a father

as fascists burn the land i long for
the country i live in sends matches,
buys pipelines, subsidizes mines
that bow to bolsonaro and burn forests,
displace mountains, un-inter the land's
soft-buried kin to mine for gold

*what is it to care humanly without thinking that humans are the most important things in the
picture?*

there are brown kids in concentration camps
brown men in concentration camps
brown women who are forced to drink from toilets
since they aren't given water in the concentration camps
and queers in concentration camps or killed
before they're thrown in concentration camps

i don't have children but the children
in the cages look like me and come from places
like my family is from, could be a million
distant cousins i can't reach, will never meet

the wrong amazon is burning / and the wrong ICE is melting

Amazonia

it is 2019 there are rapists and nazis
it is 2019 there are rapists and nazis in office
it is 2019 there's a rapist/nazi on campus
and the human rights office can't help me,
it would contravene his rights

never again is now
hear it: *never again is now*

i don't want children—how could i
when being human is not long for us
and when a brown face
is a sentence waged in melanin

white folks keep saying genocide
is too heavy a word
when they're not burning with its weight

some of us *cannot afford to theorize in splendid isolation while the death and devastation continue*

i don't want children
and my family is worried i will change my mind
when i grow old leaving no future generations,
but i'm worried that i won't survive, myself

and once, i birthed a dead thing,
not a child, but a flesh and tooth omen

when my cousins choose to birth
new generations they do not
do so to feed children
to cages. our *futurity*
is not a crime futurity is not
a crime futurity is not a crime

my body is a series of refusals

i try to survive my sick body on Wolastoq land
and offer what i can to heal this river
and the people who protect her
offer what i cannot reach to give
the land my body comes from
while its rivers blaze with fire

once whiteness has destroyed my home
once amazonia has burned,
i have to live to nurse our ghosts

Biography

Rebecca Salazar (she/they) is a writer, editor, and community organizer living on the unceded territory of the Wolastoqiyik. Published works include *sulphurtongue* (McClelland & Stewart), *the knife you need to justify the wound* (Rahila's Ghost) and *Guzzle* (Anstruther). Salazar edits for *The Fiddlehead* and *Plenitude* magazines, and co-hosts Elm & Ampersand podcast.

Notes

Sources for italicized passages: (1) from Tommy Pico's *Nature Poem* (2) from Alexis Shotwell's *Against Purity* (3) from tweets by @krzyzis and @RasBabaO, respectively (4) slogan of Never Again Action, a group of Jewish organizers mobilizing against the persecution of migrants in the US by ICE (5) from an essay on environmental racism by Dorceta Taylor (6) from another of the author's poems.

Mobile Bay

Heather Nolan



my father denies
any connection to the place
his father was born,
or at least any attachment.

it's the people that matter, he says,
blowing on the rim of his cold tea
what does a place mean
when they're gone?

and leaning in to my questioning,
he shows me the bruised sideboard
pulled from the old house
torn down with his own hands.

returning to himself he says, *should've*
just burned the damn thing down,
but later digs out the land grant, sends me an article
on the migration:

thousands of boats pouring east
from Waterford, catching
on the Southern Shore like fish
in a net. *Talamb an Éisc*.

some of them didn't leave and
here we are like cracked
foundations and here we are
and here we are.

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Biography

Heather Nolan (she/her) is a writer and multidisciplinary artist from Ktaqmkuk/Newfoundland. Her debut novel *This is Agatha Falling* (Pedlar 2019) was shortlisted for the ReLit award and longlisted for the BMO Winterset Award. Her debut poetry collection *Land of the Rock: Talamb an Carraig* is forthcoming in 2022 from Breakwater Books, and her third book, *How to Be Alone*, is forthcoming in 2023.

Brown Woman Spell (Dear Kin V)

Shazia Hafiz Ramji



Dear kin, I had an idea for a poem. A brown woman spell. I thought I would add some cardamom and cumin, knowing those are favorites. But I have none in my cupboard so what does that make me? I'm a pre-emptive strike imagining you before you can enter. Can you see how much this hurts? I would call it loot. To be in the way of yourself all the time. The roads you grew up on the same roads as the central ones in the empires. Their names suffix and compass in every turn and step. The woman in this poem is a jostling weight within my bones. She is asking to be remembered and I don't know how. The answer is in my body, yes, but I am not in my body. I am too much in my bubble of one with my one-litre bottle of water and my bachelor suite. I am not willing to give it up and get out of my head. The truth is I am terrified. When I feel various and several, I know I am whirling the way a cotton bud in an ear canal sounds, constantly chafing like an excavation, brushing off the waste of the present accumulated on what has always already been there, yearning to be found, and I know that if it does, the person I am now will disappear. I will say thank you when I'm ready.

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Biography

Shazia Hafiz Ramji is pursuing a PhD in English at the University of Calgary and is the author of *Port of Being*.

A Sister's Song

Diane Roberts



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To be seen: these eyes, the mouth, the strain, this face
smashed by thoughtless time.
A laughing Child
his Mother's sorrow
an Aunt's lament.

What is this?

Black rock hard
surfacing through craggy attentions,
a warrior in anguish. Blown to ash.

What is this?

Earth's swelling loss.
Split shards
scattered between here and
almost,
each fragment
a hint.

An ignoble death, they said, watching
and waiting for the chosen ones to arrive.

And She with glory crowning stares
straight, follows a path lit
by the fallen ones, each step
a new landing.
Meeting ground between sole
and soil.
A crossroads
daring to be noticed,
hidden by choice.

A Sister's Song

elle she la hembra...

Tiny whispers of lives forgotten
wash past—not under—
the few that survive.

Were it not for seeing the shimmer of you in the distance,
I would barely know who this was/is.

The year is 2016.

I have been struggling to articulate an appropriate response to the unrelenting violence in thought, word, and deed directed towards us as African descended peoples. I am haunted by a 4-year-old's clarity: evaporated innocence. Her sweet voice, surreal amidst the terror, reminding her mother that she's there and that everything's going to be ok. In one simple instinctual gesture. Echoing a grandmother's love for a disquieted child. And I too want to believe that it's all going to be ok.

The year is 2020.

I am bolstered by the strong voice of protest reverberating through grassroots movements—Black Lives Matter, Wet'suwet'en Strong—and I feel the need to stand up and scream NO MORE. As I move along with the Montreal crowd in protest—maintaining what we now call social distance—there are moments when I am compelled to stop my voice, to hear the chants—black lives matter, no justice, no peace—which are, to my ear, transformed into meaningless sound bites.

The year is 2021.

In this necessary pause from all that we in North America know as freedom, I recognize a deeper wound that cannot be addressed through protest alone. I observe the gestures of protest, fists raised high, and I can't help but notice exposed side ribs, hearts and guts. I listen to hear the strained voice of public grief stopped short by the horror of incompetent justice. I vibrate alongside the strained voice of protest pushing to express (in the limited time given) a manifesto justifying our right to survive.

There is no bypassing loss...

What is this?

Now reshaped to a Sister's song.
His passage or hers?
A cleansing.

Diane Roberts

Biography

Diane Roberts is a practicing interdisciplinary artist, a PhD candidate in Interdisciplinary Studies at Concordia University, a Pierre Elliott Trudeau Scholar, a Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship award holder, and the founder of the Arrivals Legacy Project (www.arrivalslegacy.com).

Notes

This work was first produced by Primary Colours/couleurs primaires in June 2021 as part of the BLM=BAM initiative which commemorated the first anniversary of the murder of George Floyd. A recording is available at primary-colours.ca/projects/151-a-sister-s-song.

Review of *Capitalism, The American Empire, and Neoliberal Globalization* by Kenneth E. Bauzon

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Jay Foster



Bauzon, Kenneth E. *Capitalism, The American Empire, and Neoliberal Globalization: Themes and Annotations from Selected Works of E. San Juan Jr.* (New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2019), xix+304 pages.

At the G7 summit in June 2021, leaders of the top seven “advanced economies” met at a seaside resort in Cornwall, England. After three days of frolicking on the beach for photo-ops, they emerged promising a billion COVID-19 vaccine doses for “less well-off” countries and affirmed \$100 billion per year in “climate finance” from both public and private sources. In short, the summit—laughably described as a meeting of world “leadership”—was simply yet another lackluster performance piece. The spending on climate change was already promised in 2009, and it pales in comparison to the *trillions* of dollars spent by G7 countries on domestic pandemic relief. Behind the G7 are the legacies of carbon capital and colonial capitalism that enabled them to be rich enough to be first in the vaccine queue and help themselves to large numbers of scarce doses. For example, Canada, a leading global exporter of moral puffery, had already snatched up about 80% more vaccines than it actually needed—more than ten doses for every person in the country. It had even elbowed in on COVAX, an international program to ensure equitable global access to vaccines. Having looked after itself at the expense of others, Canada exuded generosity at the G7 by promising to donate its “surplus” and to fund other vaccine purchases.

Canada was not alone in its rich-world entitlement. At the time of the summit, ten nations had monopolized 75% of the global vaccine supply (Al Jazeera 2011). Little wonder that UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres admonished wealthy nations for the “wildly unfair and uneven” global distribution of vaccines (Cohen and Kupferschmidt 2021). The Director-General of the World Health Organization, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, described the inequality as “scandalous” and warned that the world was “on the brink of a catastrophic moral failure” (Cohen and Kupferschmidt 2021).

This meeting of the G7, like other big-G gatherings and the World Economic Forum, was a reminder (for anyone who still needed it) of the way 21st century geopolitics continues to echo the imperial order of the 19th century. For the most part, the beneficiaries of extractive and settler colonialisms continue to be well-off nations while the colonized mostly continue to struggle economically and politically. It is mainly the recipients of the benefits of colonialism that can worry about their healthcare systems being swamped by COVID-19 patients.

What the G7 euphemistically called the “less well off” barely have health care at all, never mind anything so sophisticated as a health care system. Indeed, UNICEF reports (2001) that 60% of the world—4.5 billion people—lacks the most basic tool for public health: a toilet. The egregious inequality in global wealth and health might be attributed to the earlier industrialization of Europe and North America. It might be written off to the inescapably stochastic character of history. Either story might be plausible except for the strong evidence that colonialism *purposefully* enriched some territories in direct proportion to the extent other territories were impoverished. Walter Rodney (1973) famously expressed the point: Europe underdeveloped Africa. Kenneth E. Bauzon would suggest extending this point. The United States underdeveloped Mexico, Central America, South America, and parts of the Pacific rim.

A burgeoning body of academic argument strongly suggests that 19th century colonialism was not brought to an end between about 1950 and 1985 as former colonies achieved independence from European powers. When political scientists and global historians look at the history of “decolonization,” they offer a less emancipatory story. On this account, there is an uninterrupted line from the end of the Habsburg Empire to the World Trade Organization (WTO). (For a recent example, see Slobodian 2018.) The kind of neo-liberal globalization promoted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the WTO is a direct descendent of 19th century imperialism. The upshot is that the *longue durée* did not see what Paul Kennedy (1987) once described as “the rise and fall of the great powers.” As COVID-19 vaccine distribution starkly shows, the great powers never really fell, even if former colonizers (especially the UK) like to tell themselves stories about the end of empire. All that really changed was how global power is exerted. The so-called “decolonization” period did not mark the end of colonialism but rather its restructuring. The metropole-colony model of the 19th century underwent a great transformation into the neoliberal globalization model of the late 20th century.

Between 1918 and 1995, colonialism was rebuilt, not dismantled. The putatively invisible hand of the market was protected and entrenched using the visible hand of national and international law, framed in neo-Hobbesian terms. In Colonialism 2.0, the global expansion of capitalist markets has been achieved by implementing laws and regulations to guarantee the “fair” treatment of global capital (Gil and Clair 2014; Nicol 2010). The new global system of trade rules effectively insulates economic relations from popular accountability. This was realized ideologically, in part, by developing the notion that economics is a science akin to physics, thereby naturalizing capital (Mirowski 1989). It was entrenched organizationally by the development of national and global institutions that protect capital from democratic oversight, institutions now run mainly by

economists (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). The end result has been an international juridical framework of trade regulation, international banking, and corporate governance managed by supposedly expert elites that can, more often than not, run roughshod over local taxation regimes, labor protections, land holding, and environmental regulations.

Bauzon's *Capitalism, The American Empire and Neoliberal Globalization* adds to this line of thinking by focusing on the US contribution to the expansion of capitalism from the early 19th century into the 20th century. Potted histories of the United States often tell a story of the 13 Colonies overthrowing odious and onerous British colonial taxation to form "a more perfect union" based on principles of liberty and freedom for the benefit of "we the people." Given the title of his book, it is not unexpected that Bauzon wholly rejects this well-worn national hagiography. Insofar as this is a history of the United States, by self-admission, it mirrors Howard Zinn's *A People's History of the United States* (1980). The emphasis of Bauzon's discussion is to sketch the imperial expansion of the United States into the Pacific. This is in contrast to more standard historical accounts that take the US's expansionist ambitions to have strict "continental" or "hemispheric" limits.

The 1823 Monroe Doctrine may seem purely hemispheric by pushing back on Russian, Spanish, Portuguese, and British interventions in North and South America. But this in no way precluded the US having its own imperial interest in the Pacific. Likewise, the concept of "manifest destiny" that emerged around 1845 aspired to the acquisition of Mexican territory after the annexation of Texas. Yet again such a nebulous notion need not have continental limits. The Tyler Doctrine of 1841 should not be overlooked. It opposed any European occupation of Hawai'i, thus clearly signaling US interest and intent in acquiring the islands.

The US had clear imperial ambitions in the Pacific from the earliest days of the Republic. The United States undertook exploratory forays into the Pacific rim well before its continental interior had been conquered. When the US Navy was formed in 1838, its first mission was to assess the possibilities for Pacific expansion as far as the Fiji Islands. That first imperial foray would ultimately lead to the occupation of the Philippines between 1898 and 1946. Arguably, the US's long-standing imperial sentiments fed into George Kennan's doctrine of communist containment which ended up drawing the US into the Vietnam War (or, from the other side, the Vietnamese War of Independence) between about 1954 and 1975.

On Bauzon's account, the underlying model for the US's exploitative colonialism in the Pacific and the Americas was its experience of settler-colonialism. The brutal American-Indian Wars were undertaken to "eradicate Indian resistance to Federal forces" (Bauzon, 67). From this experience, the US learned the basic lesson of colonization: vicious barbarity is the most efficient means to overwhelm opposition to the will of the state and capital. It then became a standing *modus operandi*. Overt and deliberate brutality was used to suppress the Philippine revolution against US occupation. Indeed, the "water cure"—a prototype of the "water boarding" torture technique used by the US at Abu Ghraib and

Guantanamo—was pioneered during the Philippine campaign. The same brutality has been manifested repeatedly in subsequent US conflicts in Central and South America, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

An immediate rejoinder to this way of seeing US military invention might be to claim that war by its very nature is a brutal undertaking. Bauzon rejects this kind of response, arguing that it elides the key point that US military violence and economic expansion is deeply informed by racism. The recurrent brutality exhibited by the US in foreign conflicts is not merely part of warfare but is “racialized state violence” learned from the practice of settler-colonialism (Bauzon, 151).

The so-called American-Indian Wars, which only ended in 1924, were not wars in the sense of a series of battles between combatants. Millions of Indigenous American Indians and whole communities were not wiped out in battles. US state and federal troops, as well as mobs of armed citizen militias, systematically savaged men, women, and children and burned villages. This was nothing other than state-sanctioned domestic terrorism with a deliberate genocidal intent. Once cultivated and normalized domestically, the same savagery could be turned outward as the US expanded into the Pacific. The first US Navy expedition to the Fiji Islands, undertaken by Commodore Charles Wilkes, involved hostage taking, blood-drenched beaches, and burned villages. Many years later, the brief Spanish-American War ended with the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which effectively transferred the remnants of Spain’s overseas empire to the United States. Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines all became, in one way or another, imperial possessions of the US. The US stepped into Spain’s role as colonial master, claiming that the local populations were unprepared for self-governance. The path to further brutality was cleared by reinterpreting the US Constitution so that its declared rights are applicable only to US citizens and not the inhabitants of the newly occupied territories. Cuban and Filipino revolutionaries who resisted US occupation and rule were killed as “insurgents.” Millions of Filipinos were killed by US soldiers in acts of so-called “pacification” by means of “depopulation.”

This part of Bauzon’s argument is both compelling and illuminating, though frequently disturbing. The overall argument would have been helped if it had been buttressed by a greater discussion of how US militarism in the Pacific was connected to its commercial interests and how those commercial interests were distinctly shaped by capitalism. The dark history of US imperial companies, like the United Fruit Company in Central America, is familiar, but how US corporate power expanded into the Philippines is more obscure. It also would have been interesting to learn the details of how Bauzon connects US Pacific imperialism to its operations in the Pacific “theatre” of the Second World War and also to the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In this context, it would have been helpful to read how racism and imperialism contributed to the justification for the dropping of not just one but two atomic bombs on Japan as well as the use of the Marshall Islands for atomic bomb testing. Unfortunately, the book does not build on its four core chapters to present a detailed account of US Pacific imperialism. Instead, the book’s other chapters (four in total) offer a variety of less developed claims about capitalism, neoliberalism, the Cold War, the state of contemporary social theory, global inequality, post-colonialism, and climate change.

Frustratingly, these chapters read more like a collection of disparate polemics than a well worked-out academic argument.

The shortcoming of these chapters is their propensity to offer sweeping theoretical claims that are problematic and supported by evidence that is often merely suggestive. For example, the book opens by situating US imperialism and hegemony in Enlightenment social and political theory, which Bauzon claims (for the most part) “rationalized colonialism” and served as “a vehicle to assert the universality of Enlightenment values” (5). He then offers the startling assertion that the “Enlightenment and its relationship to empire has, unfortunately, eluded generations of critical scholarly scrutiny” (5). Bauzon is right that the antiquated Enlightenment historiography of Ernst Cassirer and Peter Gay entirely neglected the way philosophes made the white, bourgeois, European male a transhistorical universal. Nevertheless, his broad claim is difficult to square with the large and still growing literature on the relationship between the Enlightenment and empire. Notable contributions include Jennifer Pitts’ 2006 *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* and Thomas McCarthy’s 2012 *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*. There are also comprehensive edited volumes, for example, Katrin Flischuh and Lea Ypi’s 2014 *Kant and Colonialism* and Sankar Muthu’s 2012 wide-ranging *Empire and Modern Political Thought*. The role of Enlightenment values in the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) also probably deserves some discussion.

Several chapters later, Bauzon inveighs against the current state of academic social and political theory. His main charge is that Cold War conflict studies and game theory abstracted “conflict,” idealizing it as just two people with different preferences engaged in a utilitarian calculus. This sterile account of conflict “de-fanged and de-Marxified conflict theory” by leading theorists away from the analysis of concrete, in-the-world class conflict (Bauzon, 194). At one point, Bauzon decries “mainstream academics” who gave “blessing and endorsement” to the “suppression of liberation struggles.” He then observes, without even a hint of irony, that, “producers and purveyors of supposedly value-free knowledge, in fact, promote their own preferred ideological presuppositions” (194). This claim is hardly innovative. In the 1980s, there were at least two book-length studies of this issue in the disciplines of political science and history (Ricci 1984 and Novick 1988). But so far as Bauzon’s argument is concerned, it is not clear why the reader should accept its claims as something other than yet another expression of preferred ideological presuppositions. He does not engage with the excellent literature detailing how Cold War strategy transformed the very idea of rationality. (See, for example: Amadae 2003, Amadae 2016, Mirowski 2002 and Erickson 2013.) Instead, he controversially asserts that structural-functionalist approaches and systems theory accounts of society are “dominant paradigms” that are “status quo affirming” and have “conservative predispositions” (Bauzon, 192). This generality is difficult to accept without significant caveats. Were the radical systems theorists who constructed Chile’s Cybersyn as an alternative model of economic management in the 1970s simply committed to conserving the status quo? (Medina 2011)

Bauzon might be right that, within the social sciences, structuralism is coming back into vogue after post-structuralist extravagances. This point cannot be accepted as *prima facie*, however. It would require an argument rather than a set of

assertions to show that structuralism is currently dominant or even that it is intrinsically conservative. He mentions Talcott Parsons and Bronislaw Malinowski who may or may not be conservative. It isn't clear why either exemplifies structuralism. Early canonical structuralists like Claude Levi-Strauss and Roland Barthes were clearly anti-colonialist and neither seems conservative in any usual sense. Bauzon only buttresses his position with the strident claim that prevailing social theory has "traces of organismic and mechanistic principles drawn from Darwin and Newton" (191-192). This repeats the common error that Newtonianism is mechanistic—gravity's action-at-a-distance was spooky theism, not Cartesian mechanism. Further, as Piers J. Hale argues, Darwin's ideas came to be aligned with a variety of political standpoints, some liberal but others socialist (Hale 2014).

These omissions (and commissions) might be overlooked since, as the book's subtitle suggests, this is not written to be a comprehensive history of the US empire in the Pacific or a detailed analysis of the present state of social and political theory. The book is more of an exercise in comparative literature broadly informed by the ideas of the polymath E. San Juan, Jr. Both San Juan and Bauzon are Filipino intellectuals for whom the struggle to liberate the Philippines from US colonial occupation is present, and raw. San Juan is still writing and his many works span English literature, Gramscian Marxism, colonialism and post-colonialism, racism and cultural studies. Almost all his work has the lived experience of US colonialism in the Philippines as its background. Bauzon's book is peppered with references to and quotes from San Juan's writing on racism, revolution, and post-colonialism. Unfortunately, Bauzon never discusses San Juan's contribution in a unified or systematic way. Presumably, this is explained by the somewhat vague gesture at "themes and annotations" from San Juan.

Bauzon's overarching argument seems much indebted to San Juan's observation that: "the messianic impulse to genocide springs from the imperative of capital accumulation—the imperative to reduce humans to commodified labor-power, to saleable goods or services" (77). Bauzon underscores the role of racism in linking labor commodification to genocide, but there is a crucial argument here that never seems to be fully articulated. The various practices of racializing specific peoples make it much easier to *class* them as objects of brutality. Skin, because it is literally superficial, must be aligned with some claim of deeper, subcutaneous deficiency: intellectual inferiority, moral degeneracy, or a lack of the political agency needed for self-government. While ultimately spurious and ungrounded, deficiency claims are buttressed and sustained by political rhetoric, literary portrayals, social and political theory and even the natural sciences. Deficiency, or some combination of deficiencies, is then taken as licensing various brutal subjugations: impoverishment, slavery, conscription, incarceration, or extermination. At this point, what began as a mere surface has been entrenched as a very ugly and pernicious nominal essence. The same mechanism of deficiency works all too easily and efficiently with gender as well, a point that does not seem to be addressed by Bauzon, though it is addressed by San Juan in *Filipina Insurgency: Writing Against Patriarchy in the Philippines* (1999).

It is because race is used to class people, and then that classification is used to mobilize the brutality of settler and extractive colonialism, that class is much too important to be ignored or sidelined. This may be the underlying reason

Bauzon rails against “the displacement of class” in the social sciences (192). Racial classification licenses brutality, brutality enables colonialism, and colonialism is an indispensable part of capitalism, if not capitalism itself. For Bauzon as well as San Juan, it is a grievous historical error to miss these connections. Colonialism was never merely an addendum or appendage to capitalism. As even non-Marxist economic historians acknowledge, global colonial empires emerged by trade, plunder, and settlement before cottage manufactures and factory industry. In the British case, the so-called “triangle trade” of the 17th century arguably provided the capital required to intensify agricultural production, making a dislocated, precarious pool of labor available for industrial-scale exploitation. (Consider, for example: Davies 1973 and Andrews, 1984.) For this historical reason, Bauzon is bewildered by fellow Marxists Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt who open *Empire* (2000) by saying, “Empire is materializing before our eyes” and go on to argue that, “with the global market and global circuits of production has emerged a global order, a new logic and structure of rule” (qtd in Bauzon, 11). For Bauzon, this kind of claim is historically oblivious, and unforgivably so. There is nothing new about empire. He takes further issue with Hardt and Negri for ignoring the US’s imperial history. They fail to recognize or acknowledge that the “United States is an empire in its own right, history and motives” and by so doing they “absolve it of any culpability, and by identifying abstractly the network of global neoliberal institutions ... they also fail to assign proper blame” (Bauzon, 13). Bauzon urges recognition of “the deliberate and sustained drive of the US empire for expansion and hegemony, an empire that is neither accidental or abstract” (255). For Bauzon, it is nonsensical to argue that a new style of capitalist empire has emerged after some period of decolonization. Without empire and without colonialism, capitalism simply is not. Since capitalism continues, so does colonialism. In other words, Lenin was wrong. Imperialism isn’t the highest stage of capitalism, capitalism simply is imperialism full stop.

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Biography

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Review of *Post-Millennial Palestine: Literature, Memory, Resistance* Edited by Rachel Gregory Fox and Ahmad Qabaha

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Syrine Hout



Fox, Rachel Gregory, and Ahmad Qabaha, eds. *Post-Millennial Palestine: Literature, Memory, Resistance*. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2021), 248 pages.

Coinciding with the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the protests that continued to sweep across the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, the past decade has seen a growing number of English-language studies dealing with Palestinian literature. Some scholars trace specific genres, like the short story or the novel, as aesthetic and political creations in relation to pivotal moments in Palestinian history—the 1948 Nakba, the 1967 Naksa, the 1987-93 First Intifada, and the 2000-05 Second Intifada (Farag 2016; Abu-Manneh 2016)—while others examine Palestinian writings in conjunction with other media (film) or national literatures (American, Israeli) within wider theoretical frameworks, such as postcolonial feminism, diasporic studies, or world literature (Ball 2012; Qabaha 2018; Lustig 2019). Much more scholarship is in the pipeline, as seen in the notes on the contributors to *Post-Millennial Palestine: Literature, Memory, and Resistance*. This edited volume of ten essays is a welcome and timely contribution to this critical corpus. Its most unique feature is its focus on mainly 21st century literary productions by second- or third-generation survivors of the Nakba; relatively new writers who are equally yet differently invested in the cause and idea of Palestine when compared to canonical authors such as Mahmoud Darwish, Emile Habibi, Fadwa Tuqan, Samira Azzam, and Ghassan Kanafani, to mention but a few. *Post-Millennial Palestine* takes as its starting point the derailed Oslo Accords of 1993, which could not but have induced a contemporary sensibility and poetics in the face of the failed peace process and the relentless encroachment on Palestinian land in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, accompanied by daily violations of the human and political rights of the occupied. This collection was published only a few months before the latest assault on Gaza in May 2021, a tragic event which, in cities around the world, triggered enormous shows of solidarity with Palestinians, as well as a renewed commitment to their just cause for statehood (whether through a one-state or a two-state solution).

The hyphen in the title of this collection is significant, one that can be viewed in connection with that in “post-colonial.” While all Arab nations regained their independence from British, French, or Italian colonial rule in the middle decades of the last century, Palestine was forcibly taken over by British-supported Israeli settlers who declared it a Zionist state in May 1948, resulting in the displacement of over 750,000 native inhabitants. Since decolonization, intellectuals and cultural workers from countries neighboring Palestine have had ample time to digest their various traumas by narrativizing their respective (r)evolutions in complex yet sufficiently linear trajectories in which the once oppressed become *post-colonial* subjects. Sudanese author Tayeb Salih’s *Season of Migration to the North* (1966) is a case in point.

No such “fusion” of past, present, and future has been possible for Palestinians whose lives continue to be punctured by loss but also by various expressions of resistance (*muqawama*) and steadfastness (*sumud*). The inability—for lack of sufficient time—to make or see events somehow congeal so that they may be interwoven into a more coherent national narrative is perhaps best illustrated by the announcement of the Third Intifada on three occasions: in 2008, 2012, and 2015. In line with earlier authors and scholars, here the contributors assert that the Nakba is an ongoing event that forces Palestinians, both those who never left and those in the diaspora, to remain inside this inaugural rupture, thus (re)experiencing the catastrophe every day. Paradoxically, however, since the Second Intifada—marking the turn of the third millennium that witnessed more visible power relations (the Separation Wall constructed in 2002) but also a greater global awareness (the launching of the BDS Movement in 2005)—(pro-) Palestinian writers and artists have had to contrive new mode(l)s of both remembering and reimagining this open wound, an act signaled by the hyphen in “post-millennial.” Collectively, they showcase Paul Ricœur’s definition of anamnesis, an intentional act of re-remembering (*remémoration*) required to activate a future-oriented historical (and legal) claim. To varying degrees, they exhibit what Carol Fadda-Conrey dubs a translocal consciousness that connects the here and there, the then and now, the personal and the political, the real and the remembered/imagined (2014, 108). More than any other literary corpus, the Palestinian one resembles Janus, the Roman god with one face looking forward and another looking backward.

In his foreword to *Post-Millennial Palestine*, Bashir Abu-Manneh explains why Palestinian texts, many of which are either diasporic or by non-Palestinians, are multilingual, written mostly in Arabic and in English, but also in other European languages. Yet, he gives examples of only Arabo- and Anglophone ones. He argues that writings from inside and outside Palestine are complementary in charting the beleaguered entity’s common destiny. In the introduction, the two editors contend that this collection “negotiates the urgency for Palestinians to reclaim and retain their heritage in a continually unstable and fretful present” (9) with a view to the future—conforming with Ilan Pappé’s assertion that the dramatic changes on the ground after 2000 prompt “the need to look for a new conversation about Palestine” (2015, 10). In so doing, these texts display a new “language” that furnishes, pragmatically, counter-histories aimed at combating “official” narratives imposed by Israeli settler-colonialism. In this sense, Nabil Anani’s colorful *Mother’s Embrace* (featuring a Palestinian woman in a traditional

thobe hugging Jerusalem as though it was her child) on the book's cover is emblematic. Invoking Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, the editors argue further that historical incidents related to the Palestinian question are rhizomatic insofar as any new point of rupture remains relational to its historical foundations.

The volume is divided into three parts. Part I comprises four chapters on the theme of "Palestinian Archives: Catastrophe, Exile, and Life Writing." In the first chapter, Tahrir Hamdi investigates the reconfiguration of Late Style resistance, at once an attitude and an aesthetic principle, in the oeuvres of Edward Said, Mahmoud Darwish, and Mourid Barghouti, contending that these intellectuals' works foreground an "oppositional criticism in the face of divisionist agendas" (31). Marked by anger and a refusal to succumb to old age and death, this "lateness" is also practiced by contemporary authors who resist dispossession in the form of a metaphorical lateness based on an awareness of how endings (must) constitute new beginnings in the struggle for self-determination. Next, Lindsey Moore reads three memoirs—by Edward Said, his sister Jean Said Makdisi, and his mother-in-law Wadad Makdisi Cortas—within the scope of "critical Levantinism" (61) to demonstrate how each brings into relief "embedded [and] expansive models of being Palestinian," resulting from the Levant's cultural and religious syncretism, in stark contrast to Israel's ethno-nationalist logic of partition. In the following chapter, drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin's notion of a chronotope that underscores the organic relationship between time and space, Ahmad Qabaha problematizes the concept of repatriation to Palestine in the continued absence of a political solution. He does so by showing how returning home, in Ghada Karmi's 2005 memoir, sets into motion other feelings of estrangement and exile instead of turning uprootedness into reconnection. In chapter four, Sophia Brown links the surge in Palestinian life writing and oral history projects to the post-2000 memoir boom and to growing concerns, worldwide, with issues of citizenship, belonging, and human rights. This subgenre blossomed into a major branch of contemporary Palestinian literature, thanks in part to the exclusion of Palestinian refugees from the terms of the Oslo negotiations. Brown also maintains that including some of these testimonies alongside others by sympathetic non-Palestinians in English-language anthologies helps influence international public opinion and increase solidarity. Contrary to Edward Said's view, her subsequent reading of Mischa Hiller's "Onions and Diamonds" in *Seeking Palestine* (2013) distinguishes between exile as an intellectual aspiration bound up with a symbolic return and dispossession as a physical condition aiming for an actual one. In Randa Jarrar's "Imagining Myself in Palestine" in *Letters to Palestine* (2015), Brown underscores the irony inherent in the author's erasure of her presence on social media to enable an entry that is denied nonetheless. Overall, Brown maintains that anthologized short stories, by privileging specific themes and/or moments, are suitable for linking the personal to the political.

Part II, titled "Palestinian Aesthetics: Icons, Haptics, and Palimpsests," starts off with Sarah Irving's discussion of yet another genre, post-millennial Palestinian poetry, arguing that Najwan Darwish, notwithstanding his iconoclastic style in *Nothing More to Lose* (2014), is obliged nonetheless to tackle the same mythical imagery found in the work of an earlier generation of Palestinian poets. But he does so with a twist as he blends historical figures, like Jesus Christ and the 12th

century Muslim warrior Salah al-Din, with more recent references to the multiple Palestinian Intifadas. Departing from earlier poets who favored a Self-Other dichotomy, for instance between the legendary Kurdish commander and the colonizing crusaders, Darwish reworks these icons to critique both the colonizer and the colonized in order to better reflect (on) the “more complex politics of the post-Oslo generation” (115). In chapter six, Michael Pritchard zeroes in on Adania Shibli’s trauma novella *Touch* (2002), which deals with events prior to the First Intifada, with an unnamed girl taking center stage, to demonstrate how this text’s verbal design diverges from “prevailing styles of Palestinian literature that tend to privilege optical, distant, and highly contextualized narratives” (121). Instead, Shibli prioritizes the near and haptic to render a Palestine both embodied and felt. Employing Slavoj Žižek’s theories, Pritchard shows how the girl, and the text, encourage an ethical engagement on the part of the reader by delivering palpable incidents of subjective, symbolic, and systemic violence against a young person inhabiting a long-time traumatized place. Next, Rachel Gregory Fox illustrates the ways in which Susan Abulhawa’s non-linear novels—*Mornings in Jenin* (2006) and *The Blue Between Sky and Water* (2015)—function as palimpsests that cut across borders, generations, and time periods. Borrowing Laura Marks’s cinematic model of enfoldment, Fox shows how palimpsestic memories in Abulhawa’s texts oscillate between enfolding (forgetting) and unfolding (foregrounding), and how the act of return necessitates the bridging of individual and genealogical memory. With regard to Palestinian acts of remembrance, Fox maintains, like several other contributors, that the “post” in Marianne Hirsch’s definition of postmemory—like that in “post-colonial”—is again rather unique since the past continues to strongly determine both the present and the future.

Part III, titled “Palestinian Horizons: Endings and Beginnings, or Taking Flight,” begins with Nora Parr’s discussion of Arabic-language texts by Adania Shibli, Maya Abu al-Hayyat, and Mahmoud Amer, all of whom, she argues, succeed in forging a new language that is better suited to accompanying current crises. They declare an end to existing symbolic structures before heralding generation-specific visions and words to confront world politics. The only “path out of the quagmire of ‘post-’” (172), Parr argues, is for them to create new verbal tools. Next, Tom Sperlinger investigates the multiple alternatives to death and stagnation contained in the word “out” in Selma Dabbagh’s *Out of It* (2011). He shows how the novel’s different locales, Gaza, London, and an unidentified Gulf state, and distinctive modes of formal and informal education become points of hope in resisting an ongoing colonial situation. In the final chapter, Anna Ball focuses on flight in both Lisa Suhair Majaj’s diasporic poetry and Sama Alshaibi’s video art as a feminocentric poetic and political motif that “migrates creatively across generational, gendered, spatial, and formal contexts” (191). As a *movement*, it articulates national interstitialities, routes of transnational solidarity, and possible rearrivals.

The 15-page list of cited works and the nine-page index are very useful for anyone interested in this burgeoning area of both scholarly and creative output. Equally valuable are the cross-references found in most chapters. An additional chapter, however, on Palestinian writing produced in “France, Germany, and Chile” (4), for example, would have helped paint a larger and more entangled picture of the contemporary scene/market. Until a just solution is forged to end

the 73-year Israeli-Palestinian conflict, writing from and about occupied Palestine is bound to draw potential futures against the backdrop of accumulated daily nakbas; and so, until then, the fact that “Palestine” and “palimpsest” share the first three letters will remain in the minds of many a strong associative/mnemonic device. Ultimately, in a happier future, even if many do not actually return, Palestine will have returned to them.

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Review of *Music in Conflict: Palestine, Israel and the Politics of Aesthetic Production* by Nili Belkind

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Belkind, Nili. *Music in Conflict: Palestine, Israel and the Politics of Aesthetic Production*. (London and New York: Routledge, 2021), 130 pages.

The intensification of both Zionist repression and grassroots resistance across historic Palestine in May 2021 starkly contrasted Israel's indiscriminate colonial terror with a revolutionary surge of young people embracing their Palestinian roots through mass anger and political culture on the streets. Musicians were drawn into the confrontation, notably with the violent arrest of contrabassist Mariam Afifi in Jerusalem, the siege of Lydd targeting DAM and other musicians, and with Israel's aerial obliteration of the Mashariq studio in Ansar, Gaza. Highlighting the progressive nationalism at the heart of Palestinian counter-mobilizations, singer Rola Azar threw herself into leftist campaigning in Nazareth, while bands of street musicians accompanied strike action with songs of *sumud* (steadfastness) and resistance in Haifa, Ramallah, and many other locations. In Gaza, as with the Israeli bombing of the Said al-Mashal theatre in August 2018, youth have again performed Ibrahim Touqan's "Mawtini" ("My Homeland") and other anthems in the rubble. Musicians have mobilized for Palestine.

These events in themselves suggest renewed significance for research on the politics and aesthetics of Palestinian music-making, or analysis of the spaces and barriers found by performers. This book by Israeli academic Nili Belkind, however, sidesteps a "domination-resistance binary" (26) that sees progressive agency in the political and cultural movements to free Palestine, and instead strives to break down the "binary" of coexistence and national liberation (224). Examining Palestinian-Israeli musical "border-zones," Belkind aims to understand the role music-making takes in the formation of identities and communities, with chapter material built around ethnographies of performing musicianship in the occupied West Bank, Jerusalem, Yafa, and Tel Aviv. These include the Western orchestral and Indigenous musicianship of the Kamandjati project in Ramallah, the performances of '48 Palestinian vocalist Amal Murkus on Israeli platforms, and the street-level gigging of Israeli band System Ali. But by carefully

selecting certain musical narratives and silencing others, Belkind promotes collaborationist approaches to music and politics that “deconstruct Palestinian-ness,” reject the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, and reinforce the normalization of Zionist rule.

Through the history of the conflict, as Belkind terms it, “music has served to mediate the construction of competing social imaginaries in this contested land” (2). At the centre of Belkind’s narrative are a set of arguments seen here as indexing the post-Oslo era, which has given rise to a “fraught and complicated cultural politics of music-making in Palestine-Israel” (3). For Belkind, this context sparks performative imaginaries that are post-national, post-armed struggle and, as expressed through culture, have outgrown notions of resistance, *sumud*, and Palestinian national liberation. Responding to Kun’s call for theorizing the “aural border” (2005), Belkind seeks to interrogate performative space on “both sides of the border,” yet the “border” itself is largely undefined. This allows for exploration of the sometimes collaborative but usually Israeli-dominated music-making in Yafa and Jerusalem, alongside ethnographic analysis of orchestral musicianship in the West Bank, where Belkind was employed rather covertly at the Kamandjati conservatory run by Ramzi Aburedwan in Ramallah (35).

Though the stated aim of the book is to problematize the twin “tropes” of Palestinian resistance and Israeli- and Western-backed “coexistence” projects, Belkind’s advocacy clearly favours the latter. A key example is the annual oud festival in occupied Jerusalem, set up by forces allied to the Zionist mayoralty with the aim of promoting Israeli leadership of “oriental” music, claiming ownership of Middle East music traditions and reinforcing spatial domination of the colonized Palestinian capital. Narrating the 2011 festival, by which time Palestinians had led a determined and successful campaign for a boycott, Belkind focuses on Amal Murkus, who sang at the event in defiance of the calls to boycott by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel, which had labelled the event an “embodiment of Zionist cultural imperialism.”

According to Belkind’s counter-narrative, the BDS marked the point at which: “Culture became not only a resource but a harnessed weapon, the very terrain of battle” (199). Framed in this way, in direct opposition to the BDS, decades of cultural erasure, colonial theft, and the whitewashing of the outright terror visited upon musicians and other Palestinians within and outside historic Palestine, anti-colonial movements are blamed for conditions of “liminality”—actually, ethnic cleansing—and for creating “hard choices” for ’48 Palestinians in particular. That stolen pre-Nakba musical artefacts remain hidden in Zionist archives is not mentioned. In light of the re-emergence of a sense of national unity among oppressed Palestinian citizens of Israel, such arguments and omissions appear dismissive and opposed to the principled stands taken by Rola Azar, Saied Silbak, and Khaled Jubran, to name a few of the many who refuse to work within the Israeli cultural establishment. Indeed, Belkind’s response to Jubran’s denunciations of the “oud festival” are where the cracks widen in her claim to stand for a third way between coexistence and resistance:

The boycotters' appropriation of Middle Eastern culture as the sole propriety of Palestinians in Palestine-Israel negates a long history of Jewish participation in, and contributions to, Middle Eastern music (Seroussi 2010). It also positions Israel as solely the product of colonial Western interventions in the Middle East, as represented by its Ashkenazi (i.e. occidental) elite. This process of essentialization is the outcome of a national movement wanting to establish its own cohesive grand narrative. (218)

In contradistinction to a Palestinian narrative, however, Belkind highlights Israeli musicians “on the ground” whose works “blur” or “change” meanings associated with either resistance or coexistence. Among these are the Yafa-based band System Ali, whose performances are charted through the liberal Zionist “tent city” protests that accompanied the global Occupy movements of 2011. With no sense of irony—or any reference to recent intifadas, Land Days, or other mobilizations—the Tel Aviv protests became the first “sense of community, empowerment, and common purpose” seen “in decades” (157). Narrating the band’s use of Hebrew, Russian, and Arabic, Belkind misses the point that attempts to “contain all subject positions” (176) effectively shackle any opposition to Zionism itself. System Ali frequently make statements on their pride at being Israeli, accepting funding from Zionist institutions, and rejecting the pro-Palestine stand taken by DAM (189).

At one point, we read an anecdote about the System Ali concert in Tel Aviv “tent city” interrupted by a man holding a Palestinian flag and “yelling.” The reader does not learn what he was “yelling.” In an earlier chapter on West Bank concerts under occupation, world renowned Palestinian oud player and supporter of the resistance, Ahmed al-Khatib, isn’t given a surname and we don’t hear from him either. During sections on Kamandjati leader Aburedwan, Belkind repeats tropes critiqued by Willson, whose work describes his presentation to European audiences as playing “the civilised man among barbarians,” through insistence that his instrument represented an alternative to violence (Willson 2013, 286). In Belkind, the contradictions of Western-funded NGOization remain unexplored, while US “goodwill” gestures like sending Israeli musicians on West Bank tours are taken at face value and opposing voices go unheard. Following ethnomusicologist Benjamin Brinner—whose work praised “Israeli-Arab” collaborations and attacked the work of Sabreen, Simon Shaheen, and even Murkus (Brinner 2009)—the narrative of Belkind promotes “the good Arab” who accepts Israeli rule, rather than one who performs openly for Palestine. Both assert that the issue is “complicated.” Yet both oppose boycotts of Israel.

Such points clarify claims made earlier in the text, where the history of Palestinian musicianship is presented statically, through what Belkind sees as a post-1967 dichotomy between “martial hymns” mixed with “indigenous (*sha’bi*) genres” (15). Drawing on McDonald’s view on the prominence of folklore amidst declining armed struggle (again, Gaza in May 2021 has overtaken them both), Belkind sees an “ideology of silence” in national liberationist politics and music, where “resistance through violence” overwhelmed “production of knowledge” (16). In her view, “resistance”—almost always in parentheses and seen as a fetish

of Western analyses rather than having any grassroots agency—equates to hegemony and the suppression of individuality (16). Likewise, *sumud* is referred to in the past tense as “mundane survival” (147), rather than as having enduring political and collective relevance. Through this standpoint, rich fields of *watani* (nationalist or patriotic) and *thawri* (revolutionary) Palestinian musicianship are elided, including broad aesthetic experiments accompanying waves of liberation struggle within Palestine and in places of exile. Intifadas of music are replaced in this narrative by “post-national” collaboration, Israeli liberalism, and Western orchestral projects whose class privilege and European-bought curricula are never discussed.

The language employed by Belkind is worthy of attention. Reporting unproblematically on Israel’s oud festival allows repeated reference to Jerusalem as a “contested” city in the midst of a “violent conflict,” while the Kamandjati concert aimed at “sounding Palestine in disputed territory.” At no point does the reader learn that Jerusalem is occupied; uncoincidentally, Belkind works at Hebrew University, built on stolen land in East Jerusalem. Through this casual narrative, Israeli violence and blockade of Gaza is seen as a “response” to both the intifada (3) and Hamas (9), while 1948 can be reinscribed as a war of “independence” (9). Elsewhere in the book, Belkind speaks about the “sense of exile” of ’48 Palestinians but doesn’t describe the material realities of economic, political, and cultural apartheid faced by those from families internally displaced in 1948. Significantly, the important theme of normalization largely appears in parentheses. Despite pleas to undermine resistance-coexistence binaries, the language of the colonizer fundamentally shapes the narrative.

Palestinian voices are, in reality, few and far between in this text, and in Brinner’s, and are highlighted largely when they favour accommodation with Israel and work in opposition to BDS. Important musical figures like Ahmad al-Khatib and the influential Khaled Jubran are mentioned only in passing, with their commitments to musical resistance and pro-boycott narratives dismissed or, in the case of al-Khatib, totally ignored.

Alternatives to Belkind’s liberal Zionist position on politics and musical aesthetics are found in the forms of national unity and political creativity springing to life during the new uprising. With the explosion of solidarity over the colonizations of Sheikh Jarrah and Silwan, the onslaught on Gaza, and in facing down internal state terror, grassroots musical expressions have ranged from the nationalized *tarab* of Nai Bargouthi’s *Raj’een* (We’re Returning), to makeshift street versions of Walid Abdisalam’s 1980s socialist anthem *Nzilna ‘al-Shawarya* (We Went Down to the Streets), while rapper Daboor depicts in vivid terms the bullets of Sheikh Jarrah.

As artist Fadi Wahsha, son of *buzug* player Rami, lay dying after being shot in the head by Israeli occupying forces in Ramallah, troops of the same battalions videoed themselves singing Mohammad Assaf’s *Dammi Falastini* (My Blood is Palestinian), changing its words to *Dammi Israeli*. Culture and music remain weapons in the war between the colonized and the imperialist-backed colonizer. The Palestinian counterattack needs to be amplified, not obfuscated.

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Biography

Louis Brehony is an activist, musician and scholar of culture and politics in Palestine and the Arab world. His work includes the 2020 film *Kofia: A Revolution Through Music*, currently on international release, and the forthcoming book *Strings of the Street*, on Palestinian musicianship and resistance in exile.

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